Files
PaperClipAI/packages/adapter-utils/src/sandbox-managed-runtime.ts
DottaandPaperclip d172197117 feat(storage): add plain directory sync with conflict preflight (#14416)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Agent runs use workspace transport to restore and collect files.
> - Some directories belong to the agent across tasks.
> - Those directories need plain file transport without task Git state.
> - A concurrent file edit must be detected before a merge changes any
file.
> - This pull request adds optional plain-directory sync and conflict
preflight.
> - Existing task workspace sync keeps its defaults.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #14325. This is the transport prerequisite for a replacement of its
instruction revision design with current agent files.

## What Changed

- Add an opt-in plain-directory transport mode to command and sandbox
runtimes.
- Add strict merge preflight for file edits, deletions, and directory
changes.
- Accept identical replay after an interrupted merge. Preserve competing
changes.
- Set the compiled OpenCode test executable to 0755, independent of the
CI host’s file-creation mask. Preserve the original startup error if
cleanup also fails.

## Verification

- At `ced53ae532ce6966cad5a83575d83db61af98126`, all 212 targeted
transport tests passed across workspace restore, remote managed runtime,
SSH fixture, and execution-target sandbox suites. Adapter-utils
typecheck passed.
- Real isolated SSH retry fixture previously passed with
`PAPERCLIP_ENABLE_DARWIN_SSH_ENV_LAB=1`; stale deleted files remain
absent while gitignored binary bytes survive.
- Dependent PR #14420 passed real native local, legacy local, and native
Daytona persistence E2E at `169fab46d5af21caa2269b4c1b29b69c933a6951`,
which includes all production transport changes through `ced53ae53`; the
subsequent two commits only fix the OpenCode test fixture. Nine tasks,
three server restarts, and all cleanup checks passed.
- A hosted OpenCode fixture failed twice at `ced53ae53`. Reproduced the
failure locally and in Linux with `umask 0002`: the compiler created a
group-writable executable, correctly rejected by the qualified launch
boundary. Explicit 0755 permissions fix the test without weakening the
production guard. The focused test and non-root Linux reproduction now
pass under that same mask.
- Before rebase, head `69e97de0475d34aac5d532e559a405eaf015fd2b`
includes the deterministic fixture permission fix and preserves original
bootstrap diagnostics. All production transport code is unchanged since
the 212-test validation. Fresh Greptile review is 5/5 on this exact head
with no unresolved findings. All 54 current-head checks passed, with two
conditional skips. The full CI run completed successfully, including the
previously failing OpenCode runner shard.

- Merge validation on rebased head
`c509d79dd190c5cb00dc65edfde209097ff21465`: all five commits are
patch-identical to the reviewed branch. All 54 checks passed with two
conditional skips, and fresh Greptile review is 5/5 with no findings.
One retry cleared an npm archive 404 and a Cursor fixture timeout.

## Risks

- New behavior is opt-in. Existing task snapshot behavior retains its
defaults.
- Generic strict merge preflight remains opt-in. The dependent
agent-folder feature rebases changed paths before applying them to
provide per-file last-sync-wins; it does not create a conflict-review
queue.
- This change adds no database migration, dependency, or UI.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 family. The session does not expose a more specific
model ID or context-window size. Reasoning, code execution, and tool use
assisted this change. Live provider validation used `gpt-5.6-sol`.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-09-29 07:59:11 -05:00

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import { execFile as execFileCallback } from "node:child_process";
import { createHash, randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
import {
constants as fsConstants,
createReadStream,
promises as fs,
} from "node:fs";
import os from "node:os";
import { workspacePaths, workspacePathMatcher, writeWorkspacePaths, isPathManifest, type WorkspacePaths } from "./workspace-manifest.js";
import path from "node:path";
import { promisify } from "node:util";
import {
buildRemoteGitDeltaBundleScript,
isMissingGitPrerequisiteError,
createImportedGitRef,
createRemoteGitExportRef,
deleteLocalGitRef,
fetchGitBundleIntoLocalRef,
GIT_ARCHIVE_EXCLUDES,
type GitWorkspaceSnapshot,
integrateImportedGitHead,
readGitWorkspaceSnapshot,
disposeGitWorkspaceSnapshot,
ReferencedSourceIgnoreScanLimitExceededError,
readReferencedSourceGitIgnoredPaths,
resetLocalGitIndexToHead,
withShallowGitWorkspaceClone,
WORKSPACE_GIT_SCAN_SATURATED_CODE,
} from "./git-workspace-sync.js";
import {
captureDirectorySnapshot,
disposeDirectorySnapshot,
selectDirectorySnapshot,
mergeDirectoryWithBaseline,
type DirectorySnapshot,
} from "./workspace-restore-merge.js";
import {
createRuntimeProgressReporter,
type RuntimeProgressDirection,
type RuntimeProgressPhase,
type RuntimeProgressSink,
type RuntimeStatusPhase,
type RuntimeStatusSink,
} from "./runtime-progress.js";
import { isRelativePathOrDescendant, shouldExcludePath } from "./exclude-patterns.js";
import {
scheduleSyncOperations,
SYNC_OPERATION_CONCURRENCY_LIMIT,
type SyncOperationTask,
} from "./sync-operation-schedule.js";
import type { RuntimeSpanRunner } from "./acpx-engine/startup-timing.js";
import { withWorkspaceRestoreDiagnostics } from "./workspace-restore-diagnostics.js";
const execFile = promisify(execFileCallback);
const SANDBOX_WORKSPACE_HEAVY_DIR_NAMES = [
"node_modules",
"vendor",
"dist",
"build",
"out",
"coverage",
".next",
".turbo",
".cache",
] as const;
const SANDBOX_WORKSPACE_HEAVY_DIR_EXCLUDES = SANDBOX_WORKSPACE_HEAVY_DIR_NAMES.flatMap((entry) => [
entry,
`${entry}/*`,
`*/${entry}`,
`*/${entry}/*`,
]);
export interface SandboxRemoteExecutionSpec {
transport: "sandbox";
provider: string;
sandboxId: string;
remoteCwd: string;
timeoutMs: number;
apiKey: string | null;
}
/**
* Remote paths handed to an asset's `provision.postUploadCommand`. All are POSIX
* paths inside the sandbox: `assetTarPath` is the uploaded asset tarball,
* `assetDir` is where the asset should be materialized, and `runtimeRootDir`
* is the directory any `stageFiles` were written into.
*/
export interface SandboxManagedRuntimeAssetProvisionContext {
assetTarPath: string;
assetDir: string;
runtimeRootDir: string;
}
/**
* Per-asset inbound provisioning contribution. The core is adapter-agnostic:
* an asset that supplies neither `stageFiles` nor `postUploadCommand` is
* materialized with a plain destroy-then-replace `tar -xf`. An adapter that
* needs custom provisioning (e.g. a credential merge) supplies helper files via
* `stageFiles` and the shell command that consumes them via `postUploadCommand`.
*
* Both contributions ride the unified {@link SandboxSyncOperation} the core
* builds per asset: `stageFiles` become additional `files` mappings placed
* alongside the asset tar, and `postUploadCommand` becomes the operation's
* ordered `postUploadCommands`. See {@link SandboxPostUploadCommand} for the
* command-origin / confinement security contract (C1–C3).
*/
export interface SandboxManagedRuntimeAssetProvision {
/**
* Extra files placed into `runtimeRootDir` (alongside the asset tar) before
* the post-upload command runs — typically helper scripts the command
* invokes. Contents may be raw bytes or a UTF-8 string.
*/
stageFiles?: { name: string; contents: Buffer | string }[];
/**
* Builds the opaque, adapter-authored shell command that materializes the
* uploaded asset tar into `assetDir`, run as the operation's ordered
* post-upload command after every mapping has landed. Defaults to a plain
* destroy-then-replace `tar -xf` extraction when omitted. Any path embedded in
* the command MUST be built from already-confined paths and shell-quoted (C3).
*/
postUploadCommand?: (ctx: SandboxManagedRuntimeAssetProvisionContext) => string;
}
/**
* Context passed to an asset's `restore` contribution during teardown.
* `assetDir` is the asset's directory inside the sandbox and `readFile` reads
* a file back from the sandbox as raw bytes. `tempDir` is a host scratch
* directory that belongs to this restore task alone. The shared scheduler can
* run restore tasks at the same time, so a task must not share scratch space
* with another task. A restore that needs a host temporary file writes it under
* `tempDir`. The coordinator removes the directory after the task settles. The
* sandbox coordinator always sets `tempDir`. A serial runtime that never runs
* restore tasks at the same time can omit it.
*/
export interface SandboxManagedRuntimeAssetRestoreContext {
assetDir: string;
readFile: (remotePath: string) => Promise<Buffer>;
tempDir?: string;
}
export interface SandboxManagedRuntimeAsset {
key: string;
localDir: string;
followSymlinks?: boolean;
exclude?: string[];
/** Optional inbound provisioning contribution (staged files + extract command). */
provision?: SandboxManagedRuntimeAssetProvision;
/**
* Optional teardown/outbound contribution, invoked once per asset during
* `restoreWorkspace`. Defaults to a no-op when omitted.
*/
restore?: (ctx: SandboxManagedRuntimeAssetRestoreContext) => Promise<void>;
}
/**
* How a referenced project's Git-ignored paths were resolved, computed once
* per project by `resolveReferencedSourceIgnore` before staging starts. The
* sandbox lane, the SSH lane, and the content-signature walk each consume
* this ONE resolution, so the three sites never drift apart.
*
* - `git`: `localPath` is a Git work tree. `ignoredPaths` are its ignored
* entries, already re-relativized to `localPath` (see
* `resolveReferencedSourceIgnore`).
* - `other`: `localPath` is not a Git work tree. The staging path keeps
* today's fixed heavy-directory excludes.
* - `failed`: the Git read failed, timed out, breached a parse bound, or
* returned output the resolver could not safely re-relativize. The project
* is NOT staged (fail closed) — every site records it as a per-project
* failure instead of shipping it unfiltered. `reason` is always one of
* {@link REFERENCED_SOURCE_IGNORE_FAILURE_REASONS} — never a raw Git or tar
* diagnostic, an absolute host path, or a basename.
*/
export type ReferencedSourceIgnoreResolution =
| { kind: "git"; ignoredPaths: string[] }
| { kind: "other" }
| { kind: "failed"; reason: string };
/**
* The fixed, allowlisted failure categories a `failed`
* {@link ReferencedSourceIgnoreResolution} reports as `reason`. This is the
* ENTIRE vocabulary: no absolute host path, no basename, no opaque token, and
* no raw Git or tar stderr ever reaches `reason` — only one of these three
* stable strings, chosen once at the single construction point in
* `resolveReferencedSourceIgnore`. A `failed` resolution always prevents
* staging and is always re-resolved before its next use, so two different
* underlying failures colliding on the same category (e.g. a timeout and a
* malformed-output error both reporting `scanFailed`) never weakens the
* fail-closed decision.
