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https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip.git
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## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - The Docker image persists all instance state (project checkouts, worktrees, run logs, uploads) under `PAPERCLIP_HOME`, and deployments mount a volume there for durability > - The entrypoint starts as root and drops privileges to the `node` user, but it fixes `PAPERCLIP_HOME` ownership only when it remaps the user's UID/GID > - A freshly mounted volume arrives root-owned and shadows the image's build-time `chown`, so a default-UID boot drops privileges onto an unwritable home and the server crashes on its first `mkdir` > - This pull request makes the entrypoint probe the home's ownership and chown whenever it does not match the runtime user, before the privilege drop > - The benefit is that the image works out of the box on any platform-managed volume, with the common already-correct boot staying chown-free ## Linked Issues or Issue Description No public issue exists — describing the bug inline (per the bug report template). **What happened?** Running the image with a freshly created volume mounted at `/paperclip` (a Docker named volume, a Kubernetes PV, or any platform-managed volume) and the default `USER_UID`/`USER_GID` crashes on boot: `Error: EACCES: permission denied, mkdir '/paperclip/instances/default/logs'`. **Expected behavior** The container boots and initializes its instance tree on the mounted volume, exactly as it does when `/paperclip` is the image's own (build-time chowned) directory. **Steps to reproduce** 1. `docker volume create paperclip-data` 2. `docker run -v paperclip-data:/paperclip ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip:<any current tag>` 3. Observe the EACCES crash on the first `mkdir` under `/paperclip`. **Root cause** `scripts/docker-entrypoint.sh` chowns `/paperclip` only inside its UID/GID remap branch (`changed=1`). A fresh volume mount is root-owned and shadows the image's build-time `chown node:node /paperclip`; with the default 1000:1000 no remap happens, so no chown happens, and `gosu node` drops onto an unwritable home. **Paperclip version or commit:** reproduces on `master` and any published image. **Deployment mode:** any; observed on managed-cloud volume mounts and reproducible with plain Docker named volumes. **Installation method:** Docker image (`ghcr.io/paperclipai/paperclip`). **Related PRs (dedup search):** no open or merged PR touches the entrypoint ownership logic; the entrypoint's privilege-handling tests were added previously and this extends them. No duplicate found. ## What Changed - `scripts/docker-entrypoint.sh`: the remap-conditional `chown` is replaced by an ownership probe — after any UID/GID remap, the entrypoint stats `PAPERCLIP_HOME` (default `/paperclip`) and runs `chown -R node:node` only when the owner does not match the runtime user, before `exec gosu node`. Covers fresh root-owned mounts and trees written under a previous UID mapping; the already-correct boot performs no chown. The unprivileged (non-root start) branch is unchanged. - `server/src/__tests__/docker-entrypoint.test.ts`: `stat` stub added to the harness; new cases for the fresh root-owned mount with default UID/GID and for `PAPERCLIP_HOME`-relative probing; the remap case now models the post-remap ownership mismatch. ## Verification - `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/docker-entrypoint.test.ts` — 7 passed (5 existing behaviors unchanged, 2 new). - Live on a managed deployment: a container that crash-looped with the EACCES above boots cleanly once the home is chowned before the drop (the same effect this entrypoint change produces; forced there by a UID remap as an interim workaround). ## Risks - Low. Behavior changes only for boots where `PAPERCLIP_HOME` exists with mismatched ownership — exactly the boots that crash today. `chown -R` on a large previously-mismatched tree adds one-time boot latency; correctly-owned homes skip it entirely. Kubernetes restricted / OpenShift non-root starts keep the existing exec-directly path untouched. ## Model Used Claude Fable 5 (`claude-fable-5`, Anthropic; Claude Code CLI with extended thinking and tool use; tests executed locally via Vitest). ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above (no duplicates; extends the existing entrypoint privilege tests) - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge
172 lines
6.8 KiB
TypeScript
172 lines
6.8 KiB
TypeScript
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
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import { execFile } from "node:child_process";
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import { mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
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import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
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import { dirname, join } from "node:path";
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import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
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import { promisify } from "node:util";
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const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile);
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/**
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* Behavioral tests for scripts/docker-entrypoint.sh privilege handling.
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*
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* The entrypoint must support two deployment shapes with one image:
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* - Docker Compose: container starts as root, remaps the node user to
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* USER_UID/USER_GID and drops privileges via gosu.
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* - Kubernetes restricted PodSecurity / OpenShift arbitrary UIDs: the
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* container starts non-root, where neither the remap nor gosu can work,
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* so the command must be exec'd directly (with a warning on mismatch).
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*
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* The system commands (id, usermod, groupmod, chown, gosu) are stubbed via
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* PATH so the branching logic runs unmodified on any host.
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*/
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const ENTRYPOINT = join(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "..", "..", "..", "scripts", "docker-entrypoint.sh");
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let stubDir: string;
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let logFile: string;
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function writeStub(name: string, body: string) {
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const path = join(stubDir, name);
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writeFileSync(path, `#!/bin/sh\n${body}\n`, { mode: 0o755 });
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}
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function installStubs(ids: { uid: number; gid: number; nodeUid?: number; nodeGid?: number; homeMismatch?: boolean }) {
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writeStub(
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"id",
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[
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`if [ "$1" = "-u" ] && [ "$2" = "node" ]; then echo ${ids.nodeUid ?? 1000};`,
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`elif [ "$1" = "-g" ] && [ "$2" = "node" ]; then echo ${ids.nodeGid ?? 1000};`,
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`elif [ "$1" = "-u" ]; then echo ${ids.uid};`,
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`elif [ "$1" = "-g" ]; then echo ${ids.gid};`,
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`else echo 0; fi`,
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].join("\n"),
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);
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for (const cmd of ["usermod", "groupmod", "chown"]) {
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writeStub(cmd, `echo "${cmd} $*" >> "${logFile}"`);
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}
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// The entrypoint's ownership probe is a first-mismatch find over the app
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// home. An empty result models a fully node-owned tree (image-baked dir,
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// healthy volume); a path models any uid OR gid mismatch anywhere in the
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// tree (fresh root-owned mount, root-owned descendant, stale group after
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// a GID-only remap).
