101 KiB
External chat and email conversations — agent access
Product map: chat-channels.
Feature ID: chat-channels.
Review date: 2026-10-26. Source base: a1f77821b9cd5c9c846fdf7a0fa5cc620ad2b6bb; implementation: #17737.
Connection operations reviewed in this working tree. The inventory was reconciled against production UI clients, REST registrations and service entry points; it is a review checklist, not a runtime registry. Authorization and evidence contract. Fixture evidence is separate from live provider qualification and from empirical LLM success. Source-only entries have a reviewed agent path or an explicit boundary, but do not claim an individually executed HTTP test.
providers
Capability ID: chat-channels/providers.
Review: operation-reviewed.
get-companies-chat-endpoints
API: present — GET /api/companies/{companyId}/chat-endpoints; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-companies-chat-endpoints
API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/chat-endpoints; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: verified — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. Authenticated fixtures passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
Verification: passed — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
get-chat-endpoints
API: present — GET /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: verified — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. Authenticated fixtures passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
Verification: passed — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
get-companies-chat-slack-setup-options
API: present — GET /api/companies/{companyId}/chat-slack/setup-options; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-chat-endpoints-slack-managed-authorize
API: present — POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/slack/managed/authorize; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-chat-endpoints-slack-managed-provision
API: present — POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/slack/managed/provision; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
delete-companies-chat-slack-manager-grants
API: present — DELETE /api/companies/{companyId}/chat-slack/manager-grants/{grantId}; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
get-chat-slack-managed-oauth-callback
API: present — GET /api/chat-slack/managed/oauth/callback; browser/provider/MCP protocol.
Agent access: restricted — browser authentication return.
Policy: Provider state/signature or gateway-token verification, company and resource binding; browser returns require the configuring human. Agent-issued durable gateway tokens retain both issuer and responsible-user authority.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
post-chat-endpoints-slack-registration
API: present — POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/slack/registration; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-chat-endpoints-slack-install
API: present — POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/slack/install; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
get-chat-slack-oauth-callback
API: present — GET /api/chat-slack/oauth/callback; browser/provider/MCP protocol.
Agent access: restricted — browser authentication return.
Policy: Provider state/signature or gateway-token verification, company and resource binding; browser returns require the configuring human. Agent-issued durable gateway tokens retain both issuer and responsible-user authority.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
get-chat-endpoints-github-configuration
API: present — GET /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/configuration; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: verified — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. Authenticated fixtures passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
Verification: passed — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
put-chat-endpoints-github-configuration
API: present — PUT /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/configuration; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: verified — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. Authenticated fixtures passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
Verification: passed — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
post-chat-endpoints-github-verify
API: present — POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/verify; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: verified — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. Authenticated fixtures passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
Verification: passed — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
put-chat-endpoints-github-progress
API: present — PUT /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/progress; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
get-chat-endpoints-github-personal-connections
API: present — GET /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/personal-connections; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-chat-endpoints-github-people-lookup
API: present — POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/people/lookup; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-chat-endpoints-github-registration
API: present — POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/registration; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: verified — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. Authenticated fixtures passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
Verification: passed — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
post-chat-endpoints-github-registration-restart
API: present — POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/registration/restart; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
put-chat-endpoints-github-draft
API: present — PUT /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/draft; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-chat-endpoints-github-setup
API: present — POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/setup; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-chat-endpoints-github-app
API: present — POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/app; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: verified — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. Authenticated fixtures passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
Verification: passed — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
post-chat-endpoints-github-repositories-refresh
API: present — POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/repositories/refresh; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: verified — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. Authenticated fixtures passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
Verification: passed — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
get-chat-endpoints-github-repositories
API: present — GET /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/repositories; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
put-chat-endpoints-github-repositories-access
API: present — PUT /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/repositories/access; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
patch-chat-endpoints
API: present — PATCH /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: verified — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. Authenticated fixtures passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
Verification: passed — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
post-chat-endpoints-photon-inspect
API: present — POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/photon/inspect; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-chat-endpoints-setup
API: present — POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/setup; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: verified — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. Authenticated fixtures passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
Verification: passed — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
post-chat-endpoints-setup-secret
API: present — POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/setup-secret; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
get-chat-endpoints-resources
API: present — GET /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/resources; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
put-chat-endpoints-resources
API: present — PUT /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/resources; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
get-companies-email-connections
API: present — GET /api/companies/{companyId}/email/connections; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: verified — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. Authenticated fixtures passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
Verification: passed — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
post-companies-email-connections
API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/email/connections; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: verified — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. Authenticated fixtures passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
Verification: passed — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
post-companies-email-connections-inspect
API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/email/connections/{connectionId}/inspect; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-companies-email-connections-check-address
API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/email/connections/{connectionId}/check-address; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
get-companies-email-inboxes
API: present — GET /api/companies/{companyId}/email/inboxes; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — existing REST/native runtime tool or scoped gateway client, as documented by the linked route.