*/
export const REFERENCED_SOURCE_IGNORE_FAILURE_REASONS = {
/** A Git read failed, timed out, was cancelled, or returned malformed output — including a saturated scan queue that never recovered after its retries. */
scanFailed: "git-ignore-scan-failed",
/** The parsed ignored-entry count or total UTF-8 byte size breached its bound (see `readReferencedSourceGitIgnoredPaths`). */
limitExceeded: "git-ignore-scan-limit-exceeded",
/** The referenced project's `localPath` is not a descendant of its own Git top level. */
toplevelNotDescendant: "git-toplevel-not-descendant",
} as const;
/**
* A referenced (additional) project to stage into the run sandbox as a plain,
* read-only tree. `localPath` is the host checkout directory. Upstream code
* already authorized and realized this directory (`project:read`); this layer
* adds no authorization logic. `projectId` names the isolated remote
* subdirectory (`project-<projectId>` under the runtime root) the tree lands in.
*
* Additional sources are plain trees only. They never carry the anchor
* workspace's git-history, overlay, or `.paperclip-runtime` preservation
* semantics — those stay anchor-only.
*
* `ignoreResolution` is required so every construction site must supply it
* explicitly — a caller cannot default to the unfiltered legacy behavior by
* omission. Resolve it once per project with `resolveReferencedSourceIgnore`.
*/
export interface SandboxAdditionalSource {
localPath: string;
projectId: string;
ignoreResolution: ReferencedSourceIgnoreResolution;
}
/**
* Escape tar `--exclude` glob metacharacters (`*`, `?`, `[`) in a literal
* path, so a Git-ignored path that happens to contain one of them is matched
* literally instead of as a pattern. Without this, a repository-controlled
* path containing e.g. `*` could exclude unrelated sibling files that
* happen to match the resulting glob. GNU tar and bsdtar both honor a
* backslash as a `fnmatch` escape character, so this is not command
* injection — `createTarballFromDirectory` and the SSH tar equivalent both
* pass `--exclude` values as argument-vector entries, never through a shell.
*/
export function escapeTarExcludeLiteral(entry: string): string {
return entry.replace(/\\/g, "\\\\").replace(/([*?[])/g, "\\$1");
}
/**
* The tar `--exclude` entries a referenced project's resolved ignore set
* contributes, on top of the fixed heavy-directory excludes every site
* already applies. Empty for `other` (today's fixed excludes are enough)
* and for `failed` (the project is not staged at all, so no exclude list
* matters).
*/
export function referencedSourceIgnoreExcludeEntries(resolution: ReferencedSourceIgnoreResolution): string[] {
return resolution.kind === "git" ? resolution.ignoredPaths.map(escapeTarExcludeLiteral) : [];
}
/**
* Compute the relative position of `localPath` under a Git `toplevel`
* directory, as a POSIX path with no leading or trailing slash. Returns `""`
* when `localPath` IS the toplevel. Returns `null` when the relation is not a
* plain descendant — `localPath` escapes upward from `toplevel`, resolves to
* an absolute/rooted result (a different filesystem root), or the two paths
* are otherwise not comparable. The caller treats `null` as a resolution
* failure (fail closed), never as "nothing to exclude".
*/
/**
* Physical (symlink-resolved) form of a path, falling back to the plain
* resolved form when realpath fails (e.g. the path vanished mid-run — the
* downstream descendant check then fails closed on the string form).
* Git prints physical toplevels, so both sides of the descendant comparison
* must be physical too; comparing a logical path against a physical one makes
* any symlinked project or temp directory (macOS `/var` → `/private/var`)
* fail resolution spuriously.
*/
async function physicalPath(input: string): Promise<string> {
try {
return await fs.realpath(input);
} catch {
return path.resolve(input);
}
}
function relativizeUnderGitToplevel(input: { toplevel: string; localPath: string }): string | null {
const toplevel = path.resolve(input.toplevel);
const localPath = path.resolve(input.localPath);
const relative = path.relative(toplevel, localPath);
if (relative === "") return "";
if (path.isAbsolute(relative)) return null;
if (relative === ".." || relative.startsWith(`..${path.sep}`)) return null;
return relative.split(path.sep).join("/");
}
/**
* Re-relativize root-relative ignored paths (as `readReferencedSourceGitIgnoredPaths`
* reports them, from the repository toplevel) to `offset`, the position of
* the referenced project's `localPath` under that toplevel. Keeps only the
* entries that are `offset` itself or a descendant of it — an ignored path
* elsewhere in the repository does not apply to this project's staged tree —
* and strips the `offset` prefix so the result matches the tar member
* namespace, which is `localPath`-relative.
*/
function reRelativizeIgnoredPathsToLocalPath(input: { ignoredPaths: string[]; offset: string }): string[] {
if (input.offset === "") {
return [...input.ignoredPaths];
}
const prefix = `${input.offset}/`;
return input.ignoredPaths
.filter((entry) => entry.startsWith(prefix))
.map((entry) => entry.slice(prefix.length))
.filter(Boolean);
}
/**
* Bounded backoff before each retry of a saturated Git scan: none before the
* first attempt, 1 second before the second, 2 seconds before the third. Three
* total attempts (the first plus these two retries) is a liveness parameter,
* not a security control — the retry only ever fires for the scheduler's
* typed saturation code (see {@link isWorkspaceGitScanSaturatedError}).
*/
const REFERENCED_SOURCE_IGNORE_SCAN_RETRY_DELAYS_MS = [1_000, 2_000] as const;
async function delay(ms: number): Promise<void> {
await new Promise<void>((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, ms));
}
/**
* True only when `error` carries the workspace Git scan scheduler's typed
* saturation code on its `code` property. Matches the code alone, never
* message text — a message can change wording without changing meaning, and
* matching text would silently stop retrying (or start retrying the wrong
* failure) the moment it did.
*/
function isWorkspaceGitScanSaturatedError(error: unknown): boolean {
return (
typeof error === "object" &&
error !== null &&
"code" in error &&
(error as { code?: unknown }).code === WORKSPACE_GIT_SCAN_SATURATED_CODE
);
}
/**
* Resolve a referenced project's Git-ignored paths ONCE, before any staging
* site runs. Called once per project (see `execute.ts`); the sandbox lane,
* the SSH lane, and the content-signature walk all consume this one result,
* so they can never apply a different exclusion set to the same project.
*
* Fails closed: a Git read error, a timeout, malformed output, a parse-bound
* breach, or a `localPath` that is not a plain descendant of its own Git
* toplevel all return `failed`, never an empty ignore list — an empty list
* means "resolved, nothing extra to exclude", which is a different claim than
* "the resolution did not run".
*
* Retries ONLY a saturated scan queue (the shared workspace Git operation
* scheduler rejecting before spawn because it is at capacity) — a liveness
* condition, not an integrity one. Three attempts total, with the bounded
* backoff in {@link REFERENCED_SOURCE_IGNORE_SCAN_RETRY_DELAYS_MS}, retried
* through the same registered scheduler every time. No direct-spawn fallback
* exists: bypassing the scheduler would defeat the process-wide concurrency
* limit it enforces. Every other failure — timeout, cancellation, an output
* limit, a permission error, malformed output, a real Git failure, or a bound
* breach — makes exactly one attempt and fails closed immediately.
*/
export async function resolveReferencedSourceIgnore(localPath: string): Promise<ReferencedSourceIgnoreResolution> {
let scan: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof readReferencedSourceGitIgnoredPaths>> = null;
let failureReason: string | null = null;
for (let attempt = 0; attempt <= REFERENCED_SOURCE_IGNORE_SCAN_RETRY_DELAYS_MS.length; attempt += 1) {
try {
scan = await readReferencedSourceGitIgnoredPaths(localPath);
failureReason = null;
break;
} catch (error) {
failureReason = error instanceof ReferencedSourceIgnoreScanLimitExceededError
? REFERENCED_SOURCE_IGNORE_FAILURE_REASONS.limitExceeded
: REFERENCED_SOURCE_IGNORE_FAILURE_REASONS.scanFailed;
const isLastAttempt = attempt === REFERENCED_SOURCE_IGNORE_SCAN_RETRY_DELAYS_MS.length;
if (isLastAttempt || !isWorkspaceGitScanSaturatedError(error)) {
break;
}
await delay(REFERENCED_SOURCE_IGNORE_SCAN_RETRY_DELAYS_MS[attempt]!);
}
}
if (failureReason !== null) {
return { kind: "failed", reason: failureReason };
}
if (!scan) {
return { kind: "other" };
}
const offset = relativizeUnderGitToplevel({
toplevel: await physicalPath(scan.toplevel),
localPath: await physicalPath(localPath),
});
if (offset === null) {
return { kind: "failed", reason: REFERENCED_SOURCE_IGNORE_FAILURE_REASONS.toplevelNotDescendant };
}
return {
kind: "git",
ignoredPaths: reRelativizeIgnoredPathsToLocalPath({ ignoredPaths: scan.ignoredPaths, offset }),
};
}
/**
* Per-call byte-level progress hook. `transferredBytes`/`totalBytes` are decoded
* file bytes (not the base64 wire size). `totalBytes` is null when the size is
* not known up front. The transport is the source of truth for byte counts; the
* orchestrator owns the phase label and direction.
*/
export interface SandboxTransferProgressOptions {
onProgress?: (transferredBytes: number, totalBytes: number | null) => void | Promise<void>;
}
/**
* A single source→target file or directory transfer within a sync operation.
* Mirrors the plugin SDK `PluginSyncFileMapping`; kept as a local structural
* type so `adapter-utils` does not depend on the plugin SDK. For `syncIn`,
* `sourcePath` is a host path and `targetPath` a sandbox path; for `syncOut` the
* direction is reversed. Sandbox paths are POSIX.
*/
export interface SandboxSyncFileMapping {
sourcePath: string;
targetPath: string;
kind: "file" | "directory";
mode?: number;
exclude?: string[];
followSymlinks?: boolean;
/**
* Advisory read-write intent for the sandbox target. `"rw"` marks a target the
* agent may change and keep; `"ro"` marks a read-only tree. An absent value
* defaults to `"ro"` (read-only is the safe default for an advisory signal).
* The field is advisory metadata for an optional sandbox feedback wrapper. It
* does not change the transfer and adds no security.
*/
access?: "rw" | "ro";
/**
* The sandbox directory that becomes read-write when `access` is `"rw"` and a
* post-upload command extracts `targetPath` into a different directory. A tar
* mapping uploads an archive under the runtime root, so its `targetPath` is the
* staging archive, not the directory the extract command fills. This field
* names that final destination directory. When absent, the read-write
* destination is the parent directory of `targetPath`. Advisory; ignored when
* `access` is not `"rw"`.
*/
writablePath?: string;
}
/**
* A control command run against the sandbox after a sync operation's files have
* landed. Mirrors the plugin SDK `PluginPostUploadCommand`; kept as a local
* structural type so `adapter-utils` does not depend on the plugin SDK. Ordered
* within {@link SandboxSyncOperation.postUploadCommands} and executed in array
* order, fail-fast (first non-zero exit or timeout aborts the operation).
