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DottaandPaperclip bf818280f2 perf(workspaces): reserve cohort members concurrently (#20401)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip controls agent work and preserves its workspaces.
> - The online importer moves up to eight shared-source leaves under one
source fence.
> - Each member must have a durable reservation before capture starts.
> - Serial reservations repeat the same validation cost before any
archive work.
> - This pull request reserves members in parallel through their
existing independent transactions.
> - Every reservation finishes before an error can release the fence or
start capture.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs: #19873, #20387, #20394.

**Current behavior**

A measured six-member cohort spent about 110 seconds in serial
reservations. Each reservation keeps its existing source, task, recovery
and journal checks.

**Proposed behavior**

Start the bounded member reservations together. Join all outcomes,
retain member order, and refuse capture if any member fails. Keep the
exact partial-journal resume contract.

**Reason and benefit**

This removes serial metadata work before capture. Hosted speedup has not
been measured for this change.

## What Changed

- Replace only the cohort reservation caller loop with
`Promise.allSettled`.
- Preserve the existing per-member transaction, preassigned operation
ID, source fingerprint and all source fences.
- Extend the real PostgreSQL failure fixture to require overlapping
reservations and complete peer closure before fence release.
- Document the unchanged partial-journal and atomic publication
contract.

## Verification

- Canonical cached worktree preflight and plugin SDK prerequisites
passed on Node 24.22.2.
- The unchanged production baseline failed the new reservation overlap
assertion: one reader entered instead of two. The canonical PostgreSQL
wrapper cleaned up. The other 21 tests were intentionally not selected.
- The first baseline command failed before PostgreSQL because root-level
`tsx` resolution was absent. The corrected command uses the checkout's
explicit `cli/node_modules/tsx/dist/loader.mjs`.
- The four focused PostgreSQL controls passed before the final rebase:
overlap/join failure, exact partial-journal resume, parallel capture
with both cold restores, and atomic outer-commit rollback. Eighteen
tests were intentionally not selected. Server TypeScript passed.
- The final branch is based on merged #20394 at
`302ada90dfda0e8fbcd8a514d506d310c9843bcb`. The two directly affected
PostgreSQL reservation/resume controls passed again on final head
`06d436e45705da3b616a2b91725960f6e0ea52c0` (2 passed, 20 intentionally
not selected; 100.56 seconds). Server TypeScript passed again. The
canonical wrapper completed cleanup.

- The separate Ponytail review remains 4/5. Its nonblocking fan-out
warning was resolved as the documented phase contract; no source change
was required. Optional multi-error aggregation is outside this change.
- Fresh Greptile review is 5/5 on
`06d436e45705da3b616a2b91725960f6e0ea52c0`, with no actionable findings
or unresolved threads:
https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/20401#issuecomment-6754025480.

- Exact-head CI is complete: 56 success, 4 skipped and 1 neutral, with
no failed or pending checks. Aggregate `ci / verify` passed:
https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/42718439355.
- Reproduce the final focused cases on Node 24: `node --import
./cli/node_modules/tsx/dist/loader.mjs
packages/db/src/test-postgres-command.ts pnpm exec vitest run
server/src/services/remote-workspace-cohort-migration.test.ts -t "joins
concurrent reservation validation readers|resumes the exact membership
after reservation stops halfway"`. Run `pnpm --filter
@paperclipai/server exec tsc --noEmit` for TypeScript.

## Risks

- API phase contract: `concurrency` limits capture workers. Preflight,
reservation and post-finalizer validation fan out over the exact
selected member set, with the canonical maximum of eight. The original
DB pool bounds connections. `concurrency: 1` does not promise one
metadata query or transaction at a time.
- Up to eight reservations can use independent pool connections at once.
Members that pass can leave durable journals when a peer fails. The
existing exact-member resume path retains those journals; this change
does not retry automatically.
- Capture and publication remain blocked until every reservation
settles. Publication stays serial in one transaction. Saved journal
schemas, singleton behavior and recovery proof checks do not change.
- This does not change concurrency inside the publication transaction.
One PostgreSQL connection serializes that SQL, and changing its row-lock
order has no measured benefit here.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-6 (Codex), with tool use and code execution. The runtime does
not expose a more specific model identifier or context-window size.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` /
`Closes: #` / `Refs: #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the
relevant issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-11-09 17:28:23 -06:00
DottaandPaperclip 9c634e42e4 fix(workspace): bound queued source-lock admission for imports (#20370)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip manages AI agents and their work.
> - Existing local workspaces need durable imports before a volume-free
deployment.
> - Imports must acquire the same source locks as workspace writers.
> - Try-only admission can repeatedly lose to background maintenance,
even when each writer finishes.
> - This pull request adds an optional bounded wait to the canonical
migration APIs.
> - Operators can join the source-lock queue while all existing
preservation checks remain active.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**

An online import can repeatedly return `workspace_source_busy` while
background workspace maintenance reacquires its project source lock. The
import does not join the PostgreSQL lock queue.

**Expected behavior**

An administrative import can wait for a finite writer to finish. One
wait budget covers the complete source scope. Timeout or cancellation
must release acquired locks before the import reserves a journal.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Hold the source lock for an eligible local workspace.
2. Start an online import while the writer holds that lock.
3. Release the writer. Before this change, the import has already
refused admission. With `sourceLockWaitMs`, the import acquires the
source scope and commits normally.

**Paperclip version or commit**

Reproduced on master `0e3fdebea8257bdff11573081c76b306f12db230`.

**Deployment mode**

External PostgreSQL with an online workspace import. Related
preservation work: https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/20311.

## What Changed

- Add optional `sourceLockWaitMs` to singleton and cohort migration
APIs. Omitted options keep current admission behavior.
- Queue the sorted source keys with one decreasing wait budget. Abort
cancels only the dedicated backend identified by PID and backend start
time.
- Use an independent source transaction for queued singleton imports.
Keep lifecycle checks, fresh source checks, journal ownership, and
publication after commit.
- Document the canonical API option. Add real PostgreSQL importer
regressions for release, timeout, abort, and partial-key cleanup.
- Correct the inherited task-case lookup summary so the existing
search-discovery regression passes without changing its assertion or
search algorithm.

## Verification

- Baseline RED: the new singleton regression fails on the unchanged
product because the import returns busy without queueing.
- `pnpm exec vitest run
server/src/services/remote-workspace-migration.test.ts -t 'queued|bounds
the whole source queue'`: 20 passed, including five new cases.
- `pnpm exec vitest run
server/src/services/isolated-remote-workspace-source-lock.test.ts`: 4
passed.
- Server layer typecheck, `node scripts/check-module-boundaries.mjs`,
and `git diff --check` passed.
- Tests used Node 24.22.2 and the existing embedded PostgreSQL fixture.
Hosted rollout verification remains pending.
- CI build, typecheck, browser suites, all serialized suites, and the
other general shards passed. The final server shard failed only the
inherited `case-history-api-discovery.test.ts:14` search-ranking
assertion. Its unchanged local regression reproduces on the base and
passes 3/3 with a separate one-line route-summary correction. The shared
one-line summary correction is included in follow-up commit
`8163ffa9d4728134676b84c8c242a5bf62c802b5`; the unchanged case-discovery
suite passes 3/3 locally. The original CI attempt remains failed:
https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/42704666536/job/129458605783.