Policy: Existing run-bound tool, scoped credential lease, execution policy, or assigned-email-agent checks; connection-management grants do not bypass these controls.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-companies-email-inspect
API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/email/inspect; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-companies-email-inboxes
API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/email/inboxes; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
get-companies-email-deliveries
API: present — GET /api/companies/{companyId}/email/deliveries/{publicationId}; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — existing REST/native runtime tool or scoped gateway client, as documented by the linked route.
Policy: Existing run-bound tool, scoped credential lease, execution policy, or assigned-email-agent checks; connection-management grants do not bypass these controls.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
identity
Capability ID: chat-channels/identity.
Review: operation-reviewed.
post-chat-endpoints-github-identity
API: present — POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/identity; JSON REST.
Agent access: restricted — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
post-chat-endpoints-github-identity-start
API: present — POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/identity/start; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: verified — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. Authenticated fixtures passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
Verification: passed — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
Gaps: Provider fixtures do not qualify live provider setup or availability.
post-chat-endpoints-github-identity-confirm
API: present — POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/identity/confirm; JSON REST.
Agent access: restricted — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
get-chat-endpoints-principals
API: present — GET /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/principals; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-chat-endpoints-principals-link-intent
API: present — POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/principals/{principalId}/link-intent; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
delete-chat-endpoints-principals-link
API: present — DELETE /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/principals/{principalId}/link; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-chat-identity-links-confirm
API: present — POST /api/chat-identity-links/confirm; JSON REST.
Agent access: restricted — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
post-chat-identity-links-request-access
API: present — POST /api/chat-identity-links/request-access; JSON REST.
Agent access: restricted — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
get-chat-identity-links-preview
API: present — GET /api/chat-identity-links/preview; JSON REST.
Agent access: restricted — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
get-api-chat-github-manifest-callback
API: present — GET /api/chat-github/manifest/callback; browser/provider/MCP protocol.
Agent access: restricted — browser authentication return.
Policy: Provider state/signature or gateway-token verification, company and resource binding; browser returns require the configuring human. Agent-issued durable gateway tokens retain both issuer and responsible-user authority.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
get-api-chat-github-cloud-callback
API: present — GET /api/chat-github/cloud/callback; browser/provider/MCP protocol.
Agent access: restricted — browser authentication return.
Policy: Provider state/signature or gateway-token verification, company and resource binding; browser returns require the configuring human. Agent-issued durable gateway tokens retain both issuer and responsible-user authority.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
get-api-chat-github-identity-callback
API: present — GET /api/chat-github/identity/callback; browser/provider/MCP protocol.
Agent access: restricted — browser authentication return.
Policy: Provider state/signature or gateway-token verification, company and resource binding; browser returns require the configuring human. Agent-issued durable gateway tokens retain both issuer and responsible-user authority.
Evidence: verified — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above. Authenticated fixtures passed with database persistence and actual bearer/session middleware.
Verification: passed — deterministic provider fixtures / local assembled server; no live provider qualification.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
conversation
Capability ID: chat-channels/conversation.
Review: operation-reviewed.
get-chat-endpoints-github-review-detail
API: present — GET /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/reviews/{reviewId}; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user. Linked task and project visibility apply to every review row in addition to endpoint and credential visibility.
Evidence: verified — production-authenticated integration fixture with real database persistence and deterministic provider responses where required.