*
* SECURITY — command origin (Stage-1 design review, condition C1). `command` is
* a **Paperclip/adapter-authored control operation**: it may be supplied ONLY by
* core/adapter code. No server route, issue/comment content, project/workspace
* file content, provider-plugin callback, or arbitrary adapter config may supply
* a raw `command` string; any path embedded in it MUST be built by adapter/core
* helpers from already-confined paths and shell-quoted (C3). Providers treat the
* command as **opaque** — execute or reject, never rewrite/concatenate/append.
*/
export interface SandboxPostUploadCommand {
/** The opaque, adapter-authored shell command to run after upload. */
command: string;
/**
* Working directory for the command. When present, MUST be an absolute POSIX
* path confined under the operation's allowed sandbox target root (C2). When
* absent, defaults to the runtime's stable command cwd — never a process
* default cwd.
*/
cwd?: string;
/** Optional per-command timeout in milliseconds. */
timeoutMs?: number;
}
/**
* An ordered, opaque unit of work handed to the native sync transport. The
* `operationId` is an opaque, non-sensitive token authored by the orchestrator
* (never a caller/asset identifier that could leak intent); a provider MUST NOT
* interpret it.
*/
export interface SandboxSyncOperation {
operationId: string;
files: SandboxSyncFileMapping[];
/**
* Optional ordered control commands run after this operation's files land, in
* array order, fail-fast. Absent means "no commands" — byte-identical to a
* pre-contract operation. See {@link SandboxPostUploadCommand} for the command
* origin/confinement security contract (C1–C4).
*/
postUploadCommands?: SandboxPostUploadCommand[];
}
export interface SandboxSyncResult {
operations: { operationId: string; filesTransferred: number; bytesTransferred: number }[];
}
export interface SandboxManagedRuntimeClient {
makeDir(remotePath: string): Promise<void>;
writeFile(remotePath: string, bytes: ArrayBuffer, options?: SandboxTransferProgressOptions): Promise<void>;
readFile(
remotePath: string,
options?: SandboxTransferProgressOptions,
): Promise<Buffer | Uint8Array | ArrayBuffer>;
listFiles(remotePath: string): Promise<string[]>;
remove(remotePath: string): Promise<void>;
run(command: string, options: { timeoutMs: number }): Promise<void>;
/**
* True when the orchestrator may run this client's sync operations
* concurrently. The base64 fallback always sets it true. A native provider
* takes the value from the verified `concurrentSyncOperations` opt-in; an
* undeclared native provider keeps it false. One flag serves both `syncIn` and
* `syncOut`. `createCommandManagedRuntimeClient` always sets it on a prepared
* client; it is optional here so a test mock can omit it.
*/
allowConcurrentSyncOperations?: boolean;
/**
* Optional native inbound transfer. Present only when the sandbox provider
* advertises both `environmentSyncIn` and `environmentSyncOut`; otherwise the
* orchestrator falls back to the tar + base64 `writeFile`/`run` path so
* behavior is byte-identical to a provider that never opted in.
*/
syncIn?(operations: SandboxSyncOperation[]): Promise<SandboxSyncResult>;
/** Optional native outbound transfer. See {@link syncIn}. */
syncOut?(operations: SandboxSyncOperation[]): Promise<SandboxSyncResult>;
}
/**
* Host-side complete-mediation guard for native sync operations. The orchestrator
* authors every `targetPath`, but the native transport crosses the host↔sandbox
* trust boundary, so we canonicalize and confine each mapping's source and target
* to an orchestrator-owned root before handing the operation to a provider.
* Absolute escapes and `..` traversal are rejected fail-closed. Sandbox and host
* paths on the server are POSIX.
*/
export function assertSyncOperationsConfined(
operations: SandboxSyncOperation[],
roots: { sourceRoots: string[]; targetRoots: string[] },
): void {
const confine = (candidate: string, allowed: string[], label: string): void => {
const normalized = path.posix.normalize(candidate);
if (!path.posix.isAbsolute(normalized) || normalized === ".." || normalized.includes("/../") || normalized.endsWith("/..")) {
throw new Error(`sync operation ${label} path is not a confined absolute path: ${candidate}`);
}
const within = allowed.some((root) => {
const normalizedRoot = path.posix.normalize(root);
const prefix = normalizedRoot.endsWith("/") ? normalizedRoot : `${normalizedRoot}/`;
return normalized === normalizedRoot || normalized.startsWith(prefix);
});
if (!within) {
throw new Error(`sync operation ${label} path escapes its confinement root: ${candidate}`);
}
};
for (const operation of operations) {
for (const mapping of operation.files) {
confine(mapping.sourcePath, roots.sourceRoots, "source");
confine(mapping.targetPath, roots.targetRoots, "target");
}
}
}
export interface PreparedSandboxManagedRuntime {
spec: SandboxRemoteExecutionSpec;
workspaceLocalDir: string;
workspaceRemoteDir: string;
runtimeRootDir: string;
assetDirs: Record<string, string>;
/**
* Remote directory of each additional (referenced) project that staged
* successfully, keyed by `projectId`. A project whose staging failed is
* absent (per-project failure isolation). Empty when no additional sources
* were requested.
*/
additionalSourceDirs: Record<string, string>;
/**
* Each additional (referenced) project whose staging failed, paired with the
* failure message. Per-project failure isolation keeps one project's failure
* from aborting the run, so a failed project is absent from
* `additionalSourceDirs` and present here. Empty when every requested project
* staged, or when no additional sources were requested.
*/
additionalSourceFailures: AdditionalSourceStagingFailure[];
/** Durable merge inputs used to resume an outbound restore after host restart. */
workspaceSyncSnapshot: {
baseline: DirectorySnapshot;
gitSnapshot: GitWorkspaceSnapshot | null;
} | null;
cleanupWorkspaceSnapshot(): Promise<void>;
restoreWorkspace(onProgress?: RuntimeProgressSink): Promise<void>;
}
export type WorkspaceInboundMode =
"host_current" | "durable_seed" | "adopt_remote";
/**
* Controller-owned archives for replaying the exact pre-turn workspace into a
* replacement sandbox. Paths are never sent to the provider as credentials or
* persisted in database metadata.
*/
export interface WorkspaceDurableSeedPaths {
workspaceArchivePath: string;
workspaceArchiveSha256?: string;
gitArchivePath?: string | null;
gitArchiveSha256?: string | null;
}
/** One additional (referenced) project that failed to stage into the sandbox. */
export interface AdditionalSourceStagingFailure {
projectId: string;
error: string;
}
function asObject(value: unknown): Record<string, unknown> {
return value && typeof value === "object" && !Array.isArray(value)
? (value as Record<string, unknown>)
: {};
}
function asString(value: unknown): string {
return typeof value === "string" ? value : "";
}
function asNumber(value: unknown): number {
return typeof value === "number" ? value : Number(value);
}
function shellQuote(value: string) {
return `'${value.replace(/'/g, `'\"'\"'`)}'`;
}
function buildDefaultExtractRuntimeAssetCommand(input: {
remoteAssetDir: string;
remoteAssetTar: string;
}): string {
return `rm -rf ${shellQuote(input.remoteAssetDir)} && ` +
`mkdir -p ${shellQuote(input.remoteAssetDir)} && ` +
`tar -xf ${shellQuote(input.remoteAssetTar)} -C ${shellQuote(input.remoteAssetDir)} && ` +
`rm -f ${shellQuote(input.remoteAssetTar)}`;
}
// Named builder (Security Condition C3): extract an uploaded workspace tarball
// into `workspaceRemoteDir`, then remove the tarball. When `wipeExceptNames` is
// present the target's direct children (except the preserved names) are removed
// before extraction (destroy-then-replace); when null the tarball is overlaid on
// top of the existing tree (e.g. a git overlay merge). Every path is
// shell-quoted; no untrusted value is concatenated into the shell (C1/C3).
function buildWorkspaceTarExtractCommand(input: {
workspaceRemoteDir: string;
remoteTar: string;
wipeExceptNames: string[] | null;
}): string {
// The wipe must also preserve any in-flight sync scratch tarball at the
// workspace root. A concurrent referenced-project upload stages a scratch
// tarball named `.paperclip-upload-<uuid>.tar` there. Without this preserve
// term the wipe unlinks the in-flight tarball and the later extract fails.
// The static pattern must agree with the daytona scratch prefix
// `SCRATCH_PREFIX` in
// `packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/daytona/src/file-sync.ts:80`.
// The term is a static literal; `preserveFindArgs` shell-quotes it, so the
// shell passes it to `find -name` as a pattern (Security Conditions C1/C3).
const wipe = input.wipeExceptNames
? ` && find ${shellQuote(input.workspaceRemoteDir)} -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 ` +
`${preserveFindArgs([...input.wipeExceptNames, ".paperclip-upload-*"])} -exec rm -rf -- {} +`
: "";
return (
`mkdir -p ${shellQuote(input.workspaceRemoteDir)}${wipe} && ` +
`tar -xf ${shellQuote(input.remoteTar)} -C ${shellQuote(input.workspaceRemoteDir)} && ` +
`rm -f ${shellQuote(input.remoteTar)}`
);
}
// Named builder (C3): remove paths deleted in the host git worktree from the
// sandbox workspace. Every path is shell-quoted; the caller supplies only
// already-confined relative paths from the git snapshot.
function buildRemoveDeletedPathsCommand(input: { remoteDir: string; manifestPath: string }): string {
// NUL input plus bounded xargs batches preserve whitespace and never create
// one argument list for the full snapshot. Refuse symlink ancestors.
const remove = `for entry do
parent=$entry
while [ "\${parent#*/}" != "$parent" ]; do
parent=\${parent%/*}
if [ -L "$parent" ] || { [ -e "$parent" ] && [ ! -d "$parent" ]; }; then exit 42; fi
done
rm -rf -- "$entry" || exit
done`;
return `cd ${shellQuote(input.remoteDir)} && xargs -0 -r -n 64 sh -c ${shellQuote(remove)} sh < ${shellQuote(input.manifestPath)} && rm -f -- ${shellQuote(input.manifestPath)}`;
}
function buildUniqueStagingPath(input: { targetPath: string; suffix: string }): string {
return path.join(path.dirname(input.targetPath), `${input.suffix}.${randomUUID()}`);
}
// The workspace stages under `<runtimeRootDir>/workspace-upload.tar` and, for a
// git-backed workspace, under `<runtimeRootDir>/git-workspace-upload.tar`. Each
// asset stages under `<runtimeRootDir>/<key>-upload.tar`, so an asset key equal to
// one of these stems resolves to the same remote archive path. Reserve the stems.
