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| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 DottaandPaperclip
|
13709b4c7a |
feat(connections): let agents configure connections within delegated authority (#17737)
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Connections provide governed tools, chat channels, model accounts,
and gateways.
> - Several management routes require a human board actor even when an
agent has the required grant.
> - Default agents must configure these resources within the responsible
user's authority.
> - This pull request adds a shared authorization path to the existing
REST and native API surface.
> - Human authentication, execution approvals, and local host boundaries
remain enforced.
> - The benefit is that a standard agent can complete authorized setup
with a bounded human handoff.
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
**Subsystem affected**
Server authorization, connection services, shared contracts, native API
discovery, database schema.
**Problem or motivation**
Connection administration is available in the web app but often
unavailable to agents. Agent grants, responsible-user authority,
credential ownership, and actor attribution need separate checks.
Opening gateway-token creation also requires preserving the issuing
agent's delegated authority during token use.
**Proposed solution**
Use the existing authorization evaluator for every connection family.
Enforce current responsible-user authority, effective trust, grant
scope, resource visibility, and target-agent access. Keep existing agent
grants unchanged. Expose authorized configuration through default
`search_api` and `call_api`. Save human authentication steps and let
agents continue after completion.
**Roadmap alignment**
This change completes the API access path for the existing Connected
Apps, Personal & Shared AI Accounts, and governed MCP Gateway
capabilities in `ROADMAP.md`. It follows the maintainer's requested
design. Related work: #11899 enforces connection execution access and
creator/manager rules; this PR extends agent management across
connection families. It does not replace that execution-policy work.
## What Changed
- Add shared connection management context and mandatory
responsible-user, trust, scope, and target checks.
- Allow authorized agents to configure tool, chat/email, GitHub/Slack,
AI, profile, and gateway resources through existing routes.
- Preserve human credential ownership and record the actual agent,
responsible user, and run or key in audit data.
- Preserve saved browser authentication handoffs and callback session
checks.
- Bind agent-issued durable gateway tokens to their responsible user and
recheck delegated authority at use.
- Add explicit REST transport and management capability metadata,
built-in guidance, and sensitive-response handling.
- Intersect caller and endpoint-agent Slack test/invitation policies,
including independent and shared rates. Require the addressed human’s
current endpoint identity link before completing identity handoffs.
- Add production-authenticated integration scenarios. Companion #17739
contains the saved setup UI (including the required human
import/rotation step), product and permission documentation,
catalog/Vercel credential and callback ownership, and operation maps to
keep each review below 100 files. Both PRs must ship together; merge
this implementation first, then its companion.
## Verification
- Current implementation head:
`2ecd6451d0d0c8d82121a4e3fa4ce94c5befbbd6`, including master
`ea727dc3c2`, 99 files. The latest follow-up fixes the two valid
findings from the preceding f9 review. Exact-head Greptile has completed
at5/5 with no findings and Superagent passed. Full exact-head Linux CI
workflow40446606056 completed SUCCESS; only the queued external
Paperclip Review remains pending; earlier Linux passes do not qualify
this successor.
- Latest preserved-stack verification passed **2,165 tests** in fresh
PostgreSQL: **70 actual-auth scenarios**, 27 OpenAPI contracts, 2,022
native API tests and 46 saved GitHub wizard cases. **141 existing
gateway/policy acceptance tests** also passed. Workspace
typecheck/build, maps and token gates passed. The first workspace
typecheck was blocked by sandbox tsx IPC permissions; its authorized
rerun passed. This is focused local evidence; the full Linux CI matrix
is still required.
- Issuer/target gateway policy regressions were red before the fix. Both
decisions now intersect, including Block/Ask first/rates, same
credential identity and current token/user/agent authority after
approval. Invocations retain their token and actual requesting agent;
deleted tokens fail closed. Thirteen actual-auth cases cover revocation,
narrowed scope, approvals, shared rates and board compatibility.
Intermediate missing-token attribution, review-context and
implicit-session actor failures remain in the qualification record; all
final cases pass.
- Activity pagination now retains a bounded cursor across private-only
windows. The actual-JWT regression reaches three older readable events
after 27 private ones without exposing private details. A native
device-login regression was red for plaintext receipts; local check and
test-call results now use existing protected-response handling. The
passing actual-auth case proves encrypted persistence, exact replay,
redacted history and no response asset.
- Previous-head `5b55195593` Linux CI initially failed e2e shard 4/8 in
the existing connection-intent continuation test: periodic recovery
queued a repair at 01:21:47, the scripted journey completed the task at
01:21:48, and the extra queued run was cancelled at 01:21:49 because the
task was terminal. The assertion selected that latest cancelled run.
GitHub refused the first attempt while the workflow was nonterminal.
