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## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies > - In a multi-tenant deployment, route handlers that take a resource id (`issue`, `goal`, `project`, `approval`, etc.) look the resource up by id and then call `assertCompanyAccess` on its `companyId` — 404 if it doesn't exist, 403 if it exists in another tenant > - The split status codes are a classic *existence oracle*: any authenticated user can enumerate ids across tenants by probing for the 403/404 boundary, mapping out which issues, labels, approvals, etc. exist in other customers' tenants even when they cannot read the contents > - The right fix is a single uniform 404 for both "not found" and "found but cross-tenant", which collapses the oracle but still preserves write-path checks (active membership, viewer-readonly) for *authorized* tenants > - This pull request adds a non-throwing `hasCompanyAccess(req, companyId)` helper plus a `getAccessibleResource` wrapper that ~130 handlers across 14 route files now use, folding the access check into the existence check while still running `assertCompanyAccess` for authorized tenants so viewer-readonly / inactive-membership rejections fire unchanged on write paths > - The benefit is closing a multi-tenant information leak without breaking write-path security or single-tenant local-first behavior ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs #709 — asks for company-scope regression coverage across approval/activity/access routes, because a subtle route refactor could leak cross-tenant data; this PR hardens exactly those surfaces (uniform 404 across 14 route files including `approvals`, `activity`, `secrets`) and updates cross-tenant expectations in test files. It does not add the full coverage matrix #709 asks for — hence Refs, not Closes. No existing issue covers the oracle itself — described in-PR: - Route handlers returned 404 for "not found" but 403 for "exists in another tenant", a classic *existence oracle*: any authenticated user could enumerate ids across tenants by probing the 403/404 boundary. - That maps out which issues, labels, approvals, etc. exist in other customers' tenants even when their contents are unreadable. - Fix: a uniform 404 for both cases, while keeping write-path checks (active membership, viewer-readonly) for authorized tenants. ## What Changed - **`server/src/routes/authz.ts`** — new `hasCompanyAccess(req, companyId): boolean` helper alongside the existing `assertCompanyAccess`. Docstring spells out the two-step pattern (404 gate, then `assertCompanyAccess` for write-path checks). The helper mirrors `assertCompanyAccess`'s company-scope semantics exactly — in particular, signed-in instance admins do **not** get blanket access to companies they are not a member of (the repo's `authz-company-access` tests pin that behavior for `assertCompanyAccess`; an earlier draft of the helper accidentally widened it for reads). - **`getAccessibleResource(req, res, lookup, notFoundMessage)`** — the safe thing is now the easy thing. One helper wraps the whole pattern (uniform 404 for missing/cross-tenant, then `assertCompanyAccess` for write-path membership checks) and ~130 handlers across 14 route files use it: ```ts const goal = await getAccessibleResource(req, res, svc.getById(id), "Goal not found"); if (!goal) return; ``` Files: `activity`, `agents`, `approvals`, `assets`, `costs`, `environments`, `execution-workspaces`, `file-resources`, `goals`, `issue-tree-control`, `issues`, `projects`, `routines`, `secrets`. Handlers with bespoke not-found behavior (the legacy `200 []` contract, audit-logged denials in `file-resources`, null-returning authz helpers) compose `hasCompanyAccess` directly using the documented two-step pattern: ```ts // step 1: close the oracle (uniform 404 for both not-found and cross-tenant) if (!existing || !hasCompanyAccess(req, existing.companyId)) { res.status(404).json({ error: "Goal not found" }); return; } // step 2: enforce write-path membership checks for authorised tenants (no-op on GET) assertCompanyAccess(req, existing.companyId); ``` Routes where `companyId` comes from *request input* (`req.params.companyId`, `req.body.companyId`, e.g. in `companies.ts` and `plugins.ts`) deliberately retain plain `assertCompanyAccess` — there's no existence oracle to close because the companyId is an input, not a discovered value. - **Full-sweep coverage** — a scripted audit of every `assertCompanyAccess(req, <resource>.companyId)` call site in `server/src/routes/` found ~55 lookup-then-assert pairs the first pass missed; all are now gated. Notable ones: the `/secret-provider-configs/:id` CRUD routes, the agents instructions-bundle/config-revision/skills-sync routes (which check access via the `assertCanUpdateAgent` / `assertCanReadAgent` / `assertCanManageInstructionsPath` helpers), `POST /heartbeat-runs/:runId/watchdog-decisions`, `GET /issues/:id/cost-summary`, the environment + environment-lease GET routes, all six issue-tree-control routes, ~24 issue sub-resource routes (document annotations, interactions, approvals links, recovery actions, plan decompositions, lock/unlock), and the three workspace file-resource routes (these throw `notFound` instead of `forbidden` inside their audit-logging wrappers, so denied attempts are still activity-logged server-side while the client sees a uniform 404). - **Helpers made self-defending** — `assertCanUpdateAgent` / `assertCanReadAgent` / `assertCanManageInstructionsPath` (agents) and `assertCanManage{Project,Execution}WorkspaceRuntimeServices` throw `notFound` for cross-tenant resources before their `assertCompanyAccess` step, so a future caller that forgets the route-level gate still can't reopen the oracle. - **Pattern enforcement** — new `authz-existence-oracle-guard.test.ts` statically scans `server/src/routes/*.ts` and fails CI on any `assertCompanyAccess(req, <resource>.companyId)` call that is not preceded by a `hasCompanyAccess` gate, with an explicit allowlist (plus staleness check) for the request-input cases. New routes that regress to the 403/404 split fail the suite with a message pointing at the documented pattern. - **Tests** — cross-tenant expectations updated from 403→404 where routes are now gated; new `hasCompanyAccess` unit tests in `authz-company-access.test.ts` pin the instance-admin/local-implicit/agent/none semantics in lockstep with `assertCompanyAccess`; `write-path-membership.test.ts` (added in an earlier round) confirms viewer/inactive users are still rejected on writes. - **One legacy-contract preserve** — `GET /heartbeat-runs/:runId/issues` still returns `200 []` for both "doesn't exist" and "cross-tenant" so the legacy contract is preserved while the oracle stays closed. ## Verification - `pnpm run typecheck` — PASS. - `pnpm -F @paperclipai/server exec vitest run` — full server suite green locally apart from 4 pre-existing local-environment failures (`paperclip-skill-utils` ×2 and `workspace-runtime` ×1 are cwd/git-environment dependent — verified identical on a clean checkout of the base; `heartbeat-process-recovery` is the known macOS flake). - The new `authz-existence-oracle-guard` test sweeps `server/src/routes/*.ts` and confirms no remaining `assertCompanyAccess(resource.companyId)` site without a `hasCompanyAccess` gate; the only allowlisted holdouts take `companyId` from request input. ## Risks - **API contract narrowing.** Any client that specifically checked for `403` on cross-tenant access now sees `404`. This is a strict narrowing (one status instead of two for the same negative outcome) and matches what a client should expect for any id it can't access. - **Write-path checks preserved.** `assertCompanyAccess` still runs after the 404 gate on write routes, so viewer-readonly / inactive-membership rejections fire unchanged for legitimate users. - **Instance-admin scope unchanged.** `hasCompanyAccess` denies signed-in instance admins without an explicit membership, exactly like `assertCompanyAccess` (pinned by unit tests) — so the gate introduces no new read access for admins. - **Single-tenant local-first deploys** behave identically — the helper short-circuits to `true` for `local_implicit` sessions. - No new env vars, no deployment-mode switch. ## Model Used Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context), extended thinking mode; completeness sweep + instance-admin parity fix by Claude Fable 5 (1M context). ## Checklist - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] Thinking path traces from project context to this change - [x] Model used specified - [x] Checked ROADMAP.md — part of the multi-tenant hardening initiative - [x] Tests run locally and pass - [x] Added/updated cross-tenant 404 expectations across test files - [x] No UI changes - [x] Documented risks above - [x] Will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before merge Part of the multi-tenant hardening initiative — see also #5864 (per-company JWT keys) and #5865 (plugin tables `company_id`). --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
254 lines
8.1 KiB
TypeScript
254 lines
8.1 KiB
TypeScript
import express from "express";
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import request from "supertest";
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import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
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vi.unmock("http");
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vi.unmock("node:http");
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// Tests that verify the write-path membership/role checks restored by Fix 1.