const RESERVED_RUNTIME_ASSET_KEYS = new Set(["workspace", "git-workspace"]);
// Reject an asset key before any path is built from it. An asset key becomes a
// remote directory (`<runtimeRootDir>/<key>`), a remote archive name
// (`<key>-upload.tar`), and a host temp file (`<key>.tar`). A path separator or
// `..` in the key escapes those roots. A reserved stem makes the asset archive
// share a path with the workspace archive; under concurrent sync the asset task
// and the workspace task then write or upload the same archive at the same time,
// which fails extraction nondeterministically or puts asset bytes in the
// workspace. Fail closed on both cases.
function assertRuntimeAssetKeyIsSafe(key: string): void {
if (key.length === 0 || key.includes("/") || key.includes("\\") || key.includes("..")) {
throw new Error(`sandbox runtime asset key is not a simple path segment: ${key}`);
}
if (RESERVED_RUNTIME_ASSET_KEYS.has(key)) {
throw new Error(`sandbox runtime asset key collides with a reserved runtime archive name: ${key}`);
}
}
export function parseSandboxRemoteExecutionSpec(value: unknown): SandboxRemoteExecutionSpec | null {
const parsed = asObject(value);
const transport = asString(parsed.transport).trim();
const provider = asString(parsed.provider).trim();
const sandboxId = asString(parsed.sandboxId).trim();
const remoteCwd = asString(parsed.remoteCwd).trim();
const timeoutMs = asNumber(parsed.timeoutMs);
if (
transport !== "sandbox" ||
provider.length === 0 ||
sandboxId.length === 0 ||
remoteCwd.length === 0 ||
!Number.isFinite(timeoutMs) ||
timeoutMs <= 0
) {
return null;
}
return {
transport: "sandbox",
provider,
sandboxId,
remoteCwd,
timeoutMs,
apiKey: asString(parsed.apiKey).trim() || null,
};
}
export function buildSandboxExecutionSessionIdentity(spec: SandboxRemoteExecutionSpec | null) {
if (!spec) return null;
return {
transport: "sandbox",
provider: spec.provider,
sandboxId: spec.sandboxId,
remoteCwd: spec.remoteCwd,
} as const;
}
export function sandboxExecutionSessionMatches(saved: unknown, current: SandboxRemoteExecutionSpec | null): boolean {
const currentIdentity = buildSandboxExecutionSessionIdentity(current);
if (!currentIdentity) return false;
const parsedSaved = asObject(saved);
return (
asString(parsedSaved.transport) === currentIdentity.transport &&
asString(parsedSaved.provider) === currentIdentity.provider &&
asString(parsedSaved.sandboxId) === currentIdentity.sandboxId &&
asString(parsedSaved.remoteCwd) === currentIdentity.remoteCwd
);
}
async function withTempDir<T>(prefix: string, fn: (dir: string) => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
const dir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), prefix));
try {
return await fn(dir);
} finally {
await fs.rm(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => undefined);
}
}
async function sha256File(filePath: string): Promise<string> {
return await new Promise((resolveDigest, rejectDigest) => {
const digest = createHash("sha256");
const stream = createReadStream(filePath);
stream.on("data", (chunk) => digest.update(chunk));
stream.on("error", rejectDigest);
stream.on("end", () => resolveDigest(digest.digest("hex")));
});
}
async function copyDurableSeedArchive(input: {
sourcePath: string;
targetPath: string;
expectedSha256?: string | null;
}): Promise<void> {
const source = await fs.lstat(input.sourcePath);
if (source.isSymbolicLink() || !source.isFile()) {
throw new Error("workspace_durable_seed_invalid");
}
if (
input.expectedSha256 &&
(await sha256File(input.sourcePath)) !== input.expectedSha256
) {
throw new Error("workspace_durable_seed_digest_mismatch");
}
await fs.copyFile(input.sourcePath, input.targetPath);
}
async function persistDurableSeedArchive(input: {
sourcePath: string;
targetPath: string;
}): Promise<void> {
const parent = path.dirname(input.targetPath);
await fs.mkdir(parent, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
const parentStat = await fs.lstat(parent);
if (parentStat.isSymbolicLink() || !parentStat.isDirectory()) {
throw new Error("workspace_durable_seed_root_invalid");
}
const temporary = path.join(
parent,
`.${path.basename(input.targetPath)}.${randomUUID()}.tmp`,
);
try {
await fs.copyFile(input.sourcePath, temporary);
await fs.chmod(temporary, 0o600);
await fs.rename(temporary, input.targetPath);
} finally {
await fs.rm(temporary, { force: true }).catch(() => undefined);
}
}
async function execTar(args: string[]): Promise<void> {
await execFile("tar", args, {
env: {
...process.env,
COPYFILE_DISABLE: "1",
},
maxBuffer: 32 * 1024 * 1024,
});
}
export async function createTarballFromDirectory(input: {
localDir: string;
archivePath: string;
exclude?: string[];
followSymlinks?: boolean;
}): Promise<void> {
const excludeArgs = ["._*", ...(input.exclude ?? [])].flatMap((entry) => ["--exclude", entry]);
// Archive the directory's top-level entries BY NAME rather than ".". Archiving
// "." embeds a "./" self-entry whose mode/mtime tar then tries to restore onto
// the extraction target directory; that chmod/utime fails with "Operation not
// permitted" when the target is a directory the extracting (non-root) user does
// not own, e.g. an emptyDir mount in a hardened/gVisor sandbox pod. Enumerating
// entries avoids the self-entry entirely and is portable across GNU/BSD/busybox
// tar (no GNU-only --no-overwrite-dir needed). --exclude still filters nested
// matches and any named entry it matches.
await withTempDir("paperclip-tar-list-", async (directory) => {
const list = path.join(directory, "entries.nul");
const file = await fs.open(list, "wx", 0o600);
try {
for await (const entry of await fs.opendir(input.localDir)) await file.writeFile(`${entry.name}\0`);
} finally { await file.close(); }
await execTar(["-c", "--no-xattrs", ...(input.followSymlinks ? ["-h"] : []),
"-f", input.archivePath, "-C", input.localDir, ...excludeArgs, "--null", "-T", list]);
});
}
async function extractTarballToDirectory(input: {
archivePath: string;
localDir: string;
}): Promise<void> {
await fs.mkdir(input.localDir, { recursive: true });
await execTar(["-xf", input.archivePath, "-C", input.localDir]);
}
async function* walkDirectory(root: string, relative = "", childrenFirst = false): AsyncGenerator<string> {
for await (const entry of await fs.opendir(path.join(root, relative))) {
const nextRelative = relative ? path.posix.join(relative, entry.name) : entry.name;
if (!childrenFirst) yield nextRelative;
if (entry.isDirectory()) yield* walkDirectory(root, nextRelative, childrenFirst);
if (childrenFirst) yield nextRelative;
}
}
async function copyWorkspaceEntry(sourceRoot: string, targetRoot: string, relative: string): Promise<void> {
const sourcePath = path.join(sourceRoot, relative);
const targetPath = path.join(targetRoot, relative);
const stats = await fs.lstat(sourcePath);
if (stats.isDirectory()) {
await fs.mkdir(targetPath, { recursive: true });
return;
}
await fs.mkdir(path.dirname(targetPath), { recursive: true });
await fs.rm(targetPath, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => undefined);
if (stats.isSymbolicLink()) {
const linkTarget = await fs.readlink(sourcePath);
await fs.symlink(linkTarget, targetPath);
return;
}
const stagedTargetPath = buildUniqueStagingPath({ targetPath, suffix: ".paperclip-copy" });
await fs.rm(stagedTargetPath, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => undefined);
try {
await fs.copyFile(sourcePath, stagedTargetPath, fsConstants.COPYFILE_FICLONE).catch(async () => {
await fs.copyFile(sourcePath, stagedTargetPath);
});
await fs.chmod(stagedTargetPath, stats.mode);
await fs.rename(stagedTargetPath, targetPath);
} finally {
await fs.rm(stagedTargetPath, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => undefined);
}
}
export async function mirrorDirectory(
sourceDir: string,
targetDir: string,
options: { preserveAbsent?: string[] } = {},
): Promise<void> {
await fs.mkdir(targetDir, { recursive: true });
const preserveAbsent = new Set(options.preserveAbsent ?? []);
const shouldPreserveAbsent = (relative: string) =>
[...preserveAbsent].some((candidate) => isRelativePathOrDescendant(relative, candidate));
for await (const relative of walkDirectory(targetDir, "", true)) {
if (shouldPreserveAbsent(relative)) continue;
const sourceExists = await fs.lstat(path.join(sourceDir, relative)).then(() => true).catch((error: NodeJS.ErrnoException) => {
if (error.code === "ENOENT" || error.code === "ENOTDIR") return false;
throw error;
});
if (!sourceExists) {
await fs.rm(path.join(targetDir, relative), { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => undefined);
}
}
for await (const relative of walkDirectory(sourceDir)) {
await copyWorkspaceEntry(sourceDir, targetDir, relative);
}
}
interface WorkspaceSourceRoot {
sourceDir: string;
dev: number;
ino: number;
}
async function captureWorkspaceSourceRoot(localDir: string): Promise<WorkspaceSourceRoot> {
const sourceDir = await fs.realpath(localDir);
const stats = await fs.lstat(sourceDir);
if (!stats.isDirectory()) throw new Error("Workspace overlay root is not a directory");
return { sourceDir, dev: stats.dev, ino: stats.ino };
}
async function copySelectedWorkspaceEntries(input: {
sourceRoot: WorkspaceSourceRoot;
targetDir: string;
relativePaths: WorkspacePaths;
ignoredPaths?: WorkspacePaths;
exclude: string[];
}): Promise<void> {
await fs.mkdir(input.targetDir, { recursive: true });
const { sourceDir, dev, ino } = input.sourceRoot;
const assertSourceRoot = async () => {
const current = await fs.lstat(sourceDir);
if (!current.isDirectory() || current.dev !== dev || current.ino !== ino) {
throw new Error("Workspace overlay root directory changed during staging");
}
};
await assertSourceRoot();
const ignored = workspacePathMatcher(input.ignoredPaths);
try {
for (const relative of workspacePaths(input.relativePaths)) {
if (shouldExcludePath(relative, input.exclude) || ignored.matches(relative)) continue;
const sourcePath = path.join(sourceDir, relative);
const parentSegments = path.relative(sourceDir, path.dirname(sourcePath)).split(path.sep).filter(Boolean);
const assertParentDirectory = async () => {
// Git selected this path before staging. A replaced ancestor must not
// redirect the copy through a symlink, even to another workspace folder.