After completion, the single evidence-supported failed-job rerun was
accepted as **attempt 2** on the same head (workflow 40431202466). The
failed shard and final E2E aggregate passed on attempt 2, and the
complete Linux workflow for that head is successful. The original
failure remains part of qualification. No additional unchanged-code
rerun will be used for this failure.
- Companion CI also has an unchanged login-cleanup idleness timeout,
retained in its qualification record. That same 16-case suite passed in
this parent Linux run and a fresh local database. Both preceding
workflows passed after their single failed-job reruns as attempt 2; the
original failures remain recorded. No additional unchanged-code rerun
was used.
- Migration `0380_broken_aqueduct.sql` was regenerated through the
repository workflow after master took 0379 for project Git
authorization. It adds the responsible-user column with `IF NOT EXISTS`,
preserves upstream migrations, and satisfies snapshot retention and
migration safety checks.
- Upstream published Copilot v62 and v63 identities remain byte-for-byte
unchanged. The combined guidance is now v64, digest
`sha256:22e31f95ef972bcead98a4a707c9f33433558fd111e390e027a2bbb4346e112a`.
The normal shared TypeScript/Rust identity check and **61 Copilot
installation tests passed**. The old source-identity assertion first
failed against unchanged published v63; regenerating a new v64 preserves
the published release.
- Workspace `pnpm -r typecheck` and `pnpm build`, map validation, and UI
token gates passed on the final combined stack after the upstream merge.
Node 24.22.1 / pnpm 9.15.4 were used.
- **Earlier 82 API/OpenAPI tests passed** in fresh PostgreSQL 18: 55
assembled-server scenarios and 27 contracts. They use real persistent
agent keys, run JWTs, human sessions, production defaults, and
deterministic provider fixtures. No actor injection establishes access.
- The new email regression was red before per-account scope filtering.
The Arcade regression was red before human ownership and inventory-key
fixes; it also verifies actual-agent audit identity and a human-session
inventory read. The activity regression measured **200 authorization
checks before the fix and one afterward** for the same one-item page.
- **82 GitHub UI tests passed**, including all three new
failed-replacement regressions that were red before their fix. The UI
preserves an earlier copy only after confirming its committed
generation. Changed or unreadable results block copying and reconnecting
until reconciled. Human-only secret responses now include their
nonsecret committed generation.
- Private test status now rechecks the originating principal and linked
task, including mandatory agent/responsible-user privacy. Cross-agent
tests require the full caller tool access decision and the same
credential identity, regardless of auth label; caller and target
policies/approvals and rate limits apply before execution and after
human approval. A profile-only precondition was found to reject valid
allow-policy and scoped-grant access and has been removed. Both
permitted-access cases and a no-auth-label identity regression were red
before the correction; caller-specific Block still prevents provider
execution. The private-status regression was also red before its fix.
- The tool-activity regression measured 100 capability decisions and 102
run captures on a 100-event page before the fix. It now uses two task
decisions and at most two captures while retaining the same 50 visible
events, private-event filtering, and 403 after audit-grant revocation.
The regression was red before request-context reuse and task-decision
sharing; final server typecheck/build also pass.
- Generic chat configure/reconnect now hands agent-supplied verification
credentials to the addressed human before provider work or vault
changes. Actual key/JWT regressions were red for Slack signing-key
replacement and generic channel secret-reference rebinding. They now
prove unchanged refs and vaulted signing value, human setup, permitted
agent bot-token repair, and governed test messages. All 82 API/OpenAPI
cases pass in fresh PostgreSQL. Eight native receipt protections and
final server typecheck/build also pass.
- The preceding review found that old healthy state could retire a
credential-entry card before a human changed anything. The actual-JWT
regression was red. Saved field generations now change only with
protected values and commit with refs plus a verification fence; retries
retain the baseline. Old health, bot-token repair and unchanged entry
stay pending. New signing verification and current authority permit
continuation. A separate red race proved that user revocation during
provider authentication could return 403 after refs changed; authority
is now checked before persistence and inside the credential transaction.
The final 82 API/OpenAPI cases, four neighboring real-database
Slack/GitHub lifecycle cases, and final server typecheck/build pass.
- A preceding full run crossed a rate-window boundary. Database rows
prove one consumed slot at 23:35 and another at 23:36 for the same
policy/bucket. Only Date is frozen in the rate test cases; transport and
asynchronous timers remain real. Production rate behavior is unchanged,
and the final full run passes. An intermediate fixture failure that
overwrote hidden generation metadata with an API projection is retained
in the qualification record.
- Linux CI on an earlier head found two rate-admission assertions that
omitted the newly persisted bucket key. The failures were reproduced
locally; both assertions now verify the exact actor/tool bucket and all
49 policy-service tests pass. The companion qualification record retains
the initial and intermediate failures. Catalog creator attribution is
preserved in the companion to keep this implementation review at 99
files.