## Risks

Queued admission can hold earlier source keys while it waits for a later
key. The caller controls the finite budget. The abort path opens a
short-lived dedicated cancellation connection. If cancellation cannot
connect, PostgreSQL's remaining lock timeout still bounds the wait. This
option must be called at the root of administrative work; an external
scope that already holds the same source locks can cause
self-contention. The existing pre-held journal-resume path must keep its
omitted-option behavior.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, based on GPT-6, with tool use and code execution. The
exact deployment identifier and context-window size are not exposed in
this session.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` /
`Closes: #` / `Refs: #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the
relevant issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-11-09 16:29:53 -06:00
DottaandClaude Opus 5.5 7f55323abb fix(recovery): end a remote workspace epoch whose writer died during preparation (#20346)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - A task with a remote workspace prepares that workspace before the
run selects its runtime, and preparation marks the workspace epoch dirty
with the run as its writer
> - If the server is killed during preparation, the run never selected a
runtime and never started provider work, but the dirty epoch remains
> - Failed-workspace preservation, the path that resolves a dead
writer's dirty epoch, applies to native runs only, so nothing owned this
epoch
> - The dirty epoch kept the dead run's sandbox lease as a pending
export and held the workspace against the task's retry, so the task
never recovered
> - This pull request lets the ownership reconciler end such an epoch at
the last committed save
> - The benefit is that a restart during workspace preparation no longer
wedges the task

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**
In a restart-chaos wave on Daytona (a remote workspace that clones a
real repository), the controller was killed while each run's first
workspace save was in flight. That save is now settled by #20326. Each
run ended `process_lost` with a bounded retry, and both runs were still
in `execution_stage: preparing` with `runtime_mode_resolved_at: null`.
The workspace authority stayed `dirty: true`, `snapshotId: null`, with
the dead run as writer. The dead run's environment lease was proven
owner-gone but was refused by its settle as `workspace_export_pending`,
and the reconciler reported `I2_settled` violations. The retries stayed
`queued` until the test harness deleted the environment 21 minutes
later. Then they failed `remote_workspace_execution_required`, because
the environment was gone.

**Expected behavior**
When a writer dies before runtime selection, its unsaved files are only
the restored source and preparation output, because no agent turn ran.
Recovery must end that epoch at the last committed save, so the lease
settles and the retry restores the workspace into a new directory. A
writer that reached runtime selection must keep its existing recovery.

**Steps to reproduce**
1. Run a task whose agent uses Paperclip Runner with a remote sandbox
workspace.
2. Kill the server while the run is still preparing the workspace (for
example during its first save).
3. After the restart, the run ends `process_lost` and its retry is
queued, but the workspace stays dirty and owned by the dead run, the
lease stays active, and the retry never starts.

**Paperclip version or commit**
`master` at 251c6d5c69 (after #20326).

Refs #20326 (settles the save that was in flight when the controller
died).

## What Changed

- New `settlePreparationOnlyRemoteWorkspaceEpoch`
(`recovery/remote-workspace-unsaved-files-settlement.ts`), wired as the
settle of the existing `remote_workspace_unsaved_files` ownership kind.
Once the writer run is proven gone, it ends the epoch with the existing
`abandonUnverifiedRemoteWorkspaceEpoch` only when all of these are true:
  - the run is terminal;
  - its runtime was never resolved (`runtime_mode_resolved_at` is null);
  - it ended in `execution_stage: preparing`;
  - it has no native finalization;
- durable records show no work began: no `adapter.invoke` or
`adapter.progress` events, no `turn.*`, `provider.*` or
`native.process_*` events, and no recorded process id, process group,
native session or runner instance on the run;
  - the workspace authority is still dirty, with this run as writer;
  - no save for that epoch is still `running` or `pending`.
The epoch then advances with no writer and no location, and the
abandoned epoch is recorded in `remoteWorkspaceAbandonedEpochs` with an
activity entry.
- After that, the lease no longer matches a prepared source, so the
existing environment lease settle releases it and the workspace writer
hold is free for the retry.
- The ownership inventory row for this kind names the new settle.

## Verification

- Red before the fix, green after: `ends a dirty remote epoch whose
writer died during preparation, and keeps every other writer's files`
(`ownership-reconciliation-report.test.ts`). On master it settles 0
epochs. With the fix it ends only the preparation-only epoch, and keeps
the dirty epoch of a writer whose runtime was resolved, a writer that
reached execution, a live writer, and a writer with a save still in
flight.
- Red before the fix, green after, end to end: `lets a retry prepare the
workspace again after its first writer was killed during preparation`
(`remote-workspace-save-concurrency.test.ts`). It runs the real reserve
and prepare. The first writer's initial save is cut off, which leaves a
first epoch with no committed save (`snapshotId: null`). The run is
reaped as `process_lost` while still preparing, with its lease left
active. Two reconciliation passes then end the epoch and release the
lease. The retry reserves the workspace and prepares it again from the
project base in a new directory, then commits its own initial save. On
master, the epoch stays dirty.
- The safety cases also keep a preparation-stage writer with an
`adapter.invoke` event, and one with a recorded process id.
- Red before the fix, green after: `releases the lease and frees the
workspace for the retry once a preparation-only epoch ends`. Before the
passes, the lease counts as a prepared source and the workspace writer
hold is `held` for a retry. After two reconciliation passes, the lease
is no longer active, the prepared source is gone, and the writer hold is
`free`. On master the prepared source remains.
- The reconciler, retained-source fallback, remote workspace lifecycle,
save-concurrency, warm-handoff recovery, and retained orphan sandbox
suites pass (139 tests, 1 environment-gated file skipped). After
rebasing onto #20326, the reconciler, save-concurrency, retained-source
fallback, and controller instance lease suites pass (91 tests).
- `PAPERCLIP_TYPECHECK_LOW_MEMORY=1 pnpm typecheck` in `server` passed.
- Evidence: the runs in the wave's kept database all had
`runtime_mode_resolved_at: null` and `execution_stage: preparing`. Their
`runtime_mode: legacy` is only the column default, not a resolved
runtime.

## Risks

- This ends unsaved files without saving them. That is safe only because
no provider turn can have started before runtime selection, and the
guard requires the writer never to have resolved a runtime. A writer
that did resolve one keeps its existing preservation path.
- The abandoned root stays in the sandbox and is not reused. The next
preparation restores the last committed save, or the source, into a new
directory.
- No schema or API change.

## Model Used

- Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`) in Claude Code, with tool use
(shell, file edits, local database inspection).

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-09 14:12:51 -06:00
DottaandPaperclip c67909cb0f fix: keep tool approvals valid through OAuth refresh and delayed review (#20340)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip lets people manage agent work and approve app actions.
> - An approval must bind the action that the person reviewed.
> - OAuth access tokens can expire while that person is away.
> - The old target snapshot treated each token refresh as a new
authorization. It also imposed a one-hour review deadline.
> - This pull request separates token renewal from authorization
identity and keeps the human decision durable.
> - Current access, the reviewed arguments, meaningful target changes,
task closure, and execution receipts still control dispatch.
> - People can approve later without repeating a decision after routine
connection maintenance.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**

A pending app action returned `approved_tool_target_changed` after its
OAuth tokens refreshed. The tool and connection settings were unchanged.
The same card also expired after one hour. A sign-in problem could
discard an accepted decision before provider dispatch.

**Expected behavior**

The original card remains reviewable after routine OAuth refresh and a
server restart. A later approval runs the exact reviewed action once. A
connection repair preserves the decision while Paperclip verifies the
same authorization. Meaningful changes require a new review.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Connect an OAuth MCP app and configure an action to require approval.
2. Request the action, then refresh its access and refresh tokens before
approving.
3. Approve the original card. Before this change, it returns HTTP 409
even when the authorization is unchanged.
4. Wait more than one hour. Before this change, the card expires without
a task-specific deadline.

**Paperclip version or commit**

Reproduced from master at `76254ead2229`. The final branch is rebased
onto current master.

## What Changed

- Add versioned approval target comparison. New snapshots bind
credential identity epochs, consent, permissions, ownership, connection
configuration, tool contracts, and credential references. Authenticated
OAuth refresh preserves identity. Manual credential replacement does
not.
- Remove the implicit one-hour deadline from ordinary app action
reviews. Keep explicit deadlines and terminal-task expiry. Synchronize
the nullable interaction deadline in shared contracts and UI.
- Keep accepted, undispatched actions when sign-in is required. Show a
saved-approval repair state. Resume on committed connection changes
after target and access revalidation, without an idle retry loop.
- Preserve the existing execution claim, result receipt, and
uncertain-outcome no-replay rules.
- Explain meaningful target changes without inviting the person to retry
the stale card.
- Add a production task-thread Storybook example and document
compatibility and recovery behavior.

