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7773b52f05 |
fix(codex): preserve sandbox certificate trust in Codex shell commands (#20364)
<!-- Written in ASD-STE100 style: short sentences, active voice. --> ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - The Paperclip Runner and the Codex adapters run agent shell commands inside a sandboxed Codex session with a strict environment allowlist > - The controller builds `shell_environment_policy.include_only` before the sandbox injects certificate-trust variables such as `SSL_CERT_FILE` and `GIT_SSL_CAINFO` > - The allowlist drops the injected variables, so managed `git` and `gh` commands cannot verify HTTPS against a runtime-provided CA > - This pull request allows the certificate-trust variable names through every environment policy stage, from the Rust process supervisor to the shell allowlist > - The benefit is that managed `git` and `gh` work again in sandboxes that require a runtime CA, while provider-credential isolation and the bounded allowlist stay in place ## Linked Issues or Issue Description - Fixes: #20019 - Refs #20038 — community pull request for the same defect. This change reviews the approach independently. The commit credits the community author as co-author. ## What Changed - Add `CERTIFICATE_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS` (`SSL_CERT_FILE`, `SSL_CERT_DIR`, `GIT_SSL_CAINFO`, `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS`, `DENO_CERT`, `REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE`, `CURL_CA_BUNDLE`) to `packages/paperclip-runner/src/configured-environment.ts` - Native Codex shell policy (`codex-security-config.ts`): always put the certificate names in `include_only`; set inheritance to `"all"` with `ignore_default_excludes=true`, bounded by the explicit allowlist - Pass the certificate names through the app-server environment filter, the ACPX spawn environment filter, the ACPX runtime sandbox `include_only`, the runner platform environment keys, and the Rust process supervisor base key list - Legacy and ACPX-engine Codex shell allowlists (`packages/adapter-utils/src/codex-shell-environment.ts`): always include the certificate names - Add a synthetic private-CA HTTPS journey test: a real `git ls-remote` fails TLS verification without the injected CA and succeeds with it, through the policy-filtered child environment - Document the contract in `doc/sandbox-shell-environment.md` and link it from `doc/DEVELOPING.md` ## Verification - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/paperclip-runner exec vitest run src/drivers/codex/codex-security-config.test.ts src/configured-environment.test.ts src/drivers/codex/codex-shell-certificate-trust.test.ts src/drivers/codex/codex-app-server-driver.context-control.test.ts src/drivers/acpx/runtime-sandbox.test.ts` — 104 tests pass - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-utils exec vitest run src/codex-shell-environment.test.ts src/acpx-engine/execute.test.ts` — 270 tests pass - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-codex-local exec vitest run src/server/execute.test.ts` — 10 tests pass - Codex driver lifecycle, conformance, recovery, and boundaries suites pass (103 tests); environment-builder suites pass (307 tests) - Red proof: with only the source fix reverted, the new regressions fail. The journey test shows `GIT_SSL_CAINFO` is undefined in the shell environment, and `git` fails TLS verification against the private-CA fixture - `cargo check` passes for `paperclip-runner-core`; `rustfmt --check` passes for the edited Rust file - The journey test needs `git` and `openssl`; it skips when either tool is absent ## Risks - The native shell policy now always sets `shell_environment_policy.inherit="all"` with `ignore_default_excludes=true`. Before, it set `"none"` when no credentials or task keys were projected. The explicit `include_only` allowlist still bounds every inherited name, so no new secret names can cross - The allowlist grows by seven non-secret certificate-trust names. Their values point at CA files. The sandbox filesystem policy still controls access to those files; this change grants no filesystem access - No persisted run, session, or launch identity changes shape. Sessions saved by the previous release resume unchanged; the new policy applies when the next launch builds its arguments - Provider credentials keep their existing exclusions at every stage ## Model Used - Claude Fable 5 (Anthropic, model ID `claude-fable-5`), extended thinking, agentic tool use, run through Claude Code. The implementation was written and reviewed independently against the community design in #20038; the community author is credited as co-author in the commit. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green (pending: checks run after this PR opens) - [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups (pending review) - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: everlastingcrown <everlastingcrown@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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57658fcb30 |
