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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Devin FoleyandPaperclip
|
6f40e23536 |
fix(logging): redact cloud authentication headers (#14413)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - The server records HTTP requests to help operators diagnose failures. > - Cloud requests carry tenant credentials and signed assertions in headers. > - The HTTP logger did not redact four of these headers. > - This pull request adds those headers to the existing redaction list. > - Operators retain the route, method, and response status without recording these values. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What happened?** HTTP request logs could contain cloud tenant credentials, session identifiers, runtime identity assertions, and cloud control assertions. **Expected behavior** The logger must redact these header values for successful requests and failed requests. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Create an Express app with the production HTTP logger and redaction configuration. 2. Send a request with the four cloud headers and distinct test values. 3. Inspect the serialized request headers for responses with status 200, 403, and 500. **Paperclip version or commit** Reproduced on `0f14d26123` before this fix. **Deployment mode** Server with cloud proxy authentication. The regression test uses an in-process Express server. ## What Changed - Redact `x-paperclip-cloud-tenant-token`, `x-paperclip-cloud-session-id`, `x-paperclip-cloud-runtime-identity`, and `x-paperclip-cloud-control` in HTTP request logs. - Test real logger output for HTTP 200, 403, and 500 with mixed-case request header names. Route 403 and 500 through the production error handler. Check response bodies, log levels, and server error context. - Check that the method, route, and status remain available. ## Verification The `server/src/__tests__/http-log-redaction.test.ts` suite passed, including all three new cloud-header cases. - Rebased onto master at `14795136f5`. - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/http-log-redaction.test.ts` passed: 59 tests, including all three new response-status cases. The suite and server typecheck also passed after the error-handler coverage update. - `pnpm build` and `pnpm -r typecheck` passed. The full local `pnpm test:run` was attempted and stopped after the failures listed below. Greptile is 5/5 with zero unresolved review threads on the latest head. All checks for head `373d29e2f1` passed (53 successful, two intentional skips). - Full local validation did not pass. The attempt reproduced company-skill cache permission failures, the terminal-workspace cleanup assertion, a heartbeat feedback timeout, and one process-conversation timing failure. It was stopped during the general-server stage after these failures. Remaining general-server tests, other workspace groups, and serialized-server stages did not complete locally. Earlier clean-master checks reproduced the cache failures and isolated cleanup retries passed. The latest-head GitHub suite passed all of these groups. - No browser suites ran locally. This change does not affect browser behavior. ## Risks - These four values will no longer be available in HTTP logs. Route, method, and status remain available. - This change applies to new log entries. It does not remove old entries or rotate credentials. - No schema, API, or authentication behavior changes. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-6, with repository inspection, code editing, and test execution. The exact deployment model ID and context window are not exposed in this session. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass (focused suites; full local-run failures and incomplete stages are documented above) - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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|
Devin FoleyandPaperclip
|
b2e9e82f05 |
fix: stop remote Grok runs before continuing queued messages (#14100)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - The execution service owns each run and saves messages sent while it runs. > - Interrupt must stop the current executor before it delivers those messages. > - Remote Grok commands did not register the host cancellation control. > - A cancelled task run could still write Done and prevent queue recovery. > - This pull request connects remote cancellation and revokes cancelled run writes. > - Saved input can use the existing queue admission rules after verified cleanup. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What happened?** Interrupting a queued message marked a remote Grok run cancelled before its sandbox stopped. The old run could still post a reply and mark the task Done. Its saved follow-up remained deferred behind execution recovery. **Expected behavior** Stop revokes run write authority and waits for verified termination. Saved messages remain durable and enter one successor through normal admission after cleanup. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Run a task with `grok_local` in a remote sandbox. 2. Send a follow-up and use Interrupt while the command runs. 3. Let the old command attempt a task status update after cancellation. 4. Observe the task disposition and the saved message queue. **Paperclip version or commit** The gap is present in master at `d3e0f0a238`. **Deployment mode** Authenticated server with a Daytona sandbox. Related work: #14028 and #14046 handle bounded continuation. #13291 covers infrastructure interruption and verified remote cleanup. #13332 addresses atomic recovery holds. This change handles direct Grok operator cancellation and stale task writes. ## What Changed - Register remote Grok cancellation before preparation. Keep command ownership until the host confirms sandbox termination. - Reuse the sandbox cancellation boundary for the direct CLI invocation. Reject fresh attempts after cancellation and preserve workspace restore failure evidence. - Reject writes from cancelled task JWTs and runs with a pending stop. Preserve diagnostic reads and existing conversation error codes. - Recheck run authority under a database lock before task updates and interaction responses commit. - Preserve authorized handoffs that stop their own run. Only the server-issued stop receipt for that request permits the final task update. - Add tests for hung commands, unverified stops, early cancellation, copy-back failures, late Done, late interaction responses, authorized handoffs, exact lease receipts, and one queue successor across concurrent restart sweeps. - Document the cancellation and write-authority contract. ## Verification - Targeted adapter, cancellation-boundary, authentication, queued-message, interaction-service, and activity-route tests passed. The expanded run passed 214 tests; one new test had an incomplete fixture. After correcting the fixture, all 8 selected follow-up cases passed. - `pnpm -r typecheck`: passed on `179c86caf1bf0d89914a503d46e24af7e4b8c557`. - `pnpm build`: passed on the same commit. - `pnpm test:run`: the general-server group completed with 13,521 passed, 99 skipped, and 18 failed tests. It then stopped, so the remaining local groups did not run. Five Slack, email, and wake-batching failures passed on focused reruns after correcting the local environment. The remaining 13 failures reproduce as `EACCES` on rename in unchanged skill-cache code on macOS. Two custom-image suite setup hooks also failed to start embedded PostgreSQL after the machine exhausted shared-memory slots; all 31 tests in that file passed on rerun after the local resource issue was resolved. CI covers all test groups. - CI: 53 checks passed and 2 were skipped on the latest commit, including the aggregate verification gate. The last server shard passed on its single rerun after a preview-server startup timeout. The affected file also passed locally with 28 passed and 3 skipped. - Greptile: 5/5 on the latest commit. Both review threads are resolved. - No live deployment or staging task mutation has been performed. ## Risks - Stopping the sandbox can prevent file copy-back. The result preserves workspace restore failure evidence; termination does not imply restored files. - If provider termination fails, the adapter keeps ownership of its outstanding command and does not acknowledge Stop. - The write restriction now applies to ordinary cancelled tasks. Reads remain allowed. Task and interaction checks add a shared run-row lock to agent mutations. An exact server-issued receipt permits the task request that stopped its own run to complete its handoff. - Existing terminal tasks are not reopened automatically. An operator must correct a historical late Done before its saved queue can continue. - No schema migration or UI change. ## Model Used OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex, with reasoning, repository inspection, code execution, and test tools. The precise backend revision and context-window size are not exposed in this session. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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|
Devin Foley
|
8c6cc7dccf |
feat(cloud): sync primary-company archive state with the Cloud control plane (#13837)
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Paperclip Cloud runs managed instances and controls their lifecycle
from a control plane.
> - Inside the app, a person can archive a company. On a managed
instance, the Cloud-pinned primary company is the whole organization.
> - Today that archive stays local. The control plane does not learn
about it, so it keeps the instance running and shows the organization as
live.
> - This pull request notifies the control plane when the primary
company crosses the archived boundary, and adds two control endpoints so
the control plane can verify the state and undo the archive during a
restore.
> - The benefit is that an archived organization stops running and shows
as archived, and a restore brings the company back without manual steps.
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
No public issue exists. Description follows the enhancement template:
**What existing behavior does this improve?**
Company archive on Cloud-managed instances. Archiving the primary
company pauses agents and cancels runs, but the hosting control plane
never learns about it.
**Subsystem affected**
Server: company service, cloud-control middleware, instance routes.
**Current behavior**
A person archives the primary company. The instance keeps running. The
Cloud portfolio still shows the organization as live. Unarchive after a
Cloud restore requires manual steps inside the product.
**Proposed behavior**
The company service rings a Cloud lifecycle doorbell when the primary
company is archived or unarchived. The control plane verifies the state
through `GET /api/instance/lifecycle` before it acts. During a restore,
the control plane calls `POST /api/instance/lifecycle/unarchive-primary`
to bring the company back. Self-hosted instances are not affected.
**Reason and benefit**
An archived organization should not keep running, and its hosting
console should show it as archived. The verified read-back keeps the
doorbell a hint: a forged or duplicated ring cannot change state.
## What Changed
- New `services/cloud-lifecycle-sync.ts`: fire-and-forget doorbell `POST
{cloudOrigin}/v1/tenant/lifecycle-changed` with bounded retries. It runs
only on cloud-managed instances, and only for the derived primary
company id. It never blocks or fails the company mutation.
- `services/companies.ts`: ring the doorbell after a committed archive
or unarchive transition, in both the `update()` status-patch path and
`archive()`.
- New `GET /api/instance/lifecycle`: reports the primary company id, its
status, and how many other companies are not archived. Bound to a
`lifecycle:read` Cloud control assertion; board members can also read
it.
- New `POST /api/instance/lifecycle/unarchive-primary`: idempotent
unarchive of the primary company as a system actor. Bound to
`lifecycle:unarchive-primary`; requires instance admin otherwise.
- `middleware/cloud-control.ts`: a closed endpoint→method→action table
replaces the single hardcoded endpoint. Each assertion still authorizes
exactly one action on one endpoint.
- `services/cloud-instance.ts`: the primary-company id derivation moves
here as the single definition; `middleware/auth.ts` delegates to it. The
derivation itself is unchanged.
## Verification
- `pnpm exec tsc --noEmit` in `server/` is clean.
- `pnpm exec vitest run src/__tests__/cloud-lifecycle-sync.test.ts
src/__tests__/cloud-control-task-drain.test.ts
src/__tests__/instance-settings-routes.test.ts
src/__tests__/companies-service.test.ts
src/__tests__/cloud-tenant-company-provisioning.test.ts` — all pass.
- New tests cover: doorbell env-gating, retry bounds, no-throw contract;
the read-back status and sibling count; idempotent unarchive and the
admin gate; non-cloud 404s; control-assertion action binding for the new
endpoints, including cross-action and wrong-method rejection; and a
companies-service test that proves the doorbell rings exactly on
archived-boundary transitions.
## Risks
- Self-hosted instances see no behavior change: without a Cloud signal
the doorbell is a no-op and the endpoints answer 404.
- The doorbell is advisory by design. The control plane verifies through
the read-back before it acts, so a lost or duplicated ring cannot
corrupt state.
- The unarchive endpoint reuses the existing `companyService.update`
path, so agent reactivation and activity logging behave exactly like an
in-product unarchive.
## Model Used
- Claude Fable 5 (`claude-fable-5`), via Claude Code CLI, extended
thinking and tool use enabled.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
|
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|
Devin FoleyandPaperclip
|
92d4868e79 |
fix(server): isolate run errors and redact runtime capability headers (#13826)
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip manages AI agents and their work.
> - Operators use Sentry to investigate failed runs and server errors.
> - Run reports attach a task ID, run ID, error code, and adapter
fingerprint.
> - The server skips Sentry's OpenTelemetry setup to preserve its
separate tracing and privacy settings.
> - Without an async context manager, a scope mutation can attach old
run data to later errors.
> - The HTTP logger also retains a runtime credential capability header.
> - This change isolates run metadata and redacts that header so
diagnostics identify failures without leaking credentials.
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
Refs #13446 and #13719.
**What happened?**
After a terminal run failure, an unrelated server exception can inherit
that run's tags, context, and fingerprint. Sentry then groups a database
error with an earlier adapter failure. The real SDK reproduces this with
the application's `skipOpenTelemetrySetup: true` setting. HTTP request
logs also retain the `x-paperclip-github-capability` header, which must
be treated as a credential.
**Expected behavior**
Run metadata belongs to the terminal run event. Later exceptions must
not inherit it. Every genuine error must still be captured. Runtime
capability headers must be redacted on success and failure logs.
**Steps to reproduce**
1. Initialize the optional Sentry SDK with the application's options and
an in-memory transport.
2. Capture a terminal run failure.
3. Capture an unrelated exception.
4. Inspect the second event. Before this fix, it contains the first
run's identity and fingerprint.
5. Send a request with a fixture runtime GitHub capability header.
Before this fix, HTTP logs retain the fixture value.
## What Changed
- Pass tags, context, and fingerprint directly to `captureException`
instead of mutating the ambient scope.
- Preserve the existing run fields, grouping keys, ordinary exception
capture, and privacy settings.
- Test two run identities interleaved with unrelated exceptions against
the real optional SDK.
- Update the capture contract tests and document event-local run
metadata.
- Redact the runtime GitHub capability header through the existing HTTP
logger policy. Test successful, denied, and failed requests.
- Add a dedicated GitHub-hosted CI check that installs the exact
optional SDK version declared in `server/package.json`. It fails if the
real-SDK regression would be skipped. The SDK stays outside the
workspace and production dependency graph.
## Verification
- The real-SDK regression failed before the fix because the unrelated
event contained `contexts.run_failure`.
- Five focused suites passed: 123 tests, including all optional SDK
tests. Suites: `run-failure-sentry-real-sdk.test.ts`,
`run-failure-sentry.test.ts`, `sentry.test.ts`,
`run-failure-report.test.ts`, and `http-log-redaction.test.ts`. A custom
in-memory transport prevented outbound Sentry delivery.
- All three new header-redaction cases failed before the policy fix and
passed afterward.
- The dedicated CI command passed locally with
`PAPERCLIP_REQUIRE_SENTRY_TEST_SDK=1` and the audited SDK available
through `NODE_PATH`.
- Server TypeScript check passed with a scratch configuration that
resolves this checkout's workspace packages. The existing dependency
links point to another checkout.
- `node scripts/check-module-boundaries.mjs` and `git diff --check`
passed.
- Gitleaks and a separate private-data scan passed before push.
- Full local workspace typecheck, test, and build were not run. The
machine has less than 2 GiB free and those commands include Rust builds.
Full PR CI must pass before merge.
- The dedicated real-SDK GitHub check passed with 1 test executed and no
skips: https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/35774449002
- Greptile reviewed
|
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|
Devin FoleyandPaperclip
|
c65fc9e3c8 |
fix: recover authentication and browser connection failures (#13724)
fix: recover authentication and browser connection failures Include connect timeouts in the bounded retry policy for idempotent actor synchronization. Handle WebSocket constructor failures through existing reconnect paths and preserve HTTP polling while realtime is unavailable. Refresh visible company queries until the socket recovers and clear all fallback timers on hiding or unmount. Verify 172 focused tests, server/UI typechecks, UI build, and design token gates. Full workspace build/typecheck require the unavailable Rust toolchain; the full test run is tracked separately. Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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|
DottaandPaperclip
|
f589660ec0 |
feat(routines): add safe webhook setup and in-routine run management (#13637)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Routines turn scheduled work and external events into tasks for an assigned agent. > - Webhook setup was disabled, and actor authentication rejected valid webhook bearer keys. > - Operators need to connect and test a sending app before events can start work. > - This pull request adds a guided setup with durable connection tests that cannot dispatch a task. > - It keeps trigger management, execution tasks, and activity within the routine. > - The benefit is a webhook that can be configured, verified, and operated from one place. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Fixes #11937. Related: #13216 adds provider-specific Sentry support. This PR addresses general routine setup and ingress. #6841 addresses legacy secret bindings; this PR retains the existing secret service. **Current behavior** Webhook creation is disabled. Bearer deliveries can fail in agent authentication before the routine checks its key. Setup has no safe connection test. Runs and Activity send the operator away from the routine. **Proposed behavior** Choose a schedule or a webhook. Follow the setup steps, copy credentials or complete agent instructions, and test delivery without creating work. Finish setup to allow future events to start tasks. Edit or remove compact trigger cards, undo removal, and inspect tasks and activity inside the routine. **Reason and benefit** An operator can verify credentials and delivery before enabling automatic work. Durable setup state survives refreshes and restarts. Retry receipts prevent an old test event from starting work after activation. ## What Changed - Add a production trigger wizard using reusable Slack setup navigation and footer components. - Add schedule and webhook choices, one-time credentials, agent instructions, and live connection feedback. - Persist pending setup, test delivery receipts, connection status, and reversible trigger removal. - Keep setup checks free of routine runs, tasks, and agent wakeups. Preserve delivery idempotency after activation. - Add compact trigger cards, inline editing, key rotation, pause controls, removal, and Undo. - Keep Runs and Activity in the routine. Use the shared task list and compact activity rows. - Permit only exact public delivery POSTs through actor authentication. Retain webhook authentication, JSON-object validation, and log redaction. - Add production-backed Storybook states and focused server, database, and UI coverage. - Document signing modes, setup checks, retries, rotation, HTTPS ingress, and navigation. ## Verification - Full workspace typecheck, build, and token gates passed on the rebased branch. Storybook also builds. - Focused routine, middleware, logging, shared wizard, and UI coverage passes on the rebased branch: 195 tests across 14 files. The migration passed on a fresh PostgreSQL database and on two repeated applications. - Browser testing used the real app, database, and a deterministic process worker through Tailscale HTTPS and the current Cloud proxy code. - Verified rejected keys, safe setup deliveries, persisted state after restart, activation, retry deduplication, key rotation, schedule editing, removal, and Undo. - Fresh bearer and GitHub-signed deliveries created tasks that the worker checked out and completed. Runs and Activity stayed within the routine. - Current Cloud ingress tests passed. Public delivery POSTs passed through without a browser session; management routes remained gated. - All 54 current-head PR checks pass, including general and serialized tests, all eight browser E2E shards, typecheck, build, runner checks, security checks, and the canary dry run. Two optional Storybook jobs are skipped by workflow conditions. - Greptile is 5/5 on commit `7ea63a61e`, with no unresolved review threads. The stale connection-status finding is fixed and covered by a regression test. - No production deployment was performed. ## Risks - Migration 0281 adds three trigger columns and a test-receipt table. It is additive and safe to reapply. Apply it before running the new server. Existing triggers remain live by default. - Requests without delivery IDs are new events after activation. Senders must reuse an event's delivery ID for retries. - Completed webhooks keep normal dispatch behavior. Their management connection check can start work; the UI states this. - Removing a trigger archives it. Undo restores the URL and credentials. Permanent deletion remains available through the existing API. - Public ingress must remain restricted to the delivery POST route. The tenant verifies credentials. Cloud sleeping-stack behavior is unchanged. - Shared setup components also serve Slack. Existing setup contracts and navigation tests cover that integration. - Senders must use application/json with an object. Other media types receive 415. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, based on GPT-6, with reasoning, repository tools, shell execution, and browser testing. The exact deployment model ID and context-window size are not exposed in this session. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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|
3ff3b34e15 |
Return safe client errors for malformed JSON requests (#13660)
Malformed JSON requests currently reach generic crash handling and return 500 before any route handler runs. Classify the specific Express parser error as a 400 with a constant response, preserving unrelated server error reporting. Carry forward the original three commits from #7410, preserve contributor credit, and add request privacy and negative regression checks. Document the API response. Fixes #7390. Validation: 80 focused tests, direct server typecheck, and complete Linux CI passed. Greptile 5/5. Full local typecheck/build require missing Rust tooling; local test environment failures are documented in the PR. Co-Authored-By: developers-universe-1 <madelynreyes2026@gmail.com> Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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|
Devin Foley
|
a59f5a8adc |
fix(server): stop reporting expected managed-cloud transients to Sentry (#13323)
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - The server reports crashes to Sentry so operators can find real
faults
> - Three expected conditions report as crashes: a client that closes
the connection mid-request, one stale pooled database socket after a
pooled endpoint recycles, and the short boot window where a supervised
cloud stack runs a new app image before its migration runner has caught
up
> - These events arrive in the hundreds and bury real errors
> - This pull request classifies each condition as expected and stops
the Sentry capture for exactly that condition, with behavior unchanged
everywhere else
> - The benefit is a Sentry feed where each event is a real fault
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
**What happened?**
Three noise classes fill the backend Sentry project on managed cloud
fleets:
1. `Error: aborted` (ECONNRESET) reports as a 500 crash when a client
closes the tab or loses its network mid-request. Observed 18 times in
one week from routine client disconnects.
2. `Error: write CONNECTION_CLOSED ...` reports from many query paths
after a pooled Postgres endpoint suspends. The existing single retry in
cloud actor resolution still fails, because a suspended endpoint kills
every pooled socket at once and the one replay draws another dead
socket.
3. `Error: PostgreSQL has pending migrations (...). Refusing to start`
reports from every supervised stack during a fleet upgrade. The
supervisor delivers the new app image before it runs the migration
runner, so each stack crash-loops briefly by design. One fleet roll
produced 329 events (11 per container).
**Expected behavior**
A client disconnect ends the request quietly. A transient dead socket is
replayed until a live socket answers. A supervised mid-upgrade boot
refusal logs and exits nonzero without a Sentry capture, while the same
refusal on a self-hosted deployment keeps reporting.
**Steps to reproduce**
1. Abort an HTTP request mid-flight: the error handler reports a crash
to Sentry.
2. Suspend a pooled Postgres endpoint under an idle server, then issue
two quick requests: the first replay can draw a second dead socket and
surface `CONNECTION_CLOSED`.
3. On a deployment with `PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_API_ORIGIN` set, add a
migration file without running the migration runner and boot: the
refusal reports to Sentry.