Verification: passed — Actual agent-key reads return the visible review and omit or return 404 for a review linked to an inaccessible private task. Real database persistence; no live GitHub call.
Gaps: Fixture evidence does not qualify live provider behavior or an empirical model success rate.
get-chat-endpoints-github-reviews
API: present — GET /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/github/reviews; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user. Linked task and project visibility apply to every review row in addition to endpoint and credential visibility.
Evidence: verified — production-authenticated integration fixture with real database persistence and deterministic provider responses where required.
Verification: passed — Actual agent-key reads return the visible review and omit or return 404 for a review linked to an inaccessible private task. Real database persistence; no live GitHub call.
Gaps: Fixture evidence does not qualify live provider behavior or an empirical model success rate.
get-chat-endpoints-conversations
API: present — GET /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/conversations; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-chat-endpoints-conversations-publications
API: present — POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/conversations/{conversationId}/publications; JSON REST.
Agent access: restricted — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
get-chat-endpoints-conversations-publications-status
API: present — GET /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/conversations/{conversationId}/publications/{publicationId}/status; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:use; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
get-issues-chat-binding
API: present — GET /api/issues/{issueId}/chat-binding; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections, responsible-user ceiling, task privacy, endpoint resource scope and target-agent visibility.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-api-chat-webhooks
API: present — POST /api/chat-webhooks/{publicId}/{provider}; provider webhook ingress.
Agent access: not-applicable — provider-signed inbound events; agent keys and gateway tokens cannot authenticate this route.
Policy: The provider verifies the payload signature and binds the endpoint/company. The request has no agent principal.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Provider ingress has no agent invocation path. Provider signature validation remains required.
post-companies-email-send
API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/email/send; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — existing REST/native runtime tool or scoped gateway client, as documented by the linked route.
Policy: Existing run-bound tool, scoped credential lease, execution policy, or assigned-email-agent checks; connection-management grants do not bypass these controls.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
get-companies-email-tasks
API: present — GET /api/companies/{companyId}/email/tasks/{issueId}; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — existing REST/native runtime tool or scoped gateway client, as documented by the linked route.
Policy: Existing run-bound tool, scoped credential lease, execution policy, or assigned-email-agent checks; connection-management grants do not bypass these controls.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-api-chat-webhooks-agentmail
API: present — POST /api/chat-webhooks/agentmail/{publicId}; provider webhook ingress.
Agent access: not-applicable — provider-signed inbound events; agent keys and gateway tokens cannot authenticate this route.
Policy: The provider verifies the payload signature and binds the endpoint/company. The request has no agent principal.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Provider ingress has no agent invocation path. Provider signature validation remains required.
Monitor publication lineage uses the admitted wake and its source run's matching
set_task_monitor receipt, including company, task, immutable agent, requester,
and scheduled time. A source ID in context cannot grant publication. The normal
delivery worker rechecks current endpoint and sender authority. Database fixtures
exercise lineage and finalization recovery; live Slack qualification remains
separate.
Publication, provider-reply, and form-open 403/permission errors fail the rejected operation without removing unrelated assigned channel tools. Confirmed authentication failures still put the endpoint in attention, which blocks tool admission and provider sends; connection enabled intent is retained. Known resource denials and explicit revocation keep their narrower or installation-wide stops. PostgreSQL provider fixtures verify discovery after 403 and rejection after 401, including signed installation removal after a 401; they do not establish live GitHub credential recovery.
GitHub publication recovery (2026-10-14): assigned-agent submit_review, comment,
and update_comment calls reuse their run-, task-, endpoint-, and argument-bound
publication on an exact retry. Identity uses the complete durable request rather
than the shortened audit preview. A changed suffix, changed nested entry, or
missing publication cannot authorize another write. Exact retries only read the
receipt; the worker owns pending provider retries. Fresh gateway policy and provider authority remain
required. The durable worker resumes transient failures after restart and stops
at its retry cap, revoked authority, or a superseded head. A pending receipt is
not task completion. Source:
publication service and
gateway. Verification uses
PostgreSQL-backed provider fixtures; this entry does not claim live provider
qualification for the new retry path.
