Devin FoleyandPaperclip
833769ab55
Replace periodic Telegram discovery and maintenance scans with bounded startup recovery, connection-specific commit notifications, and durable action deadlines. Preserve ownership, inactive subscription parking, retry and cleanup recovery, and atomic credential binding updates. Verified full typecheck/build, 30 focused scheduler tests, 12 database-backed recovery cases, all current-head CI checks, and Greptile 5/5 with no unresolved threads. Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
7.6 KiB
Connection setup — agent access
Product map: Connection setup.
Review date: 2026-10-12. Source commit: f981fa3cc10cb8663a87dec60345fbff46d54d0a.
This is a source-reviewed baseline of representative operations and known gaps. Each capability needs operation-level review before its entire scope can be qualified. No live agent execution is claimed. Follow the map contract for format, permission checks, evidence and maintenance.
catalog
Review: baseline.
API: present — representative operation IDs:
POST /runtime-tools/connections/search.
Agent access: available — Native connections_search / run-bound runtime-tools MCP.
Policy: Setup and credentials belong to the addressed authorized human; active-run tools can search/request access.
Evidence: source-only —
implementation at the reviewed
commit above.
Verification: not-run — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent
credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution.
Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the
remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.
Gaps: Runtime tool broker searches available services without granting connection administration.
identity-and-access
Review: baseline.
API: present — representative operation IDs:
POST /api/companies/{companyId}/tools/connections.
Agent access: restricted — Board setup API plus agent connection_request.
Policy: Setup and credentials belong to the addressed authorized human; active-run tools can search/request access.
Evidence: source-only —
implementation at the reviewed
commit above.
Verification: not-run — assert the documented agent denial with an owned test fixture;
verify any listed agent request/result path separately. A delegated operation needs its
own policy and access review.
Gaps: Selecting account ownership/eligible agents is management; an agent can request the intended connection.
credentials
Review: baseline.
API: present — representative operation IDs:
POST /api/agents/me/connections/{connectionId}/start-authorization.
Agent access: partial — Scoped start-authorization/request flow; human provider login.
Policy: Setup and credentials belong to the addressed authorized human; active-run tools can search/request access.
Evidence: source-only —
implementation at the reviewed
commit above.
Verification: not-run — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent
credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution.
Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the
remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.
Gaps: An initiation endpoint exists; it is not authorization to complete the person's credential flow.
handoff
Review: baseline.
API: present — representative operation IDs:
POST /api/connection-intents/{interactionId}/complete.
Agent access: restricted — Addressed-user completion; server wakes the agent with
updated access.
Policy: Setup and credentials belong to the addressed authorized human; active-run tools can search/request access.
Evidence: source-only —
implementation at the reviewed
commit above.
Verification: not-run — assert the documented agent denial with an owned test fixture;
verify any listed agent request/result path separately. A delegated operation needs its
own policy and access review.
Gaps: OAuth/callback and addressed-user checks are deliberate separate boundaries.
draft-recovery
Review: baseline.
API: present — representative operation IDs:
POST /api/connection-intents/{interactionId}/phase.POST /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/reconnect.
Agent access: restricted — Human setup/resume APIs; agent request state and
continuation.
Policy: Setup and credentials belong to the addressed authorized human; active-run tools can search/request access.
Evidence: source-only —
implementation at the reviewed
commit above.
Verification: not-run — assert the documented agent denial with an owned test fixture;
verify any listed agent request/result path separately. A delegated operation needs its
own policy and access review.
Gaps: Board setup recovery exists. Browser-only navigation state is not automatically an agent API gap.
task-request
Review: baseline.
API: present — representative operation IDs:
POST /runtime-tools/connections/request.
Agent access: available — Native connection_request / run-bound runtime-tools MCP.
Policy: Setup and credentials belong to the addressed authorized human; active-run tools can search/request access.
Evidence: source-only —
implementation at the reviewed
commit above.
Verification: not-run — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent
credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution.
Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the
remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.
Gaps: This is the existing agent bridge for human-required setup; do not invent a second approval system.
channel-setup
Review: baseline.
API: present — representative operation IDs:
POST /api/companies/{companyId}/chat-endpoints.
Agent access: restricted — Board channel management; agent requests required setup.
Policy: Setup and credentials belong to the addressed authorized human; active-run tools can search/request access.
Evidence: source-only —
implementation at the reviewed
commit above.
Verification: not-run — assert the documented agent denial with an owned test fixture;
verify any listed agent request/result path separately. A delegated operation needs its
own policy and access review.
Gaps: Provider endpoint, represented agent and linked sender are operator choices today.
Internal recovery: Telegram discovery walks bounded pages at startup. Configuration commits only queue the changed connection; durable maintenance rows supply retry deadlines. Inactive subscription repair is parked until an endpoint or connection change. This creates no agent management permission or new API. Local database-backed provider-fixture tests in channel integration cover recovery, rollback, retries and idle query silence; they do not establish live provider or agent access.
failure
Review: baseline.
API: present — representative operation IDs:
POST /api/tool-connections/{connectionId}/health-check.
Agent access: partial — Agent observes connection tool errors; board repair APIs.
Policy: Setup and credentials belong to the addressed authorized human; active-run tools can search/request access.
Evidence: source-only —
implementation at the reviewed
commit above.
Verification: not-run — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent
credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution.
Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the
remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability.
Gaps: Error reporting and human repair exist; no generic agent permission to reconnect accounts.