**Paperclip version or commit**
master (
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|
DottaandPaperclip
|
ab15aff390 |
feat: add experimental persistent agent chat (#13284)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Conversations must use the same tasks, controls, and execution history. > - Users need an ongoing chat with an agent without managing task properties. > - Agents should clarify and plan work, then hand execution to assigned project tasks. > - This pull request combines the reviewed Agent Chat stack for one squash merge. > - The benefit is persistent conversation with normal task governance and shared UI. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **Subsystem affected** Task lifecycle, agent runtime tools, shared task UI, and browser/paid runner tests. **Problem or motivation** Users need one persistent conversation with each agent. A separate chat store or renderer would duplicate task behavior and bypass existing controls. **Proposed solution** Use a task-backed chat per company, user, and agent. Reuse the task composer and transcript. Clarify and plan in chat, then create assigned project tasks with the relevant plan. Keep Agent Chat behind its own disabled-by-default experimental setting. **Roadmap alignment** This implements the task-backed direction in [CEO Chat](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/blob/master/ROADMAP.md#-ceo-chat). Related proposals: #2504 and #9693. Related request: #7981. The maintainer requested one squash merge of the complete stack. Consolidates the reviewed runtime [#13281](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/13281), backend [#13282](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/13282), and UI [#13283](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/13283) layers with this PR's E2E coverage. All four layers passed CI and received Greptile 5/5 before consolidation. This PR targets master and includes the complete feature. ## What Changed - Add personal canonical chat tasks with ordinary company visibility, immutable identity, idempotent first sends, and an idle waiting state. - Process `/new` in queue order. Preserve history, release a chat pause, and fence old provider context and delayed writes. - Keep chat lifecycle rules across recovery, finalization, assignment, task lists, and rollups. - Support research and plan revision in chat. Hand plans to ordinary assigned project tasks before execution starts. Reject new chat subtasks. - Add repository-aware project creation and discovery tools, including multiple repository IDs and GitHub URLs, authorization, idempotency, and durable project-created cards. - Reuse task UI components for chat, with starred/recent agent navigation and a separate `enableAgentChat` experimental flag. - Add deterministic browser tests and 24 paid chat cells across four Codex/Claude profiles, with validated reports and screenshots. - Integrate current master recovery, controller lease, queued-message, and task UI changes. Gate chat interruption and deferred promotion on ownership/feature policy. Guarantee lease renewal and active controls are stopped even if teardown fails. - Preserve master's migration 0273 and generate chat migration 0274 with idempotent replay for development databases. ## Verification - Prior exact heads of all four PRs passed Linux CI, including build, typecheck, general/serialized tests, and browser E2E. Each had Greptile 5/5 and no unresolved findings. - Integrated local verification passed: full repository typecheck and production build, Storybook build, token gates, 340 focused UI tests, all 20 deterministic chat browser tests, two migration replay tests, 88 focused chat/queue/native/controller tests, and provider/session regressions including real lease expiry. These include the three lifecycle regressions for the final admission/teardown fixes; server typecheck also passes. Current head `1268eda16cc2af892055917e7292f068820be135` has Greptile 5/5 with no unresolved findings and passing security scans. All final-head CI gates passed: build, full Runner verification, typecheck/release registry, canary, all general/serialized test shards, and all browser E2E shards ([CI run](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/34696739927)). Local PostgreSQL startup contention required serialized retries; skipped fixtures do not count as passing coverage. - The earlier paid campaign passed all 24 chat cells and retained 32 screenshots: [report](https://d1p6rlowie26tp.cloudfront.net/runner-e2e/campaigns/gha-34648511170-1/index.html?report=agent-chat#suite-agent-chat). It tested `abacbdfd2f660709ec37312cdb758284c8399d04`; it is prior evidence, not a paid run of this integrated head. - Manual check: enable Agent Chat in Experimental settings, open an agent, clarify and revise a plan, then hand off to an assigned project task. Stop a reply, send `/new`, and verify fresh context with retained history. Disable the setting and verify agent shortcuts/new chat turns are blocked. ## Risks - Queue/session integration can affect retries and delayed writes. Tests cover ownership, cancellation, reset boundaries, idle recovery, and ordinary task behavior. - Migration 0274 adds conversation fields and constraints. Replay is idempotent and preserves existing development chat history. - This combines the previously reviewed stack at the maintainer's request. Agent Chat remains off by default and is separate from Conference Room. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 Astra (`gpt-6-astra`), with reasoning, code execution, browser tools, and parallel review. The exact context-window size is not exposed in this session. Codex and Claude also ran as test subjects in the linked paid campaign. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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Devin Foley
|
daea92b647 |
feat(server): accept a Cloud control assertion on the task-drain endpoint (#13125)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - The server has a task-drain admission hold so operators can stop new agent work and wait for quiescence before maintenance > - Cloud deploys restart tenant containers, but the Cloud control plane has no sanctioned credential for the drain routes, so agent runs are killed mid-restart > - The only Cloud credential this server trusts is the runtime identity assertion, deliberately scoped to the one-time bootstrap health call > - This pull request adds a disjoint, action-bound Cloud control assertion accepted only on the task-drain endpoint > - The benefit is that Cloud can hold new work and drain a stack before it restarts the container, through the same authorization and audit paths a human operator uses ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs #12485 (the task-drain admission hold this makes reachable for the Cloud control plane). **Problem or motivation** Cloud deploys restart the container without stopping agent work first. The task-drain hold from #12485 exists for exactly this, but its routes require instance-admin board authority. The Cloud control plane holds no such credential: the runtime identity assertion is accepted only on `GET /api/health`, by design. So in-flight runs die at every deploy. **Proposed solution** A second, deliberately disjoint use of the same Cloud signing key (`PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_RUNTIME_IDENTITY_JWKS`): a control assertion with its own JWS type (`paperclip-cloud-control+jwt`), its own audience, an `action` claim, a request id, and a short maximum lifetime. A new middleware accepts the `x-paperclip-cloud-control` header only on `/api/instance/task-drain`, binds each method to one exact action (`task-drain:read` / `task-drain:start` / `task-drain:stop`), verifies the assertion against the configured JWKS and `PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_STACK_ID`, and installs a synthetic instance-admin board actor so the existing route authorization, validation, transactional audit, and activity publishing run unchanged (audit rows record actor id `paperclip-cloud`). The header is rejected with 400 anywhere else, so it can never become an ambient credential. The board mutation guard exempts the new `cloud_control` source exactly like the other non-browser lanes. **Alternatives considered** Widening the existing runtime identity middleware would conflate a one-time bootstrap claim with a repeatable management credential and weaken both. A per-stack minted instance-admin API key would work with no auth change but adds a long-lived privileged credential per tenant to store and rotate. The action-bound short-lived assertion keeps authorization per-call and stateless. **Additional context** Self-hosted instances have no `PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_STACK_ID` and reject every assertion — the feature is inert off Cloud. A runtime identity token cannot replay as a control token or vice versa (disjoint `typ` and `aud`, covered by tests). The Cloud-side caller (drain before deploy, bounded quiescence wait) lands separately in the Cloud control plane. ## What Changed - `server/src/services/cloud-runtime-identity.ts`: `verifyCloudControlAssertion` plus the control header/audience/type/action constants, reusing the existing JWKS resolution, JWS parsing, and lifetime discipline. - `server/src/middleware/cloud-control.ts` (new): accepts the header only on the task-drain endpoint, per-method action binding, installs the synthetic instance-admin actor on success, 401 on invalid assertions, 400 anywhere else. - `server/src/app.ts`: mounts the middleware directly after the actor middleware, so a valid assertion replaces whatever actor the request otherwise resolved to. - `server/src/middleware/board-mutation-guard.ts`: `cloud_control` joins the non-browser exemptions. - `server/src/types/express.d.ts`, `server/src/services/authorization.ts`: `"cloud_control"` added to the actor source unions. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run --project @paperclipai/server server/src/__tests__/cloud-control-task-drain.test.ts server/src/__tests__/instance-settings-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/heartbeat-task-drain.test.ts server/src/__tests__/heartbeat-scheduling-suppression.test.ts server/src/__tests__/cloud-runtime-identity.test.ts` — 87 tests, all passing. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec tsc --noEmit` reports no new errors against the base commit's known pre-existing set. - The new suite covers: acceptance per method, cross-action rejection, unknown-action rejection, runtime-identity-token replay rejection, wrong-audience rejection, wrong-stack and self-hosted rejection, expiry and oversized-lifetime rejection, unknown-key rejection, request id validation, endpoint containment (400 elsewhere, 400 on unbound methods), pass-through without the header, and the mutation-guard exemption. ## Risks Low risk, additive. No behavior changes without the header; the header grants nothing outside the one endpoint; each assertion authorizes one action for at most five minutes; the existing route-level validation, queued transitions, and audit writes are unchanged. The browser-facing Cloud proxy strips Cloud headers, and possession of the shared tenant-session token cannot mint an assertion (signing key never leaves Cloud). ## Model Used Claude (Anthropic) — Fable 5 (`claude-fable-5`), extended thinking, agentic tool use via Claude Code. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes (module doc comments carry the contract) - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge |
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DottaandPaperclip
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889947c238 |
feat: add experimental native chat connectors (#13038)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - People also ask agents for work in their existing chat tools. > - Each external conversation needs one task and a current authorized source. > - Retries, Stop, and provider failures must not duplicate work or expose private data. > - The first chat PR establishes the opt-in provider and data contracts. > - This PR adds experimental channel integration and its durable control plane. > - Users can request work from connected channels and inspect delivery in Paperclip. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs #13100 and #13092. This is the second of exactly two chat PRs. Foundation #13100 is merged and changed 143 files. Runner prerequisite #13092 is also merged. This PR changes 400 files against master, below the 500-file review limit. It contains no wireframe images or HTML galleries. ## What Changed - Add native Slack, GitHub, Microsoft Teams, Telegram, and Discord chat connections. Keep chat disabled unless the operator enables experimental chat connectors. Preserve the production GitHub tool connection and its normal setup path. - Bind each provider bot identity to one immutable Paperclip agent. Bind each admitted external conversation to one task. Paperclip owns tasks, runs, permissions, and audit records. - Add durable admission, per-conversation queues, questions, task controls, progress, final replies, images, files, and delivery receipts. Board comments remain internal unless explicitly sent to the channel. - Check current identity, provider reach, resource access, credentials, runtime generation, and exact source before provider effects. Keep private responses private. Never send raw reasoning, private logs, credentials, or tool arguments. - Hold uncertain sends for explicit audited resolution. Make Board Send-to-channel atomic and idempotent. Keep reconnect and setup credentials in Paperclip secret storage. - Preserve current native-runner authority across retries, lost acknowledgements, and recovery. Keep immutable input and completion contracts separate from newer user input. Receipt reconciliation cannot launch a provider. - Reconcile chat close/new ordering and provider-effect lock order. Audit resource access changes in the same transaction. Submit only the selected resource from each UI toggle so stale pages cannot undo unrelated access changes. - Drain Codex stdout before certifying process exit. Bound the drain with the existing shutdown grace. Preserve observed terminal authority without treating an undrained process as successful or reusable. - Incorporate master `018ca5da` with its ACP Stop, mobile task layout, runner packaging, and official lock changes. Preserve dedicated chat-answer continuations in both directions when ordinary queued comments are adopted after Stop. - Fence late adapter readiness behind an earlier Stop for the same run. Preserve verified cleanup for registered adapters. Handle single Stop, agent pause, duplicate Stops, and failure release without creating a false cancellation receipt. - Incorporate master's `6dd48cad4` wake-queue extraction. Preserve exact failed-chat retry authorization and lineage, retired question-source suppression, and the block on generic recovery that would discard the admitted source. Fresh deferred input retains its separate promotion path. - Incorporate master `2a05b5ed3` and its queue-admission extraction, simplified transaction ports, and separate runner CI job. Preserve exact durable receipts, actor separation, and dedicated-answer isolation through the new module. A failed receipt insert rolls back the accompanying deferred-wake merge. ## Verification Current head: `afe19299d06253cb628eb398e91d1200ea9f412a`, incorporating master `2a05b5ed3457ea33efd6895520447d1d97fe98d8`. The conflicts are resolved. This successor fixes two test-harness boundaries exposed by CI: per-case route-module preparation and actual durable-save completion before intentional runner termination. Production code and all existing test/turn deadlines are unchanged. [Exact-head Greptile review](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/13038#issuecomment-5587250594) is **5/5**, completed September 10 at 13:20:55 UTC, with no actionable findings or open review threads. [Fresh exact-head CI](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/34481724341) passes **all 24 jobs**, including Build and both required aggregates. Normal exact-head guarded merge was attempted and rejected by the remaining branch approval policy: CODEOWNER review is required and no human approval is present. Normal **squash auto-merge is enabled** as of September 10 at 13:36:26 UTC. Requested CODEOWNERS have been notified; no approval bypass or self-approval was used. Earlier-head results below remain historical evidence, not qualification of this successor. - Final exact-head Linux evidence: 995/995 chat integration cases; 36/36 agent-skills routes; 35/35 runner live-session cases, including real process kill/resume; 1948 runner Vitest cases with three existing benchmark/platform guards; 870/870 API-authority cases; and 104 browser cases with four existing optional skips. Rust, conformance/replay, full repository build, typecheck, canary, all server/workspace shards, and both required aggregates pass with normal CI concurrency. Earlier failed attempts remain recorded below. - Latest test-only qualification: 141/141 route/permissions/authentication cases pass in separate cold forks, with plain server types and independent review clear. The real-runner suite passes 35/35, with plain runner types and independent review clear. A controlled premature-save acknowledgement fails as expected; matching ownership/effect/process evidence, rejected saves, real turn outcome, test abort, and pre-kill liveness are covered. No local reproduction of the original CI scheduling failure is claimed. The preceding [CI run](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/34479680858) passes 21/24 jobs, including all 995 Linux chat cases and browser aggregate (104 passed, four existing optional skips); only Build, the skills serialized shard, and the required verification aggregate fail. Its exact-head Greptile review was 5/5. Both failed job logs are retained. - Final fixture qualification: all eight focused Discord cases and all 995 chat integration cases pass. The exact modal statement/PID is observed before taking the real connection lock; the test then proves its actual blocking relationship before mutation. Original SQL execution, provider behavior, negative assertions, and 1s/15s timeouts remain unchanged. Independent review is clear and test/production hashes remain frozen. The preceding [CI attempt](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/34477184777) passed 22 jobs, including Build/runner, typecheck, canary, all other test shards, and browser aggregate (104 passed, four existing optional skips); the two fixture failures and failed verification aggregate remain recorded, not relabeled as a pass. - Current queue-module composition: 308/308 recovery/batching/queue/Stop tests; 995/995 full chat integration; 89/89 module tests, including real PostgreSQL receipt-insert rollback; 24/24 workflow/module-boundary tests; plain server and UI types. All four actual local process/ACP browser paths pass in 1.4 minutes. Fresh databases, no skips or retries, stable reviewed source hashes. The initial boundary failure is retained; its no-op service wrapper was removed without changing recovery context or weakening the check. An exploratory standalone test-directory typecheck fails because its new upstream transformation config is not a standalone typechecking project; standard CI/build does not invoke it, and no configuration was weakened to suppress those diagnostics. - The preceding head `e02a63d462ce5d47433b0aeb632bb6fd20aab1ba` passed [all 24 CI jobs](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/34436462958) and exact-head Greptile review at 5/5. Required CODEOWNER review prevented its normal merge before master advanced again. - Final extracted-module composition: 307/307 recovery, batching, queue and Stop-control tests; 995/995 full chat integration; 49/49 module tests including eight PostgreSQL adapter cases; and 19/19 issue-update tests. Plain server types pass. All four actual local process/ACP browser paths pass in 1.3 minutes. Fresh databases, no skips or retries in these cohorts, frozen source hashes, and independent review clear. - The preceding head `3e4e1c1c` passes [all PR CI jobs](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/34415826820), including Build and required `ci / verify` and `ci / e2e`. Both the original Rust failure and the previously load-sensitive lineage fixture pass with unchanged Linux concurrency. Master advanced afterward and required this reconciliation. - Final master composition: 448/448 focused UI tests, 186/186 adapter tests, 24/24 queue/control tests, and 11/11 packaging tests. Plain UI, server, shared, and adapter types pass. Token gates and diff checks pass. Independent server and UI reviews are clear. - Stop-registration regression: both real-service cases fail against exact `a95` source and pass with the fix. The full corrected recovery/control suite passes 265/265. Duplicate-owner and failed-Stop controls also pass. Plain server types pass. The readiness barrier prevents provider startup without adding an acknowledgment to an already terminal run. - Final qualification strengthens terminal-field equality and repeats both affected cases successfully on a fresh database. All four actual local process/ACP browser paths pass again in 1.3 minutes, without skips or retries. The final screenshot shows Cancelled, a paused subtree, retained input, and no error toast. - Two new actual-service regressions fail before the merge fix. They prove that queued-comment adoption could consume a dedicated chat answer or add unrelated input to that answer. The fixed four-case cohort passes, including ordinary upstream continuation and adapter Stop controls. Full recovery passes 257/257. All four actual local process/ACP Stop browser flows pass in 1.4 minutes, without skips or retries, on a fresh database. - The unchanged runner artifact was qualified with 171/171 transport tests, 870/870 API-authority tests, conformance 1/1, and replay 11/11. Six controlled reader tests prove the exit/drain repair. Its local serial Rust workspace passed 546 top-level cases plus two invoked helpers; the later passing Linux CI supplies default-concurrency evidence. - Prior exact-source full chat integration passes 995/995. Settings regressions cover concurrent stale pages, 501 destinations, pending state, rejected updates, and explicit retry. These deterministic tests do not prove live provider behavior. - Retained failed attempts and their causes are in the [qualification log](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/blob/afe19299d06253cb628eb398e91d1200ea9f412a/doc/plans/chat-adapters/2026-09-08-chat-queue-and-webhook-repair.md). The first merge adapter run timed out while macOS slept for 290 seconds. Its unchanged repeat passed with a temporary sleep guard. No assertion, deadline, or CI gate was weakened. Review commands include `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/heartbeat-process-recovery.test.ts src/__tests__/issue-queued-comments-routes.test.ts` and `pnpm exec playwright test --config tests/e2e/playwright.config.ts tests/e2e/acp-stop-continuation.spec.ts`. Database suites require fresh disposable databases. See the [browser runbook](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/blob/afe19299d06253cb628eb398e91d1200ea9f412a/doc/plans/chat-adapters/2026-09-04-chat-adapters-browser-e2e-runbook.md) for provider setup and separate live acceptance steps. ## Risks - This remains experimental. Deterministic tests and bounded live evidence do not establish every provider feature, tenant, permission layout, or media shape. Teams work-tenant qualification is still open. - Failed and uncertain provider effects remain visible and can require operator action. A transport receipt does not prove recipient visibility. - Native controller and runner artifacts must remain compatible. Preserve lease ownership, terminal authority, source binding, and quarantine during future changes. - Access and audit rows commit together, but activity notifications remain best-effort. This is not a new durable event outbox. - The PR operation does not deploy a live server, replace its runner, or change provider permissions. Remaining live qualification is documented in the [temporary handoff](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/blob/afe19299d06253cb628eb398e91d1200ea9f412a/doc/plans/chat-adapters/2026-09-08-open-qualification-followups.md). ## Model Used OpenAI Codex assisted with implementation, tool execution, testing, and review. The work records `gpt-6-astra` assistance. The environment does not report a context-window size. No private reasoning traces are included. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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DottaandPaperclip
|
ebaeba40ee |
feat: simplify agent onboarding and configuration (#13011)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Operators create agents and configure their runtimes in the board UI. > - The old creation flow presents several choices and a large form before an agent can start. > - The existing onboarding controls already provide clear provider connection steps. > - This pull request uses those controls in a new-agent wizard and organizes the full configuration pages. > - Operators can connect, test, save, and assign a first task while keeping the existing configuration tools. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Related: #10974. That earlier open PR also reorganizes agent configuration. This PR follows the reviewed Storybook designs for agent creation and the current configuration tabs. **What existing behavior does this improve?** Agent creation, provider connection, runtime tests, and full agent configuration. **Current behavior** The creation dialog leads to a large manual configuration form. Provider login controls differ from onboarding. Environment variables and secret access appear in separate places. **Proposed behavior** Choose a name and adapter. Connect Claude or Codex through the existing onboarding controls. Configure and test the runtime, save the agent, and open a task dialog with that agent assigned. Use the same design on the existing configuration tabs. **Reason and benefit** The first setup asks for fewer decisions. The full editor keeps instructions, skills, runtime controls, secret access, permissions, keys, and revisions available in clear sections. **Breaking changes** The board creation and configuration layouts change. The test-environment API adds an optional, allowlisted `testCredentials` field for one-shot probes. Database contracts stay the same. Native ACPX tests now reject unsupported local platforms before a CLI login can mask the runtime restriction. ## What Changed - Added a new-agent wizard with numbered steps, adapter branding, provider connections, editable model choices, runtime tests, and confirmation. - Added Codex app-server, Claude ACPX, and OpenCode runner choices. - Stored API credentials through existing secret APIs and persisted references in agent configuration. New setup keys are isolated from credentials used by existing agents. - Preserved external-agent invitations beside the wizard, including optional messages, one-time prompts, and clipboard fallback. - Added OpenRouter provider and secret bindings for Pi and OpenCode. - Added adapter-specific prerequisite fields for Cursor, Gemini, Kimi, and Hermes. Cursor Cloud keys are saved as new organization secrets. - Fixed Cursor Cloud repository field mapping, omitted empty remote environment values, and added useful model and repository error messages. - Preserved complete MCP assignments when multiple valid profiles contain more than 250 tools in total. Generated profiles retain exact tool selectors. - Added service branding and deployment-aware adapter choices. Cloud setup offers Claude, Codex, and OpenCode; local native runners require the experimental setting. - Made the agent list responsive at intermediate widths. - Applied the reviewed design to the real agent configuration pages. Kept the instruction editor, skills, and existing mutations. - Combined secret access and environment variables under one Save and Discard action. - Added interactive Storybook screens for setup, configuration, confirmation, authentication, and test results. - Fixed Pi provider-error parsing and thinking-effort persistence. Native ACPX validates Linux x64 on the actual local, SSH, or sandbox target. - Redacted the complete transient probe-credential field from HTTP error logs, including rejected provider names. ## Verification - Current head `df0292fe6` has a fresh Greptile 5/5 review with no unresolved findings. All 31 executed CI checks passed, including the aggregate verification gate and all browser E2E shards. Storybook visual regression is skipped by its workflow; the local Storybook build passed. - Browser tests completed real assigned tasks with direct Codex, Claude, OpenCode, Pi, and native Codex. - Verified external-agent invitation generation and automatic prompt copying in the live browser. - Pi and OpenCode used an existing OpenRouter secret. Browser checks covered save and reload, instruction edits, skill selection, environment-variable Save and Discard, and assigned task creation. - Invalid Claude API credentials remained on the connection step with an error. A live Pi/OpenRouter invalid-key probe returned a provider failure and left the user-secret inventory unchanged (zero entries before and after). - Full workspace typecheck and build passed after rebasing onto current master. After review fixes, server and UI typechecks, token gates, and the full build passed again. Storybook built successfully. - All 5,542 local UI tests passed. The Cursor Cloud and Pi adapter regressions passed all 24 tests. Review regressions passed 69 server tests and all 18 agent-list tests. - The local full test command ran 6,971 general server tests successfully. Editing review fixes during that long run caused nine tests to use stale modules; fresh isolated runs passed. An unrelated embedded-Postgres fixture hit the host shared-memory limit; its 15 affected tests passed when the fixture groups ran separately. - Local workspace groups passed after rerunning 18 CLI tests sequentially to avoid host database limits and parallel-load timeouts. The local full command stopped at the general server phase, so serialized server verification comes from the five passing CI shards. - Browser testing at 390px confirmed that the agent action menu opens and the page has no horizontal overflow. CI browser E2E shards passed. - Review the `Onboarding / New agent` and `Agents / Configuration refresh` Storybook groups. In the real app, create an agent, run its connection test, save it, assign a task, and reload its configuration. ## Risks - This changes the main agent setup and configuration UI. Regression tests cover routing, persistence, secret bindings, and form actions. - Native Claude ACPX requires Linux x64. Direct Claude works on macOS. Remote checks execute a bounded platform probe and reject unsupported or unverified targets. - A native OpenCode task reached the provider context limit because of its tool payload. Its provider connection test passed. Direct OpenCode completed a task. This existing native execution limit is not fixed here. - Claude and Codex connection keys use the existing user-secret store. Other runtime setup keys use distinct organization secrets. Existing credentials are never rotated. Probes do not store entered keys. Failed agent creation removes newly staged credentials. - Cursor Cloud has not completed a live task. Its authenticated account still needs GitHub repository access. The live run passed MCP provisioning, remote environment validation, and explicit Auto model selection before the repository prerequisite blocked execution. - Generated runtime MCP profiles can exceed the public profile-edit request limit. They still contain exact catalog selectors and preserve permission boundaries. - No database migration, dependency, lockfile, or workflow changes are included. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, based on GPT-6, with reasoning, repository tools, shell execution, and browser automation. The runtime did not expose the exact model ID or context window size. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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DottaandPaperclip