- The latest review reproduced three regressions before repair: complete
human replacements failed on unavailable old signing secrets, fresh
GitHub links incorrectly selected reconnect, and different
credential-entry requests shared an idempotency key. Each old protected
ref now has a narrow known-unavailable fallback; unexpected resolver
failures and company/scope violations still abort. Fresh imports keep
their credential form, configured endpoints keep reconnect, and
canonical field sets/completion modes distinguish handoffs while
matching retries retain their baseline. All 55 actual-auth scenarios and
27 separately run OpenAPI contracts pass, as do server typecheck/build.
Companion #17739 also passes all 41 wizard tests including actual
fresh-form submission, UI typecheck, maps and token gates. Earlier red
results and a mistyped OpenAPI filename are retained in qualification.
- The configured GitHub handoff regression was red in the
browser-component tests and actual-auth link/persistence tests. Saved
links now name requested fields and all/any completion mode; the
companion form submits those supplied fields through reconnect and
retains other saved credentials. Webhook/client-secret reconnect remains
human-only; first-setup secret restrictions remain. All 46 wizard tests
pass, including combined modes and legacy links. A duplicate review
referenced the older companion bf760912; the current form is already
fixed, linked in the reply, and its thread is resolved.
- Linux CI on
|
||
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DottaandPaperclip
|
efc2ddc7bf |
fix: stop idle login cleanup polling (#17106)
**Dependency landed:** PR #17129 is merged. This branch is rebased onto master `0f15f82b19` and preserves its provider-owned completion contract. The shared save path calls `notifyLoginSessionChanged(tx)`; the cleanup module invalidates both existing sandbox cleanup workers without selecting a provider. ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip manages work for AI agents. > - Subscription login can allocate a temporary sandbox. > - Existing cleanup workers scan the database every heartbeat tick, even with no login work. > - Empty scans keep idle databases active. > - This PR uses committed session changes and saved expiry times to schedule cleanup. > - Existing rows still drive recovery after failure and restart. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What happened?** On master `898144f4b3`, the enabled heartbeat scheduler runs both login reapers every 30 seconds by default. An instance with no pending logins still queries sessions and leases. **What did you expect to happen?** After startup reconciliation, idle login cleanup should make no recurring SQL or provider calls. New sessions, expiry, failed cleanup and restart must still recover. **Steps to reproduce** Start a claimed instance with heartbeat scheduling enabled and no pending login sessions. Observe repeated adapter-login and setup-token cleanup queries at the heartbeat interval. Related sleep migration: #17094. Searched open issues and PRs. Related setup-token cleanup work: #15774, #14236 and #16648. This PR does not change their release-result or null-lease behavior. ## What Changed - Register separate adapter-login and setup-token workers with the existing delivery coordinator and scheduler. - Notify before writes in the owning stores, the lease-tag write, and AI connection save. Shared save uses a provider-neutral notification; each cleanup worker checks its own durable predicates. The shared transaction protocol retains intent until the outer transaction settles. - Reconstruct session expiry, promotion expiry and concrete cleanup retries from existing rows. Preserve configured heartbeat spacing to bound scan bursts. - Recover tagged orphan leases even with terminal or missing sessions. Protect live acquisitions that have not attached their lease yet. - Exclude local-subscription rows from sandbox reapers. Their existing local-login worker owns cleanup. - Preserve deferred work across drain and shutdown. Add no tables, Cloud alarms or host-sleep exemptions. - Update the inventory and document producer coverage, writer scope and recovery boundaries. ## Verification - Updated head: `1d57e13606`. Seven focused suites passed (282 tests): AI connections, login cleanup, device-login service/reaper, login-session runtime, and setup-token session/reaper. `pnpm -r typecheck` and `pnpm build` passed. The duplicate local `pnpm test:run` was interrupted after CI passed all server shards; it is not counted as a complete local pass. Full-suite evidence comes from the exact-head CI run. Greptile reviewed this exact head at 5/5 with no findings or unresolved threads. [Full CI run 39669285577](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/39669285577) passed on attempt 2. Both aggregate gates passed; no checks remain failed or pending. - Extended the real PostgreSQL AI connection tests for both Anthropic and OpenAI. The tests check that neither cleanup observer wakes inside the completion callback, both wake after commit, and an idempotent save does not emit another wake. - Existing cleanup tests cover idle/history states, producer wake, expiry, promotion, cancellation, retry/restart, orphan recovery, nested commit/rollback, drain, concurrency, and shutdown. - Current-head CI attempt 1: the unchanged `sandbox-callback-bridge.test.ts` HTTP/2 preface test failed because its child process could not bind `127.0.0.1:34033` (`EADDRINUSE`). Its single unchanged rerun passed. The exact test also passed locally without changing code or timeouts. This establishes recovery from the bind collision; it does not establish which process owned the port. No login code ran in that package test. - Previous-head failures remain recorded: the login-runtime transaction fixture was corrected; a workspace-runtime readiness port-bind failure passed in isolation and fresh CI, but its first failure cause remains unconfirmed. An earlier combined AI suite timed out in local-login isolation and passed alone; its timing cause remains unconfirmed. An earlier local full suite was interrupted and was not counted as passing. ## Risks - Process-local signals cover one active server with the instrumented shared database handle. Independent SQL writers or replicas need their own signal integration. - Provider resources that never became persisted tagged leases remain the responsibility of the unchanged general lease/spool recovery. Setup-token acquisition retains its required provider expiry. - Cleanup starts are bounded by the configured heartbeat interval. Writes during a sweep can cause a final follow-up scan before quiet. - Existing login and resource blockers still prevent unsafe host sleep. This is worker polling removal, not provider sleep qualification. ## Model Used OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex, with reasoning, repository tools and test execution. The exact serving model ID and context-window size are not exposed in this session. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes:` / `Closes` / `Refs` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub references) - [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal/instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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DottaandPaperclip
|
47ded8bf97 |
feat: manage AI runtime credentials through Connections (#13247)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Agent runs need credentials for a specific provider and sign-in method. > - Connections already owns accounts, grants, and access permissions. > - AI authentication should use those same boundaries. > - This pull request adds the storage, API, adoption, and runtime foundation. > - Legacy agents keep their authentication until they explicitly adopt a managed connection. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **Problem or motivation** AI credentials are configured separately from Connections. Agents cannot consistently reuse a responsible user's account or a permitted shared account. **Proposed solution** Manage AI accounts with the existing Connections grants and permissions. Keep model and harness selection independent from credential selection. Preserve legacy authentication until validated adoption. **Alternatives considered** A separate credential registry would duplicate ownership and access policy. Automatic fallback would risk using the wrong account. **Roadmap alignment** This extends the shipped Apps, multi-user, secrets, and agent-runtime capabilities. The maintainer requested the feature and reviewed the UI. Related groundwork: #11899 (connection permissions), #10910 (connection wizard), #11692 (Claude subscription profiles), and #11854 (Codex account rotation). ## What Changed - Add AI-purpose/runtime-auth contracts and an additive, idempotent migration. - Add Claude, OpenAI, OpenRouter, and Grok provider capabilities and catalog entries. - Store credentials on grants. Resolve responsible-user defaults or explicit permitted grants. - Isolate managed credentials and provider sessions across accounts. Block missing credentials without ambient fallback. - Keep imported legacy secrets unchanged during reconnect. Use independent local Codex/Grok sign-in attempts for rotating credentials. - Add authorization, migration, concurrent refresh, retry, cancellation, and legacy-compatibility tests. This is part 1 of a two-PR stack. The app UI follows in #13248. Merge the foundation first. ## Verification - Updated against master `04e364236`, preserving upstream provider login and connector workflows. - Full workspace typecheck, production build, Storybook build, and token gates passed on the integrated branch. Final local-login changes passed 59 focused tests; new-agent and inbox regression suites passed 63 tests. - Browser checks verified automatic local Claude account detection, resumable Codex login commands, retry, focus restoration, and desktop/phone layouts. Commands create their isolated directory before invoking the CLI. - All current-head CI checks passed on `2a996560a`, including all server/workspace tests, browser shards, runner verification, typecheck, build, and canary dry run. Greptile reviewed that commit at 5/5 with no unresolved threads. Earlier local full-suite attempts hit the Mac PostgreSQL shared-memory limit; the complete suites passed in CI. - Renumbered the additive AI migration to `0276` after upstream migrations and regenerated its snapshot. Existing legacy agents retain their configuration. - Added local login status checks, owner-scoped retry, managed OpenCode remote homes, credential-aware model discovery, and task connection-repair delivery. ## Risks - Managed credential failures intentionally block execution. They do not restore legacy fallback. - Preview-era copied Codex/Grok subscriptions require independent reconnect. - The integrated branch has live provider acceptance coverage. This update verifies local Claude detection and Codex API-key task repair; it does not add a new subscription authorization/refresh or Daytona stress pass. - Runtime-auth connections must stay excluded from tool and channel handling. ## Model Used OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex, with reasoning, repository tools, code execution, and browser testing. The exact runtime model identifier and context-window size are not exposed in this session. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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Nicky LeachandPaperclip
|
60469a08e0 |