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// `assertCompanyAccess` (in authz.ts) must reject viewer-role users and
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// inactive members on non-safe HTTP methods (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE), even when
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// `hasCompanyAccess` would let them through the 404 oracle gate.
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const companyId = "11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111";
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const goalId = "22222222-2222-4222-8222-222222222222";
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const baseGoal = {
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id: goalId,
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companyId,
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level: "company" as const,
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title: "Q3 goal",
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description: null,
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parentId: null,
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ownerAgentId: null,
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createdAt: new Date("2026-04-11T00:00:00.000Z"),
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updatedAt: new Date("2026-04-11T00:00:00.000Z"),
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};
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const mockGoalService = vi.hoisted(() => ({
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list: vi.fn(),
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getById: vi.fn(),
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create: vi.fn(),
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update: vi.fn(),
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remove: vi.fn(),
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}));
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const mockLogActivity = vi.hoisted(() => vi.fn());
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const mockGetTelemetryClient = vi.hoisted(() => vi.fn());
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vi.mock("@paperclipai/shared/telemetry", () => ({
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trackGoalCreated: vi.fn(),
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}));
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vi.mock("../telemetry.js", () => ({
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getTelemetryClient: mockGetTelemetryClient,
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}));
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vi.mock("../services/index.js", () => ({
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goalService: () => mockGoalService,
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logActivity: mockLogActivity,
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}));
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let routeModules:
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| Promise<[
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typeof import("../middleware/index.js"),
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typeof import("../routes/goals.js"),
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]>
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| null = null;
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async function loadRouteModules() {
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routeModules ??= Promise.all([
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import("../middleware/index.js"),
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import("../routes/goals.js"),
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]);
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return routeModules;
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}
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async function createApp(actor: Record<string, unknown>) {
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const [{ errorHandler }, { goalRoutes }] = await loadRouteModules();
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const app = express();
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app.use(express.json());
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app.use((req, _res, next) => {
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(req as any).actor = { ...actor };
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next();
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});
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app.use("/api", goalRoutes({} as any));
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app.use(errorHandler);
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return app;
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}
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async function requestApp(
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app: express.Express,
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buildRequest: (baseUrl: string) => request.Test,
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) {
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const { createServer } = await vi.importActual<typeof import("node:http")>("node:http");
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const server = createServer(app);
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try {
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await new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
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server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", resolve);
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});
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const address = server.address();
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if (!address || typeof address === "string") {
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throw new Error("Expected HTTP server to listen on a TCP port");
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}
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return await buildRequest(`http://127.0.0.1:${address.port}`);
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} finally {
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if (server.listening) {
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await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
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server.close((error) => {
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if (error) reject(error);
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else resolve();
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});
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});
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}
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}
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}
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function resetMocks() {
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vi.clearAllMocks();
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for (const mock of Object.values(mockGoalService)) mock.mockReset();
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mockGoalService.list.mockImplementation(async () => []);
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mockGoalService.getById.mockImplementation(async () => ({ ...baseGoal }));
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mockGoalService.create.mockImplementation(async () => ({ ...baseGoal }));
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mockGoalService.update.mockImplementation(async () => ({ ...baseGoal }));
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mockGoalService.remove.mockImplementation(async () => ({ ...baseGoal }));
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mockLogActivity.mockImplementation(async () => undefined);
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mockGetTelemetryClient.mockReturnValue({ track: vi.fn() });
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}
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describe.sequential("write-path membership checks (viewer / inactive)", () => {
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beforeEach(() => {
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resetMocks();
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});
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describe("viewer role", () => {
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const viewerActor = {
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type: "board" as const,
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userId: "viewer-user",
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companyIds: [companyId],
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source: "session" as const,