GitHub main-response identity (2026-10-19): PR requests share a company-, App-, repository- and PR-bound comment. Agents still supply no comment destination. Current sender, assignee, repository and publication authority are checked before edits, including maintenance failure notices. Leading mentions for another recipient are filtered before task work; explicit mentions of this bot still follow normal access checks. Provider-fixture coverage is not live GitHub proof. Native terminal reconciliation resolves the accepted run identity through the existing chat provenance resolver; an older run's reply cannot complete a newer request merely because both requests share the same PR comment.
Speko browser sessions use POST /api/companies/{companyId}/voice-sessions,
with GET inspection/notification and POST /{sessionId}/end operations below
that collection. These routes require board identity; ordinary agent credentials
cannot start a private voice session. Start and notification also require the
experimental chat-connectors gate. Signed provider callbacks use the separate
voice-webhook routes and their session capability. Evidence: source-only —
voice routes. No live browser answer
retrieval or telephone playback is established by the UI fixtures.
Slack's Require at-mention policy applies to channel messages and channel thread replies, including queued work. DMs are exempt from mention checks; endpoint availability, Allow direct messages, and sender authorization still apply. Top-level DM replies retain their linear conversation destination. Source: admission and queued run policy. Live Slack verification of this exemption remains separate from provider-fixture coverage.
Slack eyes acknowledge the authorized task/comment commit before attachment preparation or scheduler acceptance. This server-owned receipt grants no agent authority. Generation/credential fencing, durable retries and exact-source final cleanup still apply. PostgreSQL fixtures block attachments, subscription and wakeup independently to verify that none gates the reaction; live Slack latency remains a separate check. See receipt worker.
Controller-owned receipt reactions accept the SDK's empty thread timestamp for linear DMs. Channel IDs and source message timestamps remain validated. This does not add an agent tool or change sender, task, or credential authorization. The pinned SDK transport regression is covered in receipt tests; live acknowledgement speed needs a separate provider test.
Slack assignment and tool discovery bound concurrent endpoint preparation to two. Every endpoint keeps the live task, company, agent and linked-user checks; 403 denials omit only that endpoint. Preparation waits for both active checks before it returns an ordered result or propagates an error. Tool authority reads the current bot token without resolving unrelated webhook credentials. See the real-database preparation controls and batch failure controls. These local controls do not establish live Slack latency or provider access.
Native tool gateways use the durable run task binding for discovery and policy checks, with legacy JSON task fields as a fallback. GitHub and Slack follow accepted request provenance across task continuations. GitHub can retain the originating conversation after a board follow-up from the same accepted user. An inherited origin cannot cross a task, agent, company, or requester boundary. Cycle checks reject invalid history without a fixed limit on valid continuations. Endpoint settings, linked identity, tool profiles, and invocation policy still apply on each call. The native tool contract rotates older provider sessions so an empty retained catalog is not reused. PostgreSQL fixtures cover discovery, review publication, Slack reads, and revocation in channel integration and provenance controls. The voice gateway fixture also verifies durable task binding for a later personal callback invocation. Failure replies cannot replace final answers inherited from an earlier run. These fixtures do not prove live provider delivery.
Catalog authorization projection (2026-10-17): tool discovery uses the same live service-owned task, company, agent, requester, endpoint and credential checks as full authority resolution. It omits the revision digest and search-action token, which catalog descriptors do not consume. Connector assignments and governed operations retain full revision resolution; invocation policy is still checked by the gateway. Registry replacement and missing-service controls are in authority registration tests. This is a source and local-database contract; hosted latency needs live evidence.
New conversations resolve typed project/workspace defaults from their endpoint and destination under the task-creation transaction. Defaults do not authorize private sources: admission checks the linked user's authority and assigned agent. An existing conversation keeps its task binding. See creation service and defaults contract.
post-voice-sessions
API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/voice-sessions; JSON REST.
Agent access: operator-only — the private voice caller must be an authenticated board user (or local operator); agent bearer credentials are rejected.
Policy: Company access and the service's current caller/session/endpoint authority apply. Browser start, notification, and callback preferences also require experimental chat connectors. Private microphone access, callback preferences, and incoming-call approval remain human identity/consent steps; connection-management grants do not impersonate that caller.
Evidence: source-only — voice routes, reviewed in this working tree.
Verification: not-run — verify the board caller's own state and reject agent, wrong-user, and foreign-company calls. No live telephone or browser audio qualification is claimed.
