PaperClipAI/doc/connections/README.md

Apps, Connections, and Integrations

Audience: internal engineers and product contributors working on integrations.

Start here when adding a provider: Connection authoring runbook. It is the canonical agent tutorial from provider research and protocol classification through manifest generation, branding, secrets, deterministic tests, real-account proof, and PR submission.

Runtime authentication: AI Connections.

Long-term memory: Experimental memory connectors.

Provider notes: Google Workspace, Gmail, Asana, PostHog, AgentMail, and iMessage Photon. Optional credential custody: Vercel Connect.

Post-read action: classify a new integration request, pick the right Paperclip layer to change, and avoid creating a parallel connection framework.

Decision Record

Board decisions from PAP-13211 make the Apps v2 substrate on the PAP-10341 branch canonical:

• D1: Apps v2 is the substrate. The active model is tool_applications, tool_connections, catalog entries, profiles, policy rules, action requests, gateway sessions, audit events, and runtime slots. Connections v1 is retired as an implementation path.
• D2: one credential authority per connection, brokered projections. The default is the Paperclip instance vault: durable third-party credentials live in company_secrets as secret refs. A reviewed remote MCP method may instead opt in to Vercel Connect, in which case Vercel is the durable credential authority and Paperclip stores only the connector reference and redacted grant metadata. A connection must never mix those two sources. Adapter config, plugin config, harness credential files, and run environments may receive only brokered or projected credentials.
• D3: the vocabulary and three-door IA are product law. The default product doors are Apps, Connections, and Review. Protocol and operator-depth concepts live behind Developer or Advanced surfaces.
• D4: unification lands on PAP-10341. Pages, CircleBack-style harness MCP OAuth, provider gallery work, and plugin-provided integrations converge on this branch instead of spawning new integration substrates.
• D5: inbound stays thin. External clients that call Paperclip use scoped Paperclip tokens and existing profiles/rules. They do not get a separate permission model.

Canonical Object Model

Use connection as the unifying noun. A connection is four things:

1. A stored credential reference.
2. A capability catalog.
3. A governance layer.
4. An audit trail.

Everything else is an axis on that object:

Axis	Values	It answers
Direction	outbound, inbound	Who is the client?
Transport	MCP, native REST/OpenAPI, OAuth app install, webhook	How do bytes move?
Auth mode	OAuth, API key/PAT, app installation, none	What does the secret represent?
Credential owner	company, user, run	Whose identity acts?
Packaging	catalog entry, plugin, skill	How does it ship?

MCP is a transport, not a product category. "Install the Discord app", "connect Google Drive", and "add an MCP endpoint" all produce governed connections with different transport/auth values.

Layer Stack

When you are unsure where a change belongs, place it on the narrowest layer that solves the problem:

Layer	Owns	Examples
Surface	user-facing Apps, Connections, Review, Developer/Advanced screens	gallery cards, setup wizard, review queue
Governance	profiles, bindings, allow/ask-first/block rules, quarantine, audit	read-only profile, ask-first write policy
Capability	action catalogs, schemas, risk classes, changed-tool review	search_issues, create_comment, schema hash
Credential	company_secrets, OAuth broker, credential resolver, token broker	Slack bot token ref, Google OAuth refresh token ref
Identity	actor attribution and token exchange	board user, agent run, first-party service identity
Transport	how the external system is reached	remote HTTP MCP, local stdio, REST/OpenAPI, webhook

The agent should not hold a durable provider credential. It should hold a Paperclip run/session token; the server or broker resolves the connection, checks governance, invokes the provider, and writes audit.

Identity vs. connections

Signing a user in and connecting a resource are different planes with different owners, different token profiles, and different homes. Do not merge them. This section is the public, connections-side statement of the identity model so connector implementers inherit the rule without depending on private identity-service documentation or re-deriving it.

Plane	Question	Lives where	Token profile
P1. Sign-in methods	Who are you?	paperclip-id (id.paperclip.ing → Account)	Minimal-scope provider tokens (openid email profile), used once to authenticate, encrypted at rest, never exported
P2. Connections (Apps)	What may your agents touch?	Paperclip App instances (tool_connections), acquired via the connect broker for hosted + self-hosted	Rich-scope, long-lived resource tokens in the instance's encrypted vault; per-agent grants; risk-tier policy defaults
P3. Login with Paperclip	Who may authenticate against us?	paperclip-id OIDC provider + DB-backed client registry	Our ES256 ID/access tokens issued by us to registered RPs (instances, the broker, future third parties)

Everything in doc/connections/ — the First-30 matrix, the connection authoring runbook, and the connect-broker work — lives on plane P2. It never acquires, stores, or brokers a P1 sign-in token.