|
1cc45086d3 |
feat: use the responsible person's GitHub for shared agent operations (#13005)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Several people can send instructions to the same agent and task. > - A fixed GitHub token in the provider process can keep the first person's access after another person's message is accepted. > - Task ownership cannot select credentials for each accepted instruction or preserve the identity of an operation already in progress. > - This pull request records ordered execution identity contexts and resolves credentials when managed Git, gh, or GitHub tools start. > - The benefit is automatic personal GitHub access for shared agents, with durable continuation rules and no teammate credential fallback. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **Subsystem affected** Cross-cutting: orchestration, connection grants, database, runtime adapters, native runners, and run details. **Problem or motivation** A shared agent must use the person whose instructions it has accepted. A queued message must retain its author. A retry or approval without new instructions must retain the originating identity. GitHub must remain optional for ordinary work. **Proposed solution** Persist execution identity separately from task ownership. Give new processes a run-scoped broker capability and token-free managed launchers. Capture identity at operation start. Keep an explicit dedicated-agent grant as an override. Show redacted diagnostics in run details. **Alternatives considered** Per-task ownership, fixed provider tokens, and mutable repository author configuration do not handle accepted steering or concurrent operations. A manual account-selection action would add unnecessary setup to each turn. **Roadmap alignment** This completes the existing Multiple Human Users, MCP Tool Gateway & Apps, Secrets Manager, and Self-healing Runs capabilities. The implementation follows the maintainer-approved plan. Related work: Refs #12843, Refs #12907. Existing proposals #4618 and #8945 cover per-agent or per-worktree author configuration. This change instead follows the accepted human instruction across runtime types. Refs #11831 for governed personal connection delegation; this change preserves connection audience checks and does not use standing delegation as a personal credential fallback. ## What Changed - Add durable, ordered identity contexts and active run references. Preserve message authors through consolidation, steering, retries, delegation, approvals, routines, and restart. - Add an authenticated operation-time GitHub credential broker and local/remote managed git and gh launchers. Keep personal tokens out of the long-lived provider process. - Resolve GitHub gateway and server-side Git operations through the same responsible-person or dedicated-grant selection rules. - Make absent and unavailable GitHub credentials non-blocking at generic startup. Clear host and prior-person credentials. Keep anonymous Git access where supported. - Add run-detail identity history and the dedicated-account warning. Keep task ownership and queue-versus-steer decisions unchanged. - Preserve personal OAuth declarations through connection edits. Retain exact selected grants in the gateway. - Fix continuation races found during real acceptance: verify a warm owner before credential rotation, and wait for bounded durable runner suspension before the next run starts. - Make migrations replay-safe. Retain identity through agent/run deletion, remove it with its company, and clean terminal launcher directories before releasing execution environments. Document coordinated release and rollback. ## Verification - Full workspace typecheck, build, and token gates passed. The complete local suite passed in its normal test groups: 17,120 passing tests, including all 143 serialized server suites. After integrating the newly merged runner API work, full local typecheck and build passed again, along with 890 focused integration tests. All 31 checks on the integrated revision passed, including build, browser E2E, release registry, canary dry run, typecheck, security and all test suites. Greptile is 5/5 with all review threads resolved. - Current focused checks passed: 142 native executor tests, 67 runtime lifecycle tests, 9 durable identity tests, 75 credential/routine tests, 19 low-trust/resumption tests, and the executable migration replay test. - Authenticated browser acceptance with two Paperclip users and two GitHub accounts on one shared native agent passed. Real commits and pushes followed A → B accepted steering → queued A continuation in the same saved conversation. GitHub commit author and committer identities matched all three operations. Both runs succeeded and task ownership stayed unchanged. - Real GitHub MCP calls switched from A to B after accepted steering. A delegated subtask retained its originating identity across a server restart. - Disabling B's GitHub connection left ordinary work successful. Managed gh was unauthenticated and the provider had no inherited GH_TOKEN or GITHUB_TOKEN. - The browser displayed run-detail diagnostics and the exact dedicated-account warning. A final controller-restart check followed by another-person continuation retained the conversation, selected the correct GitHub login and Git author, and removed each terminal launcher directory. - Company-lifetime migration and all five previously failing CI suites passed locally (167 tests). Same-token gateway A → B → A and six broker/launcher boundary tests passed. - Remote callback, launcher, sandbox, and runtime contract tests passed. Both native and legacy Codex completed actual Daytona executions on the integrated revision ([campaign results](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/34155056509)). The remote package-manager shim staging regression also passed locally. ## Risks - Deploy the migrations, server broker, launchers, and runner artifacts together. Existing processes finish with their original contract. New managed processes need the broker endpoint for GitHub operations. - Finish or stop new managed executions before rolling application code back. Keep the additive schema and identity history during rollback. - Scripts that require a persistent raw GH_TOKEN must use managed git, gh, or GitHub gateway tools. Run capabilities authorize code executing within that run to acquire its current identity; this is not hostile-code isolation within one execution principal. Managed commands prevent automatic credential carryover; arbitrary code deliberately copying a credential is outside that boundary. - Uncertain steering acknowledgement deliberately holds new credential acquisition until reconciliation. Already-started operations retain their captured identity. - GitHub private access and provider outages can still fail the specific operation that needs them. Dedicated grant failure does not fall back to personal access. ## Model Used OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex assisted implementation, review, shell execution, and browser acceptance. The exact model variant and context-window size are not exposed in this session. Tool use included TypeScript and Rust tests, database integration tests, GitHub CLI, and authenticated browser control. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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DottaandPaperclip
|
7dfc769f3b |
fix(server): honor proxy trust for forwarded host (#12832)
Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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Devin Foley
|
2177b85eb5 |
fix(server): retry cloud-tenant auth sync once on a dropped DB connection (#12773)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - Managed-cloud deployments authenticate tenant requests through trusted headers. The middleware syncs the tenant's user, company, and membership rows on the way through. > - Pooled Postgres endpoints sometimes close an established connection under an in-flight query (pooler recycle, compute suspend). The driver reconnects on the next query, but the statement on the wire fails. > - In this path a single dropped statement fails the whole request with a 500. This happened live on 2026-09-03: the idempotent company bootstrap insert died with `write CONNECTION_CLOSED`. > - This pull request retries the actor resolution exactly once when the error chain carries a postgres.js closed-connection code. The sync is idempotent end to end, so the replay is safe. > - The benefit is that a routine pooler blip no longer fails an authenticated request on the entry path. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What happened?** A cloud tenant request hit the trusted-header authentication middleware while the pooled Postgres endpoint closed the connection mid-query. The insert failed with `write CONNECTION_CLOSED <host>:5432` wrapped in a `Failed query: insert into "companies" …` error, and the request failed. **Expected behavior** The driver reconnects on the next query, and every statement in the tenant sync is idempotent (upserts, on-conflict inserts, deletes; the write debounce records only after the full sync succeeds). One in-request retry should absorb the blip and serve the request. Non-transient failures must keep failing fast. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Run an authenticated public deployment against a pooled Postgres endpoint. 2. Have the pooler close the connection while the middleware's tenant sync insert is on the wire. 3. Before this change the request fails with a 500; after it the retry serves the request. **Deployment mode** Authenticated public (managed cloud), external pooled PostgreSQL. ## What Changed - `resolveCloudTenantActor` now delegates to the (unchanged) resolution body through `retryOnTransientDbConnectionError`, which retries exactly once on a transient closed-connection failure - `isTransientDbConnectionError` walks the error `cause` chain (drizzle wraps the driver error) for the postgres.js codes `CONNECTION_CLOSED`, `CONNECTION_ENDED`, `CONNECTION_DESTROYED`; both helpers are exported for tests - New unit test file `cloud-tenant-transient-db-retry.test.ts`: detection matrix (including a `23505` staying non-transient), retry-once-then-succeed, no-retry on non-transient, propagate-on-second-failure ## Verification - `pnpm vitest run src/__tests__/cloud-tenant-transient-db-retry.test.ts` — 5 passed - `pnpm vitest run src/__tests__/cloud-tenant-company-provisioning.test.ts` — 7 passed against embedded Postgres, driving the real resolution path through the new wrapper ## Risks - Low risk. The retry is bounded to one attempt, gated on three explicit driver codes, and wraps an operation that is already idempotent by design. Every other failure propagates unchanged. - A genuinely down database now fails after two attempts instead of one — a few milliseconds of added latency on an already-failing request. ## Model Used Claude Fable 5 (claude-fable-5) via Claude Code, extended thinking with tool use. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above (none found for connection-retry work in this path) - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes (doc comments; no user-facing docs affected) - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above |
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DottaandPaperclip
|
9dd6526b47 |
fix(security): harden privileged server boundaries (#12776)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - The server controls secrets, host files, outbound requests, and workspace commands > - A red-team review found cases where restricted callers could cross these trust boundaries > - These cases could expose credentials or let untrusted input reach privileged resources > - This pull request applies least-privilege checks at each affected server boundary > - The benefit is safer agent execution without changing the private-instance bootstrap contract ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What happened?** Several server paths used authorization, redaction, or content-delivery rules that were too broad. Restricted agent keys could obtain company-level operational data. Some adapter and instruction paths could reach server-owned network or file resources without the required owner approval. **Expected behavior** Paperclip must redact credential values, enforce restricted-key scopes, guard outbound network access, prevent same-origin script execution, and reserve host-level file and command controls for authorized operators. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Configure an authenticated development instance at the parent commit. 2. Exercise the affected APIs with a restricted agent key or a non-instance-admin company user. 3. Observe that the parent commit returns privileged data or accepts a privileged operation. 4. Repeat on this branch and observe a redacted response, a safe download, or an HTTP 403 response. **Paperclip version or commit** The findings reproduce from commit `39898ab22` and are fixed by this pull request. **Deployment mode** Authenticated self-hosted server and local development modes. **Installation method** Built from source with pnpm. ## What Changed - Redact generic secret `value` and `token` fields recursively in structured logs. - Classify exact and separator-suffixed `KEY` environment names as secrets in company exports. - Limit restricted self-identity responses and protect company run, log, and secret catalog APIs. - Route HTTP adapter requests through DNS-pinned SSRF protection with exact private-origin allowlisting. - Download HTML, SVG, and other script-capable assets with `nosniff` and a sandbox CSP. - Require instance-admin access for external instruction roots and exports that read them. - Block agent-authenticated host command persistence across supported workspace runtime shapes. - Apply the central runtime-management decision before workspace command controls. - Keep the documented first-user instance-admin claim contract unchanged. - Add regression tests and server-owner configuration documentation. ## Verification - `pnpm -r typecheck` passes. - The Node 24 remediation suite passes with 365 tests. It skips 25 environment-gated tests. - `pnpm build` passes under Node 24. - `git diff --check` passes. - The full local runner reaches known macOS-only general-server harness failures before the serialized route lane. The Linux PR matrix is the authoritative full-suite gate. ## Risks - Restricted agent keys now receive HTTP 403 responses from company-wide run, log, and secret catalog endpoints. - Script-capable assets now download instead of rendering inline. - External instruction roots now require instance-admin access. - Private HTTP adapter endpoints now require an exact origin in `PAPERCLIP_HTTP_ADAPTER_PRIVATE_ENDPOINT_ALLOWLIST`. - Public HTTP adapter endpoints remain enabled. Redirects and metadata or link-local targets remain blocked. - No database migration is required. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-5. The exact serving snapshot and context-window size are not exposed. The model used tool-enabled reasoning, repository access, code execution, and test execution. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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DottaandCodex
|
0798c77fde |
Secure Cloud canonical runtime identity (#12766)
Accept and persist Cloud-signed canonical runtime identity before activation, then route absolute self-URLs through the durable runtime identity provider. Co-Authored-By: Codex <codex@openai.com> |
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DottaandPaperclip
|
8c3b8c432a |
Simplify app connections and enable managed Google access (#12728)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - The Apps subsystem gives humans and agents governed access to external tools. > - The current connection flow hides Apps behind an experimental gate and repeats setup text. > - Google sharing choices and generic MCP permissions do not use one consistent opening model. > - Self-hosted installs also need a safe default origin for managed OAuth without a manual config file. > - This pull request makes Apps available, simplifies connection setup, and applies one governed permissions model. > - The benefit is a shorter connection flow that works on a clean self-hosted install. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What existing behavior does this improve?** This improves the Apps connection setup flow, managed Google connection flow, generic MCP connection flow, navigation, and runtime origin discovery. **Subsystem affected** Cross-cutting. This changes `ui/`, `server/`, `packages/shared/`, connector documentation, and browser tests. **Current behavior** Apps require an experimental switch. Setup pages repeat titles and explanatory copy. Connection names require manual input. Google credential sharing does not always offer both personal and organization access. Generic MCP providers do not start with the same permission choices. Managed OAuth needs a public URL setting even when the request already has a safe HTTPS origin. **Proposed behavior** Apps are available by default. Setup asks only for required permissions and sharing choices. Paperclip creates conflict-free connection names. Google apps and generic MCP providers use the same human and agent access model. Managed OAuth derives a validated same-origin HTTPS URL when no explicit public URL is set. **Reason and benefit** A clean self-hosted install can connect a managed Google app without hidden setup. Humans can share a service account with their organization. The shorter flow reduces duplicated choices and setup errors. **Breaking changes** The Apps experimental switch is removed. Existing connection APIs remain compatible. New connections can receive a numeric suffix when a name already exists. No duplicate or related public issue was found. ## What Changed - Removed the Apps experimental gate and the breadcrumb that leaves the Apps section. - Simplified all connection setup pages and moved optional provider requirements into one small link. - Added consistent human and agent access choices for Google apps, Zapier, and generic MCP connections. - Added organization sharing to Google Workspace credentials while keeping personal access available. - Generated connection names automatically and resolved name conflicts with numeric suffixes. - Derived a validated public HTTPS origin from the request for config-free managed OAuth. - Updated connector contracts, tests, browser coverage, and authoring documentation. ## Verification - `pnpm check:token-gates` - `pnpm -r typecheck` - `pnpm build` - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/tool-access-service.test.ts server/src/__tests__/generic-mcp-connection.test.ts` (273 passed) - Targeted UI/service regression suite (308 passed) - Six targeted Playwright connection journeys on a fresh onboarding instance (6 passed) - Fresh-install browser proof through Tailscale HTTPS: enrolled with Paperclip Cloud, connected managed Google Drive, and completed a real read operation. - [Exact-head CI run](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/33669760711): all 23 matrix jobs passed, including build, typecheck, server, serialized, canary, and all browser shards. - Greptile 5/5 on `0ae2a859f269984ee950d0af231a5b09a06f3dfd`, with no unresolved review threads. ## Risks Apps are now visible to all operators. The removed experimental flag no longer hides unfinished app definitions. Managed Google availability still depends on the Cloud profile rollout and active instance enrollment. Automatic conflict handling changes only the display name of a newly conflicting connection. > I checked [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md). MCP Tool Gateway and Apps are shipped. Connected Apps is planned, and this change improves the existing shipped connection flow. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-5, with reasoning, browser control, tool use, and code execution. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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DottaandDev Agent
|
25cf079ec5 |
feat(runner): add Codex-native application integration (#12591)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - The runner package is useful only when the application can start, observe, and recover a native Codex run safely. > - Existing direct adapters must keep their current execution and finalization paths. > - The application boundary therefore needs additive persistence, authorization, coordination, and recovery behind an explicit experimental adapter. > - This pull request adds that Codex-only boundary without activating generalized providers, remote environments, or the later task/SDK surfaces. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **Subsystem affected** Shared contracts, database persistence, adapter utilities, server native-runtime services, and the experimental Paperclip Runner adapter. **Problem or motivation** The already-landed runner package has a qualified Codex path, but the application needs durable native-run state, guarded runtime selection, authenticated coordination, tool security, finalization, and recovery before the experimental adapter can be exercised safely. **Proposed solution** Add a Codex-only `paperclip_runner` application path behind the existing default-off native-runner setting. Bind native state and coordination to company/run identity, preserve persisted-run recovery, and leave every direct adapter on its existing legacy execution path. **Alternatives considered** The earlier stack boundary introduced a generalized executor and remote-environment lifecycle here. That made this PR depend on implementations in higher PRs and changed reusable sandbox behavior globally. Those pieces are now deferred together to #12592. **Roadmap alignment** ROADMAP.md does not list a conflicting native-runner integration project. This change adds the application boundary for the existing Runner architecture. ## What Changed - Added native run/result/finalization/provider-trace persistence, shared validators, and idempotent migration/replay coverage. - Added guarded Codex-only runtime selection, authenticated PRP coordination, recovery, finalization, and interaction services. - Added run/company-bound tool-gateway authorization, credential redaction, SSRF protections, and replay-safe behavior. - Added the explicit `paperclip_runner` adapter behind the default-off rollout setting. - Preserved legacy answered-question wake projection and direct-adapter execution/finalization paths. - Hardened cancellation so only owned in-memory child processes are signaled; persisted recycled PIDs/process groups are never trusted. - Retained the narrow Claude ACPX isolated-context security follow-up discovered after #12590. - Deferred the generalized executor, provider ingress, remote lifecycle, SDK/lab/eval work, release-process changes, and lockfile. ## Verification - Changed-file delta against `master`: 133 files. - GitHub Actions is the authoritative verification environment for this PR. - Full CI, security, and Greptile review will run on this lowest unmerged stack PR. - Local tests/build/typecheck were not run because this checkout is resource constrained. - Static diff/reference checks pass, and `pnpm-lock.yaml` is unchanged. ## Risks - This touches central heartbeat and agent-route code, so legacy compatibility is the primary risk. - Runtime selection remains Codex-only and explicit; direct Codex, Claude, OpenCode, process, HTTP, and plugin adapters remain on their existing paths. - Fresh native starts fail closed while the rollout flag is off; persisted native records remain readable and recoverable. - Cancellation, company/run binding, tool calls, status decisions, and completion writes are guarded or replay-safe. > For core feature work, check [ROADMAP.md](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in #dev before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-5.6, with repository tools, code execution, and parallel agent review. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either linked existing issues or described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal or instance-local Paperclip issues or links - [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id - [ ] I have run tests locally and they pass — GitHub Actions is authoritative for this resource-constrained checkout - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented risks above - [ ] All Paperclip CI and security gates are green - [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open actionable findings - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before merge ## Stack - Position: 3 of 5 overall; lowest of 3 currently unmerged - Base: `master` - Previous: [#12590](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/12590), qualified Claude ACPX runtime — merged - Next: [#12592](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/12592), generalized Codex executor, task experience, and developer SDKs --------- Co-authored-by: Dev Agent <dev@paperclip.ing> |
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DottaandPaperclip
|
b3343dbd64 |