feat(agent-login): resume an active login session and permit concurrent login terminals (#12861)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Agent authentication uses server sessions, plugin workers, and browser login panels. > - A page reload loses an active login session, and one worker permits only one login terminal. > - These limits cause lost work and prevent two owners from logging in through one worker. > - This pull request lets the browser resume active sessions and lets workers serve concurrent login terminals. > - The benefit is reliable login recovery with a bounded process-wide route limit. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What existing behavior does this improve?** It improves agent credential login recovery and concurrent login terminal handling. **Subsystem affected** Cross-cutting (multiple of the above). **Current behavior** A page reload loses the active login session. A shared plugin worker rejects a second login terminal. **Proposed behavior** The browser reads and resumes the owner's active session. A worker supports multiple login terminal routes under a process-wide ceiling. **Reason and benefit** Owners keep login progress after a reload. Two owners can log in through one worker without removing the route limit. **Breaking changes** None. The change adds owner-scoped read routes and changes login terminal concurrency. ## What Changed - Replace the single worker login route with maps keyed by host route and worker session identifiers. - Add a process-wide login route ceiling and release each reserved slot on every exit path. - Add owner-scoped active-session reads with consistent negative responses and private cache control. - Keep the device-login prompt while the session has an active public status. - Add a durable setup-token cancel fallback for a lost in-memory session. - Resume active sessions when the agent configuration or onboarding panel mounts. - Remove routine unmount cancellation and keep explicit Cancel behavior. ## Verification - `pnpm --filter @paperclip/server test` — server route, service, and plugin-worker-manager suites. - `pnpm --filter @paperclip/plugin-sdk test` — worker RPC host suite. - `cd ui && npx vitest run src/components/AgentConfigForm.render.test.tsx src/components/OnboardingWizard.test.tsx`. - `cd ui && npx tsc -b`. - `tests/e2e/onboarding.spec.ts` — reload during login. - CI must pass on this pull request. ## Risks The change affects agent authentication and the sandbox-to-host boundary. Route cleanup must release every reserved slot. Owner checks must prevent cross-owner session access. Tests cover route cleanup, owner scope, reload recovery, and concurrent worker routes. ## Model Used Codex, OpenAI GPT-5, tool use and code review support. The implementation author owns the exact model details for the code changes. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have described the issue in-PR with the relevant issue-template fields - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links - [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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Nicky LeachandPaperclip
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dc30dc4f34 |
fix(setup-token): pin the start guard to the served adapter (#12179)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - Sandbox agents use adapter login routes to start authenticated sessions > - The setup-token start route accepted adapter types that later routes and cleanup did not serve > - This mismatch could create sessions that no route or reaper could reach > - The OpenAPI body schema and synchronous login capability defaults also differed from the enforced behavior > - This pull request pins the start guard to the served adapter, shares the adapter constant, aligns the schema, and exposes login capabilities early > - The benefit is consistent session access, cleanup, API documentation, and login UI behavior ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs: #11730 Refs: #11286 **Subsystem affected** Cross-cutting server and UI login behavior. **Problem or motivation** The setup-token start route accepted a non-served adapter type. Follow-up routes and the reaper only handled the served adapter. This could create an unreachable session that held its slot. The OpenAPI schema and early capability defaults also did not match the route behavior. **Proposed solution** Pin the start guard, follow-up key, and reaper filter to one exported served-adapter constant. Derive the OpenAPI body from the strict shared schema. Add the login capability projection to synchronous defaults. **Alternatives considered** Keep separate adapter constants and add another guard at each follow-up route. This would preserve duplicate sources of truth and leave future drift possible. **Roadmap alignment** This change supports the Cloud / Sandbox agents milestone in `ROADMAP.md`. ## What Changed - Reject a setup-token start request when its adapter type is not the served adapter. - Reuse one exported adapter constant for the start guard, follow-up key, and reaper filter. - Derive the company adapter login-sessions start body from the strict shared schema. - Add the `login` capability projection to the synchronous Claude and Codex adapter defaults. - Add regression coverage for the rejected non-served adapter request. ## Verification - The setup-token route suite passes, including the non-served adapter regression test. - The setup-token session-service suite passes. - The setup-token reaper suite passes. - The OpenAPI suite passes. - The server TypeScript check passes. - The UI TypeScript check passes. - GitHub Actions must confirm all required checks after pull request creation. ## Risks The start route now rejects adapter types that follow-up routes cannot serve. No database migration exists. Revert the one commit to roll back the change. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-5, exact runtime model ID not exposed, large context window, reasoning, tool use, and code execution. The implementing engineer used AI assistance. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes: #` / `Refs: #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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Nicky LeachandPaperclip
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e0b64529b3 |
