Files
PaperClipAI/server/src/__tests__/write-path-membership.test.ts
Jannes StubbemannandClaude Opus 4.7 7f2ed0ad90 security(server): close cross-tenant existence oracle (404 instead of 403) (#3967)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies
> - In a multi-tenant deployment, route handlers that take a resource id
(`issue`, `goal`, `project`, `approval`, etc.) look the resource up by
id and then call `assertCompanyAccess` on its `companyId` — 404 if it
doesn't exist, 403 if it exists in another tenant
> - The split status codes are a classic *existence oracle*: any
authenticated user can enumerate ids across tenants by probing for the
403/404 boundary, mapping out which issues, labels, approvals, etc.
exist in other customers' tenants even when they cannot read the
contents
> - The right fix is a single uniform 404 for both "not found" and
"found but cross-tenant", which collapses the oracle but still preserves
write-path checks (active membership, viewer-readonly) for *authorized*
tenants
> - This pull request adds a non-throwing `hasCompanyAccess(req,
companyId)` helper plus a `getAccessibleResource` wrapper that ~130
handlers across 14 route files now use, folding the access check into
the existence check while still running `assertCompanyAccess` for
authorized tenants so viewer-readonly / inactive-membership rejections
fire unchanged on write paths
> - The benefit is closing a multi-tenant information leak without
breaking write-path security or single-tenant local-first behavior

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #709 — asks for company-scope regression coverage across
approval/activity/access routes, because a subtle route refactor could
leak cross-tenant data; this PR hardens exactly those surfaces (uniform
404 across 14 route files including `approvals`, `activity`, `secrets`)
and updates cross-tenant expectations in test files. It does not add the
full coverage matrix #709 asks for — hence Refs, not Closes.

No existing issue covers the oracle itself — described in-PR:

- Route handlers returned 404 for "not found" but 403 for "exists in
another tenant", a classic *existence oracle*: any authenticated user
could enumerate ids across tenants by probing the 403/404 boundary.
- That maps out which issues, labels, approvals, etc. exist in other
customers' tenants even when their contents are unreadable.
- Fix: a uniform 404 for both cases, while keeping write-path checks
(active membership, viewer-readonly) for authorized tenants.