// Inspect types instead of comparing realpath spelling: case-insensitive
// filesystems can resolve Git's indexed casing to a renamed directory.
let parentPath = sourceDir;
for (const segment of parentSegments) {
if (segment === "..") throw new Error(`Workspace overlay directory escapes its root: ${relative}`);
parentPath = path.join(parentPath, segment);
if (!(await fs.lstat(parentPath)).isDirectory()) {
throw new Error(`Workspace overlay ancestor is not a directory: ${relative}`);
}
}
};
// Include root-level entries, and do not treat a missing root as an
// ordinary source file that disappeared after the snapshot.
await assertSourceRoot();
try {
await assertParentDirectory();
await fs.lstat(sourcePath);
} catch (error) {
if ((error as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === "ENOENT") continue;
throw error;
}
await copyWorkspaceEntry(sourceDir, input.targetDir, relative);
// Do not upload the staged tree if an ancestor changed during the copy.
await assertSourceRoot();
await assertParentDirectory();
}
} finally { ignored.close(); }
}
function toBuffer(bytes: Buffer | Uint8Array | ArrayBuffer): Buffer {
if (Buffer.isBuffer(bytes)) return bytes;
if (bytes instanceof ArrayBuffer) return Buffer.from(bytes);
return Buffer.from(bytes.buffer, bytes.byteOffset, bytes.byteLength);
}
// Sum `bytesTransferred` over a `SandboxSyncResult`. The result crosses the
// plugin boundary, so a provider can return anything: guard each value and
// treat a missing, non-finite, or negative number as 0.
function sumSyncResultBytes(result: SandboxSyncResult): number {
return result.operations.reduce((total, operation) => {
const bytes = operation.bytesTransferred;
return Number.isFinite(bytes) && bytes > 0 ? total + bytes : total;
}, 0);
}
function tarExcludeFlags(exclude: string[] | undefined): string {
return ["._*", ...(exclude ?? [])].map((entry) => `--exclude ${shellQuote(entry)}`).join(" ");
}
function createRemoteTarballFromDirectoryCommand(input: {
remoteDir: string;
archivePath: string;
exclude?: string[];
}): string {
const list = `${input.archivePath}.entries`;
return [
`mkdir -p ${shellQuote(path.posix.dirname(input.archivePath))}`,
`cd ${shellQuote(input.remoteDir)}`,
`find . -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -print0 > ${shellQuote(list)}`,
`tar -cf ${shellQuote(input.archivePath)} ${tarExcludeFlags(input.exclude)} --null -T ${shellQuote(list)}`,
`rm -f -- ${shellQuote(list)}`,
].join(" && ");
}
async function emitRuntimeStatus(
sink: RuntimeStatusSink | undefined,
phase: RuntimeStatusPhase,
message: string,
): Promise<void> {
if (!sink) return;
await Promise.resolve(sink({ phase, message })).catch(() => undefined);
}
export function mergeExcludes(...groups: Array<string[] | undefined>): string[] {
return [...new Set(groups.flatMap((group) => group ?? []))];
}
function preserveFindArgs(entries: string[]): string {
return entries.map((entry) => `! -name ${shellQuote(entry)}`).join(" ");
}
// Bridge a single byte-level transfer to the throttled progress reporter. The
// transport reports decoded bytes via `options.onProgress`; the reporter turns
// them into a throttled, fully-formatted log line. `finish()` emits the terminal
// completion line (idempotent) once the transfer returns.
function makeTransferProgress(
sink: RuntimeProgressSink | undefined,
phase: RuntimeProgressPhase,
direction: RuntimeProgressDirection,
label?: string,
runtimeStatus?: {
sink: RuntimeStatusSink | undefined;
phase: RuntimeStatusPhase;
},
): {
options: SandboxTransferProgressOptions | undefined;
finish: (doneBytes?: number, totalBytes?: number | null) => Promise<void>;
} {
if (!sink && !runtimeStatus?.sink) {
return { options: undefined, finish: async () => {} };
}
const reporter = createRuntimeProgressReporter({
sink: async (line) => {
await sink?.(line);
if (runtimeStatus?.sink) {
await emitRuntimeStatus(
runtimeStatus.sink,
runtimeStatus.phase,
line.replace(/^\[paperclip\]\s*/, "").trim(),
);
}
},
phase,
direction,
target: "sandbox",
label,
});
return {
options: {
onProgress: async (transferredBytes, totalBytes) => {
await reporter.report(transferredBytes, totalBytes);
},
},
finish: async (doneBytes, totalBytes) => {
await reporter.complete(doneBytes, totalBytes);
},
};
}
export async function prepareSandboxManagedRuntime(input: {
spec: SandboxRemoteExecutionSpec;
adapterKey: string;
client: SandboxManagedRuntimeClient;
workspaceLocalDir: string;
workspaceRemoteDir?: string;
syncWorkspace?: boolean;
/** Selects authoritative host staging, exact durable-seed replay, or no-overwrite adoption. */
workspaceInboundMode?: WorkspaceInboundMode;
workspaceDurableSeed?: WorkspaceDurableSeedPaths;
/** Durable snapshots supplied when reconstructing an interrupted restore. */
workspaceBaseline?: DirectorySnapshot;
workspaceGitSnapshot?: GitWorkspaceSnapshot | null;
workspaceExclude?: string[];
/** Plain persistent directories include all files, independent of Git and task cache exclusions. */
workspaceFileMode?: "all";
preserveAbsentOnRestore?: string[];
assets?: SandboxManagedRuntimeAsset[];
/**
* Referenced (additional) projects to stage into the sandbox as plain,
* read-only trees, each in its own isolated `project-<projectId>` directory.
* Defaults to none, so a legacy/anchor-only call is behavior-identical.
*/
additionalSources?: SandboxAdditionalSource[];
// Upload progress sink. Threaded for the byte-counting transport rewrite; the
// child task wires it into writeFile/readFile.
onProgress?: RuntimeProgressSink;
onRuntimeProgress?: RuntimeStatusSink;
// Optional host span runner for the workspace tarball build. When present, the
// host builds both workspace tarballs inside one span named `pack`, so the
// host pack time is visible under the `stage.sync` step. The default is a
// no-op that keeps the current behavior and control flow. A throwing runner
// never changes control flow (see `createRuntimeSpanRunner`).
runtimeSpan?: RuntimeSpanRunner;
}): Promise<PreparedSandboxManagedRuntime> {
const workspaceRemoteDir = input.workspaceRemoteDir ?? input.spec.remoteCwd;
const runtimeRootDir = path.posix.join(workspaceRemoteDir, ".paperclip-runtime", input.adapterKey);
// A workspace directory that does not exist on this host has nothing to
// stage, no files for ignore rules to govern, and nothing to restore into —
// callers that only stage credential assets (the adapter env tests) hand
// the runtime a fresh path. Treat that one case as "do not sync" rather
// than letting the ignore scan or the staging walk die on ENOENT. Any other
// access failure still fails the preparation: a workspace that exists but
// cannot be read must not silently become an empty remote workspace.
const syncWorkspace = input.syncWorkspace !== false &&
(await fs.access(input.workspaceLocalDir).then(
() => true,
(error: NodeJS.ErrnoException) => {
if (error.code === "ENOENT") return false;
throw error;
},
));
const workspaceInboundMode = input.workspaceInboundMode ?? "host_current";
const stageWorkspace =
syncWorkspace && workspaceInboundMode !== "adopt_remote";
const prepareWorkspaceSeed =
syncWorkspace &&
workspaceInboundMode === "adopt_remote" &&
input.workspaceDurableSeed !== undefined;
if (workspaceInboundMode === "durable_seed" && !input.workspaceDurableSeed) {
throw new Error("workspace_durable_seed_missing");
}
// Reject any unsafe asset key before an archive path or an asset directory is
// built from it. This runs before the git snapshot work so a bad key fails fast.
for (const asset of input.assets ?? []) {
assertRuntimeAssetKeyIsSafe(asset.key);
}
// Wrap a host-side staging sub-step or one scheduler task in its own span when
// the caller injects a runtime span runner. The runner defaults to a no-op, so
// a caller with no injected runner keeps the current control flow, and a
// throwing runner never changes it (see `createRuntimeSpanRunner`). The two
// pre-`pack` operations — the git enumeration and the baseline content-hash
// walk — parent under the `stage.sync` step, so they stop showing up as a
// hidden gap at the head of the step. Each inbound task (`stage.workspace`,
// `stage.asset.<key>`, `stage.project.<id>`) and each outbound restore task
// (`restore.workspace`, `restore.asset.<key>`) opens its own span, so two
// concurrent tasks produce overlapping spans and the `pack` span nests under
// `stage.workspace`. The outbound spans parent under the run's `sandbox.syncBack`
// span, because the teardown runs the restore inside that span.
const runStepSpan = <T>(name: string, work: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> =>
input.runtimeSpan ? input.runtimeSpan(name, work) : work();
// Resolve an existing workspace alias once, before reading its snapshot.
// All subsequent work uses that root, so retargeting the alias cannot select
// another repository. Staging also verifies the captured directory identity.
const workspaceRoot = syncWorkspace ? await captureWorkspaceSourceRoot(input.workspaceLocalDir) : null;
if (workspaceRoot) input = { ...input, workspaceLocalDir: workspaceRoot.sourceDir };
// The git enumeration (`git status --ignored`, the HEAD diffs, `ls-files`).
// It reads git's own bookkeeping to decide what to include/exclude, so it is
// usually fast, but on a large working tree the `--ignored` walk is not free.
const gitSnapshot = syncWorkspace && input.workspaceFileMode !== "all"
? input.workspaceGitSnapshot !== undefined
? input.workspaceGitSnapshot
: await runStepSpan("snapshot.git", () =>
readGitWorkspaceSnapshot(input.workspaceLocalDir),
)
: null;
let baselineSnapshot: DirectorySnapshot | null = null;
const cleanupWorkspaceSnapshot = async () => {
await disposeDirectorySnapshot(baselineSnapshot);
await disposeGitWorkspaceSnapshot(gitSnapshot);
};
try {
// A selected subfolder has no cloneable Git snapshot, but its parent
// repository's ignore rules still govern which files may leave the host.
// Use the same bounded, path-relative resolver as referenced project trees.
const directoryIgnore = syncWorkspace && !gitSnapshot && input.workspaceFileMode !== "all"
? await resolveReferencedSourceIgnore(input.workspaceLocalDir)
: null;
if (directoryIgnore?.kind === "failed") {
throw new Error(`Workspace ignore scan failed: ${directoryIgnore.reason}`);
}
const gitIgnoredExcludes = directoryIgnore?.kind === "git" ? directoryIgnore.ignoredPaths : undefined;
const workspaceArchiveExclude = mergeExcludes(
input.workspaceFileMode === "all" ? [] : SANDBOX_WORKSPACE_HEAVY_DIR_EXCLUDES,
input.workspaceFileMode === "all" ? [] : [...GIT_ARCHIVE_EXCLUDES],
input.workspaceExclude,
gitIgnoredExcludes,
);
const restoreExclude = mergeExcludes(
input.workspaceFileMode === "all" ? [] : SANDBOX_WORKSPACE_HEAVY_DIR_EXCLUDES,
input.workspaceFileMode === "all" ? [] : [...GIT_ARCHIVE_EXCLUDES],
[".paperclip-runtime"],
input.preserveAbsentOnRestore,
input.workspaceExclude,
gitIgnoredExcludes,
);
const repositories = gitSnapshot?.repositories ?? [];
const workspaceRestoreExclude = mergeExcludes(restoreExclude, repositories.map((repo) => repo.path));
// The baseline "before" snapshot: a recursive walk of the whole workspace that
// `lstat`s every entry and SHA-256-hashes every file's bytes. This is the
// dominant cost in the pre-`pack` window — it reads the content of every
// non-excluded file, serially — so it earns its own span.
baselineSnapshot = syncWorkspace
? (input.workspaceBaseline ??