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isInstanceAdmin: false,
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memberships: [
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{ companyId, status: "active", membershipRole: "viewer" },
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],
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};
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it("rejects PATCH on a goal with 403 'Viewer access is read-only'", async () => {
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const app = await createApp(viewerActor);
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const res = await requestApp(app, (baseUrl) =>
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request(baseUrl).patch(`/api/goals/${goalId}`).send({ title: "New title" }),
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);
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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expect(res.body.error).toBe("Viewer access is read-only");
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expect(mockGoalService.update).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it("rejects DELETE on a goal with 403 'Viewer access is read-only'", async () => {
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const app = await createApp(viewerActor);
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const res = await requestApp(app, (baseUrl) =>
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request(baseUrl).delete(`/api/goals/${goalId}`),
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);
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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expect(res.body.error).toBe("Viewer access is read-only");
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expect(mockGoalService.remove).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it("rejects POST (create) on a company's goals with 403 'Viewer access is read-only'", async () => {
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const app = await createApp(viewerActor);
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const res = await requestApp(app, (baseUrl) =>
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request(baseUrl)
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.post(`/api/companies/${companyId}/goals`)
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.send({ level: "company", title: "New goal" }),
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);
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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expect(res.body.error).toBe("Viewer access is read-only");
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expect(mockGoalService.create).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it("still permits GET on the same goal (read-only access is preserved)", async () => {
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const app = await createApp(viewerActor);
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const res = await requestApp(app, (baseUrl) =>
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request(baseUrl).get(`/api/goals/${goalId}`),
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);
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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expect(res.body.id).toBe(goalId);
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expect(mockGoalService.getById).toHaveBeenCalledWith(goalId);
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});
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});
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describe("inactive membership", () => {
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const inactiveActor = {
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type: "board" as const,
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userId: "ex-employee",
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companyIds: [companyId],
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source: "session" as const,
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isInstanceAdmin: false,
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memberships: [
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{ companyId, status: "removed", membershipRole: "editor" },
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],
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};
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it("rejects PATCH on a goal with 403 'User does not have active company access'", async () => {
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const app = await createApp(inactiveActor);
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const res = await requestApp(app, (baseUrl) =>
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request(baseUrl).patch(`/api/goals/${goalId}`).send({ title: "New title" }),
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);
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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expect(res.body.error).toBe("User does not have active company access");
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expect(mockGoalService.update).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it("rejects DELETE on a goal with 403 'User does not have active company access'", async () => {
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const app = await createApp(inactiveActor);
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const res = await requestApp(app, (baseUrl) =>
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request(baseUrl).delete(`/api/goals/${goalId}`),
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);
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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expect(res.body.error).toBe("User does not have active company access");
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expect(mockGoalService.remove).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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it("rejects POST on a company's goals with 403 'User does not have active company access'", async () => {
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const app = await createApp(inactiveActor);
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const res = await requestApp(app, (baseUrl) =>
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request(baseUrl)
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.post(`/api/companies/${companyId}/goals`)
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.send({ level: "company", title: "New goal" }),
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);
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expect(res.status).toBe(403);
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expect(res.body.error).toBe("User does not have active company access");
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expect(mockGoalService.create).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
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});
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});
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describe("active editor (sanity check)", () => {
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const editorActor = {
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type: "board" as const,
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userId: "editor-user",
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companyIds: [companyId],
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source: "session" as const,
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isInstanceAdmin: false,
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memberships: [
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{ companyId, status: "active", membershipRole: "editor" },
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],
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};
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it("allows PATCH on a goal", async () => {
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const app = await createApp(editorActor);
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const res = await requestApp(app, (baseUrl) =>
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request(baseUrl).patch(`/api/goals/${goalId}`).send({ title: "New title" }),
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);
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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expect(mockGoalService.update).toHaveBeenCalledWith(goalId, { title: "New title" });
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});
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});
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});
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