Gaps: This is an explicit human boundary. Authorized agents configure the underlying connection through its endpoint API; the human controls private calling and incoming-call consent.
get-voice-session
API: present — GET /api/companies/{companyId}/voice-sessions/{sessionId}; JSON REST.
Agent access: operator-only — the private voice caller must be an authenticated board user (or local operator); agent bearer credentials are rejected.
Policy: Company access and the service's current caller/session/endpoint authority apply. Browser start, notification, and callback preferences also require experimental chat connectors. Private microphone access, callback preferences, and incoming-call approval remain human identity/consent steps; connection-management grants do not impersonate that caller.
Evidence: source-only — voice routes, reviewed in this working tree.
Verification: not-run — verify the board caller's own state and reject agent, wrong-user, and foreign-company calls. No live telephone or browser audio qualification is claimed.
Gaps: This is an explicit human boundary. Authorized agents configure the underlying connection through its endpoint API; the human controls private calling and incoming-call consent.
get-voice-notification
API: present — GET /api/companies/{companyId}/voice-sessions/{sessionId}/notification; JSON REST.
Agent access: operator-only — the private voice caller must be an authenticated board user (or local operator); agent bearer credentials are rejected.
Policy: Company access and the service's current caller/session/endpoint authority apply. Browser start, notification, and callback preferences also require experimental chat connectors. Private microphone access, callback preferences, and incoming-call approval remain human identity/consent steps; connection-management grants do not impersonate that caller.
Evidence: source-only — voice routes, reviewed in this working tree.
Verification: not-run — verify the board caller's own state and reject agent, wrong-user, and foreign-company calls. No live telephone or browser audio qualification is claimed.
Gaps: This is an explicit human boundary. Authorized agents configure the underlying connection through its endpoint API; the human controls private calling and incoming-call consent.
get-voice-report
API: present — GET /api/companies/{companyId}/voice-sessions/{sessionId}/report; JSON REST.
Agent access: operator-only — the private voice caller must be an authenticated board user (or local operator); agent bearer credentials are rejected.
Policy: Company access and the service's current caller/session/endpoint authority apply. Browser start, notification, and callback preferences also require experimental chat connectors. Private microphone access, callback preferences, and incoming-call approval remain human identity/consent steps; connection-management grants do not impersonate that caller.
Evidence: source-only — voice routes, reviewed in this working tree.
Verification: not-run — verify the board caller's own state and reject agent, wrong-user, and foreign-company calls. No live telephone or browser audio qualification is claimed.
Gaps: This is an explicit human boundary. Authorized agents configure the underlying connection through its endpoint API; the human controls private calling and incoming-call consent.
attachments
Capability ID: chat-channels/attachments.
Review: operation-reviewed.
get-issues-attachments
API: present — GET /api/issues/{id}/attachments; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and native search_api / call_api for the attachment list.
Policy: Current company membership and task read/privacy authority. Connection management grants do not replace task access.
Evidence: source-only — asset routes.
Verification: not-run — list attachments with actual agent authentication and deny a foreign or private task.
Gaps: This operation has source review, not current-head HTTP verification.
post-companies-issues-attachments
API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/issues/{issueId}/attachments; multipart upload.
Agent access: partial — agent REST upload; native attachment tools and register_deliverable use their admitted resource paths and server-owned chat delivery. JSON-only call_api does not upload multipart content.
Policy: Task mutation/privacy authority, company/resource bounds, storage limits, and admitted native tool scope. Server-owned delivery does not grant endpoint administration.
Evidence: source-only — asset routes and native authority.
Verification: not-run — upload through an admitted agent path, inspect the stored task attachment and outbound delivery, and deny a foreign task.
Gaps: Multipart upload is not a JSON native API call. Live chat file delivery remains unqualified by this connection setup audit.
post-chat-endpoints-publications-replay
API: present — POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/publications/{publicationId}/replay; JSON REST.
Agent access: restricted — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
post-chat-endpoints-publications-resolve
API: present — POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/publications/{publicationId}/resolve; JSON REST.
Agent access: restricted — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
post-chat-endpoints-actions-resolve
API: present — POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/actions/{actionId}/resolve; JSON REST.