(await runStepSpan("snapshot.baseline", () =>
captureDirectorySnapshot(input.workspaceLocalDir, {
exclude: restoreExclude,
ignoredPaths: gitSnapshot?.ignoredPaths,
diskBacked: true,
}),
)))
: null;
// Every inbound staging step delegates to the provider through `client.syncIn`:
// the orchestrator no longer inlines `writeFile`+`run` or chooses a transport,
// and there is no `usesCustomProvision` native-diversion gate. `syncIn` is
// ALWAYS present in production — the command-managed client exposes a native
// transport (Daytona/Kubernetes `uploadFiles` + provider-executed post-upload
// commands) or a byte-identical base64-tar fallback that reproduces the prior
// `writeFile`+`run` sequence. Require it explicitly so a misconfigured client
// fails loud rather than silently skipping staging. `syncOut` stays optional
// (native-only) with a tar fallback on the restore path below.
const syncIn = input.client.syncIn;
if (typeof syncIn !== "function") {
throw new Error(
"prepareSandboxManagedRuntime requires a client that exposes syncIn " +
"(createCommandManagedRuntimeClient provides a native-or-fallback implementation).",
);
}
const nativeSyncOut = typeof input.client.syncOut === "function";
let syncOperationSeq = 0;
// Opaque, ordered, non-sensitive operation tokens — never a caller/asset id.
const nextSyncOperationId = () => `sync-op-${++syncOperationSeq}`;
// Remote directory of each additional (referenced) project that stages
// successfully, keyed by projectId. A project that fails to stage is absent.
const additionalSourceDirs: Record<string, string> = {};
// Each additional (referenced) project whose staging failed, paired with the
// failure message. Per-project failure isolation keeps the run and the other
// projects going; this list makes each failure a first-class, reported outcome.
const additionalSourceFailures: AdditionalSourceStagingFailure[] = [];
// Additional projects stage as plain trees. Drop the heavy build/cache dirs a
// reference tree does not need, and `.git` — additional sources never carry
// git-history semantics (anchor-only). Each project also drops its OWN
// resolved Git-ignored paths (or keeps this fixed set as-is for a non-Git
// source) — see `resolveReferencedSourceIgnore` and the per-project merge
// below.
const additionalSourceBaseExclude = mergeExcludes(SANDBOX_WORKSPACE_HEAVY_DIR_EXCLUDES, [".git"]);
// Every delegated post-upload command (extract/wipe/remove-deleted/asset merge)
// must run under the run-specific timeout (`spec.timeoutMs`), not the provider
// sync client's default timeout — the two can differ, and before staging was
// routed through `syncIn` each of these ran via
// `client.run(cmd, { timeoutMs: spec.timeoutMs })`. When they mismatch, a
// command left without a `timeoutMs` outlives (or is killed under) the wrong
// limit. Stamp the run timeout onto every delegated command, preserving any
// command that already carries its own explicit timeout.
const withRunTimeout = (
commands: SandboxPostUploadCommand[],
): SandboxPostUploadCommand[] =>
commands.map((command) => ({
...command,
timeoutMs: command.timeoutMs ?? input.spec.timeoutMs,
}));
await withTempDir("paperclip-sandbox-sync-", async (tempDir) => {
const preservedNames = new Set([
".paperclip-runtime",
...(gitSnapshot ? [".git"] : []),
...(input.preserveAbsentOnRestore ?? []),
]);
// Stage one source directory into an isolated remote subdirectory through the
// unified `syncIn` seam. Both the workspace/asset tar path and the additional
// (referenced) project path use it: build one `SandboxSyncOperation` from the
// caller's `files` mappings (a host tarball as a single `file` mapping, or a
// whole `directory` mapping), carry any extract/wipe/merge steps as ordered
// `postUploadCommands`, confine the operation's source and target to their
// own roots (fail-closed), and delegate to `syncIn` (native transfer, or the
// base64-tar fallback). `finish` emits the terminal progress line.
const stageConfinedSyncIn = async (params: {
files: SandboxSyncFileMapping[];
postUploadCommands?: SandboxPostUploadCommand[];
sourceRoots: string[];
targetRoots: string[];
progressLabel: string;
statusPhase: RuntimeStatusPhase;
progressBytes: number;
}): Promise<void> => {
const operations: SandboxSyncOperation[] = [{
operationId: nextSyncOperationId(),
files: params.files,
...(params.postUploadCommands
? { postUploadCommands: withRunTimeout(params.postUploadCommands) }
: {}),
}];
assertSyncOperationsConfined(operations, {
sourceRoots: params.sourceRoots,
targetRoots: params.targetRoots,
});
const upload = makeTransferProgress(
input.onProgress,
"Syncing",
"to",
params.progressLabel,
{ sink: input.onRuntimeProgress, phase: params.statusPhase },
);
const syncResult = await syncIn(operations);
// Prefer the transport's own byte total. It is the real count for a
// provider that has no host tarball to stat (a referenced project rides
// a `directory` mapping). Fall back to the caller-supplied count when
// the transport reports 0, so a provider that under-reports still
// shows the host-known workspace total.
const transferredBytes = sumSyncResultBytes(syncResult);
const reportedBytes = transferredBytes > 0 ? transferredBytes : params.progressBytes;
await upload.finish(reportedBytes, reportedBytes);
};
// Build the ordered inbound operation task list. Each task stages one inbound
// operation from start to end: it packs the bytes, confines the mappings, and
// uploads them. The shared scheduler starts the tasks. When the sync client
// permits concurrency, the scheduler keeps at most SYNC_OPERATION_CONCURRENCY_LIMIT
// tasks active. When the client does not permit concurrency, the scheduler runs
// one task at a time in this order. The scheduler settles every started task
// before it returns, so no upload outlives the coordinator and ACP never starts
// before the barrier.
const inboundTasks: Array<SyncOperationTask<void>> = [];
// A required-flag list, one entry per task and index-aligned with inboundTasks.
// The workspace and each asset are required operations: a rejection is fatal
// after the barrier. Each referenced project is a nonfatal operation: its task
// records its own failure and never rejects.
const inboundTaskIsRequired: boolean[] = [];
if (stageWorkspace || prepareWorkspaceSeed) {
inboundTaskIsRequired.push(true);
inboundTasks.push(() =>
runStepSpan("stage.workspace", async () => {
// A git-backed workspace and a plain workspace both stage through ONE
// confined `syncIn` operation. A git-backed workspace carries TWO host tars —
// the git-history clone and the working-tree overlay — as two `file` mappings
// on the SAME operation, with their extract commands as ordered
// `postUploadCommands`. One operation shares one mkdir, one confine guard, one
// `uploadFiles`, and one rename exec, so the second `syncIn` round trip is
// removed. Build the whole merged file set and command list BEFORE the confine
// guard runs (inside `stageConfinedSyncIn`); never append a mapping after it.
const workspaceFiles: SandboxSyncFileMapping[] = [];
const workspacePostUploadCommands: SandboxPostUploadCommand[] = [];
let workspaceUploadBytes = 0;
// Build both host tarballs (the git-history tar and the workspace-overlay
// tar) inside one host span named `pack`. This span makes the host pack
// time visible under the `stage.sync` step, where it is otherwise a hidden
// gap with no span. The transfer (`stageConfinedSyncIn`) runs after this
// span, so `pack` measures only the host tar-build cost. The runner
// defaults to a no-op, so a caller with no injected runner keeps the
// current behavior and control flow.
await runStepSpan("pack", async () => {
// 1. git-history tar (git-backed workspace only). Both tar targets live under
// `runtimeRootDir` (`.paperclip-runtime/<adapterKey>`). The git extract
// wipes the target tree EXCEPT `.paperclip-runtime`, so the overlay tar,
// which sits under `.paperclip-runtime`, survives to run its own extract.
if (gitSnapshot) {
await emitRuntimeStatus(input.onRuntimeProgress, "git_sync", "Syncing git history to environment");
const gitTarPath = path.join(tempDir, "git-workspace.tar");
const remoteGitTar = path.posix.join(
runtimeRootDir,
"git-workspace-upload.tar",
);
if (workspaceInboundMode === "durable_seed") {
const durableGitArchive =
input.workspaceDurableSeed?.gitArchivePath;
if (!durableGitArchive) {
throw new Error("workspace_durable_seed_git_missing");
}
await copyDurableSeedArchive({
sourcePath: durableGitArchive,
targetPath: gitTarPath,
expectedSha256: input.workspaceDurableSeed?.gitArchiveSha256,
});
} else {
await withShallowGitWorkspaceClone(
{
localDir: input.workspaceLocalDir,
snapshot: gitSnapshot,
},
async (cloneDir) => {
await createTarballFromDirectory({
localDir: cloneDir,
archivePath: gitTarPath,
exclude: [".paperclip-runtime"],
});
},
);
if (input.workspaceDurableSeed?.gitArchivePath) {
await persistDurableSeedArchive({
sourcePath: gitTarPath,
targetPath: input.workspaceDurableSeed.gitArchivePath,
});
}
}
workspaceFiles.push({
sourcePath: gitTarPath,
targetPath: remoteGitTar,
kind: "file",
access: "rw",
writablePath: workspaceRemoteDir,
});
workspacePostUploadCommands.push({
command: buildWorkspaceTarExtractCommand({
workspaceRemoteDir,
remoteTar: remoteGitTar,
wipeExceptNames: [".paperclip-runtime"],
}),
});
workspaceUploadBytes += (await fs.stat(gitTarPath)).size;
}
// 2. workspace-overlay tar. A git-backed overlay merges on top of the just
// extracted git tree (no wipe); a plain workspace wipes every child except
// the preserved names first. The extract runs AFTER the git extract.