The standing rule (D7)

Adopted as a standing rule (decision D7) with the identity-model plan. State it verbatim in any P2 design so the app-store work cannot drift into merging the planes:

Sign-in tokens are never reused as resource tokens; id.paperclip.ing never stores resource tokens; no connections hub on the ID service.

P2 tokens flow broker → instance vault as pass-through only; the id.paperclip.ing Account page therefore must not grow a "Connections" hub. The reasons to hold the planes apart (from the plan §3):

• Scope discipline. Sign-in wants the narrowest grant; connections want deliberately broad ones. One button that does both is how you grant repo access just to log in.
• Blast radius. id.paperclip.ing holding every customer's Vercel/Slack/GitHub resource tokens would make it the single juiciest target in the fleet; the broker is intentionally pass-through.
• Self-hosted symmetry. Instances own their vaults, so self-hosters don't depend on our uptime to use their own connections.
• Legibility. Sign-in and connections answer different user questions, and every product we benchmarked (Vercel, Railway, GitHub, Google) keeps them on separate pages with separate names.

The explicit Vercel Connect exception does not change D7 or merge P1 and P2. The operator chooses Vercel as the P2 credential authority for an individual connection. id.paperclip.ing is not involved, and neither sign-in tokens nor provider tokens pass through it. The deployment's Vercel access token or workload OIDC identity is bootstrap authority for that external vault, not a provider resource credential.

Naming alignment

Use the surface-correct name for each plane; they intentionally differ:

Surface	Plane	Name to use
Paperclip App instances	P2	"Connections"
id.paperclip.ing Account	P1	"Ways to sign in"
id.paperclip.ing admin	P3	"OIDC clients" (until the app store productizes it)

Packaging Rule

Default to a catalog entry when an integration can be described as metadata: manifest, auth config, action catalog, resource filters, and policy defaults.

Use a plugin only when the integration needs product code such as custom UI pages, its own tables, workers, migrations, routines, or specialized ingestion. A plugin may bundle catalog entries, but it must not bypass the connection, profile, policy, credential, and audit model.

Use a skill for agent instructions. Skills may use connections; they must not own durable tokens.

Canonical Docs

• Glossary defines product and internal terms.
• Identity vs. connections is the public statement of the P1/P2/P3 boundary and the D7 standing rule for connections work.
• Security threat model harvests the keeper from PAP-2359 and maps it onto Apps v2.
• First-30 matrix harvests the keeper from PAP-2432 and is the source matrix for connector playbook work.
• Connecting any remote MCP server is the baseline: how an operator connects a standards-compliant remote MCP endpoint with no Paperclip code change, and how sign-in resolves a client.
• Connection authoring runbook is the one end-to-end, agent-executable guide for adding a vendor as a catalog entry on Apps v2: research, connection-type selection, OAuth/API-key/generated-URL setup, encrypted credential handling, branding, implementation, browser and live-provider testing, verification, and PR submission.
• Vercel Connect operator guide documents the optional external credential source, deployment flags, runtime resolution, recovery, and smoke requirements.
• MCP access governance remains the operator runbook for the current gateway, profile, policy, approval, runtime, and audit APIs.

Migration Notes

Connections v1 contributed useful policy, UX, and rollout thinking, but its implementation branch is no longer the target. When you see old tickets or code using connections, connection_grants, or a provider-directory mental model, translate the intent into Apps v2:

Connections v1 intent	Apps v2 home
Provider directory	Apps gallery / tool_applications
Configured provider instance	Connection / tool_connections
Grant allowlist	Profiles, profile bindings, policies
Resource filters	Policy/profile conditions plus provider config
Tool broker	Tool gateway and runtime supervisor
Connection UX tail	Apps, Connections, Review, Developer/Advanced IA

Do not add new work to the retired v1 branch. If an old ticket still describes a valid product gap, retarget it to an active Apps v2 issue or close it as superseded with a link to the replacement.