Agent access: restricted — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
post-companies-email-deliveries-resolve
API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/email/deliveries/{publicationId}/resolve; JSON REST.
Agent access: restricted — human connection manager records the outcome of an uncertain external delivery. Agents use normal governed send/status operations.
Policy: Existing run-bound tool, scoped credential lease, execution policy, or assigned-email-agent checks; connection-management grants do not bypass these controls.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
lifecycle
Capability ID: chat-channels/lifecycle.
Review: operation-reviewed.
post-chat-endpoints-slack-test-message
API: present — POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/slack/test-message; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:use; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user. Test messages and identity-link invitations consume normal action-policy rate limits once before dispatch; saved request receipts prevent duplicate sends.
Evidence: verified — production-authenticated integration fixture with real database persistence and deterministic provider responses where required.
Verification: passed — Actual agent-key requests honor Off/Allowed policy, consume the configured one-message quota, replay a saved request without another send, and deny distinct test/invitation requests after the quota. Provider responses are fixtures.
Gaps: Fixture evidence does not qualify live provider behavior or an empirical model success rate.
post-chat-endpoints-slack-resume
API: present — POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/slack/resume; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-chat-endpoints-test
API: present — POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/test; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-chat-endpoints-finish
API: present — POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/finish; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
get-chat-endpoints-test-status
API: present — GET /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/test-status; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
get-chat-endpoints-activity
API: present — GET /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/activity; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:view_audit; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-chat-endpoints-deliveries-replay
API: present — POST /api/chat-endpoints/{endpointId}/deliveries/{deliveryId}/replay; JSON REST.
Agent access: restricted — existing human setup or approval surface; agent can identify the saved setup and inspect the result.
Policy: Human consent, identity confirmation, action approval, or trusted-host administration. This endpoint does not delegate human identity or self-approval to an agent.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: Agent invocation is denied by the stated policy. The authorized human or operator must perform this step; this entry does not claim delegated execution.
post-email-inboxes-control
API: present — POST /api/email/inboxes/{endpointId}/control; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
post-email-inboxes-reconnect
API: present — POST /api/email/inboxes/{endpointId}/reconnect; JSON REST.
Agent access: available — agent REST and default native search_api / call_api.
Policy: tools:manage_connections; shared management policy. Resolved resources and every affected target are checked; personal ownership remains the responsible user.
Evidence: source-only — route; reviewed in the working tree based on the source commit above.
Verification: not-run — individual operation not executed in this audit; shared authorization and representative family flows are exercised by the authenticated integration suite. Follow the route schema, inspect persistence/audit, and assert owner, scope and revoked-authority denial.
Gaps: This individual operation has source review but no recorded HTTP verification. Provider availability and live setup remain unqualified.
GitHub review summary headings use the bot display name. Checks remain independently scoped by GitHub App and endpoint/PR/commit identity.
After publishing a review, native agents can report yielded with
response_wake and no attention requests. Current conversation authorization
is checked again at commit. The task remains in review without a human card;
real human dependencies retain the ordinary attention-request path. A timed
wait requires a confirmed set_task_monitor schedule. Database coverage lives
in external-chat-wait.integration.test.ts; this is not live model evidence.
post-voice-end
API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/voice-sessions/{sessionId}/end; JSON REST.
Agent access: operator-only — the private voice caller must be an authenticated board user (or local operator); agent bearer credentials are rejected.
Policy: Company access and the service's current caller/session/endpoint authority apply. Browser start, notification, and callback preferences also require experimental chat connectors. Private microphone access, callback preferences, and incoming-call approval remain human identity/consent steps; connection-management grants do not impersonate that caller.
Evidence: source-only — voice routes, reviewed in this working tree.
Verification: not-run — verify the board caller's own state and reject agent, wrong-user, and foreign-company calls. No live telephone or browser audio qualification is claimed.
Gaps: This is an explicit human boundary. Authorized agents configure the underlying connection through its endpoint API; the human controls private calling and incoming-call consent.
get-voice-callbacks
API: present — GET /api/companies/{companyId}/voice-callbacks/{endpointId}; JSON REST.
Agent access: operator-only — the private voice caller must be an authenticated board user (or local operator); agent bearer credentials are rejected.