## Verification

- Red: production-refresher invalid-grant handling and formal-approval
withdrawal during a sign-in wait also reproduced as failing regressions
before their fixes.
- Red: before implementation, the local OAuth HTTP fixture failed for
both public and confidential clients with `approved_tool_target_changed`
after token refresh.
- Green: the extended fixture passes for public and confidential clients
with personal and shared grants. It covers actual local HTTP token
exchanges, multiple refreshes, a rebuilt gateway, an ended originating
run, approval after 25 hours, duplicate approval, preserved sharing
arguments, sign-in waiting, and event-driven repair. The gateways use
the production OAuth refresher; an invalid refresh preserves the
accepted decision before provider dispatch. Omitted-scope responses
cover equivalent scope-reporting changes. The provider is an isolated
local fixture, not a deployed Notebook service.
- Negative controls refuse changed consent, scopes, tool definition,
destination, and manual credential replacement before provider
execution.
- Existing gateway service, connected-tool acceptance, secret owner,
secret service, unsigned-review queue, and connection-health suites
passed. Explicit-deadline fixtures still prove expiry behavior,
including deadlines on accepted sign-in waits. A withdrawn formal
approval cancels a waiting action before connection recovery.
- Approval card, task-chat, error-copy and target-comparison tests
passed. Server and UI typechecks passed. Token gates and Storybook
catalog checks passed.
- Inspected the new saved-approval repair card in local Storybook using
the production task thread. It shows a reconnect link and no second
approval button or false running state.
- `pnpm verify --explain` returned exit 2 and requested broad CI
coverage. [Full
CI](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/42677855507)
passed on `eb4f1c7caa9ee6e802c314ffc5eadec475a5de0c`, including build,
typecheck/release registry, general and serialized tests, and all eight
browser shards.
- Greptile reviewed the same final head at 5/5. Both findings from the
first review are fixed and their threads resolved; no open follow-ups
remain.

## Risks

- No database migration is needed. The new comparison reuses the vault
identity epoch. Only authenticated OAuth refresh code can preserve that
epoch; HTTP credential-write schemas cannot select that behavior.
- Earlier signed requests keep their original exact-version checks and
saved deadlines. Already-expired cards are not revived. A historical
card whose credentials already changed needs a fresh review.
- A new consent, account, permission set, destination, or manually
replaced credential must not inherit the old authorization. Reconnection
continues automatically only when revalidation proves the same saved
authorization.
- The interaction enrichment now permits a null deadline. Existing
string deadlines remain valid. The web client and shared validator
change together.
- This PR does not deploy to staging or perform a live Notebook
publication.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 family, with repository tools, code execution, and
browser inspection. The runtime does not expose the exact model ID,
context-window limit, or reasoning-mode label; those values are not
asserted.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-11-09 13:46:28 -06:00
DottaandClaude Opus 5.5 251c6d5c69 fix(recovery): settle a remote workspace save whose process died mid-save (#20326)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - Native runs in remote sandboxes save the workspace as snapshot
operations (`workspace_operations`, phase `remote_workspace_snapshot`).
Each save invocation is listed in `saveWork.activeIds` while it runs
> - When a controller process is killed during a save, its invocation
stays listed and the operation stays `running`
> - Nothing recorded which process ran the invocation, so the shared
ownership reconciler could not prove the owner gone and never settled
the save
> - The task's bounded retry then waited behind that save forever
> - This pull request records the owning process for each save
invocation, and lets the reconciler settle a save whose owner is proven
gone
> - The benefit is that a restart during a save no longer wedges the
task

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**
In a restart-chaos wave on Daytona with a real cloned repository, two
tasks each started their first remote snapshot save (`boundary:
initial`, epoch 1). A SIGKILL hit the controller during the save, before
any upload. Each run ended `process_lost` and got a bounded retry. The
retries stayed `queued` forever, the snapshot operations stayed
`running` with `saveWork.activeIds: [<dead invocation>]` and
`quiescedAt: null`, and the sandbox leases stayed active. The ownership
reconciler reported the saves as owner-gone but had no way to settle
them.

**Expected behavior**
After a restart, recovery must settle a remote snapshot save whose
owning process is gone. It is marked failed with provenance, so the
task's retry can continue. A save that is still running must stay
untouched.

**Steps to reproduce**
1. Run a native task with a remote workspace (for example Daytona with a
`git_repo` project source).
2. Kill the controller (SIGKILL) while the first workspace save is in
flight, before its upload.
3. After the restart, the run ends `process_lost` and its retry is
promoted to `queued`, but the save operation stays `running` and the
retry never starts.

**Paperclip version or commit**
`master` at 1b7fe33432.

Refs #20291 (the quiesced case: a save with no active invocation) and
#20233 (the same ownership pattern for local workspace commands).

## What Changed

- `saveRemoteWorkspace` records the controller process stamp of each
invocation in `saveWork.owners` when it registers the invocation. It
removes that entry when the invocation settles. A module-level set marks
invocations that are still running in this process
(`isRemoteWorkspaceSaveInvocationLive`).
- The ownership registry owns a `remote_snapshot_save` with active
invocations by that stamp. A save whose active invocations have no
stamps was written before this change and is owned by its run, as with
finalize attempts. A mix of stamps, or more than one process, is
unprovable.
- `settleAbandonedRemoteSnapshotSave` settles a save with active
invocations once its owner is proven gone:
- Process-owned: the proven stamp must still match every active
invocation, and none may be live in this process.
  - Legacy run-owned: the run must be terminal.
- Either way it clears the active invocations, records them as
`abandonedInvocationIds`, and marks the save `failed` with `lastFailure:
remote_workspace_save_abandoned`. The #20291 re-arm of blocked fallbacks
still applies.
- The controller instance lease counts running saves stamped with this
boot as held work, so a long save keeps its owner provably alive.
- The ownership inventory row for this kind describes the stamp.

## Verification

- Red before the fix, green after: `settles a remote snapshot save whose
process died mid-save, and keeps live, foreign or unprovable ones`
(`ownership-reconciliation-report.test.ts`). On master it settles 0
rows. With the fix it settles exactly two:
  - a save stamped by a dead process (proof `pid_dead`);
- the wave's shape: an unstamped active invocation on a `process_lost`
run.
It keeps five kinds of save running: a save stamped by this live
process, a stamp from another PID space, a legacy save on a live run, a
save with mixed stamps, and (in the older #20291 test) a stamped active
invocation.
- `stamps each save invocation with the process that runs it and clears
the stamp when it settles` (`remote-workspace-save-concurrency.test.ts`)
pauses a real save mid-flight. It checks the owner stamp and the
in-process live mark, then checks that both are cleared after the save
finishes.
- The reconciler, save-concurrency, remote workspace lifecycle, snapshot
retention, retained-source fallback, preparation gates, and controller
instance lease suites pass (153 tests, 1 environment-gated file
skipped).
- `PAPERCLIP_TYPECHECK_LOW_MEMORY=1 pnpm typecheck` in `server` passed.
- Not yet verified: the full Daytona wave replay that shows the queued
retry starts after the save settles. I asked the chaos harness owner to
replay it on this build.

## Risks

- A legacy save (written before this change) with an active invocation
is settled when its run is terminal. The finalize-attempt kind uses the
same rule. During a rolling deploy, an old-release process could still
be running such a save for a terminal run. If that save later succeeds,
its publication still marks the operation `succeeded`.
- If the retry in the wave is also held by the dead writer's dirty
workspace authority, settling the save may not be enough to start it.
The replay will show whether a second change is needed.
- No schema or API change. `saveWork.owners` is new optional metadata.

