Files
PaperClipAI/packages/shared/src/app-definitions.ts
T
DottaandPaperclip 4d90634f74 feat(connections): add 1Password service-account connector (#17249)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip lets people manage AI agents and govern their access to
outside services.
> - Apps connections keep provider credentials in the instance vault and
mediate every action through grants, policies, and audit.
> - Agents currently have no Apps connection for reading or managing
1Password items with an operator-supplied service-account token.
> - 1Password supports this through its official SDK; its documentation
MCP server does not expose vault operations.
> - This pull request adds a one-field service-account connection and
registers eight reviewed SDK actions through the existing
native-provider catalog.
> - Operators can select vault permissions in 1Password and agent/action
access in Paperclip without installing a CLI or handing durable
credentials to agents.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Related: #16144 adds 1Password as Paperclip's secret-storage backend.
This PR adds the separate Apps/tool-access flow with a per-connection
credential; it does not change secret providers or use a server-wide
ambient token.

**Subsystem affected**
Apps catalog, native tool-provider registry, and shared connection
setup.

**Problem or motivation**
People need to paste their own `OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN`, find official
service-account setup instructions, and authorize agents to use the
selected vaults through ordinary Paperclip governance.

**Proposed solution**
Add `1password/service-account`, with a password field labeled **Paste
your 1Password Service Account token** and a link to [1Password's
creation
instructions](https://www.1password.dev/service-accounts/get-started#create-a-service-account).
Use the pinned official `@1password/sdk` 0.5.0 for vault/item listing,
item and secret-reference reads, and item create/update/archive/delete.

**Alternatives considered**
A remote MCP card would not provide vault access. A local CLI or a
third-party MCP package adds installation and credential surfaces that
the official SDK avoids.

## What Changed

- Added the source and generated catalog definition, permission review,
official light/dark artwork, documentation, and capability-map
references.
- Added a provider-owned SDK bridge with strict schemas, account-domain
validation, contract hashes, fixed errors, bounded output, and
disposable workers with cancellation/deadlines.
- Registered the provider through master's native-provider catalog;
existing setup, health, discovery, gateway, policy, and audit owners
remain in place.
- Labeled the single password field **Paste your 1Password Service
Account token**. The shared formatter preserves explicit credential
prompts; ordinary key labels retain their existing presentation.
- Added credential-ownership, gateway read/write, policy/revocation,
worker, setup UI, and interactive Storybook coverage.

