# Local, SSH, and sandbox environments — agent access Product map: [Local, SSH, and sandbox environments](../feature-map/execution-environments.md). Review date: 2026-10-12. Source commit: `f981fa3cc10cb8663a87dec60345fbff46d54d0a`. This is a source-reviewed baseline of representative operations and known gaps. Each capability needs operation-level review before its entire scope can be qualified. No live agent execution is claimed. Follow the [map contract](../README.md) for format, permission checks, evidence and maintenance. ## `configuration` Review: `baseline`. API: `present` — representative operation IDs: - `GET /api/companies/{companyId}/environments`. - `POST /api/companies/{companyId}/environments`. Agent access: `restricted` — Board read/admin management REST / CLI environment. Policy: Environment management is instance administrator/board; permitted assignment uses agent/project policy. Evidence: `source-only` — [implementation](../../server/src/routes/environments.ts#L353) at the reviewed commit above. Verification: `not-run` — assert the documented agent denial with an owned test fixture; verify any listed agent request/result path separately. A delegated operation needs its own policy and access review. Gaps: API exists; an agent cannot use instance environment management as an ordinary company actor. ## `capabilities` Review: `baseline`. API: `present` — representative operation IDs: - `GET /api/companies/{companyId}/environments/capabilities`. Agent access: `partial` — Board environment capabilities endpoint; native run gets server-selected runtime context. Policy: Environment management is instance administrator/board; permitted assignment uses agent/project policy. Evidence: `source-only` — [implementation](../../server/src/routes/environments.ts#L353) at the reviewed commit above. Verification: `not-run` — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution. Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability. Gaps: Endpoint discovery and already-bound run capabilities differ; decide whether a safe agent-readable capability listing is desired. ## `probe` Review: `baseline`. API: `present` — representative operation IDs: - `POST /api/environments/{id}/probe`. - `POST /api/companies/{companyId}/environments/probe-config`. Agent access: `restricted` — Board/admin probes / CLI environment. Policy: Environment management is instance administrator/board; permitted assignment uses agent/project policy. Evidence: `source-only` — [implementation](../../server/src/routes/environments.ts#L353) at the reviewed commit above. Verification: `not-run` — assert the documented agent denial with an owned test fixture; verify any listed agent request/result path separately. A delegated operation needs its own policy and access review. Gaps: Reachability probes are not granted by an agent's right to execute assigned work. ## `assignment` Review: `baseline`. API: `present` — representative operation IDs: - `PATCH /api/agents/{id}`. - `PATCH /api/projects/{id}`. Agent access: `partial` — Permitted agent/project REST / native fallback, subject to protected configuration policy. Policy: Environment management is instance administrator/board; permitted assignment uses agent/project policy. Evidence: `source-only` — [implementation](../../server/src/routes/environments.ts#L353) at the reviewed commit above. Verification: `not-run` — exercise a listed permitted operation with actual agent credentials/run context; inspect its result and applicable persistence/attribution. Assert the relevant denied actor, owner, company or mode from Policy. Review the remaining operations before qualifying the whole capability. Gaps: Choosing among permitted targets differs from creating/configuring host targets; test authorized and denied selection. ## `images` Review: `baseline`. API: `present` — representative operation IDs: - `POST /api/environments/{environmentId}/custom-image-setup-sessions`. Agent access: `restricted` — Board/admin image APIs and existing terminal protocol. Policy: Environment management is instance administrator/board; permitted assignment uses agent/project policy. Evidence: `source-only` — [implementation](../../server/src/routes/environments.ts#L353) at the reviewed commit above. Verification: `not-run` — assert the documented agent denial with an owned test fixture; verify any listed agent request/result path separately. A delegated operation needs its own policy and access review. Gaps: No default agent custom-image administration/terminal path; this is a policy decision before adding a tool.