await emitRuntimeStatus(input.onRuntimeProgress, "config_sync", "Syncing workspace to environment");
const workspaceTarPath = path.join(tempDir, "workspace.tar");
if (workspaceInboundMode === "durable_seed") {
await copyDurableSeedArchive({
sourcePath: input.workspaceDurableSeed!.workspaceArchivePath,
targetPath: workspaceTarPath,
expectedSha256:
input.workspaceDurableSeed!.workspaceArchiveSha256,
});
} else {
const workspaceArchiveDir = gitSnapshot
? path.join(tempDir, "workspace-overlay")
: input.workspaceLocalDir;
if (gitSnapshot) {
await copySelectedWorkspaceEntries({
sourceRoot: workspaceRoot!,
targetDir: workspaceArchiveDir,
relativePaths: gitSnapshot.overlayPaths,
ignoredPaths: gitSnapshot.ignoredPaths,
exclude: workspaceArchiveExclude,
});
}
await createTarballFromDirectory({
localDir: workspaceArchiveDir,
archivePath: workspaceTarPath,
exclude: gitSnapshot ? undefined : workspaceArchiveExclude,
});
if (input.workspaceDurableSeed) {
await persistDurableSeedArchive({
sourcePath: workspaceTarPath,
targetPath: input.workspaceDurableSeed.workspaceArchivePath,
});
}
}
const remoteWorkspaceTar = path.posix.join(
runtimeRootDir,
"workspace-upload.tar",
);
workspaceFiles.push({
sourcePath: workspaceTarPath,
targetPath: remoteWorkspaceTar,
kind: "file",
access: "rw",
writablePath: workspaceRemoteDir,
});
workspacePostUploadCommands.push({
command: buildWorkspaceTarExtractCommand({
workspaceRemoteDir,
remoteTar: remoteWorkspaceTar,
wipeExceptNames: gitSnapshot ? null : [...preservedNames],
}),
});
// 3. Optional remove-deleted-paths command runs LAST, after both extracts.
if (gitSnapshot && (isPathManifest(gitSnapshot.deletedPaths) ? gitSnapshot.deletedPaths.count : gitSnapshot.deletedPaths.length) > 0) {
const deletedManifest = path.join(tempDir, "deleted.nul");
const remoteDeletedManifest = path.posix.join(runtimeRootDir, "deleted.nul");
await writeWorkspacePaths(gitSnapshot.deletedPaths, deletedManifest);
workspaceFiles.push({ sourcePath: deletedManifest, targetPath: remoteDeletedManifest, kind: "file", access: "rw", writablePath: runtimeRootDir });
workspacePostUploadCommands.push({ command: buildRemoveDeletedPathsCommand({ remoteDir: workspaceRemoteDir, manifestPath: remoteDeletedManifest }) });
}
workspaceUploadBytes += (await fs.stat(workspaceTarPath)).size;
});
if (!stageWorkspace) return;
// One confined `syncIn` for the whole merged workspace file set. The confine
// guard covers every mapping BEFORE any bytes upload (fail-closed): a source
// or target escape in EITHER tar mapping stops the upload of both.
await stageConfinedSyncIn({
files: workspaceFiles,
postUploadCommands: workspacePostUploadCommands,
sourceRoots: [tempDir],
targetRoots: [runtimeRootDir],
progressLabel: "workspace",
statusPhase: "config_sync",
progressBytes: workspaceUploadBytes,
});
}),
);
}
for (const asset of input.assets ?? []) {
inboundTaskIsRequired.push(true);
inboundTasks.push(() =>
runStepSpan(`stage.asset.${asset.key}`, async () => {
await emitRuntimeStatus(input.onRuntimeProgress, "config_sync", "Syncing runtime assets to environment");
const remoteAssetDir = path.posix.join(runtimeRootDir, asset.key);
const remoteAssetTar = path.posix.join(runtimeRootDir, `${asset.key}-upload.tar`);
// Every asset — default OR custom-provisioned (e.g. an adapter credential
// merge) — rides one `syncIn` operation: the asset tar plus any staged
// helper files as `files` mappings, and the extract/merge command as the
// ordered post-upload command. There is no native-diversion gate; a
// custom-provisioned asset's bytes now ride native `uploadFiles` and its
// command runs as a provider-executed post-upload command.
const assetTarPath = path.join(tempDir, `${asset.key}.tar`);
await createTarballFromDirectory({
localDir: asset.localDir,
archivePath: assetTarPath,
followSymlinks: asset.followSymlinks,
exclude: asset.exclude,
});
const files: SandboxSyncFileMapping[] = [
{ sourcePath: assetTarPath, targetPath: remoteAssetTar, kind: "file", access: "rw", writablePath: remoteAssetDir },
];
// Stage provision helper files (e.g. the merge scripts) into the temp dir
// and map them alongside the asset tar so they ride the same native upload.
for (const stageFile of asset.provision?.stageFiles ?? []) {
const safeName = stageFile.name;
if (/[\\/]|\.\.(\.|$)/.test(safeName) || safeName === "..") {
throw new Error(`provision stageFile.name must be a simple basename, got: ${safeName}`);
}
const stageBytes = typeof stageFile.contents === "string"
? Buffer.from(stageFile.contents)
: stageFile.contents;
const stageHostPath = path.join(tempDir, `${asset.key}.stage.${safeName}`);
await fs.writeFile(stageHostPath, stageBytes);
// A stage helper file (for example a merge script) is a read-only input
// that the provision command reads; the agent does not change it and does
// not keep it. So it is `access: "ro"` and never joins the writable set.
files.push({
sourcePath: stageHostPath,
targetPath: path.posix.join(runtimeRootDir, safeName),
kind: "file",
access: "ro",
});
}
const postUploadCommand = asset.provision?.postUploadCommand?.({
assetTarPath: remoteAssetTar,
assetDir: remoteAssetDir,
runtimeRootDir,
}) ?? buildDefaultExtractRuntimeAssetCommand({ remoteAssetDir, remoteAssetTar });
const assetTarSize = (await fs.stat(assetTarPath)).size;
await stageConfinedSyncIn({
files,
postUploadCommands: [{ command: postUploadCommand }],
sourceRoots: [tempDir],
targetRoots: [runtimeRootDir],
progressLabel: asset.key,
statusPhase: "config_sync",
progressBytes: assetTarSize,
});
}),
);
}
// Stage each referenced (additional) project as a plain, read-only tree in
// its OWN isolated remote directory (`project-<projectId>`). An additional
// project rides one confined `syncIn` directory mapping — a native directory
// transfer, or the base64-tar fallback — with source and target confined to
// their own roots. No workspace, git-history, or `.paperclip-runtime`
// semantics apply; those stay anchor-only. Per-project failure isolation: one
// project's confinement or sync failure logs a warning and is skipped, and
// the run plus the other projects continue. Only a project that stages
// successfully appears in `additionalSourceDirs`.
const additionalSourceList = input.additionalSources ?? [];
// Record each referenced-project failure in its input-order slot. Slot order
// keeps the failure list stable no matter the task completion order under
// concurrency.
const additionalFailureSlots: Array<AdditionalSourceStagingFailure | null> =
additionalSourceList.map(() => null);
additionalSourceList.forEach((source, sourceIndex) => {
inboundTaskIsRequired.push(false);
inboundTasks.push(() =>
runStepSpan(`stage.project.${source.projectId}`, async () => {
const { localPath, projectId, ignoreResolution } = source;
const label = `project-${projectId}`;
try {
if (!path.posix.isAbsolute(localPath)) {
throw new Error(`additional source localPath is not an absolute path: ${localPath}`);
}
if (
projectId.length === 0 ||
projectId.includes("/") ||
projectId.includes("\\") ||
projectId.includes("..")
) {
throw new Error(`additional source projectId is not a simple path segment: ${projectId}`);
}
// Fail closed: a project whose ignore resolution failed is not staged
// at all. Shipping it with only the fixed heavy-directory excludes
// would defeat the resolution's purpose.
if (ignoreResolution.kind === "failed") {
throw new Error(`referenced project ignore resolution failed: ${ignoreResolution.reason}`);
}
const remoteProjectDir = path.posix.join(runtimeRootDir, label);
const exclude = mergeExcludes(
additionalSourceBaseExclude,
referencedSourceIgnoreExcludeEntries(ignoreResolution),
);
await emitRuntimeStatus(input.onRuntimeProgress, "config_sync", "Syncing referenced project to environment");
await stageConfinedSyncIn({
files: [{
sourcePath: localPath,
targetPath: remoteProjectDir,
kind: "directory",
exclude,
access: "ro",
}],
sourceRoots: [localPath],
targetRoots: [remoteProjectDir],
progressLabel: label,
statusPhase: "config_sync",
progressBytes: 0,
});
additionalSourceDirs[projectId] = remoteProjectDir;
} catch (error) {
const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
// Record the failure as a first-class per-project outcome so the run can count it in the
// requested-vs-synced accounting and surface the reason on the run result and the run log.
// The structured slot carries the reason, so no `console.warn` line is needed here.
additionalFailureSlots[sourceIndex] = { projectId, error: message };
}
}),
);
});
// Run every inbound operation through the shared scheduler. It starts the
// tasks under the client's concurrency permission and the bound, and it
// settles every started task before it returns. This is the startup barrier:
// the coordinator returns only after every upload settles.
const inboundResults = await scheduleSyncOperations(
inboundTasks,
input.client.allowConcurrentSyncOperations === true,
SYNC_OPERATION_CONCURRENCY_LIMIT,
);
// Collect the referenced-project failures in stable input order.
for (const failure of additionalFailureSlots) {
if (failure) {
additionalSourceFailures.push(failure);
}
}
// Select a fatal failure in stable operation order. The workspace comes first,
// then each asset. A referenced-project task never rejects, so a nonfatal
// outcome never appears here. Raise the first required rejection, so two
// required failures raise the earlier one.
for (let index = 0; index < inboundResults.length; index += 1) {
const result = inboundResults[index];
if (inboundTaskIsRequired[index] && result.status === "rejected") {
throw result.reason;
}
}
});
const assetDirs = Object.fromEntries(
(input.assets ?? []).map((asset) => [asset.key, path.posix.join(runtimeRootDir, asset.key)]),
);
return {
spec: input.spec,
workspaceLocalDir: input.workspaceLocalDir,
workspaceRemoteDir,
runtimeRootDir,
assetDirs,
additionalSourceDirs,
additionalSourceFailures,
workspaceSyncSnapshot:
syncWorkspace && baselineSnapshot
? { baseline: baselineSnapshot, gitSnapshot }
: null,
cleanupWorkspaceSnapshot,
restoreWorkspace: async (onProgress?: RuntimeProgressSink) => {
try {
const restoreSink = onProgress ?? input.onProgress;
// Build the ordered outbound restore task list. Each task runs one
// restore from start to end: the workspace restore, or one asset restore.
// The shared scheduler starts the tasks. When the sync client permits
// concurrency, the scheduler keeps at most SYNC_OPERATION_CONCURRENCY_LIMIT
// tasks active. When the client does not permit concurrency, the scheduler
// runs one task at a time in this order. The scheduler settles every
// started task before it returns, so lease teardown never starts while an
// outbound restore task still writes host data.
const outboundTasks: Array<SyncOperationTask<void>> = [];
// The workspace restore task runs only when the run syncs the workspace.
// The task exports the sandbox git history (git-backed workspace), reads
// the sandbox workspace back, and merges it into the host workspace root.
// The merge is the only outbound write inside the host workspace root.