## Model Used

- Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`) in Claude Code, with tool use
(shell, file edits).

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-09 13:27:44 -06:00
Dotta 1b7fe33432 fix(workspaces): preserve import verification across process restarts (#20311)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Online import preserves old local files before the web server can
use a disposable filesystem.
> - A parent import must authenticate saved child archives before it can
omit their directories.
> - The operation journal preserves import identity, but completed child
checks existed only in process memory.
> - A container restart therefore repeated downloads, decryption and
restoration that had already succeeded.
> - This pull request saves a versioned verification receipt on each
immutable child snapshot.
> - A replacement process can reuse those checks while it reacquires
locks and verifies current local files.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #19854 for verification reuse within a live source fence. Refs
#19873 for cohort import. Refs #20298 for the separate remote-hold
admission fix. Searched related workspace verification and restart PRs;
none provides durable child verification.

**What happened?**

Replacing a server container interrupts a long online import. The
original operation and snapshot survive, but a later invocation
downloads, decrypts and restores completed child archives again. The
current cache ends with the source-lock owner.

**Expected behavior**

Completed immutable checks survive process and scratch loss. Resume
keeps the same operation and snapshot, reuses only correctly bound
verification, and publishes once. Current local files and Git state must
still be checked under fresh source locks.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Import two nested child workspaces, then start the parent import.
2. Kill the importer after a child verification finishes. Remove its
scratch directory.
3. Resume in a new process. Before this fix, the completed child is
downloaded and restored again.

**Paperclip version or commit**

The regression fails on the previous migration verifier. The final
branch includes master at `189fefb99183953be37f0d1084275fbb0f35d6e2`.

**Deployment mode**

Managed Linux server with PostgreSQL and explicit S3 storage
configuration.

## What Changed

- Add optional opaque storage namespace identity. S3 binds it to the
explicit endpoint, region, bucket, normalized prefix and addressing
style. Implicit endpoints retain full verification.
- Save a versioned child-snapshot receipt only after canonical crypto,
manifest and file restoration succeed and a second HEAD confirms the
same strong ETag and size.
- Bind reuse to the complete snapshot reference, key material, child
lineage, source operation and storage namespace. Require a fresh strong
HEAD and canonical validation that the current secret provider can
unwrap the saved snapshot key.
- Keep current directory/Git capture and source-owner checks on every
invocation. Read-only verifier callers do not write checkpoints.
- Merge checkpoint metadata under a short row lock without changing
parent journal hashes, snapshot retention or update timestamps. Bound
reads and writes. Lock timeouts, statement timeouts, deadlocks and
serialization conflicts are safe cache misses. Other errors remain
fatal.
- Extend real PostgreSQL/Git/archive tests with process death, scratch
removal, resume, changed bindings and single publication.

## Verification

- Baseline RED: two import invocations read each child twice. With
durable receipts, each child is read once across both invocations.
- Real process regression passed on the final rebased head: SIGKILL the
owned importer after one checkpoint, delete all scratch, and resume in a
new Node process. It retains the same operation and snapshot, reads each
child once across both processes, and records one publication.
- 53 focused cases passed in 104.86 seconds on the final production
bytes before rebase. They cover existing nested/cohort behavior,
namespace identity, changed source/reference/key/lineage/ETag, unknown
proof versions, weak validators and bounded row contention.
- After clean rebase and stronger scratch/snapshot assertions, the real
process case passed again in 18.54 seconds. Server TypeScript, module
boundaries and diff checks passed on final head
`9da68ee7ce4a778201ef85e21a11c49eeea7bc16`. Required CI supplies
final-head broad coverage.
- The initial restricted-network dependency setup failed; unchanged
preflight passed with normal network access. Initial TypeScript failures
in test pipe assertions were corrected. No failed attempt is counted as
a pass.
- Review found a missing current-master-key check. A real restart
regression with all child checkpoints complete reproduced unsafe
publication after switching to a different valid master key. Follow-up
`7ea92c2abd9ffdb2e7dd81cecf62c8fc7a6e74a5` delegates to the canonical
snapshot-key owner before both durable and in-memory cache hits.
- The fixed process regressions passed 2/2. Ten key-authority and
existing identity/source guard cases passed. The wrong-key process now
refuses with zero additional child payload GETs, no publication, and
unchanged original journal/snapshot rows. Server typecheck, module
boundaries and diff checks passed on the follow-up.
- Review also found that transient database failures could make the
optional checkpoint cache stop a valid import. Read and save now fall
back only for SQLSTATE `55P03`, `57014`, `40P01`, and `40001`.
Connection loss, identity changes, crypto failures, programming errors
and cancellation remain fatal. Reads use a read-only transaction with
one-second lock and eight-second statement limits.
- The checkpoint database-fault regression failed two cases before the
fix. All four recoverable import cases then passed. The final selected
run passed 21 cases, including fatal-error and cancellation controls,
real row contention, both process-restart cases and key/identity guards.
Server typecheck and boundaries passed. Fault injection is limited to
the checkpoint database boundary; the importer, PostgreSQL, Git,
archives, storage and publication remain real.
- Latest master was merged without rewriting published history. Six real
import/process-restart cases passed again on final head
`8c8e4213a680ebb5c8d6864416bc3a4f271e1e76` in 38.03 seconds. [Required
CI](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/42658248222)
finished with 54 successful checks and four intentional skips; Snyk
passed. [Fresh
review](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/20311#issuecomment-6745354381)
is 5/5 with all four threads addressed and resolved. Hosted verification
after normal release delivery remains pending.

## Risks

- A stale receipt could skip authentication of a different object.
Complete reference/lineage/namespace binding, fresh strong HEAD and
row-locked save validation prevent that reuse. Missing or unsupported
hints trigger full verification.
- Mutable local files can change between attempts. Their source locks
and fresh captures remain required; a checkpoint never certifies current
local bytes.
- Checkpoint persistence can contend with other snapshot owners. It has
one-second lock and eight-second statement limits; the four classified
transient SQL errors retain the normal fully verified path. Other
database errors stop the import so lost source ownership cannot be
hidden.
- No schema, archive format, public API or saved-run identity change.
Older snapshots without receipts remain readable and get full
verification. Existing data and recovery obligations stay intact.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-6.1 Sol (`gpt-6.1-sol`), with reasoning, repository
tools and code execution. Context-window size is not exposed by the
runtime.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
2026-11-09 11:03:48 -06:00
DottaandClaude Opus 5.5 099adb2728 fix(recovery): settle a remote workspace save that stopped without finishing (#20291)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - Native runs in remote sandboxes save the workspace as snapshots.
Each save is a `workspace_operations` row with phase
`remote_workspace_snapshot`
> - The ownership registry lists that kind as in-progress work, but it
had no settle step
> - When a restart cut off a failing final save, the row stayed
`running` after its invocations had all stopped and its run had ended
> - The retained-source fallback refuses while any workspace operation
is running, so a task whose saved files could not be verified could
never continue from its last save
> - This pull request lets the ownership reconciler settle that row as
failed
> - The benefit is that the automatic fallback can continue such a task
without any user action

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**
A native run in a remote sandbox finished its turn. Its final workspace
save failed because the sandbox disk was full ("No space left on device"
in the snapshot copy). A graceful restart then interrupted the retry.
The run ended as `native_workspace_sync_out_retry_exhausted`. Its
`remote_workspace_snapshot` row kept `status: running` for six days,
with `saveWork: { activeIds: [], unknown: false, quiescedAt: <time> }`
and `exportCleanup: { state: "pending" }`. The retained-source fallback
checked the task and refused with `workspace_operation_running`, so the
task stayed blocked.

**Expected behavior**
A save with no active or unknown invocation, whose run is terminal, is
finished work. The reconciler must mark it failed, so the fallback can
continue from the last committed save. A save that might still be
running must stay untouched.