Policy: Company access and the service's current caller/session/endpoint authority apply. Browser start, notification, and callback preferences also require experimental chat connectors. Private microphone access, callback preferences, and incoming-call approval remain human identity/consent steps; connection-management grants do not impersonate that caller.
Evidence: source-only — voice routes, reviewed in this working tree.
Verification: not-run — verify the board caller's own state and reject agent, wrong-user, and foreign-company calls. No live telephone or browser audio qualification is claimed.
Gaps: This is an explicit human boundary. Authorized agents configure the underlying connection through its endpoint API; the human controls private calling and incoming-call consent.
put-voice-callbacks
API: present — PUT /api/companies/{companyId}/voice-callbacks/{endpointId}; JSON REST.
Agent access: operator-only — the private voice caller must be an authenticated board user (or local operator); agent bearer credentials are rejected.
Policy: Company access and the service's current caller/session/endpoint authority apply. Browser start, notification, and callback preferences also require experimental chat connectors. Private microphone access, callback preferences, and incoming-call approval remain human identity/consent steps; connection-management grants do not impersonate that caller.
Evidence: source-only — voice routes, reviewed in this working tree.
Verification: not-run — verify the board caller's own state and reject agent, wrong-user, and foreign-company calls. No live telephone or browser audio qualification is claimed.
Gaps: This is an explicit human boundary. Authorized agents configure the underlying connection through its endpoint API; the human controls private calling and incoming-call consent.
get-voice-phone
API: present — GET /api/companies/{companyId}/voice-phone/{endpointId}; JSON REST.
Agent access: operator-only — the private voice caller must be an authenticated board user (or local operator); agent bearer credentials are rejected.
Policy: Company access and the service's current caller/session/endpoint authority apply. Browser start, notification, and callback preferences also require experimental chat connectors. Private microphone access, callback preferences, and incoming-call approval remain human identity/consent steps; connection-management grants do not impersonate that caller.
Evidence: source-only — voice routes, reviewed in this working tree.
Verification: not-run — verify the board caller's own state and reject agent, wrong-user, and foreign-company calls. No live telephone or browser audio qualification is claimed.
Gaps: This is an explicit human boundary. Authorized agents configure the underlying connection through its endpoint API; the human controls private calling and incoming-call consent.
put-voice-phone
API: present — PUT /api/companies/{companyId}/voice-phone/{endpointId}; JSON REST.
Agent access: operator-only — the private voice caller must be an authenticated board user (or local operator); agent bearer credentials are rejected.
Policy: Company access and the service's current caller/session/endpoint authority apply. Browser start, notification, and callback preferences also require experimental chat connectors. Private microphone access, callback preferences, and incoming-call approval remain human identity/consent steps; connection-management grants do not impersonate that caller.
Evidence: source-only — voice routes, reviewed in this working tree.
Verification: not-run — verify the board caller's own state and reject agent, wrong-user, and foreign-company calls. No live telephone or browser audio qualification is claimed.
Gaps: This is an explicit human boundary. Authorized agents configure the underlying connection through its endpoint API; the human controls private calling and incoming-call consent.
get-voice-incoming
API: present — GET /api/companies/{companyId}/voice-phone/{endpointId}/incoming; JSON REST.
Agent access: operator-only — the private voice caller must be an authenticated board user (or local operator); agent bearer credentials are rejected.
Policy: Company access and the service's current caller/session/endpoint authority apply. Browser start, notification, and callback preferences also require experimental chat connectors. Private microphone access, callback preferences, and incoming-call approval remain human identity/consent steps; connection-management grants do not impersonate that caller.
Evidence: source-only — voice routes, reviewed in this working tree.
Verification: not-run — verify the board caller's own state and reject agent, wrong-user, and foreign-company calls. No live telephone or browser audio qualification is claimed.
Gaps: This is an explicit human boundary. Authorized agents configure the underlying connection through its endpoint API; the human controls private calling and incoming-call consent.
post-voice-incoming-decision
API: present — POST /api/companies/{companyId}/voice-phone/{endpointId}/incoming/{callId}; JSON REST.
Agent access: operator-only — the private voice caller must be an authenticated board user (or local operator); agent bearer credentials are rejected.