## Verification

- Final review follow-up: added two deterministic worker-entry tests for
nested exact-token redaction and oversized-output rejection. Removing
each guard caused exactly its regression test to fail. The focused
provider suite passed **15 tests**, and the official server typecheck
passed after rebuilding stale workspace SDK artifacts. Current head
`569cb7f9bd57db791fb13a6034ce69bf50878cb1` passed the full [CI
run](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/40016166260),
including typecheck, build, unit/integration tests, and all eight
browser shards. The required `ci / verify` and `ci / e2e` gates passed.
[Greptile](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/17249#issuecomment-6353731805)
and [Paperclip
Review](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/17249#issuecomment-6372165895)
each rated this exact head **5/5**, with no open findings. Paperclip
Review completed with a neutral check because its scoped reviewer could
not inspect CI; the full CI result was verified separately. Other
neutral checks and intentionally skipped Storybook jobs contain no
actionable findings.
- CI recovery on the same commit: the first attempt lost six jobs. Five
logged simultaneous runner shutdowns at 18:49 UTC on 2026-10-23; the
sixth stopped logging before a test result and its root cause was not
established. No assertion failure appeared in the retrieved logs. All
six jobs and the aggregate gates passed one failed-job retry. [CI
run](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/40005754936).
- Copy follow-up: the catalog, provider, and setup UI suites passed
**275 tests**. The governed gateway lifecycle passed **3 tests** (one
live-only test skipped), including create, update, archive, and delete.
UI token gates and map checks passed. The branch was rebased onto
`9c442cf48e` to resolve additive catalog conflicts while retaining the
Vercel and Supabase entries. The existing live write proof below remains
applicable; this follow-up changes presentation only.
- Five affected suites, including the existing Daytona consumer, passed
**290 tests** (one opt-in live test skipped in fixture mode). Full `pnpm
-r typecheck` and `pnpm build` passed. The local broad-suite attempt
could not complete because PostgreSQL semaphore exhaustion prevented a
competing integration suite from starting; the complete affected-file
retry passed after disposable-process cleanup. The prior commit
`f208a8aff6dc28859cc3f343497e18d85f124579` passed the complete CI
matrix. All CI build, typecheck, test, and browser gates also passed on
the earlier commit `9e2f3d3140368a08da43b004b2e8d3a0f4c0fa4d`. The
separate Paperclip Review reported a worker-result regression-test gap
on that head; the follow-up above addresses it. Its review thread is
resolved, and both fresh current-head reviews are clean as recorded
above.
- Token gates, module boundaries, brand validation, map checks, and
Storybook catalog checks passed.
- Direct SDK create/archive/delete and rejected-call coverage passed (13
provider tests); the Storybook Permissions/Test play completed
successfully in Chromium. Server and UI typechecks passed after those
fixes. Greptile passed prior commit
`9e2f3d3140368a08da43b004b2e8d3a0f4c0fa4d` at **5/5**. Both reviewers
also passed the worker-test follow-up at **5/5** as recorded above.
- Live 1Password proof on 2026-10-22: connect, eight-action discovery,
vault listing through an actual run-scoped gateway, refresh, reconnect
preserving identity, another read, removal, and denial through the
retained session passed. Credential absence was asserted in
responses/audit; an exact-token scan of inspected logs and changed files
passed.
- Real browser: Connectors → 1Password → token entry → personal access
limited to one disposable agent → completion → Permissions → Test
`onepassword_list_vaults` succeeded. The disposable connection was
removed afterward.
- Compiled-worker smoke initially exposed inherited Node launch flags.
Workers now use explicit empty `execArgv`; the compiled worker then
authenticated successfully and listed one vault.
- Live write proof on **2026-10-23**: the replacement Keychain token
passed all eight actions through the actual run-scoped gateway for both
personal and shared credentials. The test created, listed, read,
updated, resolved a secret from, archived, and deleted two synthetic
items. Both were absent from subsequent item lists. Refresh/reconnect,
identity preservation, removal, retained-session denial, and credential
absence passed. The live suite passed **3 tests** (one fixture-only test
skipped) in 116.65 seconds. The expanded fixture suite passed **3
tests** (one live-only test skipped); the 13 provider tests and server
typecheck passed. An exact-token scan passed over 64 source/log files.
- Failure history: the original token denied creation on 2026-10-22 and
created no item. The first 2026-10-23 attempt stopped before provider
calls because host PostgreSQL semaphore limits prevented test-database
startup. A temporary ten-connection test profile allowed the complete
retry to pass without changing shared services or host limits. A new
delete-result assertion also exposed an outdated fixture response
(`success` instead of `deleted`); the fixture was corrected and the
complete fixture suite passed.

Official contract sources: [service
accounts](https://www.1password.dev/service-accounts/get-started),
[SDKs](https://www.1password.dev/sdks), [item
management](https://www.1password.dev/sdks/manage-items), [official
JavaScript SDK](https://github.com/1Password/onepassword-sdk-js).

## Risks

- Authorized item/secret reads intentionally return secret values to the
agent and ordinary tool-result history. Select trusted agents and use
restricted service-account vaults; the connection token itself is
redacted.
- New connections retain existing Paperclip action defaults, including
Allowed writes/destructive actions for selected agents. 1Password still
enforces the token's permissions.
- Service-account access cannot be changed in place. Create a
replacement account and reconnect to change vault permissions; read-only
keys can connect but cannot write.
- SDK authentication happens per action in a disposable worker. Calls
have a 30-second maximum; cancellation stops local work, while a
mutation already accepted by 1Password can still finish. Writes are
never automatically retried.
- Additive dependency and catalog change; no database migration.
Disable/remove the connection to withdraw access, or remove the provider
from catalog visibility for rollback.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, based on GPT-6, with code editing, shell/browser tools,
and live provider verification. A more specific runtime model ID and
context-window limit were not exposed in this session.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-23 13:27:33 -07:00