**Steps to reproduce**
1. Run a native task in a remote sandbox. Make its final save fail, then
restart the server during the retry, so the save's work is quiesced and
the operation stays `running`.
2. Let the task's recovery refuse with an unverifiable-source failure
(for example `allocation_ownership_ambiguous`).
3. The retained-source fallback refuses with
`workspace_operation_running` on every check, and the task never
continues.

**Paperclip version or commit**
`master` at f7c85bca18.

Refs #20282 (the other cause of the same stuck task: a false ownership
refusal).

## What Changed

- `settleAbandonedRemoteSnapshotSave`
(`recovery/workspace-finalize-attempt-settlement.ts`) settles a
`remote_workspace_snapshot` row in `running` or `pending` only when all
of these are true:
- its save work is quiesced (`activeIds` is empty and `unknown` is
false);
  - its run is terminal.
It sets `status: failed`, records `abandonedSave` provenance and
`lastFailure: remote_workspace_save_abandoned`, keeps `saveWork` and
`exportCleanup`, writes a `workspace_operation.reconciled` activity
entry, and wakes the workspace's terminal work.
- The ownership registry wires it as the settle of
`remote_snapshot_save`.
- In the same transaction it re-arms blocked fallbacks. For every open
hold whose fallback check last refused with
`workspace_operation_running` and whose source run used this save's
workspace, it clears the check and wakes the workspace-recovery queue. A
hold that had already spent its 12 checks (no next check) continues as
well.
- The settle uses the save path's own `readSaveWork`, now exported, so
it never settles save work that the save path would treat as invalid.
- Because the row now has a `lastFailure`, `retireQuiescedSaves` retires
it like any failed save when a later final save commits. A later retry
of the same save boundary reopens a failed row, as before.
- The ownership inventory row for this kind names the new settle.

## Verification

- Red before the fix, green after: `settles a remote snapshot save that
stopped without finishing after its run ended, and keeps open or live
ones` (`ownership-reconciliation-report.test.ts`). Before: `settled: 0`.
After: only the abandoned save settles. Saves with a live run, an active
invocation, or unknown save work stay `running`.
- Red before the fix, green after, end to end: `continues once the
reconciler settles a final save a restart left running after its run
ended` (`workspace-recovery-fallback.test.ts`). The fallback first
refuses with `workspace_operation_running`, and the test then spends its
check budget (12 checks, no next check), so the hold drops out of
discovery. After one ownership reconciliation pass, the save is `failed`
and the check is cleared. The worker then resolves the hold with
`retained_source_unverifiable_continued_from_last_saved`. Without the
re-arm, this test fails.
- The reconciler test also covers save work that is not quiesced
(`quiescedAt: null`), save work that is invalid (`quiescedAt: ""`), and
a `pending` save.
- `workspace-recovery-fallback.test.ts` (16 tests),
`ownership-reconciliation-report.test.ts`, and the remote workspace
lifecycle, save-concurrency, and snapshot-retention suites pass (80
tests, 1 environment-gated file skipped).
- `PAPERCLIP_TYPECHECK_LOW_MEMORY=1 pnpm typecheck` in `server` passed.

## Risks

- A save in another process registers its invocation in `activeIds` in
the same row-locked transaction before it runs. The settle locks the row
and requires `activeIds` to be empty and `unknown` to be false, so it
cannot fail a save that is still working.
- A save whose process died with its invocation still in `activeIds`
stays `running`. That case needs an owner-death proof, which is out of
scope here.
- No schema or API change.

## Model Used

- Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`) in Claude Code, with tool use
(shell, file edits, read-only browser diagnostics).

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-09 10:26:04 -06:00
Dotta 5c73633a8f fix(workspaces): preserve remote recovery holds during online import (#20298)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Online workspace import preserves old controller-local files while
unrelated remote work continues.
> - A task can have an old local checkout and a separate durable remote
workspace.
> - A terminal remote run can retain a file-recovery hold on that task.
> - The legacy source checker rejects remote references, so that hold
blocks independent local imports.
> - This pull request proves that the hold belongs only to the separate
remote source and fences its finalizer during import.
> - Old files can migrate while the remote recovery obligation stays
intact.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #19873 and #19854 for the existing cohort and source-verification
paths. Searched related online migration and remote recovery PRs; no
duplicate fix was found.

**What happened?**

Online import rejects a legacy Git checkout with
`online_workspace_source_scope_unproven` when a same-task failed run has
a prepared reference to a separate durable remote workspace. The legacy
run reader rejects remote references before the hold can be classified.

**Expected behavior**

Independent local files can import under their source fences. The
separate remote workspace, dirty writer, allocation, accepted result and
recovery hold must stay intact.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Create related local Git workspaces.
2. Record a terminal failed native run and an exhausted file-recovery
hold for a separate durable remote workspace on the same task.
3. Import the local leaf online. The old checker refuses before capture.

**Paperclip version or commit**

Reproduced on master at `052c638b519ebb15f81e4fcd1a96adf6cd3b2f10`.

**Deployment mode**

Managed server with PostgreSQL and remote Runner execution.

## What Changed

- Add a distinct remote-only preservation proof. Keep remote runs
excluded from legacy export sources.
- Use the canonical source inspector and prepared-reference matcher.
Bind the run, finalizer, action, task, accepted result, authority,
allocation and prior committed snapshot.
- Acquire the held run's finalizer fence through the existing sorted
lock path. Existing source-proof reinspection rejects changes before
publication.
- Preserve previous-release prepared references with an older baseline
snapshot. Do not require that snapshot's epoch or source run to equal
the current run.
- Add real PostgreSQL import, authenticated cold restore, preservation,
refusal, lock-contention and publication-race regressions. Document the
behavior.

## Verification

- Genuine baseline failure on unchanged product: the real importer
refuses with `online_workspace_source_scope_unproven`.
- Final focused regression file: 23 tests passed in 13.19 seconds
through the canonical isolated PostgreSQL wrapper on Node 24.22.2.
- 24 existing affected migration/recovery tests passed against the same
final production bytes. Another 83 tests were explicitly excluded by the
focused selection; no full-suite pass is claimed.
- The positive imports local bytes, confirms the remote finalizer fence
is held during upload, leaves all remote records unchanged, parks the
original repository and authenticates/restores the archive.
- Refusal and race cases cover malformed, foreign, same-local and mixed
references; active owners/writers; changed allocation, result, task,
action, authority and baseline; and finalizer contention.
- Server TypeScript check, module-boundary check and `git diff --check`
passed.
- An intermediate run had one incorrect assertion that expected an
explicit empty legacy-source array. The canonical journal omits that
empty field. The final assertion accepts absence and still forbids any
exported remote source. Final relevant results are 23 new plus 24
existing passes, rather than a claim that the earlier invocation passed
in full.
- Required CI passed on head `6a278e717db2b5f614b0a595f99bfd0fb5430227`:
55 successful checks and 4 intentional skips. [CI
run](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/42650025033).
Greptile reviewed that head at 5/5 with no actionable findings or open
inline/review comments. Hosted continuation remains pending normal
delivery.

## Risks

- A false disjointness proof could admit an unsafe local import. Strict
company/task/source binding, the canonical inspector, finalizer fencing
and publication revalidation retain refusal on uncertainty.
- This does not recover or settle remote files. Dirty authority and the
original recovery obligation remain unchanged.
- No schema, public API, archive format or saved-run identity changes.
Existing persisted state carries forward.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-6.1 Sol (`gpt-6.1-sol`), with reasoning, repository
tools and code execution. The runtime does not expose the context-window
size.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
2026-11-09 10:13:41 -06:00
DottaandClaude Opus 5.5 ac0d0374f2 perf(issue-detail): measure task opens on real instances (#20276)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - People open a task from their issues list to see what an agent is
doing and to reply
> - On a busy staging instance, the composer and the latest messages
take 1.1–2.0 s to appear after a click. For one task with a slow run
log, they took 13.9 s
> - Local fixtures do not reproduce this. They do not have real network
round trips, real server contention, or real object-store latency
> - This pull request adds the measurement we need: a browser harness
that times a task open on a real instance, and a Server-Timing entry on
every API response that separates server time from network time
> - It also records the staging baseline and the improvement plan
> - The benefit is that each later performance change can be measured on
real data with the same tool, before and after deploy

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**Problem or motivation**
Opening a task from the issues list is slow on instances with real data.
The composer and the latest chat messages can take seconds to appear. We
could not measure this on staging in a repeatable way. We also could not
tell server time from network and queueing time for most API requests.