Policy: Company access and the service's current caller/session/endpoint authority apply. Browser start, notification, and callback preferences also require experimental chat connectors. Private microphone access, callback preferences, and incoming-call approval remain human identity/consent steps; connection-management grants do not impersonate that caller.
Evidence: source-only — voice routes, reviewed in this working tree.
Verification: not-run — verify the board caller's own state and reject agent, wrong-user, and foreign-company calls. No live telephone or browser audio qualification is claimed.
Gaps: This is an explicit human boundary. Authorized agents configure the underlying connection through its endpoint API; the human controls private calling and incoming-call consent.
get-voice-phone-history
API: present — GET /api/companies/{companyId}/voice-phone/{endpointId}/history; JSON REST.
Agent access: operator-only — the private voice caller must be an authenticated board user (or local operator); agent bearer credentials are rejected.
Policy: Company access and the service's current caller/session/endpoint authority apply. Browser start, notification, and callback preferences also require experimental chat connectors. Private microphone access, callback preferences, and incoming-call approval remain human identity/consent steps; connection-management grants do not impersonate that caller.
Evidence: source-only — voice routes, reviewed in this working tree.
Verification: not-run — verify the board caller's own state and reject agent, wrong-user, and foreign-company calls. No live telephone or browser audio qualification is claimed.
Gaps: This is an explicit human boundary. Authorized agents configure the underlying connection through its endpoint API; the human controls private calling and incoming-call consent.
get-voice-history
API: present — GET /api/companies/{companyId}/voice-history/{endpointId}; JSON REST.
Agent access: operator-only — the private voice caller must be an authenticated board user (or local operator); agent bearer credentials are rejected.
Policy: Company access and the service's current caller/session/endpoint authority apply. Browser start, notification, and callback preferences also require experimental chat connectors. Private microphone access, callback preferences, and incoming-call approval remain human identity/consent steps; connection-management grants do not impersonate that caller.
Evidence: source-only — voice routes, reviewed in this working tree.
Verification: not-run — verify the board caller's own state and reject agent, wrong-user, and foreign-company calls. No live telephone or browser audio qualification is claimed.
Gaps: This is an explicit human boundary. Authorized agents configure the underlying connection through its endpoint API; the human controls private calling and incoming-call consent.
outbound-email
Capability ID: chat-channels/outbound-email.
Review: baseline.
API: present — GET /api/companies/{companyId}/email/inboxes; POST /api/companies/{companyId}/email/send for both send/reply; GET /api/companies/{companyId}/email/tasks/{issueId}; GET /api/companies/{companyId}/email/deliveries/{publicationId}. Administrative uncertain-outcome resolution uses POST /api/companies/{companyId}/email/deliveries/{publicationId}/resolve.
Agent access: partial — the assigned agent can use the email REST/CLI path with its actual active run and admitted email.send/email.reply policy. Board writers use their own credential authority. Availability of a CLI or scenario email tool does not establish that a native run has that tool binding or generic fallback admitted.
Policy: Agent sends require ownership of the inbox and source task, task read access, an available agent within budget, a running task run that owns execution/checkout, standard work mode, and no restricted external execution. Active endpoint, connection, credential access, and email.send/email.reply policy are rechecked. Authenticated board sends require active company membership and credential access; viewer sends additionally require instance-admin status. Local implicit authority skips the membership check. Agent reads retain task/inbox/company checks; board thread/delivery reads use the route’s company-access boundary. Delivery resolution requires board tools:manage_connections or existing elevated operator authority, not ordinary agent access.
Evidence: source-only — reviewed at 9ef434fe79c57d976b8b03b14c5242db270b8320. Email CLI, request schema, email routes, and email authority/publication.
Verification: not-run — Use the actual permitted writer and run to create one child/publication, confirm recipient delivery and an exact-message reply, and repeat idempotent requests without duplicate sends. Assert run/owner/mode/budget/company/credential/attachment denials and separate read access. Inspect the provider before resolving an unknown write outcome; a 202 or queued publication alone is not proof of delivery.
Gaps: Real AgentMail transport, recipient delivery, and each native tool binding still need live proof. Controlled provider receipts and inbound-reply recipes do not establish a newly initiated external email journey.