## What Changed

- **`server/src/routes/authz.ts`** — new `hasCompanyAccess(req,
companyId): boolean` helper alongside the existing
`assertCompanyAccess`. Docstring spells out the two-step pattern (404
gate, then `assertCompanyAccess` for write-path checks). The helper
mirrors `assertCompanyAccess`'s company-scope semantics exactly — in
particular, signed-in instance admins do **not** get blanket access to
companies they are not a member of (the repo's `authz-company-access`
tests pin that behavior for `assertCompanyAccess`; an earlier draft of
the helper accidentally widened it for reads).
- **`getAccessibleResource(req, res, lookup, notFoundMessage)`** — the
safe thing is now the easy thing. One helper wraps the whole pattern
(uniform 404 for missing/cross-tenant, then `assertCompanyAccess` for
write-path membership checks) and ~130 handlers across 14 route files
use it:
  ```ts
const goal = await getAccessibleResource(req, res, svc.getById(id),
"Goal not found");
  if (!goal) return;
  ```
Files: `activity`, `agents`, `approvals`, `assets`, `costs`,
`environments`, `execution-workspaces`, `file-resources`, `goals`,
`issue-tree-control`, `issues`, `projects`, `routines`, `secrets`.
Handlers with bespoke not-found behavior (the legacy `200 []` contract,
audit-logged denials in `file-resources`, null-returning authz helpers)
compose `hasCompanyAccess` directly using the documented two-step
pattern:
  ```ts
// step 1: close the oracle (uniform 404 for both not-found and
cross-tenant)
  if (!existing || !hasCompanyAccess(req, existing.companyId)) {
    res.status(404).json({ error: "Goal not found" });
    return;
  }
// step 2: enforce write-path membership checks for authorised tenants
(no-op on GET)
  assertCompanyAccess(req, existing.companyId);
  ```
Routes where `companyId` comes from *request input*
(`req.params.companyId`, `req.body.companyId`, e.g. in `companies.ts`
and `plugins.ts`) deliberately retain plain `assertCompanyAccess` —
there's no existence oracle to close because the companyId is an input,
not a discovered value.
- **Full-sweep coverage** — a scripted audit of every
`assertCompanyAccess(req, <resource>.companyId)` call site in
`server/src/routes/` found ~55 lookup-then-assert pairs the first pass
missed; all are now gated. Notable ones: the
`/secret-provider-configs/:id` CRUD routes, the agents
instructions-bundle/config-revision/skills-sync routes (which check
access via the `assertCanUpdateAgent` / `assertCanReadAgent` /
`assertCanManageInstructionsPath` helpers), `POST
/heartbeat-runs/:runId/watchdog-decisions`, `GET
/issues/:id/cost-summary`, the environment + environment-lease GET
routes, all six issue-tree-control routes, ~24 issue sub-resource routes
(document annotations, interactions, approvals links, recovery actions,
plan decompositions, lock/unlock), and the three workspace file-resource
routes (these throw `notFound` instead of `forbidden` inside their
audit-logging wrappers, so denied attempts are still activity-logged
server-side while the client sees a uniform 404).
- **Helpers made self-defending** — `assertCanUpdateAgent` /
`assertCanReadAgent` / `assertCanManageInstructionsPath` (agents) and
`assertCanManage{Project,Execution}WorkspaceRuntimeServices` throw
`notFound` for cross-tenant resources before their `assertCompanyAccess`
step, so a future caller that forgets the route-level gate still can't
reopen the oracle.
- **Pattern enforcement** — new `authz-existence-oracle-guard.test.ts`
statically scans `server/src/routes/*.ts` and fails CI on any
`assertCompanyAccess(req, <resource>.companyId)` call that is not
preceded by a `hasCompanyAccess` gate, with an explicit allowlist (plus
staleness check) for the request-input cases. New routes that regress to
the 403/404 split fail the suite with a message pointing at the
documented pattern.
- **Tests** — cross-tenant expectations updated from 403→404 where
routes are now gated; new `hasCompanyAccess` unit tests in
`authz-company-access.test.ts` pin the
instance-admin/local-implicit/agent/none semantics in lockstep with
`assertCompanyAccess`; `write-path-membership.test.ts` (added in an
earlier round) confirms viewer/inactive users are still rejected on
writes.
- **One legacy-contract preserve** — `GET /heartbeat-runs/:runId/issues`
still returns `200 []` for both "doesn't exist" and "cross-tenant" so
the legacy contract is preserved while the oracle stays closed.

## Verification

- `pnpm run typecheck` — PASS.
- `pnpm -F @paperclipai/server exec vitest run` — full server suite
green locally apart from 4 pre-existing local-environment failures
(`paperclip-skill-utils` ×2 and `workspace-runtime` ×1 are
cwd/git-environment dependent — verified identical on a clean checkout
of the base; `heartbeat-process-recovery` is the known macOS flake).
- The new `authz-existence-oracle-guard` test sweeps
`server/src/routes/*.ts` and confirms no remaining
`assertCompanyAccess(resource.companyId)` site without a
`hasCompanyAccess` gate; the only allowlisted holdouts take `companyId`
from request input.

## Risks

- **API contract narrowing.** Any client that specifically checked for
`403` on cross-tenant access now sees `404`. This is a strict narrowing
(one status instead of two for the same negative outcome) and matches
what a client should expect for any id it can't access.
- **Write-path checks preserved.** `assertCompanyAccess` still runs
after the 404 gate on write routes, so viewer-readonly /
inactive-membership rejections fire unchanged for legitimate users.
- **Instance-admin scope unchanged.** `hasCompanyAccess` denies
signed-in instance admins without an explicit membership, exactly like
`assertCompanyAccess` (pinned by unit tests) — so the gate introduces no
new read access for admins.
- **Single-tenant local-first deploys** behave identically — the helper
short-circuits to `true` for `local_implicit` sessions.
- No new env vars, no deployment-mode switch.