**Proposed solution**
Add a reusable browser harness for task opens, and add a `paperclip_api`
Server-Timing entry to every API response.

**Alternatives considered**
Local Playwright fixtures only. They do not reproduce real network round
trips, server contention or object-store latency, so they did not show
the delays that people see. Per-endpoint Server-Timing only. It does not
cover the many other requests that run during a task open.

**Roadmap alignment**
This is measurement for existing task-loading behaviour. It does not add
product features. The staging baseline and the measured causes are in
`doc/plans/2026-11-09-task-loading-performance.md`. Follow-up pull
requests change the loading behaviour itself, starting with #20277.

## What Changed

- Added `server/src/middleware/api-server-timing.ts`. Every `/api`
response now has a `paperclip_api;dur=<ms>` Server-Timing entry. The
value is the server time from request arrival until headers are written,
including admission waits. The entry is appended, so the existing
`paperclip_issue` phases stay first.
- Registered the middleware first in `server/src/app.ts`.
- Added `tests/perf/issue-detail/staging-click-harness.js`. It clicks a
task row and records, frame by frame, when the composer and the latest
message become visible, layout shifts, movement of the latest message,
and the requests that run before the page is ready. The summary labels
each sample instead of using the task reference. It replaces query
values and every path segment that contains a digit. A fetch that is
still running when the sample ends is listed as pending.
- Documented the harness in `tests/perf/issue-detail/README.md`.
- Added the dated plan
`doc/plans/2026-11-09-task-loading-performance.md` with the staging
baseline, the causes, and the prioritized slices.

## Verification

- `cd server && npx vitest run src/__tests__/api-server-timing.test.ts`.
3 tests pass. They cover the JSON responses, the time spent in earlier
middleware, preserving route phases, and explicit `writeHead` calls.
- `tests/perf/issue-detail/issue-detail.perf.spec.ts` reads the first
`dur=` value. That value is still `paperclip_issue`.
- The harness was used on staging to capture the baseline in the plan
document.

## Risks

- Low risk. The header has only a duration, with no request, user or
company data.
- The middleware wraps `res.writeHead` once for each request. This is
the same pattern that `on-headers` uses.
- Server-Timing is visible to same-origin scripts only. No
`Timing-Allow-Origin` header is added.

## Model Used

- Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`), Anthropic, used in Claude Code
with tool use (shell, browser automation, file editing).

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [ ] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-09 09:06:37 -06:00
DottaandClaude Opus 5.5 6fd46c0025 perf(budgets): judge Paperclip's share of restart recovery; report the provider's session load (#20183)
## Thinking Path

- Speed budgets protect the time to first visible agent activity, and
restart recovery is one of the judged metrics
(`native-speed-budgets.ts`, wave grader).
- In the B1 concurrency-6 chaos wave (`w-20261109T045320-s9807`), Codex
`restart_recovery` was p50 8.6 s and p95 11.2 s, against a budget of 6.5
s and 8.0 s. At concurrency 4 (K13) it was 3.8 s and 5.0 s.
- The preparation spans on a copy of the kept database break it down:
- Paperclip's share (ready → claim → prepare → runtime stage → runner
launch) is a steady 1.2–2.0 s.
- `provider.session.load`, the Codex app-server boot plus
`thread/resume` of long saved sessions, takes 3.0–6.3 s, 65–75% of each
recovery.
- Resumes run concurrently, and the worktree lock and the startup
reconciler are not on the path.
- Judging the full latency therefore mixes our code with provider and
session-size effects. Budget the part we control, so a regression in our
code shows up regardless of session size or concurrency, and report the
rest.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**
`restart_recovery` breached its budget whenever many long provider
sessions resumed at once, although Paperclip's own recovery work stayed
within about 2 s. The breach did not point at anything Paperclip could
fix, and a real regression in our code could hide inside the
provider-load variance.

**Steps to reproduce**
1. Run a local chaos wave at concurrency 6 with long-running Codex tasks
and K1/K2/K4 faults (for example B1, seed 9807).
2. Compare `restart_recovery` in `speed.json` with
`provider.session.load` in the recovered runs' run logs.

**Expected behavior**
The budget judges Paperclip's share of a recovery. The provider's
session load and the full latency are reported but not judged.

## What Changed

- `server/src/services/native-runtime/native-speed-budgets.ts`:
- New budgeted metric `restart_recovery_control_plane`: from `ready` to
the start of `provider.session.load`, or to the next provider event when
nothing reloads (for example a reattached runner).
- Its budget is 2.5 s / 4.0 s for claude, codex and opencode. Measured:
1.2–2.0 s per run at concurrency 6.
  - The full `restart_recovery` stays in the table for reporting.
  - Breach payloads carry `restartTotalMs` and `providerLoadMs`.
- `server/src/services/native-runtime/native-run-trace.ts`:
- The per-run check records when `provider.session.load` starts, keeps
the recovery measurement, and judges it when the run finishes.
- It judges after the deferred diagnostics drain, so a provider span
committed after the provider event still counts.
  - It emits `restart_recovery_control_plane` breaches only.
- `tests/restart-chaos/ttft-baseline-stats.ts`: each recovery sample
gains `controlPlaneMs` and `providerLoadMs`. The provider-load start is
the span event's write time minus its duration.
- `tests/restart-chaos/wave-speed.ts`:
- Three restart rows per adapter: `restart_recovery` (report-only),
`restart_recovery_control_plane` (budgeted) and `restart_provider_load`
(report-only).
  - All three have outage time removed.
- `tests/restart-chaos/ttft-baseline.ts`: the recovery table adds a
"Paperclip share" column.
- Docs: `doc/run-log-events.md` (metric and payload) and the
speed-budget table in
`doc/plans/2026-11-07-durable-ownership-and-reconciliation.md`.

## Verification

- `server`: `npx vitest run
src/services/native-runtime/native-speed-budgets.test.ts`, 18 passed.
Two new tests:
  - a recovery dominated by provider load does not breach;
- a slow Paperclip share breaches with `restartTotalMs` and
`providerLoadMs`, even when the provider span is committed after the
provider event.

The existing recovery tests moved to the new metric. All six were red
before the trace change.
- `tests/restart-chaos`: `npx vitest run --config
tests/restart-chaos/vitest.config.ts wave-speed.test.ts
ttft-baseline-stats.test.ts`, 29 passed. New tests cover the sample
split and the grader rows (a judged share, a report-only provider load,
zero breaches).
- Server typecheck: no errors in the touched files.

## Risks

- **Lower sensitivity to provider-side slowdowns.** A provider
regression in session load no longer breaches. It stays visible in the
report-only rows and in breach payloads.
- **Runs with no `provider.session.load` span** (reattach, or an adapter
that doesn't emit it) are judged on the full latency against the
control-plane budget. That's conservative.
- **Run-log consumers that filter on `metric: "restart_recovery"`** see
`restart_recovery_control_plane` from now on. The doc notes the change
date.

## Model Used

Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`, Anthropic), 1M context window, tool
use and code execution, via Claude Code.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-09 01:22:28 -06:00
DottaandClaude Opus 5.5 95d476c57b docs(plans): record the measured seed experiment for per-turn uploads (#20139)
## Thinking Path

- #20100 proposed sending only the changed files on per-turn follow-ups,
with the repository seed held inside Daytona in a snapshot or a volume.
It asked for one measured experiment before building.
- Snapshot and volume operations were blocked by our Daytona key's
permissions. A restricted key with those permissions now exists, so the
experiment has run.
- This PR records the numbers and the decision in the design doc.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #20100

**What happened?**
The #20100 design's seed-location choice was unmeasured: snapshot build
time and volume read speed were both open questions.

**Steps to reproduce**
1. Run the SDK timing of direct upload, volume extract, and snapshot
build and create on the paperclip seed (58.7 MB gzip) in Daytona `us`, 2
vCPU.

**Expected behavior**
The design doc states the measured winner, the per-turn saving, the
one-time cost, and the work needed to build it.

## What Changed

- `doc/plans/2026-11-08-incremental-per-turn-workspace-upload.md`:
  - The status now reads: measured; snapshot chosen; not built.
  - New "Experiment results" table:
    - direct upload: 6.4 s per turn;
    - volume: 6.8 s per turn, which rules it out;
- snapshot: about 2–3.5 s per turn, after a 177 s build per seed
generation.
- Findings: fork is unsupported, compression is exhausted, and the
snapshot builder runs as `daytona` and does not extract archives.
- New "Work to build the snapshot seed" list: lifecycle, sandbox
creation, verification and fallback, expiry and cleanup, and rebuild
policy.

## Verification

Docs only. Every Daytona resource the experiment created was deleted,
and an account-wide listing confirmed none remained.

## Risks

None at runtime.

## Model Used

Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`, Anthropic), 1M context window, tool
use and code execution, via Claude Code.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-08 18:21:08 -06:00
DottaandClaude Opus 5.5 2a16be36ab docs(plans): per-turn follow-ups without re-uploading the repository (#20100)
## Thinking Path

- Per-turn remote sandboxes stay the default while warm reuse (#20048)
is on hold.
- On the paperclip clone, a per-turn follow-up spends about 13 s in
`workspace_sync.transfer`, though its changes pack in 0.5 s: every fresh
sandbox receives the whole 70 MB (gzip) seed again, at about 5 MB/s from
the controller.
- The coordinator asked for a design that uploads only changed files
into a fresh sandbox, with a full-upload fallback, measured against the
spans. It also asked to build it only if the implementation is bounded
and safe.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #20048

**What happened?**
Per-turn follow-ups on large repositories wait about 13 s re-uploading
the full workspace seed even when almost nothing changed (pack 0.54 s,
transfer 13.3 s, time to first token about 31 s).

**Steps to reproduce**
1. Run `tests/restart-chaos/ttft-baseline.ts --env daytona
--workspace-repo <paperclip clone>` with per-turn sandboxes.
2. Compare `workspace_sync.pack` and `workspace_sync.transfer` on the
follow-up turn.

**Expected behavior**
A follow-up uploads only its overlay into a sandbox that already holds
the seed, falling back to the full upload when unsure.

## What Changed

- `doc/plans/2026-11-08-incremental-per-turn-workspace-upload.md`. It
contains:
- the measured span table and the size analysis (220 MB archive, 70 MB
gzip, about 5 MB/s);
- the expected saving: about 12–13 s per follow-up, time to first token
about 31 s → about 18 s;
- a design keyed by seed generation with a content-hashed manifest,
using a Daytona snapshot (preferred) or a Daytona volume to hold the
seed;
  - the overlay-only turn flow, with a verified fallback;
  - one bounded experiment to choose the seed location before building.
- Not built yet: both seed locations need provider capabilities
(snapshot build time, volume read speed) that must be measured first, so
the implementation isn't bounded until the experiment picks one.

## Verification

Docs only.

## Risks

None at runtime.

## Model Used

Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`, Anthropic), 1M context window, tool
use and code execution, via Claude Code.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-08 14:21:24 -06:00
DottaandClaude Opus 5.5 c02fd8d427 docs(plans): salvage-then-retire design for kept restore-source and done-task warm sandboxes (#20087)
## Thinking Path

- Paperclip keeps some remote sandboxes after their run: warm ones for
reuse, and failed runs' stopped sandboxes as workspace-restore sources.
- In the warm Daytona chaos waves for #20048, the real leaks were
restore sources that nothing retires once a user Retry closes their
recovery actions. Separately, a done task's suspended warm sandbox is
only destroyed when its environment is deleted.
- Retiring them early needs a provider-I/O salvage step: compare against
the durable save, export anything unsaved to the issue, then destroy.
That spans recovery, storage, attachments and teardown. The coordinator
asked for a design note so it can be its own reviewed task instead of a
rushed patch.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #20048, #20085, #20086

**What happened?**
Closed restore sources and done-task warm sandboxes stay suspended until
their environment is deleted, costing storage. No path compares them
with the last durable save or exports their unsaved files before
retirement.

**Steps to reproduce**
1. A run fails; its sandbox is kept as a `retain_on_failure` restore
source.
2. The user clicks Retry; a fresh run succeeds and the task is done.
3. The restore-source sandbox is never retired until the environment is
deleted.

**Expected behavior**
After a clean compare, or a confirmed export of anything unsaved to the
issue, the sandbox is destroyed. If salvage fails, it stays suspended
and is retried.

## What Changed

- `doc/plans/2026-11-08-restore-source-salvage-and-warm-retirement.md`:
a design for one owned kind (`environment_kept_sandbox_retirement`) on
the shared reconciler. It covers listing rules for both cases (24 h
default retention for done-task warm sandboxes), a three-stage salvage
state machine (compare, export, retire) with a provider-I/O step and
receipt table, failure handling that never destroys without proof, and
the test plan.

## Verification

Docs only; no code or tests changed.

## Risks

None at runtime. Additive documentation.

## Model Used

Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`, Anthropic), 1M context window, tool
use and code execution, via Claude Code.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-08 14:13:05 -06:00
DottaandClaude Opus 5.5 b32ef9f111 perf(budgets): judge time to first visible agent activity; keep time to first text as a reported metric (#20077)
## Thinking Path

- The native speed budgets (plan invariant 8) judge how fast an agent
responds. They judged `task.time_to_first_token`: time to the first
deliverable **text**.
- In the clean local restart storm (w-20261108T153612-s9401), Claude
breached its TTFT budget (cold p50/p95 17.4/34.7 s against 16.5/30). The
per-run spans showed this was not a control-plane wait: in all 49 cold
runs (and 76% of warm), Claude started a tool call before writing any
text. Its first visible activity came at 7.4 s p50 from run creation;
first text came at 19.6 s. Codex never calls a tool first.
- So first text charges model tool work as latency for tool-first
adapters. What the user experiences as "the agent responded" is the
first visible activity: a text delta, a tool-call start, or a thinking
indicator.
- The coordinator decided: budgets judge time to first visible agent
activity from run creation, with the budget numbers unchanged; first
text stays a reported metric with no budget for tool-first adapters.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**
Local storm s9401: the Claude TTFT budget breached on every aggregate,
while the control-plane steps (queue 0.05 s, prepare 0.3 s, runner
startup ~4 s, first provider event 1.3–1.8 s) were well within budget.
The rest of the first-text wait was Claude streaming tool input (about
5.5 s per call) and running tools before it wrote text.

**Steps to reproduce**
1. Run a Claude task whose first action is a tool call (most real
tasks).
2. Read the run log: `provider.time_to_first_agent_event` ends at the
tool call; `task.time_to_first_token` ends many seconds later at the
first text.
3. The speed budget judges the later one and reports a breach.

**Expected behavior**
The budget judges the first visible agent activity from run creation
(`task.time_to_first_agent_activity`). Time to first text is still
recorded and reported.