295 lines
10 KiB
TypeScript

import { APP_DEFINITIONS } from "./app-definitions.generated.js";
import { SELF_SERVE_MCP_CANDIDATES } from "./self-serve-mcp-research.js";
import type { AppDefinition, ConnectionMethodDef, FieldDef } from "./types/app-definition.js";
import type { ToolConnectionOwnership } from "./types/tool-access.js";
export const CONNECTABLE_APP_SLUGS = new Set([
"anthropic", "openai", "openrouter", "xai", "google", "bedrock",
"responses-api", "messages-api", "chat-completions-api", "local",
"agentmail",
"browser-use-cloud",
"daytona",
"unikraft",
"vercel",
"1password",
"cognee",
...SELF_SERVE_MCP_CANDIDATES.map((entry) => entry.slug),
"monday",
"enterpret",
"zapier",
"arcade",
"executor",
"slack",
"notion",
"paperclip-notebook",
"railway",
"posthog",
"linear",
"google-sheets",
"context7",
"shopify",
"composio",
"gmail",
"google-drive",
"google-docs",
"google-slides",
"google-calendar",
"google-chat",
"google-people",
"google-workspace-search",
"google-workspace",
"github",
"github-code-review-bot",
"discord",
"speko",
"microsoft-teams",
"telegram",
"imessage-photon",
]);
export const CONNECTABLE_APP_DEFINITIONS = APP_DEFINITIONS.filter((app) =>
CONNECTABLE_APP_SLUGS.has(app.slug)
);
/**
* Definitions retained for existing connections and later verification, but
* intentionally withheld from the customer-facing store. Keeping visibility
* separate from recognition avoids breaking saved connections when a provider
* is pulled from Browse or reserved for a future first-party experience.
*/
export const APP_STORE_HIDDEN_SLUGS = new Set([
"beehiiv",
"brex",
"candid",
"clickup",
"coda",
"egnyte",
"embat",
"kernel",
"klaviyo",
"local-falcon",
"manufact",
"monday",
"oreilly",
"planetscale",
"razorpay",
"sanity",
"similarweb",
"ticket-tailor",
"ticktick",
"xero",
]);
export const APP_STORE_DEFINITIONS = CONNECTABLE_APP_DEFINITIONS.filter((app) =>
!APP_STORE_HIDDEN_SLUGS.has(app.slug)
);
export const DEFAULT_OWNERSHIP_AVAILABILITY: Record<ToolConnectionOwnership, boolean> = {
platform_shared: false,
platform_provisioned: false,
customer: true,
dcr: true,
};
export function getConnectableAppDefinition(slug: string): AppDefinition | null {
return CONNECTABLE_APP_DEFINITIONS.find((app) => app.slug === slug) ?? null;
}
export function getAppStoreDefinition(slug: string): AppDefinition | null {
return APP_STORE_DEFINITIONS.find((app) => app.slug === slug) ?? null;
}
export function isAppStoreVisibleSlug(slug: string | null | undefined): boolean {
return Boolean(slug && !APP_STORE_HIDDEN_SLUGS.has(slug) && CONNECTABLE_APP_SLUGS.has(slug));
}
function wildcardPatternToRegExp(pattern: string): RegExp {
const escaped = pattern.replace(/[.+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, "\\$&").replace(/\*/g, ".*");
return new RegExp(`^${escaped}$`, "i");
}
export function getAppDefinitionForUrl(
link: string,
definitions: readonly AppDefinition[] = CONNECTABLE_APP_DEFINITIONS,
): AppDefinition | null {
let normalized: string;
try {
normalized = new URL(link.trim()).toString();
} catch {
return null;
}
return definitions.find((app) =>
app.urlPatterns.some((pattern) => wildcardPatternToRegExp(pattern).test(normalized))
) ?? null;
}
export function getAvailableConnectionMethods(app: AppDefinition): ConnectionMethodDef[] {
const availability = app.ownershipAvailability ?? DEFAULT_OWNERSHIP_AVAILABILITY;
return app.methods.filter((method) =>
method.ownershipModes.some((ownership) => availability[ownership] !== false)
);
}
/**
* Pick the method that gives a new connection the app's useful write surface.
*
* Google Workspace publishes separate read and write capability groups. The
* read method is intentionally listed first for documentation, but treating
* array order as a product default silently created read-only connections and
* left every write action Off. Capability metadata is the durable signal; apps
* without an explicit write/draft capability retain their declared order.
*/
export function getRecommendedConnectionMethod(
methods: readonly ConnectionMethodDef[],
): ConnectionMethodDef | null {
const recommendedCapability = (candidates: readonly ConnectionMethodDef[]) => candidates.find((method) => {
const capabilityKey = method.capabilityProfile?.key;
return capabilityKey === "write" || capabilityKey === "draft";
});
const managedMethods = methods.filter((method) =>
method.oauthStrategy === "paperclip_cloud_connector"
|| method.oauthStrategy === "paperclip_id_connector"
);
// Prefer the permissions needed for agent work, then the simplest sign-in.
// Explicit read-only selections pass their own capability group here.
return recommendedCapability(managedMethods)
?? recommendedCapability(methods)
?? managedMethods[0]
?? methods[0]
?? null;
}
export function getAvailableConnectionMethod(
app: AppDefinition,
methodKey?: string | null,
): ConnectionMethodDef | null {
const methods = getAvailableConnectionMethods(app);
return methodKey
? methods.find((method) => method.key === methodKey) ?? null
: getRecommendedConnectionMethod(methods);
}
export function connectionMethodSupportsAutomaticOAuth(method: ConnectionMethodDef | null | undefined): boolean {
return method?.auth === "oauth" && (
(method.oauthStrategy === "paperclip_cloud_connector" || method.oauthStrategy === "paperclip_id_connector")
|| method.ownershipModes.includes("dcr")
);
}
export function connectionMethodAcceptsCustomerOAuthClient(method: ConnectionMethodDef | null | undefined): boolean {
return method?.auth === "oauth"
&& !method.oauthStrategy
&& method.ownershipModes.includes("customer");
}
export function connectionMethodSupportsCatalogSetup(method: ConnectionMethodDef | null | undefined): boolean {
if (!method) return false;
if (method.transport === "runtime_auth") return Boolean(method.ai);
if (method.auth === "none" || method.auth === "api_key") return true;
return connectionMethodSupportsAutomaticOAuth(method)
|| connectionMethodAcceptsCustomerOAuthClient(method);
}
export function connectionMethodRequiresConfiguration(method: ConnectionMethodDef | null | undefined): boolean {
if (!method) return false;
const visibleTenantFields = method.tenantFields?.filter((field) => !field.hidden) ?? [];
const visibleExtensionFields = method.extensionFields?.filter((field) => !field.hidden) ?? [];
return Boolean(
method.credentialFields?.length
|| visibleTenantFields.length
|| visibleExtensionFields.length
|| method.configRequirements?.atLeastOneOf?.length
// "Use your own OAuth app" is an advanced alternative when DCR/CIMD is
// available, not a required setup field. Only customer-client-only methods
// must stop on the configuration screen.
|| (
connectionMethodAcceptsCustomerOAuthClient(method)
&& !connectionMethodSupportsAutomaticOAuth(method)
),
);
}
export function appSupportsCatalogSetup(app: AppDefinition | null | undefined): boolean {
return Boolean(app && getAvailableConnectionMethods(app).some(connectionMethodSupportsCatalogSetup));
}
export function isConnectableAppSlug(slug: string | null | undefined): boolean {
return Boolean(slug && CONNECTABLE_APP_SLUGS.has(slug));
}
export function appSupportsAutomaticOAuth(app: AppDefinition | null | undefined): boolean {
return Boolean(app && getAvailableConnectionMethods(app).some(connectionMethodSupportsAutomaticOAuth));
}
export function appAcceptsCustomerOAuthClient(app: AppDefinition | null | undefined): boolean {
return Boolean(app && getAvailableConnectionMethods(app).some(connectionMethodAcceptsCustomerOAuthClient));
}
export function credentialConfigPath(field: FieldDef, method?: ConnectionMethodDef | null): string {
if (method?.transport === "local_stdio" && method.keyPlacement?.location === "env") return `env.${field.key}`;
return `credentials.${field.key}`;
}
/** Older credential references used bare names; current references use paths. */
export function connectionCredentialConfigPath(ref: { name: string }): string {
return /^(credentials|headers|oauth|remote)\./.test(ref.name)
? ref.name
: `credentials.${ref.name}`;
}
export function resolveConnectionMethodServerUrl(
method: ConnectionMethodDef,
configValues: Record<string, string | boolean>,
): string | null {
const template = method.defaults?.serverUrlTemplate;
if (!template) return method.defaults?.serverUrl ?? null;
let missingValue = false;
const resolved = template.replace(/\{([a-zA-Z0-9_-]+)\}/g, (_placeholder, key: string) => {
const value = configValues[key];
if (value === undefined || String(value).trim().length === 0) {
missingValue = true;
return "";
}
return encodeURIComponent(String(value).trim());
});
if (missingValue) return null;
try {
return new URL(resolved).toString();
} catch {
return null;
}
}
export function recommendedDefaultsForApp(app: AppDefinition, methodKey?: string | null): Record<string, unknown> {
// Keep the parameters in the public contract: callers resolve defaults for a
// concrete app/method. Connection finalization remains a configure-authorized,
// audited operation, and Ask first stays available as an operator-selected
// policy for any action after the connection is made.
const method = methodKey
? app.methods.find((candidate) => candidate.key === methodKey)
: null;
if (app.slug === "gmail" && method?.capabilityProfile?.key === "archive") {
return {
access: "all_agents",
askFirstRiskLevels: ["write", "destructive"],
};
}
// Enterpret's run_graph_query self-reports readOnlyHint but executes Cypher
// and has not been established as read-only. Classify it as write (server
// classifyRisk) and require Ask first so new token connections do not ship
// that action as Allowed.
if (app.slug === "enterpret") {
return {
access: "all_agents",
askFirstRiskLevels: ["write", "destructive"],
};
}
return {
access: "all_agents",
askFirstRiskLevels: [],
};
}