feat(auth): normalize agent login in the sandbox onto one session table and a capability contract (#11730)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - Sandbox agents need a safe login path for each supported adapter > - Codex device login and Claude setup-token login used separate session stores and route logic > - Separate stores made session lookup, expiry, and login capability checks harder to keep consistent > - This pull request unifies both flows on one session table and one capability contract > - The benefit is one company-scoped login model with public session identifiers and shared lifecycle rules ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **Subsystem affected** Cross-cutting (multiple of the above) **Problem or motivation** Codex and Claude sandbox login used separate session stores and different route paths. This split increased the risk of inconsistent company scoping, session lookup, and cleanup. **Proposed solution** Use `adapter_auth_sessions` for both login flows. Use public session identifiers for API access. Select login behavior from projected adapter capability data. Share the route spine, lease arguments, runner lifecycle, and reaper rules. **Alternatives considered** Keep two session tables and add matching fixes to both routes. This keeps duplicate logic and does not provide one capability contract, so this pull request uses shared infrastructure. **Roadmap alignment** This change supports the shipped Cloud / Sandbox agents milestone in `ROADMAP.md`. ## What Changed - Unify Codex device login and Claude setup-token login on `adapter_auth_sessions`. - Return and look up sessions with company-scoped public session identifiers. - Enforce one active session for each company, owner, and adapter. - Share the login route spine, sandbox lease arguments, runner lifecycle, and missing-auth check. - Add a standalone setup-token reaper with adapter-specific row selection. - Add optional login capability projection for adapters and drive route and UI selection from that data. - Rename the provider flag to `supportsLoginPty` and validate its deprecated alias. - Remove the old Claude setup-token session table and add the required migrations. ## Verification - Server typecheck passed with `tsc`. - Database typecheck passed. - UI typecheck passed with `tsc -b`. - Codex login service and route suites passed. - Setup-token session, route, and reaper suites passed. - Adapter session schema, plugin validator, capability projection, UI render, and Daytona suites passed. - GitHub Actions must confirm the complete CI gate after pull request creation. ## Risks - The migrations remove short-lived in-flight login rows during deployment. A login that spans the migration can continue until its provider lease expires. - The Codex credential store remains company-scoped. A cross-owner credential race remains a documented, board-accepted risk. - API clients that use internal session row identifiers no longer work. The API accepts only public session identifiers. ## Model Used Codex, GPT-5, exact runtime model ID not exposed in this handoff, large context window, reasoning, and repository tool use. The implementing engineer produced the code with AI assistance. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes: #` / `Refs: #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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Devin Foley
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962e98b1be |
feat(server): operator declaration for platform edge TLS termination on the Claude login guard (#11579)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - The Claude local adapter supports a setup-token subscription login, and its confidential routes pass a fail-closed transport guard > - The guard accepts direct socket TLS, a local_trusted loopback peer, or an allowlisted proxy peer that forwards https — and deliberately never reads the global `TRUST_PROXY` > - On a managed platform the edge terminates TLS, the app socket is always plain HTTP, and the edge-proxy peer addresses are not stable or documented, so none of the three cases can hold > - Every login on such a deployment shows the clear-text transport warning although the user's connection is HTTPS, and the agent-scoped confidential routes fail closed entirely > - This pull request adds a dedicated operator declaration that the platform edge terminates TLS, as a fourth guard case > - The benefit is a correct transport decision on managed platforms with the default posture unchanged everywhere else ## Linked Issues or Issue Description No public GitHub issue covers this. The problem is described in-PR following the enhancement template. Related public PRs: [#11347](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/11347) added the new-agent login flow and the non-blocking transport advisory, and [#11286](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/11286) added the setup-token login and the guard with its `CLAUDE_LOGIN_TRUSTED_PROXIES` allowlist. **Subsystem affected** server/ — the confidential transport guard for the Claude setup-token login (`services/setup-token-session.ts`, `routes/agents.ts`, `app.ts`). **Current behavior** The guard allows a confidential response on direct socket TLS, on a `local_trusted` loopback peer, or when the immediate peer is on the dedicated `CLAUDE_LOGIN_TRUSTED_PROXIES` allowlist and forwards `https`. Behind a managed platform's TLS-terminating edge (Railway, Render, Fly, and similar), the app socket is plain HTTP and the edge-proxy peer addresses are not operator-visible or stable, so the allowlist cannot express them — IPv6 entries match by exact string only. The result: the login panel shows "This connection is not encrypted" for a connection that is HTTPS to the user, and the agent-scoped confidential routes return the fixed no-secret error. **Proposed behavior** `CLAUDE_LOGIN_EDGE_TLS_TERMINATED=true` is an explicit, single-purpose operator declaration that every client request reaches the server through the platform's TLS-terminating edge. Under the declaration the guard treats a request as confidential unless the edge itself labels the client hop as plain `http` in `X-Forwarded-Proto`. The declaration is never derived from the global `TRUST_PROXY` setting, which the guard still never reads. Without the declaration, nothing changes. **Reason and benefit** The guard's spoofing concern does not apply to this deployment shape: a client cannot pick its transport, because the platform admits HTTPS only, and the header the guard consults is set by the platform