feat(connections): add self-serve intent runtime (#12345)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Agents need a governed way to request app connections during issue work. > - The catalog now describes the available providers and setup methods. > - A request must become a durable, company-scoped intent before an operator acts on it. > - This pull request adds that intent runtime across server, agent, CLI, and shared contracts. > - The benefit is a safe bridge from agent need to operator-approved setup. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs #11965 This is stack 7 of 11. It depends on stack 6 and replaces another reviewable part of #11965. ## What Changed - Add connection intent types, validation, service logic, and routes. - Add agent runtime tools and CLI support for connection requests. - Add issue-thread interaction support for connection intents. - Add runtime, route, adapter, and contract tests. - Hold the final resolved-continuation row lock through asynchronous adapter preparation until an actual process spawn, so parking or reassignment cannot cross that boundary. - Report Hermes Gateway's first remote run request through the shared dispatch hook so the resolved-intent lock is released at the true dispatch boundary. - Revalidate the addressed user's live non-viewer membership and connection-management authority for every intent mutation, including OAuth completion. ## Verification - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/tool-access-service.test.ts` - Result: 176 tests passed. - `pnpm build` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/heartbeat-stale-queue-invalidation.test.ts` (32 passed; includes non-process dispatch lock-release coverage) - `pnpm exec vitest run --project @paperclipai/server server/src/__tests__/connection-intents-service.test.ts -t "addressed-user mutation"` (1 passed) - `pnpm exec vitest run --project @paperclipai/server server/src/__tests__/tool-access-service.test.ts -t "binds OAuth callback completion to the initiating board session"` (1 passed) - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/hermes-paperclip-adapter test -- src/gateway/server/execute.test.ts` (23 passed; includes dispatch-hook ordering and exactly-once coverage) - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/hermes-paperclip-adapter typecheck` ## Risks - A malformed intent could create an unusable operator request. - Validators and company checks reject invalid or cross-company requests. - The final continuation gate holds the issue row lock through adapter preparation until process or remote dispatch; later operator changes use the normal active-run interruption path. - The change does not add a database migration. > I checked `ROADMAP.md`. This stack continues the existing app connection work from #11965 and does not duplicate another planned item. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-5. The runtime model ID and context window were not exposed. The model used reasoning, tool use, and code execution. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have linked the public source pull request with `Refs #` - [x] I have not referenced internal or instance-local Paperclip issues or links - [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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DottaandPaperclip
|
20ccf3f476 |
feat(apps): add connection grants and delegated identities (#12341)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - External tools need explicit identity and access boundaries. > - Shared connection credentials cannot represent every user-scoped use case. > - Grants must stay company-scoped and support safe delegation. > - This pull request adds connection grants, identity rules, and their database contract. > - The benefit is durable control over which identity an agent may use. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs #11965 This is stack 3 of 11. It depends on stack 2 and replaces another reviewable part of #11965. ## What Changed - Add company and user connection grants. - Add delegated identity and membership rules. - Synchronize database, shared, server, and UI contracts. - Register the grant-member replacement route in the OpenAPI surface in the same layer that mounts it. - Add migration 0231 with replay-safe guards and coverage. ## Verification - `pnpm -r typecheck` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/tool-access-service.test.ts` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/openapi-routes.test.ts` (5 passed) - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/db check:migrations` - `pnpm build` ## Risks - Incorrect grant selection could expose the wrong credential scope. - The service enforces company and subject boundaries before credential use. - Migration 0231 is generated, ordered after 0230, and safe to replay. > I checked `ROADMAP.md`. This stack continues the existing app connection work from #11965 and does not duplicate another planned item. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-5. The runtime model ID and context window were not exposed. The model used reasoning, tool use, and code execution. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either linked a public issue or pull request with `Refs #` - [x] I have not referenced internal or instance-local Paperclip issues or links - [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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DottaandPaperclip
|
cabc9146d0 |
feat(apps): add secure remote MCP and PostHog setup (#12339)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Apps give those agents governed access to external tools. > - Remote MCP setup needs secure endpoint validation and durable credentials. > - PostHog needs both browser sign-in and personal API key setup paths. > - This pull request adds the shared remote MCP foundation and the PostHog definition. > - The benefit is a secure and reusable base for later app connection work. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs #11965 This is stack 1 of 11. It replaces the first reviewable part of #11965. ## What Changed - Add guarded remote MCP setup and credential handling. - Add PostHog OAuth and API key connection methods. - Add focused server, shared contract, and UI coverage. - Keep the migration replay-safe and idempotent. - Give the late-close security regression the same 10-second CI headroom as the adjacent real-timer handshake test. - Synchronize fake-timer handshake tests at the exact ensure-session boundary so real filesystem setup cannot race the fake deadline. - Drive PTY overflow coverage only after listener registration so scheduling cannot reorder the test fixture. ## Verification - pnpm exec vitest run packages/adapter-utils/src/acpx-engine/execute.test.ts server/src/__tests__/plugin-worker-manager.test.ts (220 passed; affected cases also passed five focused stress repetitions) - `pnpm exec vitest run packages/adapter-utils/src/acpx-engine/execute.test.ts -t "never leaks a sandbox-provided value from a late close rejection into logs or the result"` (1 passed) - `pnpm exec vitest run packages/adapter-utils/src/acpx-engine/execute.test.ts -t "never promotes a late ensureSession resolution|closes a late-resolving real handle exactly once"` (2 passed) - `pnpm -r typecheck` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/tool-access-service.test.ts` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/db check:migrations` - `pnpm build` ## Risks - Remote endpoint validation can reject configurations that previously passed without checks. - OAuth configuration errors can block setup until the operator corrects the provider settings. - The migration uses guarded statements so repeated execution is safe. - The test-only synchronization changes do not affect runtime behavior; they remove filesystem/fake-clock and listener-registration races observed under parallel CI load. > I checked `ROADMAP.md`. This stack continues the existing app connection work from #11965 and does not duplicate another planned item. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-5. The runtime model ID and context window were not exposed. The model used reasoning, tool use, and code execution. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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Devin Foley
|
76f7019bdf |
feat(server): derive hosted-tenant issue prefixes from the company name and follow renames (#12292)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - Every company has an issue prefix. It is the visible half of each task and case identifier, and a self-hosted company derives it from the name it was created with > - A hosted or managed instance does not use the create-company flow. The trusted-header auth path claims the tenant company instead > - That path minted the prefix from a hash of the stack id, and it wrote a placeholder description that nobody chose > - So a hosted company showed opaque task IDs such as `PC7F2A-14`, and a rename never changed them > - This pull request derives the prefix from the company name on that path too. It re-derives the prefix when the name changes on a managed instance, and it rewrites the stored issue and case identifiers so existing tasks follow the rename > - It also repairs each company that an earlier build claimed. The repair runs once, on the next authenticated request > - The benefit is that task IDs on a hosted instance read like the ones on a self-hosted instance, and they stay correct after a rename ## Linked Issues or Issue Description No public issue exists. The description below follows `.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/enhancement.yml`. **What existing behavior does this improve?** The tenant company claim in `resolveCloudTenantActor` (`server/src/middleware/auth.ts`) and the company update in `companyService.update` (`server/src/services/companies.ts`). Both decide the `issue_prefix` and the `description` of a company on a hosted or managed instance. **Subsystem affected** `server/` — REST API and orchestration services. One small hint was also added in `ui/`. **Current behavior** A self-hosted company gets its issue prefix from its name. "Acme Robotics" becomes `ACM`, and its tasks read `ACM-14`. A hosted or managed instance claims the company through the trusted-header auth path. That path wrote a different prefix: `"PC"` plus the first four hex characters of the SHA-256 of the stack id. The same path also wrote a placeholder description, `"Provisioned by ... for stack <stack id>."`. The result is a task ID such as `PC7F2A-14`. It says nothing about the company. A later rename of the company does not change it, because nothing re-derives the prefix after creation. **Proposed behavior** The claim path derives the prefix from the company name, exactly as the create-company flow does. It writes no description. On a managed instance, a rename re-derives the prefix. The stored issue and case identifiers move with it, so `ACM-14` becomes `NOR-14` when "Acme Robotics" becomes "Northwind Traders". A rename that keeps the same three-letter base keeps the current prefix, including any disambiguating suffix. A self-hosted instance is unchanged. A rename there still keeps the prefix the company was created with. Companies that an earlier build already claimed get a one-time repair on their next authenticated request. The repair re-derives the prefix from the current name, re-keys the identifiers, and clears the placeholder description. **Reason and benefit** A task ID is the primary handle for a task. People type it, paste it into chat, and read it in a URL. On a hosted instance that handle was an opaque hash, and it disagreed with the company name that the same user chose during signup. The name is the only prefix source a hosted user ever supplies, so the prefix now follows it. **Breaking changes** Yes, on hosted and managed instances only. A company rename now rewrites the stored issue and case identifiers. Links that carry an old identifier stop resolving after the rename. The company settings page states this before the user saves. The one-time repair applies the same rewrite once to companies that carry the old hash prefix. Self-hosted behavior does not change. ## What Changed - Added `server/src/services/issue-prefix.ts`. It holds the prefix helpers that used to live inside the `companyService` closure: `ISSUE_PREFIX_FALLBACK`, `deriveIssuePrefixBase`, `issuePrefixSuffixForAttempt`, and `isIssuePrefixConflict`. The companies service now imports them. - Added `pickAvailableIssuePrefix` to that module. It reads the prefixes in one base family and returns the first free candidate. A standalone `INSERT` can retry on a unique violation, because each failed statement is its own implicit transaction. A caller that already holds a transaction cannot, because the violation aborts the whole transaction. Such a caller picks first, then writes. - Added `rekeyCompanyIssueIdentifiers` to that module. It rewrites the prefix of the stored `issues.identifier` and `cases.identifier` values of one company in the caller's transaction, and it returns the two row counts. - `companyService.update` re-derives the prefix when the name changes on a managed instance, re-keys both tables in the same transaction, and writes a `company.updated` activity entry after the commit. - `resolveCloudTenantActor` claims the company with a name-derived prefix and a null description. The claim retries with the next suffix when the prefix is taken. - `resolveCloudTenantActor` also runs a one-time repair for companies that carry the old hash prefix. An exact-match fence on the update lets a concurrent rename win. The repair is idempotent, because its guards stop matching after it lands. - The rename takes a row lock on the company before it compares anything against it, and it re-keys from the prefix it reads under that lock. Only patch and environment facts gate the lock, so no stale read can steer the decision. Two overlapping updates would otherwise leave a company whose prefix disagrees with its own identifiers, in either direction: two renames, where the second re-keys from a prefix the first already moved; or a rename plus a stale form that resubmits the original name, where the second sees an unchanged name, skips re-derivation, and restores the old name on top of the first rename's prefix. Only a managed instance takes the lock, and only for an update that carries a name. - Both helpers compare an exact identifier head instead of a LIKE pattern. A stored prefix is data, so it must never be read as a pattern. - The company settings page shows a hint under the name field on a managed instance: renaming can change the task ID prefix. ## Verification Automated tests: ``` pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run \ src/services/issue-prefix.test.ts \ src/__tests__/companies-service.test.ts \ src/__tests__/cloud-tenant-company-provisioning.test.ts \ src/middleware/cloud-tenant-actor.test.ts \ src/__tests__/auth-session-route.test.ts \ src/__tests__/cloud-routes.test.ts \ src/__tests__/cloud-instance.test.ts \ src/__tests__/company-branding-route.test.ts \ src/__tests__/company-cloud-floor.test.ts \ src/__tests__/companies-route-cross-company-authz.test.ts \ src/__tests__/companies-route-path-guard.test.ts \ src/__tests__/company-portability.test.ts pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui exec vitest run pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui typecheck ``` New coverage: - `server/src/services/issue-prefix.test.ts` covers the derivation, the suffix ladder, the cause-chain walk of the unique-violation detector, and `pickAvailableIssuePrefix` against a stubbed select. - `server/src/__tests__/companies-service.test.ts` covers a managed rename against a real Postgres database: the prefix moves, both identifier tables are re-keyed, and the activity entry is written. It also covers a same-base rename, a collision that takes the suffixed candidate, a non-name patch, and a self-hosted rename that leaves the prefix alone. Two more tests drive the overlap cases: two concurrent renames of the same company, and a rename racing a stale form that resubmits the original name. Both assert that the surviving name's base matches the company prefix and that the stored identifiers sit on that prefix. - `server/src/__tests__/cloud-tenant-company-provisioning.test.ts` covers the claim path and the repair against a real Postgres database: a name-derived prefix, a null description, a suffixed prefix on collision, the full repair, a second pass that changes nothing, a description-only repair, and an operator-written description that the repair leaves alone. - `ui/src/pages/CompanySettingsRenameHint.test.tsx` covers the hint on a managed instance and its absence on a self-hosted instance. The `substring` cast in `rekeyCompanyIssueIdentifiers` is load-bearing and the database tests prove it. The driver binds the offset as text. Without the `::int` cast Postgres resolves the SQL-regex overload of `substring`, and every identifier becomes NULL. ## Risks - **Re-keying changes existing identifiers and URLs.** This is deliberate, and it happens on hosted and managed instances only. After a rename, a link that carries an old task identifier stops resolving. The settings page warns about this before the user saves. - **Identifiers inside comment text are not rewritten.** Only the `identifier` columns of `issues` and `cases` move. A task ID that someone typed into a comment, a description, or a document keeps the old prefix. - **A lost prefix race inside the rename transaction surfaces as a conflict.** The rename picks a free prefix and then writes, because a unique violation inside a transaction aborts the whole transaction. Two *different* companies renamed onto the same base at the same moment can still collide. The loser sees its PATCH fail with the unique violation. The write is retryable by the client, and the window is a single statement wide. Two renames of the *same* company no longer race: the row lock serializes them, and the second one re-keys from what the first committed. - **The rename holds a row lock.** A managed rename takes `SELECT ... FOR UPDATE` on its own company row for the rest of the transaction. It is one row, and no other path in the transaction locks a company row, so there is no lock-order cycle. A self-hosted instance and every non-rename company update never reach the lock. - **The one-time repair is best effort.** It runs inside a try/catch and logs a warning on failure, so it never blocks authentication. A failed pass is retried on the next request, because its guards still match. - No schema change and no migration. ## Model Used - Provider: Anthropic (Claude) - Model: Claude Opus, model id `claude-opus-5[1m]` - Context window: 1M - Reasoning mode: extended thinking - Capabilities used: agentic tool use through Claude Code (file edits, shell, test runs against an embedded Postgres database) ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge |
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Nicky LeachandPaperclip
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8f1e3cfe24 |
feat(observability): add opt-in Sentry error monitoring for the server and the browser (#12190)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - The server and the browser need clear error reports when an operator enables external monitoring. > - Paperclip already uses an opt-in OpenTelemetry pattern for server traces. > - Sentry can provide error reports for both runtime paths when the operator sets one data source name. > - This pull request adds one opt-in Sentry gate for the server and the browser. > - The benefit is faster diagnosis while the default setup sends no Sentry data. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What is improved?** Paperclip gains optional error monitoring for server and browser failures. **Subsystem affected** Cross-cutting (server, UI, and shared authentication data). **Current behavior** Paperclip has no built-in Sentry error capture for server failures or browser boundary failures. Operators must inspect local logs and browser tools. **Proposed behavior** When the operator sets `SENTRY_DSN`, the server and authenticated browser use the same Sentry project. When the variable is absent, both paths stay inactive. The server loads Sentry dynamically and fails open when the optional package is absent. **Reason and benefit** Operators can inspect runtime errors in one Sentry project. The default setup remains local and sends no monitoring data. **Breaking changes** None when `SENTRY_DSN` remains unset. Authenticated session responses add the optional `sentryDsn` field. **Additional context** The implementation uses built-in Sentry privacy options. It disables default HTTP context and breadcrumb integrations and keeps `sendDefaultPii` false. ## What Changed - Add an opt-in server Sentry gate with dynamic package loading and fail-open behavior. - Add the Sentry data source name to the authenticated session response. - Add an authenticated browser Sentry gate and React error boundary capture. - Add tests for server, browser, route, and application error paths. - Document activation, installation, privacy settings, capture behavior, and operator controls. ## Verification - Run `npx vitest run server/src/__tests__/sentry.test.ts`. - Run `npx vitest run ui/src/lib/sentry.test.ts`. - Run `npx vitest run server/src/__tests__/auth-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/shutdown.test.ts`. - Confirm that the full continuous integration suite passes on this pull request. - Leave `SENTRY_DSN` unset and confirm that the server and browser gates stay inactive. - Set `SENTRY_DSN` and install the optional Sentry packages before a manual capture check. ## Risks The operator controls the Sentry project and accepts the data risk when the operator enables the feature. Error objects can contain messages, stacks, or cause chains with private values. The default configuration sends no data because the feature stays off without `SENTRY_DSN`. A missing optional server package does not stop server boot. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-5, with tool use, repository inspection, GitHub CLI operations, and code review support. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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417336f8be |
fix(workspaces): attach PR preparation to existing branches (#11703)
<!-- Write all pull request text in Simplified Technical English (ASD-STE100): short sentences, one instruction per sentence, simple approved vocabulary, and the active voice. --> ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Execution workspaces isolate an agent task from the primary checkout. > - Pull request preparation can need a branch that already contains completed work. > - The workspace policy could not require an exact existing branch. > - Workspace cleanup also treated worktree creation as branch ownership. > - This pull request adds an exact existing-branch policy and separate branch ownership metadata. > - The benefit is safe pull request preparation that preserves every existing commit and operator-owned branch. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What happened?** A pull request preparation run could not pin its execution workspace to an exact existing branch. Workspace reuse and cleanup could also confuse worktree creation with branch ownership. **Expected behavior** The run must attach only to the requested branch in an isolated Git worktree. It must fail if the branch is missing, busy, or inconsistent. Cleanup must not delete a branch that Paperclip does not own. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Create a branch that contains completed work. 2. Configure a pull request preparation task to use that branch. 3. Start the task and observe that the prior policy cannot require the exact branch. **Paperclip version or commit** This behavior reproduces on the base revision before this pull request. **Deployment mode** Local development with isolated Git worktrees. ## What Changed - Add `existingBranch` to the execution workspace policy and shared validation contracts. - Require `existingBranch` to use an isolated Git worktree and reject conflicting branch templates. - Attach to the exact branch without creating, renaming, resetting, or deleting it. - Track branch ownership separately from worktree creation and use that ownership during cleanup. - Return HTTP 422 for invalid existing-branch settings on every issue-producing route. - Add a bounded repair script for existing pull request preparation tasks. - Add focused policy, route, heartbeat, runtime, and ready-comment tests. - Document the exact-branch behavior and safety rules. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/execution-workspace-policy.test.ts server/src/__tests__/heartbeat-workspace-session.test.ts server/src/__tests__/issue-existing-branch-validation-status.test.ts server/src/__tests__/workspace-runtime.test.ts server/src/services/workspace-runtime-exposure.test.ts server/src/services/workspace-runtime-ready-comment.test.ts` passed 335 tests. - `pnpm -r typecheck` passed for all workspace projects. - `pnpm test:run` passed 4,431 tests. Two unrelated embedded-Postgres setup hooks timed out under aggregate load. Their isolated rerun passed 74 tests. - `pnpm build` passed for all workspace projects. - The two review regressions passed with 139 unrelated tests skipped. - All latest-head CI gates passed after one unrelated timing-sensitive test passed on rerun. - Greptile scored the latest head 5/5 with no unresolved review threads. ## Risks - Invalid workspace settings now return HTTP 422 instead of a generic validation response. - The exact branch must already exist and must not be checked out by another worktree. - The new policy fails closed when it cannot prove branch identity or ownership. - This change has no database migration. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex from the GPT-5 family assisted with this change. The runtime did not expose its exact deployment ID or context window. The agent used high-reasoning mode, repository tools, shell execution, and code execution. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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DottaandPaperclip
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a2bf936f9a |
feat(workspaces): sign the workspace login handoff and gate readiness (#11671)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Managed worktree services run isolated Paperclip instances with cloned databases. > - A reachable service was reported as ready even when its database, runtime identity, or login path was not usable. > - The first candidate added verified database seeding and managed repair in #11665. > - This pull request consolidates that candidate with signed login handoff and a complete readiness contract. > - Post-QA fixes close five defects in repair identity, repair responses, UI retry, seed journal handling, and seed-source trust. > - The benefit is a workspace that either opens safely or reports one accurate recovery action. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description No public GitHub issue exists for this work, so the problem is described here. **What happened** Managed workspace URLs could return HTTP 200 and report ready while login failed. QA also found cases where repair used the wrong instance identity, returned a generic error, left the UI stuck, rejected a safe journal lag, or trusted a mutable workspace manifest. **Expected behavior** Opening a ready workspace signs the board user in to the correct isolated instance. Provisioning and repair use a registered source and report a structured recovery state. **Actual behavior** Entry depended on a password copied into the clone. Several failure paths could publish stale readiness, hide the repair precondition, or trust state that the workspace could modify. **Additional context** This pull request includes the commits first published in #11665. That pull request keeps the original base head for review history. This consolidated pull request is the merge candidate. Related open readiness work includes #11575 and #11621. ## What Changed - Adds a short-lived, signed, single-use login ticket. It binds the user, workspace, instance, and runtime origin. - Exchanges the ticket through Better Auth. It creates the session and cookie through the supported adapter path. - Adds protected workspace readiness fields for the database, clone data, login handoff, seed phase, and runtime identity. - Fails readiness closed when the guest has no company or execution-workspace binding. - Binds ticket issuance to the exact cloned user and active company membership selected for the handoff. - Verifies every current active board identity through the exact-user handoff before publication or reuse. - Gates managed runtime publication on the readiness contract and the recorded worktree instance identity. - Refreshes runtime work products from the live runtime row after a port change. - Adds one workspace access card with ready, degraded, repairing, and failed states. - Uses the runtime response identity for repair. It returns structured repair precondition errors. - Lets a valid source journal lag converge during provisioning. - Binds seed and repair manifests to a source registered outside the agent-writable worktree. - Clears recovered UI errors so a successful retry can open the workspace. - Makes runtime tests register canonical sources and avoid ports owned by live host listeners. - Keeps Vitest on source suites when compiled `dist` trees exist. - Isolates CLI and adapter tests from ambient AWS and runtime API environment variables. - Preserves a 404 response for cross-company workspace ID lookups before runtime authorization. - Makes concurrent single-flight coverage independent of path-canonicalization scheduling order. ## Verification The following checks passed on the integrated head: ```sh pnpm -r typecheck pnpm build pnpm check:token-gates pnpm --filter @paperclipai/db check:migrations ``` - The server source lane passed 420 files and 4,953 tests. Five tests were skipped. - The CLI lane passed 57 files and 385 tests. - The database lane passed 26 files and 97 tests. - The shared package passed 58 files and 506 tests. - The adapter utility lane passed 640 tests. Four tests were skipped. - The Claude adapter passed 220 tests. One test was skipped. - The Codex adapter passed 323 tests. - The OpenClaw adapter passed 13 tests. - The OpenCode adapter passed 42 tests. - The plugin SDK passed 45 tests. - The workspace runtime suite passed 124 tests. - The caller-scoped readiness and handoff suite passed 52 tests. - The workspace provisioning shell suite passed 7 tests. - The runtime exposure suite passed 17 tests while live host mappings occupied fixed test ports. - `git diff --check` passed and the worktree is clean. The serialized route lane will run in GitHub CI with its normal shards. No deployment or active-workspace migration was performed. ## Risks - This is a medium-risk authentication and runtime-readiness change. - The login ticket uses exact origin, workspace, instance, and user binding. It has a short expiry and a one-time nonce. - Runtime publication is stricter. A real readiness, identity, per-user handoff, or control-plane database disagreement now blocks publication. - This pull request supersedes #11665 as the merge candidate. Close #11665 after this pull request merges. - No new database migration is included. The lockfile and workflow files are unchanged. - Deployment and active-workspace migration are intentionally outside this pull request. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used Claude Opus 5 (`claude-opus-5[1m]`), 1M context, extended thinking, tool use, and code execution produced the main candidate. OpenAI GPT-5 (`gpt-5`) through Codex, with agentic reasoning, tool use, and code execution, integrated the post-QA fixes and hardened the test gates. The Codex context-window size was not exposed. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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1c366a9059 |
fix(server): reject invalid agent credentials instead of downgrading to the local user actor (#11589)
<!-- Write all pull request text in Simplified Technical English (ASD-STE100): short sentences, one instruction per sentence, simple approved vocabulary, and the active voice. --> ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - The server authenticates each agent request in `actorMiddleware` before it attributes chat comments > - When an agent bearer token failed verification, the middleware called `next()` with no error and the request continued without an agent actor > - The request then fell back to the local user actor, so the server stored agent replies as user comments > - The task chat UI renders user comments in blue bubbles, so agent messages appeared as blue user bubbles > - This pull request rejects invalid agent credentials with 401 instead of a silent downgrade > - The benefit is that agent messages keep agent attribution, and broken credentials fail loudly with a clear retry message ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What happened?** A user cancelled an onboarding question card. The agent posted a follow-up reply. The reply appeared in a blue bubble, which the UI reserves for human messages. The agent run held an expired local agent JWT. The auth middleware could not verify the token, called `next()` without an actor, and the request fell back to the local user identity. The server stored the agent comment as a user comment. **Expected behavior** Agent messages always render as agent bubbles. A request with invalid agent credentials must fail with 401 so the adapter can refresh credentials and retry. It must not post content under a human identity. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Start a local Paperclip instance. 2. Give an agent run an expired or malformed agent JWT. 3. Let the agent post an issue comment through the API bridge. 4. Before this change: the comment is stored with the local user identity and renders as a blue bubble. After this change: the request fails with 401 and a message that tells the caller to obtain fresh credentials. ## What Changed - `server/src/middleware/auth.ts`: a bearer token that fails verification now produces a 401 `unauthorized` error instead of a silent fall-through to the anonymous/local-user actor. - The 401 message states the cause: expired token, unverifiable token, empty bearer token, missing agent record, agent record in another company, terminated agent, or agent pending approval. - The API-key path now also rejects an agent record whose company does not match the key. - `packages/adapter-utils/src/execution-target.ts`: the bridge proxy now writes a `comment id: <id>` marker to the run log for each posted issue comment, so misattributed comments can be traced to a run. - `ui/src/components/task-chat/task-chat-adapter.test.ts`: a regression test asserts that a recovered `local-board` comment with a derived agent author renders as an agent bubble, not a user bubble. - `server/src/__tests__/agent-auth-middleware.test.ts` and `packages/adapter-utils/src/execution-target-sandbox.test.ts`: new tests cover each rejection path and the log marker. ## Verification - Run `pnpm vitest run src/__tests__/agent-auth-middleware.test.ts` in `server/` — 14 tests pass. - Run `pnpm vitest run execution-target-sandbox` at the repo root — 44 tests pass. - Run `pnpm vitest run src/components/task-chat/task-chat-adapter.test.ts` in `ui/` — 4 tests pass. - Manual check: post an issue comment with an expired agent JWT; the API returns 401 with a retry message and no comment is stored. ## Risks - Behavioral shift: requests that previously continued as anonymous or local-user actors after a failed agent-token verification now receive 401. Any caller that relied on the silent downgrade must refresh its credentials. This is the intended fix, and the adapters already handle 401 with a credential refresh. - No schema or migration changes. Low risk otherwise. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - Claude (Anthropic), model ID `claude-fable-5`, via Claude Code with extended thinking and tool use (agent harness with shell, file, and git tools). ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [ ] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Nicky LeachandPaperclip
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fdb9a4880d |
fix(security): route paperclipai CLI guidance through safe npx form (CWE-78) (#11400)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - Paperclip provides CLI commands and guidance for operators and agents > - The `pnpm paperclipai` script can pass argument values through a shell > - Shell re-parsing can execute command substitutions inside quoted values > - This pull request routes guidance through inert-argv `npx paperclipai` commands and adds regression coverage > - The benefit is safer operator guidance across documentation and runtime hints ## Linked Issues or Issue Description This pull request fixes a command-injection-class defect in Paperclip CLI guidance. **What happened?** The `pnpm paperclipai <sub> --flag "$VALUE"` form can re-parse argument values through a shell. A command substitution inside a quoted value can execute on the host. **Expected behavior** Paperclip guidance must pass CLI values as inert argument values. Host-derived values must not appear in copyable commands. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Run a Paperclip guidance command that uses the `pnpm paperclipai` script. 2. Provide a quoted value that contains a command substitution. 3. Observe that the shell can evaluate the substitution before the CLI starts. 4. Compare the result with the `npx paperclipai` form. **Paperclip version or commit** `5670984b75d109950c968542a0111ebb6967f4da` **Deployment mode** All deployment modes that show or use the affected CLI guidance. **Installation method** Built from source and installed CLI guidance. **Agent adapter(s) involved** Not adapter-specific (core bug). **Database mode** Not database-related. **Access context** Both. **Additional context** The earlier merged PR [#11343](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/11343) used the unsafe `pnpm exec paperclipai` form. This fresh PR replaces that guidance with the safe `npx paperclipai` form. ## What Changed - Standardize documentation and runtime hints on `npx paperclipai`. - Remove the broken `pnpm exec paperclipai` guidance. - Use a static `<host>` placeholder in private-hostname guidance. - Add regression tests for unsafe forms, continued lines, static hosts, and offline guidance. ## Verification - `git diff --check origin/master...origin/fix/paperclipai-cli-npx-safe-invocation` passes. - The branch adds `server/src/__tests__/cli-invocation-safety.test.ts` and updates private-hostname tests. - CI must run the new tests, typecheck, lint, and build checks. - Local Vitest execution was not available because this worktree has no installed Vitest binary. ## Risks - The change affects operator and agent documentation text. - The runtime hints now show `<host>` instead of a request-derived host value. - No database schema or migration changes exist. - CI will detect any missed unsafe invocation or type error. ## Model Used OpenAI GPT-5, exact model ID `gpt-5`, with tool use and code-review assistance. The model used repository inspection, Git operations, and PR preparation. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] CI ran the test suites and they pass; local test execution was unavailable in this worktree - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I addressed all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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Nicky LeachandPaperclip
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5ca7b4c1fe |
fix(security): standardize paperclipai CLI guidance on safe npx path (#11343)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Paperclip provides CLI guidance to agents and operators through documentation and runtime messages. > - Content-bearing `pnpm paperclipai` examples send arguments through a shell. > - Shell evaluation can execute command substitutions in untrusted argument content. > - Runtime hostname guidance can also place request-derived content inside a shell command. > - This pull request uses `npx paperclipai` for content-bearing guidance and uses a static hostname placeholder. > - The benefit is safer copy-paste guidance for agents and operators. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **Issue type** Incorrect information **Where is the issue?** CLI guidance in `doc/CLI.md`, `skills/paperclip/SKILL.md`, documentation, and runtime-generated hints. **What's wrong?** Content-bearing `pnpm paperclipai` commands can pass argument text through `/bin/sh`. Shell command substitution in an argument can execute before the CLI receives the value. **Suggested fix** Use `npx paperclipai` for content-bearing commands. Use a static `<host>` placeholder when runtime guidance displays the allowed-hostname command. ## What Changed - Replace content-bearing `pnpm paperclipai` examples with `npx paperclipai` across the documentation and agent-facing guidance. - Update runtime-generated CLI hints to use a static `<host>` placeholder. - Add safety notes to `doc/CLI.md` and `skills/paperclip/SKILL.md`. - Add scans and regression tests for unsafe invocation and hostile hostname headers. - Keep fixed lifecycle commands and `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/*` build commands unchanged. ## Verification - Run `tsc --noEmit` for the changed server files. - Run `cli-invocation-safety.test.ts`. - Run `private-hostname-guard.test.ts`. - Confirm that hostile hostname headers do not enter shown shell commands. - Confirm that the three commits contain the required Paperclip co-author trailer. ## Risks - This change updates documentation and diagnostic text across many surfaces. - Fixed lifecycle and setup commands remain unchanged. - The tests fail if content-bearing `pnpm paperclipai` guidance returns. - The change does not alter the CLI argument parser. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-5, tool use, code execution, and repository review assistance. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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Constantineandcucurigoo
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276730d63e |
fix(server): recognize cross-package Zod errors (#10168)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip validates API request bodies with Zod and converts validation failures into client errors. > - The global error handler recognized Zod failures with `instanceof ZodError`. > - Monorepo dependency layouts can provide more than one installed Zod module instance. > - A valid Zod error from another instance fails that identity check and falls through as HTTP 500. > - This pull request keeps the native path and adds a narrow structural fallback for named Zod errors with an issues array. > - The benefit is stable HTTP 400 validation semantics regardless of package-instance identity. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Related but not duplicate: Refs #6908. That PR catches `instanceof ZodError` inside validation middleware and returns 422; it does not cover errors created by a second Zod module instance, which is the reproduced failure here. **What happened?** An invalid `POST /api/issues/:id/work-products` payload raised a real Zod validation error but returned HTTP 500 because the error came from a different Zod package instance. **Expected behavior** All genuine Zod validation failures return HTTP 400 with validation details, independent of module identity. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Submit a work-product body missing the required `provider`, `externalId`, and `url` fields. 2. Ensure the route schema is resolved from a different installed Zod instance than the server error handler. 3. Observe HTTP 500 before this fix. 4. Observe HTTP 400 after this fix. **Environment** - Paperclip base: `14f20be92b86a49ff2c35495e5b0fa4d719998ef` - Deployment: self-hosted, built from source - Access context: board API - Adapter scope: not adapter-specific - [x] I searched open PRs for `ZodError`, validation errors, and work-product validation and linked related work above. ## What Changed - Add a narrow `readZodIssues` helper that accepts native Zod errors or structurally valid cross-package Zod errors. - Preserve existing HTTP 400 response shape and structured error context. - Add a regression for a Zod error object from another module instance. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/error-handler.test.ts` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` - Full upstream CI test/build/e2e matrix passed. - Local post-deploy smoke returned HTTP 400 for the previously failing invalid work-product payload. ## Risks - A deliberately thrown object named `ZodError` with an `issues` array will be treated as a client validation failure. The effect is limited to returning HTTP 400 instead of 500; no authorization or persistence behavior changes. - No schema or migration changes. > This is a bug fix, not roadmap feature work. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex `gpt-5.6-sol`, with tool use, code execution, repository inspection, and independent read-only review agents. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either linked related public work and described the bug in-PR following the bug template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links - [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal ticket id - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have considered documentation; no user-facing documentation change is required - [x] I have considered and documented risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: cucurigoo <cucurigoo@users.noreply.github.com> |
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e31951a17d |
feat: Claude agent setup-token login in a sandbox (#11286)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - Claude agents that run in a remote sandbox need a safe in-product login path > - The existing host login route cannot open a pseudo-terminal inside that sandbox > - The login flow must protect the browser code, the login URL, and the OAuth token at every step > - This pull request adds the parser, the runner, a Daytona pseudo-terminal transport, and a guarded, owner-bound session route behind an injectable transport > - The route stays inert in the default build and fails closed until a sandbox provider binds the live transport > - The benefit is a company-scoped setup-token flow with one-time secret delivery, redaction, and fail-closed transport checks, ready for a later staged production rollout ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **Agent or provider** Claude Code setup-token login for sandbox agents. **Why this adapter is useful** Sandbox agents need a supported way to sign in without host credentials. An authorized owner completes the browser step and receives the token one time. **How the agent is invoked** When a sandbox provider binds the injectable transport, the server starts `claude setup-token` through a sandbox pseudo-terminal, sends the browser code to the matched prompt, and returns the token through the guarded session route. The default build does not bind the transport. In that state the start route fails closed with a fixed no-secret `503`. It does not start a process and it does not hold a sandbox lease. **Additional context** The transport is injectable, so each sandbox provider binds its own pseudo-terminal. This pull request adds the Daytona transport but does not bind it in the production server. A production wiring needs a lease manager, a live pseudo-terminal factory, a durable token store, and its own security review. The route keeps secrets out of logs, activity details, errors, telemetry, and non-owner responses. ## What Changed - Add strict parsers for the setup-token URL, the prompt, and the success token. - Add a login runner that drives the `claude setup-token` command through a pseudo-terminal. - Add the Daytona pseudo-terminal transport and the sandbox plugin wiring. - Add a company-scoped, owner-bound login session service with rate limits, a reaper, cleanup, and one-time token delivery. - Add the guarded session routes at `/agents/:id/setup-token-login-sessions/*` behind an injectable transport. The routes become the live login path only when a provider binds the transport. - Keep the start route fail-closed in the default build. It returns a fixed no-secret `503` and it does not bind `setupTokenLogin`. - Keep the existing host route `POST /agents/:id/claude-login` in place. This pull request does not replace it. - Keep confidential responses behind a fail-closed TLS transport guard with `Cache-Control: no-store`, and extend redaction for the new fields. - Export the parser and the runner from the Claude local server entry, and document the new session routes in the OpenAPI spec. ## Verification - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run setup-token-route setup-token-session` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-claude-local exec vitest run` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server run typecheck` - Confirm that the pull request checks pass on GitHub. ## Risks - Low user-facing risk on merge. The default build does not bind the transport, so the production start route stays fail-closed with a `503`. The merge does not change the production login behavior. - When a provider later binds the transport, the flow starts a live sandbox process and holds a short-lived in-memory secret. Cleanup must stop the child before it releases the sandbox lease. - The transport guard fails closed when the deployment does not provide a trusted TLS path. A wrong proxy allowlist can block a valid request. - The production wiring is out of scope. It needs a lease manager, a live pseudo-terminal factory, a durable token store, and its own security review before the server binds `setupTokenLogin`. ## Model Used Anthropic Claude Opus 4.8 assisted the implementation. It used extended reasoning, code execution, repository tool use, and a 200,000-token context window. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes: #` / `Refs: #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes (the OpenAPI spec covers the new session routes; no user-facing documentation needs changes) - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Devin Foley
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2c53437fc9 |
fix(server): authenticate cloud-proxied browsers on the live-events websocket (#11290)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - The UI receives live run/issue events over a websocket at `/api/companies/:id/events/ws`; the server authorizes upgrades with a bearer token or a Better Auth session > - On a cloud-managed deployment, browsers authenticate through trusted `x-paperclip-cloud-*` headers injected by the managing front door — they never hold a local Better Auth session, and the Express middleware lane that understands those headers is not consulted for websocket upgrades > - Every browser websocket upgrade behind the front door therefore resolves no identity and is rejected 403: the live-events socket has never connected on a managed instance, leaving permanent reconnect churn and console failure noise while the UI silently degrades to polling > - This pull request adds a cloud-actor lane to the upgrade authorization, reusing the same trusted-header resolver the HTTP middleware uses > - The benefit is working realtime updates on managed instances, an end to the reconnect churn, and unchanged self-hosted behavior ## Linked Issues or Issue Description No existing issue. Description follows the bug template: **What happened?** On a cloud-managed instance, the browser console shows `WebSocket connection to 'wss://…/api/companies/<id>/events/ws' failed:` repeating indefinitely for every company, on a healthy instance. The server rejects each upgrade with 403 because `authorizeUpgrade` in `server/src/realtime/live-events-ws.ts` only knows bearer tokens and Better Auth sessions, while cloud-proxied browsers authenticate via `x-paperclip-cloud-*` trusted headers (handled only by the Express `actorMiddleware` lane in `server/src/middleware/auth.ts`). **Expected behavior** A browser that authenticates through the trusted cloud headers can open the live-events websocket for any company in its membership scope, exactly as it can call the HTTP API for those companies. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Run Paperclip in `authenticated` mode behind a proxy that injects the `x-paperclip-cloud-*` headers with a valid `PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_TENANT_SERVER_TOKEN`. 2. Load any company page in a browser (no local Better Auth session). 3. HTTP API calls succeed; every `/events/ws` upgrade is rejected 403 and the UI retries forever. ## What Changed - `server/src/middleware/auth.ts`: `resolveCloudTenantActor` now accepts a minimal `CloudActorHeaderSource` (`header(name)`) instead of an Express `Request` — `Request` satisfies it unchanged — plus `cloudActorHeaderSourceFromHeaders` to adapt raw `IncomingMessage.headers`. - `server/src/realtime/live-events-ws.ts`: `authorizeUpgrade` gains an injected `resolveCloudActor` lane, tried before the Better Auth session fallback in `authenticated` mode. A resolved cloud actor is authoritative: the upgrade is authorized only for a company in the actor's membership scope (`companyIds`, the same scope the HTTP lane grants). Absent/unresolvable cloud headers fall through to the session path. - `server/src/index.ts`: wires `resolveCloudActor` through `resolveCloudTenantActor` + the header shim. The resolver self-gates: without `PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_TENANT_SERVER_TOKEN` and a matching trust token it returns null, so self-hosted deployments never take this path. - Tests: upgrade authorized for an in-scope company (session resolver not consulted), rejected for an out-of-scope company, fall-through to session auth when no cloud actor resolves; header-shim resolution from a raw lowercased header map including `string[]` values. ## Verification - `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/live-events-ws.test.ts server/src/middleware/cloud-tenant-actor.test.ts` — 25 tests pass. - `pnpm typecheck` in `server/` — clean. - Not verified live end-to-end: that requires a managed instance running this build; the direct probe evidence (HTTP authenticated fine, every WS upgrade 403) matches the code path exactly. ## Risks Low risk. The new lane only activates when the deployment configures the cloud trust token and the request presents it; both checks already protect the HTTP lane. Authorization scope is the same `companyIds` set the HTTP middleware computes (primary stack company plus the user's real membership rows). The cloud resolver's user/company materialization writes are debounced (existing behavior shared with the HTTP lane), so websocket reconnect storms do not amplify database writes. Self-hosted instances see no behavioral change, covered by the fall-through test. ## Model Used - Claude (Anthropic), Claude Fable 5 (`claude-fable-5`), via Claude Code CLI with extended thinking and tool use (code search, edit, test execution; diagnosis included live websocket handshake probes against a managed instance). ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge |
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|
b847e8b6f6 |
perf(server): reduce issue detail request overhead (#10414)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source control plane people use to coordinate AI-agent work > - Opening an issue fans out into several authenticated issue-detail reads, so repeated work on that path directly affects perceived latency > - Those reads repeated issue and authorization lookups, returned full private JSON even when unchanged, and performed non-critical bookkeeping writes on the request path > - Interaction reads also performed lifecycle writes even though `GET` must be read-only > - This pull request adds request-scoped reuse, private conditional responses, read-only interaction access, and bounded write debouncing without crossing actor, request, or company boundaries > - The result is less database, serialization, logging, and response-body work while preserving authorization and interaction lifecycle invariants ## Linked Issues or Issue Description This is the server-only latency phase. Related work is tracked separately in #10415 (aggregate view), #10416 (warm navigation, merged into the base), and #10463 (bundle split). This pull request intentionally excludes those scopes. **What happened?** Opening an issue detail view caused avoidable server costs: repeated issue and authorization reads within one request, full private JSON responses when a representation was unchanged, writes during interaction-list reads, production debug transport setup, and immediate bookkeeping writes for cloud tenant activity and board-key usage. **Expected behavior** All successful JSON `GET /api/issues/:id/*` responses should support strong private ETags and `304 Not Modified`. Repeated work may be reused only within the current request. `GET /interactions` must not modify stored interactions. Non-critical activity timestamps may be debounced without weakening authentication or stale instance-admin cleanup. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Start Paperclip in local development or self-hosted server mode. 2. Open one issue and request its detail subresources with the same authenticated actor. 3. Repeat a successful JSON request with its `ETag` in `If-None-Match`. 4. Observe `304 Not Modified`, no interaction writes from `GET /interactions`, and unchanged authorization boundaries. **Deployment mode / installation** - Local development or self-hosted server - Built from source - Core server behavior; not adapter-specific ## What Changed - Added strong ETags and `Cache-Control: private, must-revalidate` to successful JSON reads under `/api/issues/:id/*`, including standards-compliant `If-None-Match` handling. - Added request-scoped promise memoization for issue and authorization lookups; no authorization result survives the request. - Made `GET /interactions` read-only, moved supersession and terminal-state handling to mutation paths, and prevented plugin callers from accepting or rejecting interactions after an issue closes. - Removed the production debug-file logger transport while preserving development formatting. - Debounced cloud-tenant activity and board-key `lastUsedAt` persistence, while keeping stale instance-admin deletion unconditional and authentication checks per request. - Added focused tests for ETags, request isolation, authorization lifecycle behavior, interaction invariants, logger configuration, and retry-safe debounce behavior. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/private-json-etag.test.ts server/src/__tests__/issue-thread-interaction-routes.test.ts` — 2 files, 23 tests passed. - Focused Vitest run covering request memoization, authorization, interactions, plugin orchestration, logger, cloud tenant, board auth, and issue services — 9 files, 264 tests passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` — passed. - `git diff --check origin/master...HEAD` — passed. - Scope guardrails: 21 changed files under `server/src`; no lockfile, workflow, migration, UI, aggregate-view, or bundle-split changes. ## Risks - Strong ETags hash each successful serialized JSON response. This adds a small CPU cost but avoids transferring unchanged bodies. - Debounced bookkeeping timestamps can lag by the bounded debounce interval. They are non-critical usage metadata; authentication still runs per request, and stale instance-admin deletion remains unconditional. - Legacy pending interactions on terminal issues are projected as expired by reads and are finalized only by mutation paths. The stored record remains unchanged on `GET` by design. - No database schema or migration changes are included. > This is a focused performance correction and does not duplicate a planned core feature in `ROADMAP.md`. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex using `gpt-5.3-codex` for the initial implementation and `gpt-5.6-sol` for isolation, verification, and PR preparation, with reasoning, repository tool use, code execution, and GitHub CLI access. The runtimes did not expose authoritative context-window sizes. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> Co-authored-by: Dev Agent <dev@paperclip.ing> |
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DottaandPaperclip
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5858ccb981 |
feat: make in-app features cloud-aware (#10850)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Operators use the same board application in self-hosted and Paperclip Cloud deployments. > - A Cloud tenant contains one company, so an in-app company switch does not change the active Cloud stack. > - Cloud operators need the sidebar and company surfaces to use the signed-in user's stack portfolio. > - The server must derive Cloud identity and links from trusted instance context instead of client input. > - This pull request adds canonical Cloud context, a trusted stack portfolio proxy, and Cloud-aware navigation. > - The benefit is consistent stack switching on Cloud while self-hosted company behavior stays unchanged. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **Subsystem affected** Cross-cutting: server REST routes and the React board UI. **Problem or motivation** A Cloud-managed instance contains one company. The existing company switcher could only switch records inside that tenant. It could not move the operator to another Cloud stack. The existing header also gave long organization names too little width. **Proposed solution** Expose a canonical public Cloud context in health data. Add a trusted server proxy for the current user's stack portfolio. Use that data in the board UI to switch stacks with top-level navigation. Keep the existing company behavior on self-hosted instances. Move search into the navigation and keep long organization names inside the sidebar panel. **Alternatives considered** An in-app `/stacks` route was rejected because Cloud tenant hosts reserve that path and stack selection must wake or authenticate another tenant. Client-supplied user identity was rejected because the server can derive the trusted Cloud actor. **Roadmap alignment** This change advances the Cloud deployments milestone. It keeps the product local-first and Cloud-ready without changing the self-hosted mental model. ## What Changed - Added canonical Cloud instance context and public health metadata. - Added a Cloud-only stack portfolio proxy with trusted actor forwarding and per-user caching. - Prevented normal company creation on Cloud-managed instances. - Switched the sidebar and Companies page from company actions to stack actions on Cloud. - Added full-page stack navigation and Cloud create-stack links. - Moved search into the sidebar navigation so the organization name keeps more width. - Added truncation and hover recovery for long organization and stack names. - Added server and UI regression coverage for Cloud and self-hosted behavior. - Updated the implementation specification for the Cloud contracts. ## Verification - `node scripts/check-token-gates.mjs` passed. All three token gates are clean. - `pnpm --dir server exec vitest run src/__tests__/health.test.ts src/__tests__/cloud-instance.test.ts src/__tests__/cloud-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/company-cloud-floor.test.ts src/__tests__/company-portability-routes.test.ts` passed: 5 files and 66 tests. - `pnpm --dir ui exec vitest run src/components/SidebarCompanyMenu.test.tsx` passed: 1 file and 11 tests. - Pre-PR QA report `7da87ca7` passed all 8 acceptance criteria with real HTTP route factories and real Chromium screenshots in Cloud and self-hosted modes. - Security reviews passed for the canonical Cloud context and stack portfolio proxy. ## Risks - Cloud stack switching depends on the configured Cloud application and tenant portfolio URLs. - The new health `cloud` block is public by design, but it contains only canonical public instance metadata. - The stack proxy fails closed on self-hosted instances and derives the user identity from the trusted actor. - Self-hosted navigation and company creation retain their existing paths and behavior. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex, model `gpt-5`. The run used reasoning, repository tools, shell execution, and GitHub integration. The deployment did not expose its context-window size. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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DottaandPaperclip
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2495e29f7f |
Preserve company display names in cloud tenants (#10845)
Prefer the trusted organization name, repair known machine-generated legacy names with compare-and-set safety, and preserve the audited fallback behavior required by PAP-16331. Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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Devin Foley
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1c52f02d34 |
Let cloud tenant sessions reach companies they hold memberships in (#10524)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - On Paperclip Cloud, each stack authenticates its users to the tenant app through trusted headers (`resolveCloudTenantActor`), which seed a primary company for the stack > - That actor was pinned to exactly one company — the seeded primary — regardless of any other companies the user actually holds a membership in > - Companies created later (via the import flow, or company creation) write real membership rows for the user, but the pinned actor ignored them, so those companies showed up in listings yet returned "User does not have access to this company" when opened > - This pull request unions the pinned primary with the user's own active membership rows, exactly as a locally authenticated session already does > - The benefit is that a Cloud user can reach every company they belong to — most visibly, a company they just imported ## Linked Issues or Issue Description - Refs #10507 (Import/Export — imported companies were unreachable on Cloud stacks). No open issue; bug described above (companies visible in listing but unreachable; expected: reachable when the user holds an active membership). ## What Changed - Extracted the session path's own active-membership query into `loadActiveUserCompanyMemberships(db, userId)` (single-sourced; the session path now calls it too). - `resolveCloudTenantActor` unions its result with the pinned primary: `companyIds = [primary, ...others]`, memberships likewise, primary first. Strictly per-user; a membership-read failure degrades to primary-only (mirrors the existing fail-closed owner-elevation pattern). No change to owner instance-admin elevation, grant seeding, the stale instance-admin purge, or trusted-header validation. - Grants are seeded at membership creation across all flows (company create, invite/join, import), not per request — so no extra seeding was added here. ## Verification - `@paperclipai/server` typecheck clean. - `cloud-tenant-actor.test.ts` (+ union / other-user-excluded / inactive-excluded / no-rows-identical cases), `auth-session-route.test.ts` (route-level: trusted headers reach a unioned company through `assertCompanyAccess`), plus agent-auth, authz-company-access, cross-company-authz, portability-routes — 83 tests green. ## Risks - Low and tightly scoped: only widens a Cloud actor's reachable companies to those it already holds active memberships in; users without extra memberships, other users' rows, and owner elevation are all unaffected. Read failure fails closed to primary-only. ## Model Used - Claude Fable 5 (`claude-fable-5`, Anthropic), Claude Code CLI, extended thinking + tool use. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge |
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Devin FoleyandPaperclip
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c274f10abc |
feat(server): computed owner instance-admin elevation for cloud-managed instances, behind platform floors (#10343)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - Cloud-managed instances authenticate tenant users through a trusted-header path (`resolveCloudTenantActor`) that deliberately never grants `instance_admin`, so every tenant user is company-scoped > - On a dedicated (single-owner) managed instance that leaves the paying owner unable to administer their own instance: instance settings, the environments admin surface, and the custom sandbox image flow are all instance-admin gated (the environments UI can't even show the provider/image of the platform sandbox because the restricted read view blanks `config` entirely) > - Re-granting the old blanket `instance_user_roles` row would repeat the mistake the shared-pool hardening fixed: DB rows go stale, resurrect via restores, and elevate through every auth path > - This pull request elevates only the stack `owner`, computed per request at the trusted-header boundary behind a new managed-tier feature flag, and ships that elevation together with code floors on the platform-owned surfaces an instance admin must not control on a managed instance > - The benefit is that dedicated-stack owners can administer their own instance while platform credentials, execution policy, backups, and runtime code-install stay platform-owned, and self-hosted behavior is unchanged ## Linked Issues or Issue Description No public GitHub issue exists for this change; the underlying issue is described here following the feature-request template. ### Problem or motivation - On cloud-managed instances, tenant users resolved from trusted headers are always company-scoped. For dedicated instances with a single paying owner, the owner cannot reach any instance-admin surface of their own instance (instance settings, environments administration, custom image setup), and the restricted environment read view hides even structural fields like the sandbox provider and image. - The previous hardening intentionally removed blanket elevation (and purges stale `instance_user_roles` rows on every trusted-header authentication). That protection must not regress for shared multi-tenant pools. ### Proposed solution - Owner-only, computed, flag-gated elevation plus code floors on platform-owned surfaces, in one PR so the elevation can never ship without the floors. ### Alternatives considered - Re-inserting an `instance_user_roles` row for owners (the pre-hardening model): rejected — DB rows go stale, survive restores, and elevate through every auth path; #7525 removed exactly this. - Widening only the environments read view without any elevation: rejected — it fixes one screen but still leaves a dedicated-instance owner unable to administer instance settings or custom images. - Elevating additional stack roles (`member`/`admin`/`support`): rejected — only the owner has an ownership claim over the whole instance; other roles stay company-scoped. ### Roadmap alignment - Extends the shipped "Cloud deployments" roadmap work (multi-tenant isolation, company-scoped cloud tenants, managed-instance bootstrap) without overlapping planned core items, and leaves self-hosted behavior unchanged. ## What Changed - **New feature key** `enableOwnerInstanceAdmin` (`packages/shared`): boolean flag in `instanceExperimentalSettingsSchema`, catalog tier `managed`, `cloudDefault: true`, `selfHostedDefault: false`. Inert on self-hosted instances — the elevation path only exists behind the cloud tenant trust token. - **Computed elevation** (`server/src/middleware/auth.ts`): `resolveCloudTenantActor` now returns `isInstanceAdmin: true` only when the trusted-header stack role is `owner` **and** the flag is enabled. The flag is resolved through the instance-settings service so the managed-config overlay applies (the control plane can disable elevation fleet-wide without touching tenant databases; a DB row edit or restore cannot resurrect it). Resolution fails closed on settings read errors. The `instance_user_roles` never-insert and the per-request stale-row purge are byte-identical. `member`/`admin`/`support` stack roles stay company-scoped. - **Authorization guard split** (`server/src/services/authorization.ts`): the blanket-allow now trusts the actor's *computed* `isInstanceAdmin` flag (only the attested resolver can set it for `cloud_tenant` actors) while keeping the `instance_user_roles` DB lookup excluded for `cloud_tenant` — a stale or hand-inserted role row still elevates nothing. - **Floor F1 — platform environment credentials** (`server/src/routes/environments.ts`): on cloud-managed instances, platform-provisioned environment rows (`managedByPaperclip` marker, plus the legacy managed-Kubernetes marker) use a single floored view for every reader on all environment routes (list, get, create, update, delete responses): `envVars` are never echoed and credential-shaped `config` keys (reusing the managed-config `SECRET_LIKE_CONFIG_KEY_PATTERN`) are dropped — for **all** actors including instance admins — while structural config (provider, image, template, region, …) and the managed markers stay visible. This also fixes the environments UI for managed sandboxes, which previously lost the provider/image entirely in the restricted view. The floor also covers writes: `PATCH /environments/:id` and `DELETE /environments/:id` on a platform-provisioned row are rejected (403, `environment_platform_managed`) for every actor including instance admins, and the guard binds to the persisted row's markers so a patch cannot strip the managed marker to lift the floor. The one recovery path is a metadata-only PATCH that solely clears the marker keys (null/false), for rows stamped through the old unrestricted API before the markers became reserved — and it never applies to a row whose slot markers are live platform state: the single local row (`environments_local_driver_idx`), which `ensureLocalEnvironment` adopts and stamps on cloud-managed instances from every caller (company creation, the heartbeat, run orchestration), and the single marked sandbox row (`environments_managed_sandbox_idx`) while a managed-sandbox bootstrap path is configured (managed-config `environments` section or `PAPERCLIP_EXECUTION_MODE=kubernetes`) and the provisioner therefore adopts and refreshes it on every boot. Clearing a live slot row's markers would let the next write reclassify it as tenant-managed and bypass the floor; conversely, when no sandbox provisioning path is configured the platform holds no claim on any sandbox row, so a platform marker there is stale by definition and the recovery patch applies. Every marker outside a live slot is clearable, so no legacy row is ever locked permanently. Custom-image setup and probes on the platform sandbox stay available to instance admins — those are the owner-facing flows this elevation exists for. The marker keys themselves are reserved: client create/update payloads that set `managedByPaperclip` or `managedKubernetesSandbox` are rejected (422, `environment_platform_marker_reserved`) on cloud-managed instances, so a tenant row can never be stamped platform-provisioned through the API and self-locked behind the write floor (the provisioner writes markers at the service layer, not through these routes). Tenant-created environments are otherwise unaffected. - **Floor F2 — executionMode** (`server/src/routes/instance-settings.ts`): on cloud-managed instances, `PATCH /instance/settings/general` rejects writes that would change `executionMode` (403, `execution_mode_platform_managed`). Same-value echoes pass so settings forms that submit the full general-settings object keep working. The boot-time execution-policy bootstrap path is untouched (it calls the service directly). - **Floor F3 — manual database backups** (`server/src/routes/instance-database-backups.ts`): floored off on cloud-managed instances (403, `database_backups_platform_managed`); backups are platform-owned there, and the result would also echo a server-side filesystem path. - **Floor F4 — adapter code install** (`server/src/routes/adapters.ts`): `POST /adapters/install` and `POST /adapters/:type/reinstall` are floored off on cloud-managed instances (403, `adapter_install_platform_managed`). Adapter packages execute in the server process, so a runtime install would let an instance admin read the platform trust anchors out of the process environment. This mirrors the existing bundled-only plugin install floor; adapter code on managed instances comes bundled with the platform image. ## Instance-admin surface audit Before widening who can hold `isInstanceAdmin`, every instance-admin-gated surface in `server/src` was enumerated and reviewed for whether its response or side effects could echo process environment values or platform credentials (tenant trust token, JWT signing keys, database connection strings, provider API keys): 29 distinct gate definitions covering ~90+ call sites, in four groups — sole instance-admin gates (12), instance-admin-or-company-permission gates (10), response-shaping/scope-widening sites (6), and the central `allow_instance_admin` short-circuit in the authorization service (58 `decide()` call sites). Findings and dispositions: - **Environment read/write responses** exposed platform sandbox `envVars`/credential-shaped config to instance admins → closed by floor F1. - **Manual backup trigger** echoed a server filesystem path and triggers a platform-owned operation → closed by floor F3. - **Adapter install/reinstall** loads externally fetched code into the server process (indirect, complete env exposure) → closed by floor F4. The sibling plugin-install path already had a bundled-only floor on managed instances and needed no change. - **Token-minting surfaces** (gateway tokens, custom-image terminal/connection tokens) mint credentials scoped to the instance's own resources, not platform trust anchors → acceptable for an owner-admin of a dedicated instance; unchanged. - All remaining gated surfaces return ordinary instance-scoped business data; none echo `process.env` or platform secrets directly. OAuth client secrets are referenced by env-var *name* only; SSH private keys are stored as secret refs before persistence and are not echoed. Operational note for managed platforms: this model assumes the process environment of a managed instance holds only that instance's own credentials. Platform operators should keep provider credentials per-instance (never fleet-shared) since an instance admin ultimately controls in-process code on their own instance. ## Verification - `pnpm vitest run server/src/middleware/cloud-tenant-actor.test.ts` — resolver matrix: owner × flag on/off, flag via managed overlay (on-over-DB-off and off-over-DB-on), member/admin/support × flag on, no-token self-hosted, fail-closed settings read, purge still runs and no role row is ever inserted (14 tests). - `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts` — computed flag elevates a `cloud_tenant` actor; a stale `instance_user_roles` row still never does; `session` actors unchanged (full suite, embedded Postgres). - `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/environment-routes.test.ts` — F1: no secret echo to admins on get/list, structural config visible to restricted readers, platform-row PATCH/DELETE rejected for admins (including a marker-stripping patch), marker-clear recovery allowed for stale legacy rows and for a marked sandbox row when no provisioning path is configured, but refused on the managed local row and on the sandbox slot row under a managed-config `environments` entry or the forced kubernetes execution mode, client marker-stamping creates/patches rejected, tenant rows still readable and writable, self-hosted read+write regression (60 tests). - `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/environment-service.test.ts` — `ensureLocalEnvironment` adopts a pre-existing local row on cloud-managed instances (marker stamped, other metadata preserved, idempotent — no rewrite on re-ensure) and leaves self-hosted rows untouched (22 tests, embedded Postgres). - `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/instance-settings-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/instance-database-backups-routes.test.ts` — F2 change-vs-echo matrix incl. self-hosted regression; F3 floor for both admin shapes (32 tests). - `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/adapter-routes-authz.test.ts` — F4 floor; self-hosted install/reinstall behavior unchanged (existing cases). - `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/first-admin-claim.test.ts server/src/__tests__/bootstrap-claim-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/managed-config.test.ts server/src/__tests__/health.test.ts server/src/__tests__/instance-settings-managed-overlay.test.ts server/src/services/managed-environments.test.ts server/src/services/execution-policy-bootstrap.test.ts` — first-admin bootstrap gate and managed-config behavior unchanged (91 tests). - `pnpm vitest run packages/shared/src/feature-catalog.test.ts` — catalog/schema sync tests cover the new key (selfHostedDefault must equal the schema default). - `pnpm run typecheck` — all 31 workspace projects clean. ## Risks - Self-hosted behavior is unchanged: every floor binds to `isCloudManagedInstance()` (tenant trust token present), the new flag defaults off with no elevation path, and regression tests pin the self-hosted branches. - The elevation is fail-closed and stateless: turning the flag off (managed overlay or DB) de-elevates on the next request; there is no role row to clean up and restores cannot resurrect elevation. - On a cloud-managed instance a pre-existing unmarked local row is adopted (stamped `managedByPaperclip`) by the next ensure and becomes platform-owned — the intended managed-product semantic: the platform owns the single local slot. Self-hosted instances are untouched. - F1 widens restricted readers' view of platform-provisioned rows from fully blanked `config`/`metadata` to structural-only `config` plus markers. Platform-delivered config is guaranteed secret-free by the managed-config contract (secret-shaped keys fail startup), and the floor re-drops secret-shaped keys defensively. - One extra instance-settings read per trusted-header request for owner-role actors (the resolver already performs several queries per request). ## Model Used Claude Fable 5 (Anthropic) — model id `claude-fable-5`, extended thinking enabled, agentic tool use via Claude Code; read-only explore subagents on the same model were used for the surface audit sweep. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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DottaandPaperclip
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cac3c0fa1a |
feat(connections): add runtime subjects and grants (#9982)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - Connections is the subsystem that lets operators connect external apps and govern which subjects may use those credentials > - #9958 established the v3 schema foundation and #9981 adds the AppDefinition catalog layer > - The runtime still needs subject-aware authorization state, scoped key handling, and API/OpenAPI routes so connected apps can actually be granted and used safely > - This pull request adds the runtime grants/authorization behavior on top of the catalog branch, while keeping unrelated dependency and workflow sync commits out of the stack > - The benefit is a reviewable runtime layer that can land after the catalog PR, then unblock the wizard and orchestrator cutover work ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs #9958 and #9981. Refs #9981. No public GitHub issue exists for this branch. This is the runtime layer for the Connections v3 stack and is rebased onto `master` after #9981 landed. ## What Changed - Adds the connection user authorization state migration and schema wiring. - Adds shared runtime subject/grant types and validators. - Adds runtime grant and scoped key behavior in the tool-access service. - Adds runtime route coverage and registers the routes in OpenAPI. - Replays only the Connections runtime commits on top of the catalog branch, dropping unrelated sync/dependency history from the prior closed runtime PR. ## Verification - `pnpm run preflight:workspace-links` - `pnpm exec vitest run packages/shared/src/validators/tool-access.test.ts server/src/__tests__/tool-access-service.test.ts` ## Risks - Medium: runtime grant enforcement is security-sensitive and must fail closed for unknown key scopes. - Migration ordering depends on the schema and catalog layers already merged through #9958 and #9981. - This PR is rebased and retargeted to `master` with runtime-only commits. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used OpenAI GPT-5 Codex coding agent with repository tool use. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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NoSoloSoftandAndrew Aymeloglu
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156830006b |
fix: redact HTTP cookies from server logs (#7977)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Operators rely on Paperclip server logs for maintenance, incident triage, and support handoffs. > - The HTTP logger persisted request metadata and only redacted authorization headers. > - Request cookies and set-cookie headers can contain active session material and should not be written to durable logs. > - This pull request keeps the fix intentionally narrow: centralize the HTTP log redaction path list and include cookie-bearing headers. > - The benefit is lower credential/session leakage risk from routine server.log collection or sharing. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description No GitHub issue exists for this exact local finding. Inline bug report: - Type: security/privacy bug. - Affected area: server HTTP logging middleware. - Observed problem: local Paperclip maintenance found raw cookies present in server.log. - Expected behavior: durable HTTP logs redact authorization and cookie-bearing request/response headers. - Impact: anyone with access to copied/exported logs could see session-bearing cookie values. - Related/open PRs found during dedup search: #7242, #7306, #7346. This PR is the minimal local fix branch created from the verified local maintenance patch; those PRs may be better upstream candidates if maintainers prefer their broader coverage. ## What Changed - Added `HTTP_LOG_REDACT_PATHS` for HTTP logger redaction paths. - Kept existing `req.headers.authorization` redaction. - Added redaction for `req.headers.cookie`, request `set-cookie`, and response `set-cookie` paths. - Added focused tests asserting the required redaction paths are present and that pino-http output redacts live request/response header secrets. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/http-log-redaction.test.ts` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` - Pre-commit TruffleHog scan: 0 verified/unverified secrets. - PR CI observed passing so far for policy, Typecheck + Release Registry, Build, e2e, Socket, Snyk, security-review, and serialized/workspace suites; remaining jobs may still be running. ## Risks - Low runtime risk: this only expands pino redaction paths. - Possible coverage risk: broader redaction helpers in related PRs may cover more serialized variants beyond the pino-http request/response header pipeline tested here. - No migrations, schema changes, or UI changes. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex via Hermes Agent, model gpt-5.5, tool-using coding/ops session. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Andrew Aymeloglu <aaymeloglu@gmail.com> |
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Devin Foley
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2f42a4968d |
Treat cloud-managed instances as bootstrapped in the health gate (#9912)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - Paperclip instances can be self-hosted, or provisioned and managed by a cloud control plane that authenticates users through trusted headers validated against `PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_TENANT_SERVER_TOKEN` (`resolveCloudTenantActor`) > - In `authenticated` deployment mode, the health route reports `bootstrapStatus: bootstrap_pending` until at least one `instance_admin` exists, and the UI locks everyone out at the "waiting on its first admin" claim screen until then — correct for self-hosted instances, where a human operator must claim the instance > - But the cloud-tenant trust middleware, by deliberate security hardening, never grants `instance_admin` and actively purges legacy grants — so a cloud-managed instance can never leave `bootstrap_pending`: the gate demands a role the middleware forbids > - Every control-plane-provisioned instance is therefore permanently locked at the claim screen even though its users and memberships exist > - This pull request makes the gate cloud-aware: when the tenant server token is configured, the instance is considered bootstrapped, because the control plane owns identity and there is no operator claim step > - The benefit is that cloud-managed instances become usable while self-hosted behavior stays byte-for-byte identical, now pinned by a previously missing regression test ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs #2927 (introduced the browser-native first-admin bootstrap flow this gate feeds). No existing public issue for the deadlock; inline description per the bug report template: - **What happened?**: an instance configured with `PAPERCLIP_DEPLOYMENT_MODE=authenticated` and `PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_TENANT_SERVER_TOKEN` reports `bootstrapStatus: bootstrap_pending` forever. All users — including ones created via the trusted-header path with owner-level company membership — are locked out at the "This Paperclip is waiting on its first admin" screen. - **Expected behavior**: a control-plane-managed instance has no first-admin claim step; users arriving with control-plane identity should reach the app. - **Steps to reproduce**: 1. Run the server with `PAPERCLIP_DEPLOYMENT_MODE=authenticated` and a `PAPERCLIP_CLOUD_TENANT_SERVER_TOKEN` set 2. Create users only through trusted cloud headers (the middleware upserts them but never grants `instance_admin`, and purges any legacy grants) 3. `GET /api/health` → `bootstrapStatus` stays `bootstrap_pending`; the UI shows the claim screen for every visitor, and no supported path exists to create the `instance_admin` the gate requires - **Paperclip version or commit**: reproducible on `master` as of 2026-07-20; present since the cloud-tenant `instance_admin` purge hardening landed. ## What Changed - `server/src/middleware/auth.ts`: new exported `isCloudManagedInstance()` predicate beside the trust middleware that defines the tenant-token contract. - `server/src/routes/health.ts`: the authenticated-mode first-admin gate is skipped when the instance is cloud-managed; `bootstrapStatus` reports `ready`. - `server/src/__tests__/health.test.ts`: two new tests — authenticated without the token → `bootstrap_pending` (previously untested regression baseline), and with the token → `ready` despite zero instance admins. ## Verification - `pnpm vitest run src/__tests__/health.test.ts` in `server/` — 13/13 - `pnpm vitest run src/middleware/cloud-tenant-actor.test.ts` — 6/6 - Manual: with the env vars from the repro steps set, `GET /api/health` now returns `bootstrapStatus: "ready"`; without the token, behavior is unchanged ## Risks - None for self-hosted deployments: without the env var the gate is the prior behavior, now pinned by the new regression test. - For cloud-managed instances the claim screen and `bootstrapInviteActive` flow no longer appear — intended; browser-based claim was already disabled in that configuration. ## Model Used - Claude (Anthropic) — model id `claude-fable-5`, via the Claude Code CLI harness with tool use (shell, file edits, test execution). Diagnosis and change agent-assisted, human-directed. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes (n/a — behavior documented in code comments and pinned by tests) - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge |
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89ce36d7af |
feat(skills): open-by-default company skill policy and core UX (#9564)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip uses company skills to make agent capabilities reusable across an organization. > - Skill operations currently mix capability availability with permission checks, which creates avoidable setup friction and inconsistent denial handling. > - The policy contract needs to remain open by default while allowing company-scoped restrictions for governed deployments. > - Core owns the canonical policy actions, persistence, evaluation, API behavior, safe import boundaries, and generic denial/read-only UI. > - Enterprise policy-editor implementation belongs in the separate `paperclip-ee` repository and is intentionally excluded from this PR. ### Problem or motivation Company skill operations can encounter permission dead ends even when no explicit restriction has been configured, and import-source classification can drift between policy evaluation and execution. ### Proposed solution Define eight canonical skill policy actions, default all actions to allowed, persist company-scoped restrictions, expose policy evaluation APIs, normalize import sources at the boundary, and update Skill Studio to present actionable restriction states without embedding Enterprise Edition implementation in the core repository. ### Alternatives considered Keeping capability checks distributed across routes and UI surfaces was rejected because it duplicates policy logic and makes denial behavior inconsistent. Shipping the Enterprise policy editor in this repository was rejected because `paperclip-ee` is a separate repository and must receive its own PR. ### Roadmap alignment Extends the completed **Skills Manager** roadmap area by adding coherent governance and removing workflow dead ends. ### Additional context The core API contract remains suitable for a separate Enterprise Edition editor, but this PR contains no `paperclip-ee` package or EE-specific UI integration code. ## What Changed - Added the company skill policy contract to product and implementation documentation, including the open-by-default rule, eight canonical actions, decision shape, and core/EE ownership boundary. - Added the company-scoped policy schema, migration `0170`, shared validators, policy service, REST routes, OpenAPI coverage, and focused server tests. - Hardened import policy enforcement by normalizing import sources and keeping source classification consistent between policy evaluation and execution. - Updated core Skill Studio behavior to remove generic permission dead ends and show actionable policy/platform denial states only when an operation is actually denied. - Removed the `plugin-paperclip-ee` package, Docker wiring, EE discovery/deep-link helpers, and EE-specific UI tests/stories from this PR so that implementation can be submitted separately to the EE repository. - Preserved open-by-default behavior when no explicit company restriction exists. ## Verification - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui exec vitest run src/components/skill-studio/SkillPolicySurfaces.test.tsx src/lib/skill-policy-denial.test.ts` — 20/20 passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui exec tsc --noEmit` — passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/worktree-config.test.ts` — 12/12 passed. - `pnpm check:token-gates` — passed with all gates clean. - `git diff --check` — passed. - `git diff --name-only origin/master | rg 'paperclip-ee|ee-skill-policy'` — no matches. ## Risks - Migration `0170` introduces company policy persistence; rollout depends on the migration applying before policy routes are exercised. - Open-by-default is an intentional behavioral policy: deployments expecting implicit denials must configure explicit restrictions. - Import normalization is security-sensitive and should retain focused review. - The separate EE editor must stay contract-compatible with the core policy API as policy actions evolve. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex CLI, runtime model identifier and context-window size not exposed by this execution environment; reasoning, repository tool use, shell execution, and code review capabilities enabled. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details available to this runtime) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked or described the result above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run focused tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green on the latest head - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Evyatar Bluzer <bluzername@users.noreply.github.com> |
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DottaandPaperclip
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cfa5e0704e |
feat(mcp) [split 3/8]: add tool access policy core (#9558)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - Governed MCP access spans contracts, runtime enforcement, adapters, UI surfaces, and operator verification > - The parity reference PR #9534 is too large for effective automated or human review > - The feature therefore needs a linear stack whose individual diffs stay below the 100-file review limit > - This pull request is split 3/8 and focuses on tool-access policy and authorization core > - The benefit is a standalone, testable review boundary while preserving byte-for-byte parity at the top of the stack ## Linked Issues or Issue Description - Related parity reference: #9534 - Problem: Authorization, OAuth binding, secret projection, content guards, and policy evaluation need a security-reviewable server boundary. - Proposed solution: Adds tool-access services/routes/tests plus the runtime service dependencies directly imported by the core, without registering the routes in the application. - Alternatives considered: keeping #9534 as one 403-file review, or rewriting the feature to manufacture seams; both were rejected in favor of path extraction plus compile-driven boundary moves. - Roadmap alignment: this advances the existing governed MCP/tool-access work already represented by #9534; it does not introduce a separate roadmap initiative. - Stack position: base branch is `pap10341-split/02-schema-shared`. - Merge policy: merge bottom-up, in order, only after the complete eight-PR stack has been reviewed and the top-of-stack parity gate remains empty. - Requested review: SecurityEngineer for authz, OAuth, secrets, and content guards; Greptile on every PR. ## What Changed - Adds tool-access services/routes/tests plus the runtime service dependencies directly imported by the core, without registering the routes in the application. - Keeps this PR below 100 changed files and independently typecheckable. - Preserves the final tree from #9534 when combined with the other seven stack levels. ## Verification - `pnpm typecheck` - Focused server Vitest run — 4 files, 143 tests passed ## Risks - Authorization bugs could permit cross-company or over-broad tool access; the PR remains inert until PR 4 wiring and requires dedicated security review. - Stack risk: merging out of order can expose incomplete layers; mitigate by following the documented bottom-up merge policy. - Parity risk: later edits to an intermediate branch can drift from #9534; mitigate by re-running the empty top-of-stack diff before merge. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex, exact model ID `gpt-5.4`; runtime-managed context window; medium reasoning with repository, shell, Git, GitHub CLI, and code-execution tools enabled. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] Internal references are omitted except the execution-plan link explicitly required for this coordinated split stack - [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge ## Stack Coordination - Internal execution plan: [PAP-13874](/PAP/issues/PAP-13874#document-plan) - Parity reference: #9534 - Stack: #9556 → #9557 → #9558 → #9559 → #9560 → #9561 → #9562 → #9563 - Merge bottom-up only after full-stack review and an empty parity diff at #9563. --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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DottaandClaude Fable 5
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23f34491e2 |
Fix apiCompression corrupting and dropping Better Auth responses for gzip clients (#9381)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - Its server fronts every API route — including Better Auth sign-in — with Express middleware, and #9190 added an `apiCompression` middleware that gzips JSON responses over 1KB > - That middleware buffers `res.write()` chunks with `String(chunk)`, but Better Auth (via better-call) streams `Uint8Array` chunks and commits headers with `writeHead()` before streaming > - `String(Uint8Array)` serializes the body to comma-separated decimal bytes (~3.4x inflation), and once the inflated body crossed the 1KB threshold, `setHeader()` threw `ERR_HTTP_HEADERS_SENT` and the catch handler destroyed the socket > - Every real browser sends `Accept-Encoding: gzip`, so sign-in returned zero bytes (`net::ERR_EMPTY_RESPONSE` / "Failed to fetch"), while curl without `Accept-Encoding` worked — making the bug easy to misdiagnose as a client or network issue > - This pull request makes the middleware byte-safe for `Uint8Array` chunks, passes through responses whose headers are already committed, and falls back to the uncompressed body instead of destroying the connection when compression fails > - The benefit is that browser sign-in (and any other streamed binary-chunk response) works again for gzip-accepting clients, with regression tests locking in all three behaviors ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs #9190 (introduced the `apiCompression` middleware). No public GitHub issue exists; bug description: - **What happened:** Sign-in from any real browser failed with `net::ERR_EMPTY_RESPONSE` / "Failed to fetch". The server logged `ERR_HTTP_HEADERS_SENT` from the compression middleware and destroyed the response socket, so zero bytes reached the client. - **Expected:** `/api/auth/*` responses are delivered intact regardless of the client's `Accept-Encoding`. - **Steps to reproduce:** Run the server with API compression active, open the web UI in a browser (which sends `Accept-Encoding: gzip`), and attempt email/password sign-in. The auth response body exceeds ~300 bytes, so after the ~3.4x stringification inflation it crosses the 1024-byte compression threshold and the response is destroyed. `curl` without `Accept-Encoding` succeeds against the same server. - **Scope:** Any route that streams `Uint8Array` chunks and/or commits headers via `writeHead()` before writing — in practice all Better Auth routes served through better-call. ## What Changed - `server/src/middleware/api-compression.ts`: - Buffer `res.write()` chunks with a `toBodyBuffer()` helper that converts `Uint8Array`/`ArrayBuffer` views via `Buffer.from()` instead of `String()`, so binary chunks are preserved byte-for-byte. - Pass responses through untouched once headers are already sent (`writeHead()`-style streaming), since compression headers can no longer be set at that point. - On any compression failure, write the original uncompressed body instead of calling `res.destroy()`, so clients get a valid (just uncompressed) response rather than a dropped connection. - `server/src/__tests__/api-compression.test.ts`: three new regression tests — small `writeHead`+`Uint8Array` responses are delivered byte-for-byte, large ones no longer drop the connection, and `Uint8Array` JSON bodies gzip without corruption (includes `/api/auth-bridge` and `/api/uint8-json` test routes mirroring better-call's streaming pattern). ## Verification - `cd server && pnpm vitest run src/__tests__/api-compression.test.ts` — 10/10 passing (7 pre-existing + 3 new regression tests). - Manual: with the fix, browser sign-in against a dev instance succeeds for gzip-accepting clients; before the fix the same request returned `net::ERR_EMPTY_RESPONSE`. ## Risks - Low risk. The middleware still compresses large text/JSON responses exactly as before; the changes only affect paths that previously produced corrupted or destroyed responses. - Behavioral shift: responses whose headers were already committed are now delivered uncompressed instead of being (incorrectly) buffered — this is strictly less surprising than the previous corrupted output. - Failure-path shift: a compression error now yields an uncompressed 200 response instead of a dropped connection. ## Model Used - Claude Fable 5 (`claude-fable-5`, Anthropic), extended thinking enabled, running via Claude Code / Paperclip agent harness with tool use (shell, file edit, test execution). ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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|
DottaandPaperclip
|
176645187c |
Fix request storm polling and issue-list coalescing (#9190)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - The board UI keeps issue, agent, activity, and run state fresh through polling across several pages and sidebar surfaces > - When multiple components or browser tabs poll the same company data at the same time, the API can receive bursts of duplicate issue-list requests > - Those duplicate requests increase database and server load without returning meaningfully different data > - This pull request adds server-side compression/coalescing plus client-side visibility-aware and cross-tab shared polling > - The benefit is lower request volume during normal board usage while preserving fresh UI data for active users ## Linked Issues or Issue Description No exact public GitHub issue was found for this request. Problem: - The board can issue redundant polling requests for the same issue-list data from multiple UI surfaces and tabs. - In busy operator sessions, those bursts can trigger request-storm behavior and unnecessary issue-list load. - Expected behavior is to reuse identical in-flight work server-side and reduce hidden-tab or duplicate-tab polling client-side while preserving normal refresh behavior. Related public context found during duplicate search: - #8206 covers a different board UI 404-storm scope. - #5165 covers separate issue-list behavior around page-size truncation. ## What Changed - Added API compression middleware foundation and a company/created-at index for heartbeat run access. - Added server-side issue-list request storm detection and identical in-flight request coalescing. - Added UI fetch metadata, visibility-aware polling, and request deduplication for issue/activity/client calls. - Added cross-tab shared polling primitives and wired them into the sidebar, inbox, dashboard, issue, project, routine, and agent surfaces. - Resolved the latest `master` migration collision by keeping upstream `0140_built_in_managed_resources.sql` and renumbering this branch's heartbeat-run index migration to `0141_heartbeat_runs_company_created_at_index.sql`; the SQL uses `CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS` for idempotency. - Stabilized server heartbeat cleanup tests exposed by the PR check matrix. - Fixed the Greptile compression follow-up by weakening strong ETags on encoded JSON responses and bypassing compression for streamed/download responses. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run ui/src/components/IssuesList.test.tsx ui/src/pages/Inbox.test.tsx` — passed after resolving the latest `master` conflict in `IssuesList.tsx` and updating the 200-result cap expectations. - `pnpm check:token-gates` — passed after the UI conflict resolution. - `jq -e '.entries | length as $n | (map(.idx) | unique | length == $n) and (map(.tag) | unique | length == $n)' packages/db/src/migrations/meta/_journal.json` — passed after renumbering the migration to `0141`. - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/api-compression.test.ts` - passed after the compression follow-up. - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/issue-list-assignee-filter-routes.test.ts` - passed after the compression follow-up. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` - passed after the compression follow-up. - Greptile Review for head `8dbddac41ec273fda404100b4981ddb912fad57b` - passed after the latest conflict/migration fix; all Greptile review threads are resolved. - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/api-compression.test.ts server/src/__tests__/issue-list-assignee-filter-routes.test.ts ui/src/api/client.test.ts ui/src/api/issues.test.ts ui/src/lib/polling.test.ts ui/src/lib/cross-tab-poll.test.ts ui/src/pages/Inbox.test.tsx ui/src/components/SidebarProjects.test.tsx ui/src/components/SidebarAccountMenu.test.tsx ui/src/lib/issueDetailCache.test.ts` — passed. - `pnpm exec vitest run ui/src/api/client.test.ts` — passed. - `pnpm exec vitest run ui/src/pages/Inbox.test.tsx ui/src/components/SidebarProjects.test.tsx ui/src/components/SidebarAccountMenu.test.tsx ui/src/lib/issueDetailCache.test.ts` — passed. - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/heartbeat-worktree-suppression.test.ts` — passed. - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/low-trust-red-team-routes.test.ts` — passed. - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/heartbeat-workspace-finalize-branch.test.ts` — passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui typecheck` — passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` — passed. - GitHub PR checks for head `8dbddac41ec273fda404100b4981ddb912fad57b`: all GitHub Actions/status checks passed; Greptile, Superagent, Socket, Snyk, build, typecheck/release registry, general tests, serialized server suites, e2e, canary dry run, policy, and commitperclip review are green; Storybook visual regression and security-review were skipped/neutral by policy. - Confirmed this branch does not include `pnpm-lock.yaml` or `.github/workflows` changes. ## Risks - Medium risk: issue-list coalescing changes request timing and cache semantics for a hot API path. - Medium risk: cross-tab polling uses browser coordination primitives, so older or unusual browser environments need fallback behavior to stay correct. - Low migration risk: the new index migration is ordered after current `master` and uses `CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS`. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex coding agent, GPT-5-based model, tool-enabled with shell/git execution. Exact hosted deployment identifier and context-window size were not surfaced in the agent runtime. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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|
b13eb5b2b5 |
Skill Studio: three-pane skill IDE with sandboxed test runs (#9241)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - The Skills Manager gives operators a reusable skill layer, but iteration still required manual edits, ad hoc prompts, and indirect run inspection. > - Skill authors need a focused workflow for editing skill files, saving representative test inputs, and running those inputs through an agent without exposing harness tasks as normal company work. > - The backend therefore needs durable test inputs, reusable run templates, hidden harness issues, scoped run execution, retention metadata, and read-containment rules around hidden work. > - The frontend needs a three-pane Studio that keeps skill files, saved inputs/templates, and run output/history visible together while preserving the existing design system and token rules. > - This pull request ships that Skill Studio surface end to end: database migrations, shared contracts, server APIs/services, hidden harness execution behavior, UI routes/components, and focused tests. > - The benefit is faster and safer skill iteration, with inspectable outputs and fewer ways for internal harness work to leak into normal task lists, costs, or adjacent read APIs. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description No public GitHub issue exists for this feature. Feature request summary: - Problem: Skill authors need to edit and test company skills in one place instead of switching between the skill detail page, task creation, run output, and manual prompt history. - Proposed solution: Add a Skill Studio workbench with saved inputs, reusable templates, hidden sandboxed test runs, live run status, output inspection, run history, rerun/delete controls, and frontmatter-aware editing. - Expected users: Paperclip operators and agent-company maintainers who create, fork, import, and tune skills. - Related public PRs: Supersedes #9205, which was replaced so the public PR branch name follows contributor policy. - Duplicate search: searched public GitHub issues and PRs for "Skill Studio"; no other active public issue or PR directly covers this feature. ## What Changed - Added database migrations for Skill Studio test inputs, test runs, test run retention, and reusable run templates. - Added shared Skill Studio types, validators, route helpers, frontmatter utilities, and status handling. - Added server services and routes for saved inputs, test runs, templates, reruns, terminal-run deletion, hidden harness issue execution, and run-detail hydration. - Strengthened hidden-issue read containment across issue-adjacent routes and cost rollups used by skill test harness work. - Added the Skill Studio UI with skill file editing, frontmatter editing, saved inputs, templates, run creation/cancel/rerun/delete flows, output rendering, history, route support, and responsive pane behavior. - Added focused backend, shared, and UI tests for the new APIs, routing logic, editor/run behavior, hidden-issue containment, and migration safety. - Rebased onto current `master`, removed the generated lockfile diff from the PR, and verified no workflow files are changed. ## Verification - [x] `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/db check:migrations` - [x] `pnpm check:token-gates` - [x] `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/company-skills-service.test.ts server/src/__tests__/company-skills-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/company-skill-test-runs-service.test.ts ui/src/lib/skill-studio.test.ts ui/src/pages/SkillStudio.test.tsx` — 5 files, 132 tests passed - [x] Greptile review on the latest PR head - [x] GitHub PR checks on the latest PR head ## Risks - Medium risk because this is a broad feature touching database schema, server orchestration, issue visibility, and a large UI surface. - Hidden harness issue containment is security-sensitive; this PR includes regression coverage for adjacent read paths and cost rollups. - The new migrations are additive and use idempotent guards where applicable, but deployed databases that previously tested draft migration numbers should still be checked carefully. - The UI depends on a new resizable panels package in `ui/package.json`; the lockfile is intentionally left to repository automation. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 coding agent with shell, git, and GitHub CLI tool use. Earlier feature commits include assistance from other Paperclip coding agents; this PR preparation, rebase, cleanup commit, and PR body were completed by OpenAI Codex in a Paperclip worktree. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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|
Nicky LeachandPaperclip
|
88bf71b84e |
Reject projectless isolated git worktree tasks (#9231)
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is an open-source platform for orchestrating AI agents;
agents run inside execution workspaces that range from a shared
container to full git worktrees cloned from a project repository.
> - Isolated git-worktree workspaces require a project to determine
which repository to clone — without a project the worktree base path
cannot be computed.
> - A task pinned to `isolated_workspace` + `git_worktree` with no
project was previously accepted at creation time but failed late at
dispatch with the opaque `workspace_validation_failed` /
`git_worktree_base_agent_home` error — only after the heartbeat
attempted to provision the workspace.
> - Fail-closed validation should happen in two places: (1) explicit
create/update pins that contradict the requirement are rejected at the
HTTP layer with a structured 422; (2) rows that reach the heartbeat
dispatcher with this invalid combination (e.g. through inheritance or a
retroactively-removed project) are blocked before any heartbeat run or
adapter spawn.
> - This PR adds the shared detection policy, the create/update guard in
the issues service, and the heartbeat pre-dispatch guard, together with
focused unit tests for all three layers.
> - The benefit is deterministic early failure with a clear remediation
message instead of a late, cryptic runtime error.
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
No upstream public GitHub issue — describing the problem inline
(bug-report format).
**What happened?**
Creating an issue with `executionWorkspaceSettings: { mode:
"isolated_workspace", type: "git_worktree" }` and no `projectId` was
accepted without error. The issue then became blocked at dispatch time
with the opaque message `git_worktree_base_agent_home` /
`workspace_validation_failed` — surfaced only after the heartbeat
attempted to provision the workspace.
**Expected behavior**
The platform should reject the invalid combination at create/update time
with a structured 422 that includes a clear remediation message, before
any heartbeat resource is consumed.
**Steps to reproduce**
1. Call `POST /api/issues` (or `PATCH /api/issues/:id`) with
`executionWorkspaceSettings: { mode: "isolated_workspace", type:
"git_worktree" }` and omit `projectId` (or set it to `null`).
2. Observe: request succeeds (200/201).
3. Assign the issue to an agent and watch it enter `blocked` with a
cryptic `workspace_validation_failed` error at dispatch.
**Related prior fix** — Refs #4844 (`fix(validator): reject static cwd
combined with git_worktree strategy`) — same validation area, different
dimension (static cwd vs. missing project).
**Paperclip version / commit**
Latest `master` (pre-this-PR).
**Deployment mode**
Standard (app-global server).
## What Changed
- **`execution-workspace-policy.ts`** — new shared
`detectWorkspaceWorktreeRequiresProject` function returning a stable
`workspace_worktree_requires_project` policy violation when an isolated
git-worktree task has no project, project workspace, or reusable
execution workspace; exports canonical remediation text used by both the
HTTP guard and the heartbeat guard.
- **`issues.ts`** — create and update paths check the new policy before
persisting; explicit pins to `isolated_workspace` / `operator_branch` +
`git_worktree` with no project are rejected with a 422 including the
policy code and remediation text.
- **`heartbeat.ts`** — pre-dispatch preflight checks the same policy for
rows that reach the heartbeat with the invalid combination (e.g. through
inheritance); such rows are marked `blocked` with a skipped wakeup
request, durable issue comment, and activity log before any heartbeat
run or adapter spawn.
- **`execution-workspace-policy.test.ts`** — focused policy-layer unit
tests for detection logic and remediation text.
- **`issues-service.test.ts`** — create/update 422 guard tests for the
new policy.
- **`heartbeat-workspace-branch-containment.test.ts`** — pre-dispatch
blocking test for inherited/ambiguous invalid rows; also fixes a cleanup
race in the existing test suite.
## Verification
```sh
pnpm exec vitest run \
server/src/__tests__/execution-workspace-policy.test.ts \
server/src/__tests__/issues-service.test.ts \
server/src/__tests__/heartbeat-workspace-branch-containment.test.ts
pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck
# Targeted regression
pnpm exec vitest run \
server/src/__tests__/heartbeat-workspace-branch-containment.test.ts \
-t "blocks projectless isolated git-worktree issues before dispatch"
```
All three test files and typecheck passed locally before this PR was
opened.
## Risks
**Low risk.** The policy detection function is pure with no side
effects. The create/update guard only triggers on explicit
`isolated_workspace` or `operator_branch` + `git_worktree` pins combined
with a missing project — it does not fire on inherited settings (handled
by the heartbeat preflight), so there is no false-positive rejection
risk for valid tasks. The heartbeat guard fires before any resource is
provisioned; the only behavioral change for already-invalid rows is that
they receive a clear `blocked` status and durable comment instead of a
late cryptic error.
## Model Used
Claude Sonnet 4.6 (`claude-sonnet-4-6`), 200k context window, tool use
enabled (agentic coding). Used to implement all server-side changes and
tests in this PR.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [ ] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
---------
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
|
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|
ad961227f5 |
feat(secrets): add user-specific runtime secrets (#8825)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Agent runs often need provider credentials, API tokens, and other environment-bound secrets. > - Company-level secrets work for shared credentials, but they do not model values that should differ by human operator. > - Without a user-scoped model, a run can dispatch without knowing whether the responsible human has supplied the needed value. > - Paperclip also needs run attribution to make those user-scoped runtime checks deterministic and auditable. > - This pull request adds user-specific secret definitions, per-user values, environment bindings, responsible-user attribution, and runtime resolution gates. > - The benefit is that teams can define the secret once, let each user provide their own value, and block runs before dispatch when required user secrets or active definitions are unavailable. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs #224 Refs #6057 This PR implements user-specific secret support as a core secret-management capability rather than a one-off adapter setting. It is related to existing public work on company secrets UI and runtime secret refs, but is distinct because the value is owned by the responsible user and resolved at run dispatch time. Related PR search before opening found existing secrets work such as #1550, #8256, #8614, #8634, and #8647; none of those add the full user-secret definition/value/runtime gate covered here. ## What Changed - Added user-secret definitions and per-user "My secrets" values, keeping stored values out of access metadata. - Added `user_secret_ref` environment bindings and UI affordances to pick them alongside existing secret refs. - Added responsible-user runtime resolution so user-secret refs resolve against the human responsible for the run. - Added pre-dispatch missing-secret gates so runs fail before adapter dispatch when required user values are absent or definitions are inactive. - Added low-trust allowlist hardening for user-secret runtime access. - Added issue, routine, run, and agent API key responsible-user attribution and fail-closed dispatch behavior when attribution cannot be resolved. - Added denial-copy mapping so responsible-user authorization failures surface as actionable run outcomes instead of opaque setup failures. - Added OpenAPI documentation for the user-secret routes. - Rebases cleanly on current `master`; migrations were renumbered incrementally as `0128_user_specific_secrets`, `0129_agent_api_key_responsible_user`, and `0130_run_responsible_user_invariant` after upstream `0126`/`0127` migrations. - Removed previously committed local design screenshots so the PR contains code/docs/tests only. ## Verification - PASS: PR head `2527febd106bcf3ca264ca0da7fca491084192d6` is based on `paperclipai/paperclip:master`. - PASS: `git diff --check` - PASS: `git diff --name-only public/master...HEAD | rg '^(pnpm-lock\\.yaml|\\.github/workflows/|screenshots/)' || true` produced no files. - PASS: migration journal audit confirmed unique indexes through `130` with tail entries `0126_issue_comment_derived_attribution`, `0127_environment_custom_images_instance_scoped`, `0128_user_specific_secrets`, `0129_agent_api_key_responsible_user`, and `0130_run_responsible_user_invariant`. - PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui typecheck` - PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` - PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/heartbeat-responsible-user-invariant.test.ts` - PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/heartbeat-active-run-output-watchdog.test.ts src/__tests__/heartbeat-stale-queue-invalidation.test.ts src/__tests__/heartbeat-workspace-finalize-branch.test.ts src/__tests__/issue-monitor-scheduler.test.ts` - PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/heartbeat-comment-wake-batching.test.ts src/__tests__/heartbeat-retry-scheduling.test.ts src/__tests__/heartbeat-accepted-plan-workspace-refresh.test.ts src/__tests__/heartbeat-plugin-environment.test.ts` - PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/low-trust-red-team-routes.test.ts` - PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/secrets-service.test.ts` (55 tests) - PASS: `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/secrets-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/secrets-service.test.ts` (89 tests after final Greptile cleanup fixes) - PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/heartbeat-issue-liveness-escalation.test.ts` (17 tests after the final rebase CI fix) - PASS: focused server Vitest batches covering heartbeat recovery, project env, plugin env, routines, low-trust, pipelines, monitors, watchdog, and stale queue paths. - PASS: GitHub checks are green on `2527febd106bcf3ca264ca0da7fca491084192d6`, including Typecheck + Release Registry, Build, General tests, serialized server suites, e2e, Canary Dry Run, verify, security checks, and Greptile Review. - PASS: Greptile Review completed successfully on `2527febd106bcf3ca264ca0da7fca491084192d6` with Confidence Score 5/5, and GraphQL review-thread audit returned zero unresolved non-outdated threads. ## Risks - Runtime behavior now depends on a run having a correct responsible user; missing or incorrect responsibility assignment can block runs before adapter dispatch. - `user_secret_ref` bindings intentionally expose metadata without values, but UI/API callers may need to handle the new binding kind explicitly. - External secret providers and IAM policies are not automatically provisioned by this PR; operators still need to configure provider-side access for non-local vaults. - The PR is broad across db/shared/server/UI/runtime paths, so release validation should include both API and UI secret workflows before merge. - The migration renumbering is intentionally incremental after upstream migrations; the branch migrations use guarded column/table/index/constraint creation so users who tested the older draft numbering should not hit duplicate DDL for the existing objects. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-5-based coding agent (`gpt-5`), Codex local adapter with shell/tool use and code execution. Context window and internal reasoning mode are not exposed by the runtime. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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DottaandPaperclip
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fd2f82ac5b |
[codex] Add built-in Hermes adapters (#8543)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Agent adapters are the boundary between the control plane and the runtimes that actually do work. > - Hermes support needs to be available as first-class local and gateway adapters while still preserving the adapter-manager override path for external packages. > - The adapter work touches runtime execution, UI adapter metadata, onboarding prompts, scoped credentials, release packaging, and smoke coverage, so the handoff needs concrete verification rather than only unit tests. > - This pull request adds built-in Hermes local and Hermes gateway support, keeps external adapter overrides compatible, and documents/tests the gateway flow end to end. > - The benefit is that operators can hire Hermes-backed agents without a manual plugin install, while self-hosted installs can still override/shadow the built-ins through Adapter manager packages. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description No public GitHub issue exists for this exact Hermes built-in adapter, gateway onboarding, and release-source work. Problem description: - Hermes local and gateway adapters need a public, reviewable source path in the monorepo so package artifacts and built-in adapter behavior match the application source. - Operators need built-in `hermes_local` and `hermes_gateway` adapter choices without losing the ability to install external Hermes packages as overrides. - Gateway onboarding needs secure defaults for API server URLs, API keys, and generated agent setup text. - Hermes-originated task bridge credentials need narrower API-key scope configuration. - Related public PRs found during duplicate search include #3027, #2363, #7544, #7950, #8095, and #8543. ## What Changed - Added the unified Hermes adapter package with local and gateway server/UI/CLI exports, config schemas, transcript parsing, model detection, and package metadata. - Registered `hermes_local` and `hermes_gateway` as built-in adapters across shared constants, server registries, CLI packaging, and UI adapter registries. - Kept the external adapter override path compatible so installed Hermes packages can shadow built-ins and restore the built-in parser when disabled. - Added Hermes gateway onboarding docs, board-operator docs, Docker smoke assets, and shell smoke harnesses for join/e2e validation. - Added scoped task-bridge API-key support, authorization checks, issue-origin handling, and tests for Hermes-created Paperclip tasks. - Hardened gateway transport and redaction behavior for API keys, headers, session data, and smoke diagnostics. - Updated release packaging/bootstrap checks for the Hermes packages while leaving `pnpm-lock.yaml` out of the PR per repository policy. ## Verification Targeted local verification recorded before PR handoff: - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/hermes-paperclip-adapter exec vitest run src/gateway/server/execute.test.ts` — 14/14 passed. - `pnpm test:hermes-gateway-smoke` — 6/6 passed. - Hermes package typecheck/build checks passed. - Focused server/UI adapter tests passed — 31/31. - Release helper Node tests passed — 18/18. - `git diff --check origin/master..HEAD` passed. Fresh Docker E2E smoke evidence: - Ran `pnpm smoke:hermes-gateway-e2e` on 2026-06-26 with a fresh state directory and fresh Docker container against a live Paperclip dev server. - Hermes direct execution reached `completed`. - Hermes stop/cancel path reached `cancelled`. - Hermes gateway created a Paperclip task, Paperclip ran the Hermes agent, and the task reached `done` with the expected marker response. - Temporary board auth keys, token files, smoke state, and Docker containers were cleaned up after the run. PR checks on head `b5eae40ce`: - GitHub Actions passed: `policy`, `review`, `Typecheck + Release Registry`, all general test shards, all serialized server shards, `Build`, `Canary Dry Run`, `e2e`, and aggregate `verify`. - External checks passed: Snyk and Socket Project Report. - External Socket Pull Request Alerts remained pending after the first-party CI matrix completed. ## Risks - Medium risk: this spans adapter registration, package publishing, gateway execution, onboarding docs, API-key scoping, and UI adapter metadata. - Migration risk is low: the scope-config migration adds a nullable column and does not rewrite existing keys. - Gateway execution depends on operator-provided Hermes API configuration; the smoke covers the Docker gateway path but real deployments may differ by network/auth setup. - Direct Greptile review on the latest expanded diff is file-count limited, although the commitperclip review gate passed. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 coding agent, tool use enabled in a local repository workspace. Context window size is not exposed in this environment. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Commitperclip review gate is green; direct Greptile review is file-count limited on the latest expanded diff - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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DottaandPaperclip
|
43b005b704 |
Add pipeline workflow primitives and operator UI (#7903)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - The pipeline subsystem models repeatable work as items moving through stages, with agent automation, review gates, blockers, drift notices, and linked work. > - Operators need this to be usable as one coherent workflow surface, not just as backend primitives or disconnected route experiments. > - The branch now carries the pipeline data model, service/routes, CLI/tutorial path, aggregation feeds, operator UI, stage automation controls, liveness/retry handling, and follow-up polish that make the primitive reviewable end to end. > - This pull request is the single review target for that pipeline workflow primitive stack. > - The benefit is that reviewers can evaluate the full operator experience and server contract together against `master`. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description No public GitHub issue exists for this work. The underlying feature request is described inline. ### Problem or motivation Paperclip needs a first-class way to model multi-stage agent/company workflows where upstream items can spawn downstream work, request review, carry fields across pipelines, surface drift, retry automation, and show operators where work is blocked or active. Without a unified pipeline primitive, these workflows spread across ad hoc issues, routines, and comments, making the state hard to inspect or operate. ### Proposed solution Add the pipeline workflow primitive stack: database schema and migrations, shared validators/types, server services and REST routes, aggregation and liveness helpers, CLI/tutorial smoke support, and the React operator UI for pipeline lists, boards, item detail, review/learnings views, settings, stage automation, secrets, carry-over fields, and retry/recovery flows. ### Alternatives considered - Keep workflows as loosely linked issues and routines: rejected because operators need a single board/detail/settings surface for repeated workflow patterns. - Ship backend primitives first and defer UI: rejected for this branch because the operator experience is the main way to validate the primitive. - Add a narrower one-off content workflow: rejected because the same primitives are useful across future company processes. ## What Changed - Added and evolved pipeline schema, migrations, shared contracts, server services, REST routes, route tests, and CLI/tutorial smoke support. - Added pipeline aggregation, health/liveness, drift acknowledgment, blocker/carry-over, automation retry, stage automation environment, and permission recovery behavior. - Added the operator UI for pipeline index/board/item detail/settings/review/learnings flows, including stage secrets, automation controls, markdown/item descriptions, linked issue assets, liveness banners, and source automation metadata. - Refactored issue document frame rendering through the shared `DocumentFrameHeader` component to keep document controls consistent with the pipeline document surfaces. - Kept this PR as the single base-branch review target for the current pipeline branch. ## Verification Current branch refresh: - `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/pipelines-service.test.ts` — 31 passed - `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/pipelines-routes.test.ts` — 19 passed - `pnpm --filter ./server typecheck` — passed - `pnpm --filter ./ui typecheck` — passed - Verified Pipelines remains gated by `enablePipelines === true`: sidebar item is hidden unless the flag is enabled, direct pipeline routes redirect to `/dashboard` when disabled, and the Experimental settings UI still has no Pipelines toggle. - GitHub status checks on `df071c710646de625131064c3fb6588b5e97964a` — all complete with no failing conclusions, including Actions, Socket, Superagent/Security, and Greptile Review - Greptile summary on `df071c710646de625131064c3fb6588b5e97964a` — Confidence Score 5/5 - GitHub review-thread sweep — 0 unresolved Greptile threads Previously recorded during branch development: - Server pipeline service/route and aggregation tests - Shared validator tests - UI pipeline page/settings/item-detail/learnings/liveness tests - Pipeline tutorial smoke path ## Risks - High review surface: this is a large feature branch spanning database, shared contracts, server behavior, CLI/docs, and UI. - Migration ordering and schema compatibility need reviewer attention because this branch has been kept current across multiple `master` syncs. - GitHub still reports merge state `BLOCKED` because the PR is awaiting normal human review/branch-protection completion; all current status checks are green. - Branch-name checklist exception: this PR uses the pre-existing requested branch name, which predates the current public-branch naming rule. The PR title/body avoid internal issue references. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex coding agent based on GPT-5, with repository tool use, shell execution, git/GitHub CLI operations, and local verification commands. Earlier commits in this branch were assisted by Paperclip agents and other AI coding agents as recorded in commit authorship. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [ ] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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Jannes StubbemannandClaude Opus 4.7
|
937fe62d10 |
feat(server): TRUST_PROXY supports CIDR list + named subnets (supersedes #3729) (#5872)
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies
> - Express looks at incoming `X-Forwarded-For` headers only when
`app.set("trust proxy", …)` says it should, and uses that resolved
client IP downstream for rate-limiting, audit logging, and any
auth/abuse signal that ties back to source IP
> - The original PR #3729 added `TRUST_PROXY` accepting only `"true"` or
a positive integer, which forces operators to pick between two unsafe
defaults: hop-count (brittle if topology changes) or boolean-true (any
client can spoof `X-Forwarded-For` and bypass rate-limits or pollute
audit logs)
> - `trust proxy: true` is one of the most common Express
misconfigurations and trivially exploitable for IP-spoofing-based
rate-limit bypass; the safest config — trust only the LB's actual CIDR
or only loopback — was unreachable with the previous parser
> - This pull request replaces the parser with full Express 5 support —
unset / `false` / `0` (Express default), positive integer hop count,
comma-separated CIDR list, named subnets (`loopback`, `linklocal`,
`uniquelocal`) — and emits a startup error naming the offending token on
invalid input
> - The benefit is that operators can now trust *only* their actual
ingress and close the spoofing window without leaking client-IP
integrity to downstream layers, while preserving every
previously-working config as a strict superset
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
Refs #1690 — login returns 500 behind a reverse proxy because Express
`trust proxy` is not enabled; this PR ships the configuration surface
(`TRUST_PROXY` with CIDR lists and named subnets) that lets operators
enable it safely. It does not change the default, so #1690 still
requires the operator to set `TRUST_PROXY` — hence Refs, not Fixes.
No other existing issue covers this directly — remaining problem
described in-PR:
- The original `TRUST_PROXY` parser (PR #3729, which this PR supersedes)
accepted only `"true"` or a hop count, forcing operators to choose
between brittle hop-counting and the spoofable `trust proxy: true`.
- `trust proxy: true` lets any client spoof `X-Forwarded-For` and bypass
rate limits or pollute audit logs; the safest config — trusting only the
LB's actual CIDR or only loopback — was unreachable with the previous
parser.
Duplicate-PR search: #1854 / #1714 are earlier minimal trust-proxy
enablement PRs; this PR supersedes #3729 and generalizes beyond a
boolean enable (CIDR lists + named subnets).
## What Changed
- **`server/src/middleware/trust-proxy.ts`** — new helper exposing
`parseTrustProxyEnv` (testable) and `applyTrustProxy(app)` (one-call
boot wiring). Surface:
- Unset / `""` / `false` / `0` → no `app.set("trust proxy", …)` (Express
default: trust nothing).
- `true` → `app.set("trust proxy", true)`. Documented as unsafe in
untrusted-LB deployments.
- Positive integer (e.g. `"2"`) → hop count. Strict parse: rejects
`"01"`, leading/trailing whitespace.
- Comma-separated list of CIDRs and/or named subnets (e.g.
`"loopback,uniquelocal,10.0.0.0/8,fd00::/8"`) → array passed to
`app.set("trust proxy", [...])`.
- Anything else → startup error naming the offending token.
- **`server/src/app.ts`** — one import + one call to
`applyTrustProxy(app)`.
- **`server/src/__tests__/trust-proxy.test.ts`** — 12 cases: unset,
`"true"`, `"0"`, `"2"`, `"01"` rejected, `" 2 "` rejected, `"loopback"`,
`"loopback,uniquelocal"`, `"10.0.0.0/8"`, `"10.0.0.0/8,fd00::/8"`,
`"bogus"` rejected (error names the bad token), mixed-list with one bad
token rejected (error names the offending token specifically).
## Verification
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server run typecheck` — clean.
- `npx vitest run trust-proxy` — 12/12 pass.
## Risks
- **No new required env vars.** Unset means default Express behavior
(trust nothing). Pure superset of #3729's surface — anything that worked
under #3729 still works here.
- **Strict parse.** `"01"` and `" 2 "` are rejected on purpose so
configuration mistakes surface at startup, not as silently-degraded
auth/rate-limit behavior. The error message names the offending token.
- **No runtime cost** — the parse runs once at boot. The downstream
`trust proxy` setting is internal to Express.
- Single-tenant local-first deploys unaffected by default.
## Model Used
Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context), extended thinking mode.
## Checklist
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] Thinking path traces from project context to this change
- [x] Model used specified
- [x] Checked ROADMAP.md — not in conflict with planned core work
- [x] Tests run locally and pass (`trust-proxy` 12/12)
- [x] Added boundary cases (leading-zero, whitespace, unknown token,
mixed-list-with-bad-token)
- [x] No UI changes
- [x] Documented risks above
- [x] Will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before merge
Closes #3729.
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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