// Every other task writes a disjoint host target: an asset restore writes
// its own store outside the workspace root. So the workspace task and the
// asset tasks share one parallel set. Keep any future asset that must write
// inside the host workspace root out of this set, and run it after the
// merge. Each task gets its own restore temp directory, so two concurrent
// tasks never share scratch state.
if (syncWorkspace) {
outboundTasks.push(() =>
withWorkspaceRestoreDiagnostics("workspace", () => runStepSpan("restore.workspace", async () => {
// Each repository owns its Git history and merge. The parent baseline also
// records child files so restart recovery has their original merge inputs.
for (const repository of repositories) {
const prefix = `${repository.path}/`;
const localDir = path.join(input.workspaceLocalDir, repository.path);
if (await fs.realpath(localDir) !== path.join(await fs.realpath(input.workspaceLocalDir), repository.path)) {
throw new Error("Project repository escaped its workspace");
}
const nestedExclude = mergeExcludes(
baselineSnapshot!.exclude.flatMap((entry) =>
entry.startsWith(prefix) ? [entry.slice(prefix.length)]
: entry.startsWith("*/") ? [entry] : []),
);
const nested = await prepareSandboxManagedRuntime({
spec: { ...input.spec, remoteCwd: path.posix.join(workspaceRemoteDir, repository.path) },
client: input.client,
adapterKey: input.adapterKey,
workspaceLocalDir: localDir,
workspaceInboundMode: "adopt_remote",
workspaceGitSnapshot: repository.snapshot,
workspaceExclude: nestedExclude,
workspaceBaseline: await selectDirectorySnapshot(baselineSnapshot!, {
prefix,
exclude: mergeExcludes(SANDBOX_WORKSPACE_HEAVY_DIR_EXCLUDES, [...GIT_ARCHIVE_EXCLUDES], [".paperclip-runtime"], nestedExclude),
ignoredPaths: repository.snapshot.ignoredPaths,
}),
onRuntimeProgress: input.onRuntimeProgress,
});
await nested.restoreWorkspace(restoreSink);
}
await withTempDir("paperclip-sandbox-restore-", async (tempDir) => {
let importedRef: string | null = null;
let importedHead: string | null = null;
let remoteWorkspaceStatus = "dirty";
try {
if (gitSnapshot) {
await emitRuntimeStatus(input.onRuntimeProgress, "export", "Exporting git changes from environment");
importedRef = createImportedGitRef("sandbox");
const remoteGitBundle = path.posix.join(runtimeRootDir, "git-delta.bundle");
const remoteWorkspaceStatusPath = path.posix.join(runtimeRootDir, "workspace-status.txt");
const exportRef = createRemoteGitExportRef("sandbox");
const localBundlePath = path.join(tempDir, "git-delta.bundle");
// Export the sandbox history and import it into the host workspace.
// The delta bundle assumes the host holds the bundle's boundary
// commit; when the host has been reset far enough that it does not,
// the import fails on a missing prerequisite. In that case re-export
// a full, self-contained bundle from the still-live sandbox rather
// than discard the completed run.
const exportAndImport = async (forceFullBundle: boolean): Promise<string> => {
await input.client.run(
`sh -c ${shellQuote(buildRemoteGitDeltaBundleScript({
remoteDir: workspaceRemoteDir,
baseSha: gitSnapshot.headCommit,
exportRef,
bundlePath: remoteGitBundle,
statusPath: forceFullBundle ? undefined : remoteWorkspaceStatusPath,
forceFullBundle,
}))}`,
{ timeoutMs: input.spec.timeoutMs },
);
const gitExport = makeTransferProgress(
restoreSink,
"Exporting git history",
"from",
undefined,
{ sink: input.onRuntimeProgress, phase: "export" },
);
if (nativeSyncOut) {
// Native outbound: the provider copies the bundle straight from
// the sandbox into the host restore temp directory. This maps to
// one `kind: "file"` mapping. The host does not buffer the full
// bundle in RAM and does not move the bytes through the base64
// read loop. The git import step below reads the bundle from
// `localBundlePath`. The provider transfer reports its own byte
// total, so the "Exporting git history" progress still degrades to
// start-and-finish (mirrors the workspace restore below), but the
// finish line carries the real transferred byte count.
const operations: SandboxSyncOperation[] = [{
operationId: nextSyncOperationId(),
files: [{
sourcePath: remoteGitBundle,
targetPath: localBundlePath,
kind: "file",
}],
}];
assertSyncOperationsConfined(operations, {
sourceRoots: [runtimeRootDir],
targetRoots: [tempDir],
});
const syncResult = await input.client.syncOut!(operations);
const transferredBytes = sumSyncResultBytes(syncResult);
await gitExport.finish(transferredBytes, transferredBytes);
} else {
const bundleBytes = await input.client.readFile(remoteGitBundle, gitExport.options);
const bundleBuffer = toBuffer(bundleBytes);
await gitExport.finish(bundleBuffer.byteLength, bundleBuffer.byteLength);
await fs.writeFile(localBundlePath, bundleBuffer);
}
await input.client.remove(remoteGitBundle).catch(() => undefined);
if (!forceFullBundle) {
remoteWorkspaceStatus = await input.client.readFile(remoteWorkspaceStatusPath)
.then((bytes) => toBuffer(bytes).toString("utf8").trim())
.catch(() => "dirty");
remoteWorkspaceStatus = remoteWorkspaceStatus === "clean" ? "clean" : "dirty";
await input.client.remove(remoteWorkspaceStatusPath).catch(() => undefined);
}
return fetchGitBundleIntoLocalRef({
localDir: input.workspaceLocalDir,
bundlePath: localBundlePath,
exportRef,
importedRef: importedRef!,
baseSha: gitSnapshot.headCommit,
});
};
try {
importedHead = await exportAndImport(false);
} catch (error) {
if (!isMissingGitPrerequisiteError(error)) throw error;
importedHead = await exportAndImport(true);
}
}
await emitRuntimeStatus(input.onRuntimeProgress, "restore", "Restoring workspace from environment");
const extractedDir = path.join(tempDir, "workspace");
if (nativeSyncOut) {
// Native outbound: the provider materializes the sandbox workspace into
// a fresh host directory. It is a clean destroy-then-replace into a
// temp dir the orchestrator just created, so it maps exactly to a
// generic directory file mapping; the host-side baseline merge below is
// unchanged. The provider transfer reports its own byte total, so the
// finish line carries the real transferred byte count.
const operations: SandboxSyncOperation[] = [{
operationId: nextSyncOperationId(),
files: [{
sourcePath: workspaceRemoteDir,
targetPath: extractedDir,
kind: "directory",
exclude: workspaceRestoreExclude,
}],
}];
assertSyncOperationsConfined(operations, {
sourceRoots: [workspaceRemoteDir],
targetRoots: [extractedDir],
});
await fs.mkdir(extractedDir, { recursive: true });
const workspaceRestore = makeTransferProgress(
restoreSink,
"Restoring",
"from",
"workspace",
{ sink: input.onRuntimeProgress, phase: "restore" },
);
const syncResult = await input.client.syncOut!(operations);
const transferredBytes = sumSyncResultBytes(syncResult);
await workspaceRestore.finish(transferredBytes, transferredBytes);
} else {
const remoteWorkspaceTar = path.posix.join(runtimeRootDir, "workspace-download.tar");
await input.client.run(
`sh -c ${shellQuote(createRemoteTarballFromDirectoryCommand({
remoteDir: workspaceRemoteDir,
archivePath: remoteWorkspaceTar,
exclude: workspaceRestoreExclude,
}))}`,
{ timeoutMs: input.spec.timeoutMs },
);
const workspaceRestore = makeTransferProgress(
restoreSink,
"Restoring",
"from",
"workspace",
{ sink: input.onRuntimeProgress, phase: "restore" },
);
const archiveBytes = await input.client.readFile(remoteWorkspaceTar, workspaceRestore.options);
const archiveBuffer = toBuffer(archiveBytes);
await workspaceRestore.finish(archiveBuffer.byteLength, archiveBuffer.byteLength);
await input.client.remove(remoteWorkspaceTar).catch(() => undefined);
const localArchivePath = path.join(tempDir, "workspace.tar");
await fs.writeFile(localArchivePath, archiveBuffer);
await extractTarballToDirectory({
archivePath: localArchivePath,
localDir: extractedDir,
});
}
const gitHeadToIntegrate = importedHead;
const mergeBaseline = repositories.length === 0 ? baselineSnapshot! : await selectDirectorySnapshot(baselineSnapshot!, {
omit: repositories.map((repo) => repo.path), exclude: workspaceRestoreExclude, ignoredPaths: gitSnapshot?.ignoredPaths,
});
try {
await mergeDirectoryWithBaseline({
baseline: mergeBaseline,
sourceDir: extractedDir,
targetDir: input.workspaceLocalDir,
beforeApply: gitHeadToIntegrate
? async () => {
await integrateImportedGitHead({
localDir: input.workspaceLocalDir,
importedHead: gitHeadToIntegrate,
});
}
: undefined,
afterApply: gitSnapshot
? async () => {
await resetLocalGitIndexToHead({
localDir: input.workspaceLocalDir,
checkWorkingTreeClean: remoteWorkspaceStatus === "clean",
});
}
: undefined,
});
} finally { if (mergeBaseline !== baselineSnapshot) await disposeDirectorySnapshot(mergeBaseline); }
} finally {
await emitRuntimeStatus(input.onRuntimeProgress, "finalize", "Finalizing workspace");
if (importedRef) {
await deleteLocalGitRef({ localDir: input.workspaceLocalDir, ref: importedRef });
}
}
});
}), restoreSink),
);
}
// One restore task per asset that has a teardown contribution. Each task
// reads its asset back through `readFile` and writes a disjoint host
// target. Each task gets its own restore temp directory.
for (const asset of input.assets ?? []) {
if (!asset.restore) continue;
const assetRestore = asset.restore;
const assetKey = asset.key;
outboundTasks.push(() =>
withWorkspaceRestoreDiagnostics(
"asset",
() => runStepSpan(`restore.asset.${assetKey}`, async () => {
await withTempDir("paperclip-sandbox-restore-", async (tempDir) => {
await assetRestore({
assetDir: path.posix.join(runtimeRootDir, assetKey),
readFile: async (remotePath) => toBuffer(await input.client.readFile(remotePath)),
tempDir,
});
});
}), restoreSink),
);
}
// Run every outbound restore through the shared scheduler. It starts the
// tasks under the client concurrency permission and the bound, and it
// settles every started task before it returns. This is the teardown
// barrier.
const outboundResults = await scheduleSyncOperations(
outboundTasks,
input.client.allowConcurrentSyncOperations === true,
SYNC_OPERATION_CONCURRENCY_LIMIT,
);
// Every outbound restore is a required operation: a rejection is fatal.
// The workspace comes first, then each asset in order. Raise the first
// rejection in stable task order, so two failures raise the earlier one.
for (const result of outboundResults) {
if (result.status === "rejected") {
throw result.reason;
}
}
} finally { await cleanupWorkspaceSnapshot(); }
},
};
} catch (error) { await cleanupWorkspaceSnapshot(); throw error; }
}