edge, not the client. A blanket warning that is always wrong teaches users to ignore it. The declaration keeps the strict default for every deployment that does not opt in, and it keeps the allowlist as the precise tool for operators who do know their proxy addresses. ## What Changed - `ConfidentialTransportConfig` gains optional `edgeTlsTerminated` (default false), documented as the operator declaration for platform edge TLS termination. - `evaluateConfidentialTransport` adds the declaration as a guard case: allowed unless the forwarded protocol's first hop is explicitly `http` (reason `edge_labeled_plain_http` then; `operator_edge_tls_termination` when allowed). - `assessConfidentialStartup` reports `edge_tls_termination_declared`, so the startup log shows why forwarded requests pass. - `app.ts` parses `CLAUDE_LOGIN_EDGE_TLS_TERMINATED` (truthy: `1/true/yes/on`) and passes it to the agent routes; the routes build the guard config from it. - The SR-7 operator-requirement comment on the setup-token routes documents the new variable next to the allowlist. - Tests: five new guard unit cases and a route case asserting the prompt and code responses carry no `transportAdvisory` under the declaration. ## Verification ```sh cd server npx tsc --noEmit # clean npx vitest run src/services/setup-token-session.test.ts \ src/routes/setup-token-route.test.ts \ src/__tests__/openapi-routes.test.ts # 3 files, 89 passed ``` The new "keeps failing closed when the declaration is absent" case pins the unchanged default posture. ## Risks The declaration is an operator statement the server cannot verify; an operator who sets it on a deployment whose edge does not terminate TLS re-labels plain-HTTP requests as confidential. This is the same trust class as `CLAUDE_LOGIN_TRUSTED_PROXIES` (a wrong allowlist entry has the same effect) and is opt-in, off by default, and scoped to the login routes only. The guard still fails closed when the edge explicitly labels a request `http`. No schema change, no API shape change — `transportAdvisory` was already nullable. ## Model Used Claude Fable 5 (`claude-fable-5`), extended thinking, with tool use and code execution — investigation, implementation, and tests. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge |
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Nicky LeachandPaperclip
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c1c46f1e4e |
feat: Claude login on the new-agent page before agent creation (#11347)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - The Claude local adapter supports subscription login through a sandbox > - The new-agent page must show login before the user creates an agent > - Test results must not expose raw sandbox diagnostics or secret values > - This pull request adds the login UI to both Test lanes and closes the diagnostic boundary > - The branch also adds durable cleanup recovery for failed sandbox teardown > - Reusable sandboxes must retain both their recorded teardown configuration and a valid lifecycle path until destruction succeeds > - The benefit is a usable login flow with fixed public checks, redacted server logs, and recoverable sandbox cleanup ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Related public work: [#9488](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/9488) adds first-class recognition for `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN` in headless and remote runs. Related public issue: [#2681](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/issues/2681) requests Claude Code subscription support. This pull request adds the login transport and new-agent UI flow that those changes do not provide. **Subsystem affected:** Claude local adapter, server login probes, sandbox provider setup, cleanup recovery, and the new-agent UI. **Problem or motivation:** The Test lanes did not show the sandbox login panel in all supported cases. Test results also exposed raw probe diagnostics, and JSON escapes could end secret redaction early. **Proposed solution:** Surface the login capability through the bundled provider manifest. Prepare the same probe runtime in the ACP lane. Send diagnostics only to redacted server logs. Keep Test checks on fixed public messages. Normalize login URL hints to allowlisted HTTPS Claude and Anthropic hosts. Consume JSON escapes during redaction. Preserve failed sandbox cleanup state across retries and restarts, and prevent deletion from severing the lifecycle context of a live reusable sandbox. **Alternatives considered:** Keep raw diagnostics in Test checks or trust login URL text from the sandbox. Both choices increase information exposure. Keep separate probe behavior in the ACP lane. That choice would leave the two Test lanes inconsistent. ## What Changed - Surface the sandbox login panel on both Test lanes. - Reconcile the bundled Daytona plugin manifest so `supportsSetupTokenLogin` reaches the UI capability gate. - Prepare the ACP Test lane with the same probe runtime as the CLI Test lane. - Add the `claude_acp_login_probe_unavailable` warning when the ACP probe cannot run. - Send raw sandbox diagnostics only to redacted server logs. - Keep Test checks on fixed public messages in the ACP, managed-config, and CLI paths. - Normalize login URL hints to allowlisted HTTPS Claude and Anthropic hosts. - Redact JSON and escaped-JSON secret values, including escaped quotes and backslashes. - Preserve orphan cleanup records across provider failures, restarts, and unavailable plugins. - Atomically block environment deletion while a live reusable sandbox lease still depends on it. - Verify pending cleanup destroys plugin sandboxes with the provider configuration recorded on the lease, even after the current environment configuration changes. ## Verification - Head under review: `506b7fa2d83c36bfa5fd722ee9d95b0c7431c241`. - Focused environment route/service/runtime coverage passes: 196 tests across 3 files. - `pnpm -r typecheck` passes. - `pnpm build` passes. - The full Vitest run completed with 4,754 passing and 28 failing tests. All 23 source-test failures reproduce unchanged on parent head `58cfe61a33191ce03d965d65085d26064b4888ba`; the other 5 are duplicate executions from stale `server/dist` output. The failures are unrelated macOS path/listener and scheduler-fixture failures, so there is no new bad commit for bisect to localize. - All required CI checks pass for the current head, including build, typecheck/release registry, all server and workspace shards, serialized server suites, canary, and e2e. - A fresh Greptile review for `506b7fa2d83c36bfa5fd722ee9d95b0c7431c241` reports 5/5, “safe to merge,” with no blocking failure remaining. ## Risks - A probe or redaction change could hide useful server diagnostics. - An allowlist change could reject a valid Claude login URL. - Cleanup recovery changes could affect provider teardown ordering. - An environment with a live reusable sandbox can no longer be deleted until the owning issue or execution workspace completes teardown. - The implementation keeps public Test messages fixed and sends detail to redacted server logs. ## Model Used OpenAI GPT-5 via Codex — exact model ID: GPT-5; tool use and code execution enabled; extended reasoning enabled. The implementation author used AI-assisted development. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes: #` / `Refs: #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and documented the result - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation or confirmed no separate documentation change is needed - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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|
e31951a17d |
feat: Claude agent setup-token login in a sandbox (#11286)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - Claude agents that run in a remote sandbox need a safe in-product login path > - The existing host login route cannot open a pseudo-terminal inside that sandbox > - The login flow must protect the browser code, the login URL, and the OAuth token at every step > - This pull request adds the parser, the runner, a Daytona pseudo-terminal transport, and a guarded, owner-bound session route behind an injectable transport > - The route stays inert in the default build and fails closed until a sandbox provider binds the live transport > - The benefit is a company-scoped setup-token flow with one-time secret delivery, redaction, and fail-closed transport checks, ready for a later staged production rollout ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **Agent or provider** Claude Code setup-token login for sandbox agents. **Why this adapter is useful** Sandbox agents need a supported way to sign in without host credentials. An authorized owner completes the browser step and receives the token one time. **How the agent is invoked** When a sandbox provider binds the injectable transport, the server starts `claude setup-token` through a sandbox pseudo-terminal, sends the browser code to the matched prompt, and returns the token through the guarded session route. The default build does not bind the transport. In that state the start route fails closed with a fixed no-secret `503`. It does not start a process and it does not hold a sandbox lease. **Additional context** The transport is injectable, so each sandbox provider binds its own pseudo-terminal. This pull request adds the Daytona transport but does not bind it in the production server. A production wiring needs a lease manager, a live pseudo-terminal factory, a durable token store, and its own security review. The route keeps secrets out of logs, activity details, errors, telemetry, and non-owner responses. ## What Changed - Add strict parsers for the setup-token URL, the prompt, and the success token. - Add a login runner that drives the `claude setup-token` command through a pseudo-terminal. - Add the Daytona pseudo-terminal transport and the sandbox plugin wiring. - Add a company-scoped, owner-bound login session service with rate limits, a reaper, cleanup, and one-time token delivery. - Add the guarded session routes at `/agents/:id/setup-token-login-sessions/*` behind an injectable transport. The routes become the live login path only when a provider binds the transport. - Keep the start route fail-closed in the default build. It returns a fixed no-secret `503` and it does not bind `setupTokenLogin`. - Keep the existing host route `POST /agents/:id/claude-login` in place. This pull request does not replace it. - Keep confidential responses behind a fail-closed TLS transport guard with `Cache-Control: no-store`, and extend redaction for the new fields. - Export the parser and the runner from the Claude local server entry, and document the new session routes in the OpenAPI spec. ## Verification - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run setup-token-route setup-token-session` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-claude-local exec vitest run` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server run typecheck` - Confirm that the pull request checks pass on GitHub. ## Risks - Low user-facing risk on merge. The default build does not bind the transport, so the production start route stays fail-closed with a `503`. The merge does not change the production login behavior. - When a provider later binds the transport, the flow starts a live sandbox process and holds a short-lived in-memory secret. Cleanup must stop the child before it releases the sandbox lease. - The transport guard fails closed when the deployment does not provide a trusted TLS path. A wrong proxy allowlist can block a valid request. - The production wiring is out of scope. It needs a lease manager, a live pseudo-terminal factory, a durable token store, and its own security review before the server binds `setupTokenLogin`. ## Model Used Anthropic Claude Opus 4.8 assisted the implementation. It used extended reasoning, code execution, repository tool use, and a 200,000-token context window. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes: #` / `Refs: #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes (the OpenAPI spec covers the new session routes; no user-facing documentation needs changes) - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |