Files
PaperClipAI/server/src/__tests__/authz-company-access.test.ts
Jannes StubbemannandClaude Opus 4.7 7f2ed0ad90 security(server): close cross-tenant existence oracle (404 instead of 403) (#3967)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies
> - In a multi-tenant deployment, route handlers that take a resource id
(`issue`, `goal`, `project`, `approval`, etc.) look the resource up by
id and then call `assertCompanyAccess` on its `companyId` — 404 if it
doesn't exist, 403 if it exists in another tenant
> - The split status codes are a classic *existence oracle*: any
authenticated user can enumerate ids across tenants by probing for the
403/404 boundary, mapping out which issues, labels, approvals, etc.
exist in other customers' tenants even when they cannot read the
contents
> - The right fix is a single uniform 404 for both "not found" and
"found but cross-tenant", which collapses the oracle but still preserves
write-path checks (active membership, viewer-readonly) for *authorized*
tenants
> - This pull request adds a non-throwing `hasCompanyAccess(req,
companyId)` helper plus a `getAccessibleResource` wrapper that ~130
handlers across 14 route files now use, folding the access check into
the existence check while still running `assertCompanyAccess` for
authorized tenants so viewer-readonly / inactive-membership rejections
fire unchanged on write paths
> - The benefit is closing a multi-tenant information leak without
breaking write-path security or single-tenant local-first behavior

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #709 — asks for company-scope regression coverage across
approval/activity/access routes, because a subtle route refactor could
leak cross-tenant data; this PR hardens exactly those surfaces (uniform
404 across 14 route files including `approvals`, `activity`, `secrets`)
and updates cross-tenant expectations in test files. It does not add the
full coverage matrix #709 asks for — hence Refs, not Closes.

No existing issue covers the oracle itself — described in-PR:

- Route handlers returned 404 for "not found" but 403 for "exists in
another tenant", a classic *existence oracle*: any authenticated user
could enumerate ids across tenants by probing the 403/404 boundary.
- That maps out which issues, labels, approvals, etc. exist in other
customers' tenants even when their contents are unreadable.
- Fix: a uniform 404 for both cases, while keeping write-path checks
(active membership, viewer-readonly) for authorized tenants.

## What Changed

- **`server/src/routes/authz.ts`** — new `hasCompanyAccess(req,
companyId): boolean` helper alongside the existing
`assertCompanyAccess`. Docstring spells out the two-step pattern (404
gate, then `assertCompanyAccess` for write-path checks). The helper
mirrors `assertCompanyAccess`'s company-scope semantics exactly — in
particular, signed-in instance admins do **not** get blanket access to
companies they are not a member of (the repo's `authz-company-access`
tests pin that behavior for `assertCompanyAccess`; an earlier draft of
the helper accidentally widened it for reads).
- **`getAccessibleResource(req, res, lookup, notFoundMessage)`** — the
safe thing is now the easy thing. One helper wraps the whole pattern
(uniform 404 for missing/cross-tenant, then `assertCompanyAccess` for
write-path membership checks) and ~130 handlers across 14 route files
use it:
  ```ts
const goal = await getAccessibleResource(req, res, svc.getById(id),
"Goal not found");
  if (!goal) return;
  ```
Files: `activity`, `agents`, `approvals`, `assets`, `costs`,
`environments`, `execution-workspaces`, `file-resources`, `goals`,
`issue-tree-control`, `issues`, `projects`, `routines`, `secrets`.
Handlers with bespoke not-found behavior (the legacy `200 []` contract,
audit-logged denials in `file-resources`, null-returning authz helpers)
compose `hasCompanyAccess` directly using the documented two-step
pattern:
  ```ts
// step 1: close the oracle (uniform 404 for both not-found and
cross-tenant)
  if (!existing || !hasCompanyAccess(req, existing.companyId)) {
    res.status(404).json({ error: "Goal not found" });
    return;
  }
// step 2: enforce write-path membership checks for authorised tenants
(no-op on GET)
  assertCompanyAccess(req, existing.companyId);
  ```
Routes where `companyId` comes from *request input*
(`req.params.companyId`, `req.body.companyId`, e.g. in `companies.ts`
and `plugins.ts`) deliberately retain plain `assertCompanyAccess` —
there's no existence oracle to close because the companyId is an input,
not a discovered value.
- **Full-sweep coverage** — a scripted audit of every
`assertCompanyAccess(req, <resource>.companyId)` call site in
`server/src/routes/` found ~55 lookup-then-assert pairs the first pass
missed; all are now gated. Notable ones: the
`/secret-provider-configs/:id` CRUD routes, the agents
instructions-bundle/config-revision/skills-sync routes (which check
access via the `assertCanUpdateAgent` / `assertCanReadAgent` /
`assertCanManageInstructionsPath` helpers), `POST
/heartbeat-runs/:runId/watchdog-decisions`, `GET
/issues/:id/cost-summary`, the environment + environment-lease GET
routes, all six issue-tree-control routes, ~24 issue sub-resource routes
(document annotations, interactions, approvals links, recovery actions,
plan decompositions, lock/unlock), and the three workspace file-resource
routes (these throw `notFound` instead of `forbidden` inside their
audit-logging wrappers, so denied attempts are still activity-logged
server-side while the client sees a uniform 404).
- **Helpers made self-defending** — `assertCanUpdateAgent` /
`assertCanReadAgent` / `assertCanManageInstructionsPath` (agents) and
`assertCanManage{Project,Execution}WorkspaceRuntimeServices` throw
`notFound` for cross-tenant resources before their `assertCompanyAccess`
step, so a future caller that forgets the route-level gate still can't
reopen the oracle.
- **Pattern enforcement** — new `authz-existence-oracle-guard.test.ts`
statically scans `server/src/routes/*.ts` and fails CI on any
`assertCompanyAccess(req, <resource>.companyId)` call that is not
preceded by a `hasCompanyAccess` gate, with an explicit allowlist (plus
staleness check) for the request-input cases. New routes that regress to
the 403/404 split fail the suite with a message pointing at the
documented pattern.
- **Tests** — cross-tenant expectations updated from 403→404 where
routes are now gated; new `hasCompanyAccess` unit tests in
`authz-company-access.test.ts` pin the
instance-admin/local-implicit/agent/none semantics in lockstep with
`assertCompanyAccess`; `write-path-membership.test.ts` (added in an
earlier round) confirms viewer/inactive users are still rejected on
writes.
- **One legacy-contract preserve** — `GET /heartbeat-runs/:runId/issues`
still returns `200 []` for both "doesn't exist" and "cross-tenant" so
the legacy contract is preserved while the oracle stays closed.

## Verification

- `pnpm run typecheck` — PASS.
- `pnpm -F @paperclipai/server exec vitest run` — full server suite
green locally apart from 4 pre-existing local-environment failures
(`paperclip-skill-utils` ×2 and `workspace-runtime` ×1 are
cwd/git-environment dependent — verified identical on a clean checkout
of the base; `heartbeat-process-recovery` is the known macOS flake).
- The new `authz-existence-oracle-guard` test sweeps
`server/src/routes/*.ts` and confirms no remaining
`assertCompanyAccess(resource.companyId)` site without a
`hasCompanyAccess` gate; the only allowlisted holdouts take `companyId`
from request input.

## Risks

- **API contract narrowing.** Any client that specifically checked for
`403` on cross-tenant access now sees `404`. This is a strict narrowing
(one status instead of two for the same negative outcome) and matches
what a client should expect for any id it can't access.
- **Write-path checks preserved.** `assertCompanyAccess` still runs
after the 404 gate on write routes, so viewer-readonly /
inactive-membership rejections fire unchanged for legitimate users.
- **Instance-admin scope unchanged.** `hasCompanyAccess` denies
signed-in instance admins without an explicit membership, exactly like
`assertCompanyAccess` (pinned by unit tests) — so the gate introduces no
new read access for admins.
- **Single-tenant local-first deploys** behave identically — the helper
short-circuits to `true` for `local_implicit` sessions.
- No new env vars, no deployment-mode switch.

## Model Used

Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context), extended thinking mode; completeness sweep
+ instance-admin parity fix by Claude Fable 5 (1M context).

## Checklist

- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] Thinking path traces from project context to this change
- [x] Model used specified
- [x] Checked ROADMAP.md — part of the multi-tenant hardening initiative
- [x] Tests run locally and pass
- [x] Added/updated cross-tenant 404 expectations across test files
- [x] No UI changes
- [x] Documented risks above
- [x] Will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before merge

Part of the multi-tenant hardening initiative — see also #5864
(per-company JWT keys) and #5865 (plugin tables `company_id`).

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-14 15:53:09 -07:00

318 lines
8.9 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import { HttpError } from "../errors.js";
import { assertBoardOrgAccess, assertCompanyAccess, hasBoardOrgAccess, hasCompanyAccess } from "../routes/authz.js";
function makeReq(input: {
method?: string;
actor: Express.Request["actor"];
}) {
return {
method: input.method ?? "GET",
actor: input.actor,
} as Express.Request;
}
describe("assertCompanyAccess", () => {
it("allows viewer memberships to read", () => {
const req = makeReq({
method: "GET",
actor: {
type: "board",
userId: "user-1",
source: "session",
companyIds: ["company-1"],
memberships: [
{ companyId: "company-1", membershipRole: "viewer", status: "active" },
],
},
});
expect(() => assertCompanyAccess(req, "company-1")).not.toThrow();
});
it("rejects viewer memberships for writes", () => {
const req = makeReq({
method: "PATCH",
actor: {
type: "board",
userId: "user-1",
source: "session",
companyIds: ["company-1"],
memberships: [
{ companyId: "company-1", membershipRole: "viewer", status: "active" },
],
},
});
expect(() => assertCompanyAccess(req, "company-1")).toThrow("Viewer access is read-only");
});
it("rejects writes when membership details are present but omit the target company", () => {
const req = makeReq({
method: "POST",
actor: {
type: "board",
userId: "user-1",
source: "session",
companyIds: ["company-1"],
memberships: [],
},
});
expect(() => assertCompanyAccess(req, "company-1")).toThrow("User does not have active company access");
});
it("allows legacy board actors that only provide company ids", () => {
const req = makeReq({
method: "POST",
actor: {
type: "board",
userId: "user-1",
source: "session",
companyIds: ["company-1"],
},
});
expect(() => assertCompanyAccess(req, "company-1")).not.toThrow();
});
it("rejects signed-in instance admins without explicit company access", () => {
const req = makeReq({
method: "GET",
actor: {
type: "board",
userId: "admin-1",
source: "session",
isInstanceAdmin: true,
companyIds: [],
memberships: [],
},
});
expect(() => assertCompanyAccess(req, "company-1")).toThrow("User does not have access to this company");
});
it("allows local trusted board access without explicit membership", () => {
const req = makeReq({
method: "GET",
actor: {
type: "board",
userId: "local-board",
source: "local_implicit",
isInstanceAdmin: true,
},
});
expect(() => assertCompanyAccess(req, "company-1")).not.toThrow();
});
it("fails closed when an on-behalf-of agent lacks a responsible user membership snapshot", () => {
const req = makeReq({
method: "GET",
actor: {
type: "agent",
agentId: "agent-1",
companyId: "company-1",
onBehalfOfUserId: "user-1",
onBehalfOfMemberships: [],
source: "agent_jwt",
},
});
expect(() => assertCompanyAccess(req, "company-1")).toThrow(HttpError);
try {
assertCompanyAccess(req, "company-1");
} catch (err) {
expect((err as HttpError).details).toMatchObject({ code: "RESPONSIBLE_USER_UNAVAILABLE" });
}
});
it("rejects on-behalf-of agent writes when the responsible user is read-only", () => {
const req = makeReq({
method: "PATCH",
actor: {
type: "agent",
agentId: "agent-1",
companyId: "company-1",
onBehalfOfUserId: "user-1",
onBehalfOfMemberships: [
{ companyId: "company-1", membershipRole: "viewer", status: "active" },
],
source: "agent_jwt",
},
});
try {
assertCompanyAccess(req, "company-1");
} catch (err) {
expect((err as HttpError).status).toBe(403);
expect((err as HttpError).details).toMatchObject({ code: "RESPONSIBLE_USER_UNAUTHORIZED" });
return;
}
throw new Error("Expected responsible-user company access denial");
});
it("logs only in shadow mode for responsible-user company access denials", () => {
const previous = process.env.PAPERCLIP_RESPONSIBLE_USER_AUTHZ_SHADOW;
process.env.PAPERCLIP_RESPONSIBLE_USER_AUTHZ_SHADOW = "true";
try {
const req = makeReq({
method: "PATCH",
actor: {
type: "agent",
agentId: "agent-1",
companyId: "company-1",
onBehalfOfUserId: "user-1",
onBehalfOfMemberships: [],
source: "agent_jwt",
},
});
expect(() => assertCompanyAccess(req, "company-1")).not.toThrow();
} finally {
if (previous === undefined) delete process.env.PAPERCLIP_RESPONSIBLE_USER_AUTHZ_SHADOW;
else process.env.PAPERCLIP_RESPONSIBLE_USER_AUTHZ_SHADOW = previous;
}
});
it("allows on-behalf-of agent writes for active non-viewer responsible users", () => {
const req = makeReq({
method: "PATCH",
actor: {
type: "agent",
agentId: "agent-1",
companyId: "company-1",
onBehalfOfUserId: "user-1",
onBehalfOfMemberships: [
{ companyId: "company-1", membershipRole: "operator", status: "active" },
],
source: "agent_jwt",
},
});
expect(() => assertCompanyAccess(req, "company-1")).not.toThrow();
});
});
describe("hasCompanyAccess", () => {
it("allows members of the company", () => {
const req = makeReq({
actor: {
type: "board",
userId: "user-1",
source: "session",
companyIds: ["company-1"],
memberships: [{ companyId: "company-1", membershipRole: "viewer", status: "active" }],
},
});
expect(hasCompanyAccess(req, "company-1")).toBe(true);
});
it("denies users from other companies", () => {
const req = makeReq({
actor: {
type: "board",
userId: "user-1",
source: "session",
companyIds: ["company-1"],
memberships: [{ companyId: "company-1", membershipRole: "operator", status: "active" }],
},
});
expect(hasCompanyAccess(req, "company-2")).toBe(false);
});
it("denies signed-in instance admins without explicit company access, matching assertCompanyAccess", () => {
const req = makeReq({
actor: {
type: "board",
userId: "admin-1",
source: "session",
isInstanceAdmin: true,
companyIds: [],
memberships: [],
},
});
expect(hasCompanyAccess(req, "company-1")).toBe(false);
expect(() => assertCompanyAccess(req, "company-1")).toThrow("User does not have access to this company");
});
it("allows local trusted board access without explicit membership", () => {
const req = makeReq({
actor: {
type: "board",
userId: "local-board",
source: "local_implicit",
isInstanceAdmin: true,
},
});
expect(hasCompanyAccess(req, "company-1")).toBe(true);
});
it("scopes agent actors to their own company", () => {
const agent = { type: "agent", agentId: "agent-1", companyId: "company-1" } as const;
expect(hasCompanyAccess(makeReq({ actor: agent }), "company-1")).toBe(true);
expect(hasCompanyAccess(makeReq({ actor: agent }), "company-2")).toBe(false);
});
it("denies unauthenticated actors", () => {
const req = makeReq({ actor: { type: "none" } });
expect(hasCompanyAccess(req, "company-1")).toBe(false);
});
});
describe("assertBoardOrgAccess", () => {
it("allows signed-in board users with active company access", () => {
const req = makeReq({
actor: {
type: "board",
userId: "user-1",
source: "session",
companyIds: ["company-1"],
memberships: [{ companyId: "company-1", membershipRole: "operator", status: "active" }],
isInstanceAdmin: false,
},
});
expect(hasBoardOrgAccess(req)).toBe(true);
expect(() => assertBoardOrgAccess(req)).not.toThrow();
});
it("allows instance admins without company memberships", () => {
const req = makeReq({
actor: {
type: "board",
userId: "admin-1",
source: "session",
companyIds: [],
memberships: [],
isInstanceAdmin: true,
},
});
expect(hasBoardOrgAccess(req)).toBe(true);
expect(() => assertBoardOrgAccess(req)).not.toThrow();
});
it("rejects signed-in users without company access or instance admin rights", () => {
const req = makeReq({
actor: {
type: "board",
userId: "outsider-1",
source: "session",
companyIds: [],
memberships: [],
isInstanceAdmin: false,
},
});
expect(hasBoardOrgAccess(req)).toBe(false);
expect(() => assertBoardOrgAccess(req)).toThrow("Company membership or instance admin access required");
});
});