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writeStub("find", ids.homeMismatch ? `echo "$1/mismatched-entry"` : `true`);
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writeStub("gosu", `echo "gosu $*" >> "${logFile}"\nshift\nexec "$@"`);
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}
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async function runEntrypoint(env: Record<string, string> = {}) {
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const result = await execFileAsync("sh", [ENTRYPOINT, "echo", "ENTRYPOINT-CMD-RAN"], {
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env: { PATH: `${stubDir}:${process.env.PATH}`, ...env },
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});
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const calls = existsSync(logFile) ? readFileSync(logFile, "utf8") : "";
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return { stdout: result.stdout, stderr: result.stderr, calls };
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}
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beforeEach(() => {
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stubDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "entrypoint-stubs-"));
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logFile = join(stubDir, "calls.log");
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});
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afterEach(() => {
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rmSync(stubDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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});
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describe("docker-entrypoint.sh", () => {
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it("keeps the root-start gosu flow with default UID/GID (Docker Compose)", async () => {
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installStubs({ uid: 0, gid: 0 });
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const { stdout, calls } = await runEntrypoint();
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expect(stdout).toContain("ENTRYPOINT-CMD-RAN");
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expect(calls).toContain("gosu node echo ENTRYPOINT-CMD-RAN");
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expect(calls).not.toContain("usermod");
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expect(calls).not.toContain("chown");
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});
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it("remaps the node user and chowns /paperclip before gosu when root requests a different UID/GID", async () => {
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// The stubbed node uid stays 1000 while the stat probe reports the old
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// ownership, modelling the post-remap mismatch that must trigger chown.
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installStubs({ uid: 0, gid: 0, homeMismatch: true });
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const { stdout, calls } = await runEntrypoint({ USER_UID: "1001", USER_GID: "1001", PAPERCLIP_HOME: stubDir });
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expect(stdout).toContain("ENTRYPOINT-CMD-RAN");
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expect(calls).toContain("usermod -o -u 1001 node");
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expect(calls).toContain("groupmod -o -g 1001 node");
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expect(calls).toContain(`chown -R node:node ${stubDir}`);
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expect(calls).toContain("gosu node echo ENTRYPOINT-CMD-RAN");
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});
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it("chowns a root-owned home before gosu even with the default UID/GID (fresh volume mount)", async () => {
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// A freshly mounted volume arrives root-owned and shadows the image's
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// build-time chown; with no remap requested the old entrypoint dropped
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// privileges onto an unwritable home and the server crashed on its
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// first mkdir.
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installStubs({ uid: 0, gid: 0, homeMismatch: true });
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const { stdout, calls } = await runEntrypoint({ PAPERCLIP_HOME: stubDir });
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expect(stdout).toContain("ENTRYPOINT-CMD-RAN");
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expect(calls).toContain(`chown -R node:node ${stubDir}`);
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expect(calls).not.toContain("usermod");
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expect(calls).toContain("gosu node echo ENTRYPOINT-CMD-RAN");
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});
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it("repairs ownership on a GID-only remap (stale group on persisted descendants)", async () => {
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installStubs({ uid: 0, gid: 0, homeMismatch: true });
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const { calls } = await runEntrypoint({ USER_GID: "1001", PAPERCLIP_HOME: stubDir });
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expect(calls).toContain("groupmod -o -g 1001 node");
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expect(calls).toContain(`chown -R node:node ${stubDir}`);
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});
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it("keeps a fully node-owned tree chown-free (no per-boot recursive chown)", async () => {
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installStubs({ uid: 0, gid: 0, homeMismatch: false });
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const { calls } = await runEntrypoint({ PAPERCLIP_HOME: stubDir });
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expect(calls).not.toContain("chown");
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expect(calls).toContain("gosu node echo ENTRYPOINT-CMD-RAN");
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});
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it("honours PAPERCLIP_HOME for the ownership probe", async () => {
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installStubs({ uid: 0, gid: 0, homeMismatch: true });
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const { calls } = await runEntrypoint({ PAPERCLIP_HOME: stubDir });
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expect(calls).toContain(`chown -R node:node ${stubDir}`);
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});
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it("execs directly and silently when already running as the requested user (restricted PodSecurity)", async () => {
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installStubs({ uid: 1000, gid: 1000 });
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const { stdout, stderr, calls } = await runEntrypoint();
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expect(stdout).toContain("ENTRYPOINT-CMD-RAN");
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expect(stderr).toBe("");
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expect(calls).toBe("");
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});
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it("execs directly with a warning for an arbitrary non-root UID (OpenShift-style)", async () => {
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installStubs({ uid: 1234, gid: 1234 });
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const { stdout, stderr, calls } = await runEntrypoint();
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expect(stdout).toContain("ENTRYPOINT-CMD-RAN");
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expect(stderr).toContain("running unprivileged as 1234:1234; cannot remap to requested 1000:1000");
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expect(calls).toBe("");
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});
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it("execs directly with a warning on a non-root GID mismatch", async () => {
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installStubs({ uid: 1000, gid: 1001 });
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const { stdout, stderr, calls } = await runEntrypoint();
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expect(stdout).toContain("ENTRYPOINT-CMD-RAN");
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expect(stderr).toContain("running unprivileged as 1000:1001; cannot remap to requested 1000:1000");
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expect(calls).toBe("");
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});
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});
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