## Model Used

Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context), extended thinking mode; completeness sweep
+ instance-admin parity fix by Claude Fable 5 (1M context).

## Checklist

- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] Thinking path traces from project context to this change
- [x] Model used specified
- [x] Checked ROADMAP.md — part of the multi-tenant hardening initiative
- [x] Tests run locally and pass
- [x] Added/updated cross-tenant 404 expectations across test files
- [x] No UI changes
- [x] Documented risks above
- [x] Will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before merge

Part of the multi-tenant hardening initiative — see also #5864
(per-company JWT keys) and #5865 (plugin tables `company_id`).

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-14 15:53:09 -07:00

254 lines
8.1 KiB
TypeScript

import express from "express";
import request from "supertest";
import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
vi.unmock("http");
vi.unmock("node:http");
// Tests that verify the write-path membership/role checks restored by Fix 1.
// `assertCompanyAccess` (in authz.ts) must reject viewer-role users and
// inactive members on non-safe HTTP methods (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE), even when
// `hasCompanyAccess` would let them through the 404 oracle gate.
const companyId = "11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111";
const goalId = "22222222-2222-4222-8222-222222222222";
const baseGoal = {
id: goalId,
companyId,
level: "company" as const,
title: "Q3 goal",
description: null,
parentId: null,
ownerAgentId: null,
createdAt: new Date("2026-04-11T00:00:00.000Z"),
updatedAt: new Date("2026-04-11T00:00:00.000Z"),
};
const mockGoalService = vi.hoisted(() => ({
list: vi.fn(),
getById: vi.fn(),
create: vi.fn(),
update: vi.fn(),
remove: vi.fn(),
}));
const mockLogActivity = vi.hoisted(() => vi.fn());
const mockGetTelemetryClient = vi.hoisted(() => vi.fn());
vi.mock("@paperclipai/shared/telemetry", () => ({
trackGoalCreated: vi.fn(),
}));
vi.mock("../telemetry.js", () => ({
getTelemetryClient: mockGetTelemetryClient,
}));
vi.mock("../services/index.js", () => ({
goalService: () => mockGoalService,
logActivity: mockLogActivity,
}));
let routeModules:
| Promise<[
typeof import("../middleware/index.js"),
typeof import("../routes/goals.js"),
]>
| null = null;
async function loadRouteModules() {
routeModules ??= Promise.all([
import("../middleware/index.js"),
import("../routes/goals.js"),
]);
return routeModules;
}
async function createApp(actor: Record<string, unknown>) {
const [{ errorHandler }, { goalRoutes }] = await loadRouteModules();
const app = express();
app.use(express.json());
app.use((req, _res, next) => {
(req as any).actor = { ...actor };
next();
});
app.use("/api", goalRoutes({} as any));
app.use(errorHandler);
return app;
}
async function requestApp(
app: express.Express,
buildRequest: (baseUrl: string) => request.Test,
) {
const { createServer } = await vi.importActual<typeof import("node:http")>("node:http");
const server = createServer(app);
try {
await new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", resolve);
});
const address = server.address();
if (!address || typeof address === "string") {
throw new Error("Expected HTTP server to listen on a TCP port");
}
return await buildRequest(`http://127.0.0.1:${address.port}`);
} finally {
if (server.listening) {
await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
server.close((error) => {
if (error) reject(error);
else resolve();
});
});
}
}
}
function resetMocks() {
vi.clearAllMocks();
for (const mock of Object.values(mockGoalService)) mock.mockReset();
mockGoalService.list.mockImplementation(async () => []);
mockGoalService.getById.mockImplementation(async () => ({ ...baseGoal }));
mockGoalService.create.mockImplementation(async () => ({ ...baseGoal }));
mockGoalService.update.mockImplementation(async () => ({ ...baseGoal }));
mockGoalService.remove.mockImplementation(async () => ({ ...baseGoal }));
mockLogActivity.mockImplementation(async () => undefined);
mockGetTelemetryClient.mockReturnValue({ track: vi.fn() });
}
describe.sequential("write-path membership checks (viewer / inactive)", () => {
beforeEach(() => {
resetMocks();
});
describe("viewer role", () => {
const viewerActor = {
type: "board" as const,
userId: "viewer-user",
companyIds: [companyId],
source: "session" as const,
isInstanceAdmin: false,
memberships: [
{ companyId, status: "active", membershipRole: "viewer" },
],
};
it("rejects PATCH on a goal with 403 'Viewer access is read-only'", async () => {
const app = await createApp(viewerActor);
const res = await requestApp(app, (baseUrl) =>
request(baseUrl).patch(`/api/goals/${goalId}`).send({ title: "New title" }),
);
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
expect(res.body.error).toBe("Viewer access is read-only");
expect(mockGoalService.update).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it("rejects DELETE on a goal with 403 'Viewer access is read-only'", async () => {
const app = await createApp(viewerActor);
const res = await requestApp(app, (baseUrl) =>
request(baseUrl).delete(`/api/goals/${goalId}`),
);
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
expect(res.body.error).toBe("Viewer access is read-only");
expect(mockGoalService.remove).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it("rejects POST (create) on a company's goals with 403 'Viewer access is read-only'", async () => {
const app = await createApp(viewerActor);
const res = await requestApp(app, (baseUrl) =>
request(baseUrl)
.post(`/api/companies/${companyId}/goals`)
.send({ level: "company", title: "New goal" }),
);
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
expect(res.body.error).toBe("Viewer access is read-only");
expect(mockGoalService.create).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it("still permits GET on the same goal (read-only access is preserved)", async () => {
const app = await createApp(viewerActor);
const res = await requestApp(app, (baseUrl) =>
request(baseUrl).get(`/api/goals/${goalId}`),
);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.body.id).toBe(goalId);
expect(mockGoalService.getById).toHaveBeenCalledWith(goalId);
});
});
describe("inactive membership", () => {
const inactiveActor = {
type: "board" as const,
userId: "ex-employee",
companyIds: [companyId],
source: "session" as const,
isInstanceAdmin: false,
memberships: [
{ companyId, status: "removed", membershipRole: "editor" },
],
};
it("rejects PATCH on a goal with 403 'User does not have active company access'", async () => {
const app = await createApp(inactiveActor);
const res = await requestApp(app, (baseUrl) =>
request(baseUrl).patch(`/api/goals/${goalId}`).send({ title: "New title" }),
);
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
expect(res.body.error).toBe("User does not have active company access");
expect(mockGoalService.update).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it("rejects DELETE on a goal with 403 'User does not have active company access'", async () => {
const app = await createApp(inactiveActor);
const res = await requestApp(app, (baseUrl) =>
request(baseUrl).delete(`/api/goals/${goalId}`),
);
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
expect(res.body.error).toBe("User does not have active company access");
expect(mockGoalService.remove).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it("rejects POST on a company's goals with 403 'User does not have active company access'", async () => {
const app = await createApp(inactiveActor);
const res = await requestApp(app, (baseUrl) =>
request(baseUrl)
.post(`/api/companies/${companyId}/goals`)
.send({ level: "company", title: "New goal" }),
);
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
expect(res.body.error).toBe("User does not have active company access");
expect(mockGoalService.create).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
describe("active editor (sanity check)", () => {
const editorActor = {
type: "board" as const,
userId: "editor-user",
companyIds: [companyId],
source: "session" as const,
isInstanceAdmin: false,
memberships: [
{ companyId, status: "active", membershipRole: "editor" },
],
};
it("allows PATCH on a goal", async () => {
const app = await createApp(editorActor);
const res = await requestApp(app, (baseUrl) =>
request(baseUrl).patch(`/api/goals/${goalId}`).send({ title: "New title" }),
);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(mockGoalService.update).toHaveBeenCalledWith(goalId, { title: "New title" });
});
});
});