fix(codex): pass the run's GitHub broker capability to shell commands (#17605)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - When an execution has managed GitHub, Paperclip gives it token-free `git` and `gh` launchers. Each launcher call gets the run's credential from the broker with a per-run capability (`PAPERCLIP_GITHUB_BROKER_TOKEN`). > - The launchers run inside the agent's shell commands and read the capability from their environment. > - #17216 limits the environment of Codex shell commands to an allowlist, and it keeps every `PAPERCLIP_GITHUB_*` name out. > - So on legacy Codex through ACP, the launchers do not get the capability, report `capability_missing`, and continue without credentials. > - The native runner already passes the same names to its Codex provider (`GITHUB_CREDENTIAL_ENVIRONMENT_KEYS` in `packages/paperclip-runner/runner/crates/runner-core/src/codex_provider.rs`). > - This pull request adds the broker capability to the legacy Codex shell allowlist when Paperclip set it for the run. > - The benefit is that managed `git` and `gh` work again for legacy Codex agents. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Fixes #17599 Refs #16549, #17216 ## What Changed - `packages/adapter-utils/src/codex-shell-environment.ts`: the shell allowlist also includes `PAPERCLIP_GITHUB_BROKER_TOKEN` and `PAPERCLIP_GITHUB_BRIDGE_TOKEN` when they have a value in the run's environment. Only the names enter `shell_environment_policy.include_only`. The values stay out of the Codex config and the arguments. - `packages/adapter-utils/src/codex-shell-environment.test.ts`: a new test for the capability. The "runtime transports" test no longer lists the broker token, because the launchers need it in the shell. ## Verification - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-utils exec vitest run src/codex-shell-environment.test.ts`: 5 passed. The new test fails without the change. - Before the change, on a deployment with a legacy Codex agent that has managed GitHub, `gh pr view` in a shell command fails with `Paperclip: GitHub capability_missing; continuing without managed credentials`, and the shell has the broker URL but not the broker capability. I will add the result after the change is deployed there. ## Risks - Codex shell commands can now read the run's broker capability. The broker accepts it only while the run is live (`captureRunIdentity` requires `status === "running"`), and it returns the credential that the managed `gh` command receives anyway. - Agents cannot set these names in their configuration. `stripForbiddenEnvBindings` removes them (`server/src/services/heartbeat/run-preparation.ts`) before the server adds the run's own values. - No change for runs without managed GitHub: Paperclip does not set the capability, so the allowlist does not add it. ## Model Used - Provider and model: Anthropic Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`), used through Claude Code. - Capabilities used: tool use, code execution (local tests and type checks), and repository search. - A human reviewed the diagnosis and the change before this pull request was opened. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [ ] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [ ] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [ ] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge |
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042051904d |
fix(codex): deliver configured service secrets to shell tools (#17216)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip lets operators assign tools and credentials to agents. > - Legacy Codex starts provider processes and builds a separate shell environment policy. > - Both ACP and CLI removed every variable whose name contained KEY, SECRET, or TOKEN. > - This also removed service credentials that the operator explicitly assigned, such as SLACK_BOT_TOKEN. > - This pull request uses the resolved configuration to admit assigned service secrets by name. > - Every Codex launch keeps a bounded shell allowlist, including launches without an agent identity. > - Assigned scripts can use their credentials without adding unassigned host secrets to shell tools. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Related: #16255. That PR fixes project-level exclude patterns. This PR fixes the removal of explicitly assigned service secrets and the fallback to an inherited policy when no agent identity is present. **What happened?** A Codex task could not run a Slack posting script. SLACK_BOT_TOKEN was present in its resolved launch environment, but Paperclip removed its name from shell_environment_policy.include_only. A live removal check also showed that an identity-free launch without an explicit policy could inherit an unassigned host token. **Expected behavior** An explicitly assigned service credential reaches shell commands. Removing that binding removes its shell access on the next launch. Unassigned host credentials stay outside the allowlist. Codex login credentials and observability headers keep their separate provider paths. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Configure a Legacy Codex agent with a synthetic SLACK_BOT_TOKEN value. 2. Run a shell command that checks whether the variable exists without printing its value. 3. Before this fix, the variable is absent. Repeat through ACP and CLI. 4. Remove the binding and run a second turn. Check that neither the removed token nor an unassigned host token reaches the command. **Paperclip version or commit** Reproduced in the executor regressions before the fix on master at |