## What Changed

- `server/src/services/native-runtime/native-session-executor.ts`: when
the first meaningful agent event commits (the existing
`firstMeaningfulAgentEventKind`: text delta, tool-call start, or
reasoning), record `task.time_to_first_agent_activity`. It uses the same
detached anchor resolution as TTFT (accepted comment, answered question,
durable wake request, or run creation), so it adds nothing to the turn
path.
- `server/src/services/native-runtime/native-speed-budgets.ts`: the
metric is now named `time_to_first_activity` (was `ttft`), with
identical budget numbers. The type comment documents the definition and
why first text is unbudgeted.
- `server/src/services/native-runtime/native-run-trace.ts`: the budget
check judges `task.time_to_first_agent_activity` from run creation,
keeping the existing input-wait handling. `task.time_to_first_token` is
no longer budgeted.
- `tests/restart-chaos/ttft-baseline-stats.ts` and `ttft-baseline.ts`:
report first activity from run creation (the budgeted value) next to
TTFT.
- Docs: `doc/observability.md` (new span) and
`doc/plans/2026-11-07-ttft-baseline.md` (metric table).
- Tests:
- A tool-first turn records first activity at the tool call (5 s) while
TTFT records first text (16 s).
- A tool-first trace with slow first text but fast first activity is
within budget.
  - The existing budget tests now judge the activity span.

Observability path (AGENTS.md section 5.7): the new run-log span uses
only the existing `eventKind` and `anchor` attributes. Its name survives
run-log redaction intact; checked with `redactEventPayload`. The
operator OTLP gate is unchanged. It is not Telemetry.

## Verification

- `cd server && npx vitest run
src/services/native-runtime/native-speed-budgets.test.ts
src/services/native-runtime/native-run-trace.test.ts`: 44/44 pass.
- `cd server && npx vitest run
src/services/native-runtime/native-session-executor.test.ts -t "first
visible activity|first assistant text once|first-token timing"`: 7/7
pass.
- `npx vitest run --root tests/restart-chaos`: 159/159 pass; `tsc` on
`tests/restart-chaos` is clean.

## Risks

- **A metric rename.** Consumers of `run.performance.budget_exceeded`
see `metric: "time_to_first_activity"` instead of `"ttft"`. In-repo
there are none besides the tests; Phase 3's chaos speed grade switches
to the new span.
- **A looser budget for slow first text.** Intentional: first text is
reported, not judged. A regression in control-plane latency still shows
up in first activity.

## Model Used

Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`, Anthropic), 1M context window, tool
use and code execution, via Claude Code.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-08 12:32:42 -06:00
DottaandClaude Opus 5.5 e8a3f1f6f2 feat(recovery): prove a replaced container's records gone through a fenced controller epoch (#20054)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - After a restart, the control plane settles in-progress records
(leases, claims, intents) only once it proves their owner process is
gone
> - The proof compares host and PID space, so a stamp from a replaced
container or a rebooted machine stays unprovable forever, and its
records never settle
> - Self-hosted users on Docker, Kubernetes and Fly hit this on every
redeploy; a Railway deployment with an exclusive volume is covered by
`deployment_replaced` (#20026)
> - This pull request adds a fenced controller epoch: each boot holds a
database lease, and an expired boot is fenced so its records can be
proven gone
> - The benefit is that work stranded by a replaced container is
recovered, without keeping an idle database awake

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Follow-up to #20026 and the Phase 2 durable-ownership data. Related:
#19965 (owner stamps), #19883 (process space). No duplicate PR was
found.

**What happened?**

A record stamped by a server process in another container reports
`different_process_space`. A dead PID elsewhere is never proof, so the
record stays `unprovable` and is never settled. Every redeploy of a
self-hosted container leaves such records behind.

**Expected behavior**

A record owned by a server boot that was replaced (stopped cleanly, or
lost its lease and was fenced) is proven gone and settled exactly once.
A live boot's records stay with it. An idle server issues no recurring
queries.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Run Paperclip in a container and start work, so an environment lease
is stamped by that boot.
2. Replace the container. The new container has a new PID namespace.
3. The ownership reconciler reports `different_process_space`
(unprovable) for the old lease, forever.

**Paperclip version or commit**

`master` before this PR.

## What Changed

- New `controller_instances` table (migration 0449): boot id, epoch
(bigserial), process space, pid, a lease on the database clock,
`fenced_at` / `fenced_by_epoch`, `stopped_at`.
- `controller-instance-lease.ts`, registered with the shared
delivery-work coordinator (`controller-instance-lease` queue, runs
during drain):
- **Holds work → renews; idle → silent.** One upsert creates the row on
first use and extends the lease only if the boot holds work: a stamp
within the last 90 s, or a stamp whose ownership write may still be
pending (held until the server's tracked work settles, capped at 10
minutes; a renewal that sees some other held record does not clear it,
so a slow ownership write cannot be outlived), or an in-progress record
held by its boot id. Those records are active environment leases,
in-flight cleanup claims, sandbox creation intents, workspace finalize
attempts, agent lifecycle steps, native finalizer and cleanup leases
(`lease_holder` bound to the token), open native coordinator claims, and
running legacy runs. Renewal runs every 30 s while the boot holds work.
When it finds none, the lease lapses and the worker sleeps until the
next stamp (`onControllerStamp`).
- **No idle trailing statements.** When the server's last tracked work
settles, the worker re-checks holdings at once, at most every 5 s (the
rate limit also absorbs the worker's own run). So the last check happens
with the work, not 30 s later.
- **Quiesce, don't crash.** Each renewal has a 10 s bound. A failed or
timed-out renewal applies an internal task drain, so no new work is
dispatched. A recovered renewal resumes. The boot exits only after 60 s
of failure (counted from the first failed attempt's start) while it
still holds work, or at once when it finds itself fenced.
- **Fence on demand, by a newer epoch.** For a stamp from another host
or PID space, the prover reads that boot's row:
    - `stopped` or `fenced`: gone.
    - live lease: alive.
- otherwise, the boot's last sign of life is the later of its lease
expiry and the record's last write plus the TTL. Within 30 s of that,
the owner stays `alive` (`controller_lease_grace`), so the settle watch
keeps rechecking. After that, the prover fences the boot, but only with
a lease row of its own (created on demand) and only an older epoch.
  - A graceful shutdown records `stopped_at`.
- A reconciliation pass that settles nothing (`record: false` or
`settle: false`) never fences and never creates the boot's row.
- `owner-proof.ts`: these proofs apply only to server-held records. A
stamp with a recorded process group stays unprovable, because agent
processes can outlive their server. The reconciler passes each record's
`updatedAt` to the proof.
- `task-admission.ts`:
- the quiesce drain never replaces an operator's drain, and has no idle
owner, so HTTP stays open;
- a `subscribeIdleWorkSettled` hook fires when the last tracked work
finishes.
- Off on a Railway deployment with an exclusive volume (it has its own
replacement proof). `PAPERCLIP_CONTROLLER_INSTANCE_LEASE=on|off`
overrides this. A stateless Railway service keeps the lease. A server
without its own lease row never fences.
- `maintenance-server-routes.test.ts`: in the post-run quiet window, the
lease may check once more that the run's records were released. The test
now excludes those statements, then asserts that the lease issues
nothing in a further window.
- Docs: `doc/execution-semantics.md`; the Phase 2 data doc records the
two known gaps.

## Verification

- `controller-instance-lease.test.ts` (15 cases):
- a replaced container with all Railway variables empty is fenced and
settled exactly once over two passes;
  - a live lease is alive;
- an owner in grace, and work written after an idle lapse, stay alive
and watched;
  - an older epoch never fences a newer one;
- no fencing without its own lease row (off or unregistered), and an
idle prover creates its row on demand;
  - a stopped boot is gone;
  - process-group stamps stay unprovable;
- idle issues zero statements, and one upsert renews only while records
are held;
  - **a 45 s outage:** quiesced, no exit, resumes;
- **a renewal that never answers:** bounded, and the boot exits on time;
- **a 70 s outage:** exits at 60–65 s, and the successor recovers the
work exactly once;
  - fenced: stops;
  - the settle re-check;
- graceful stop; off on a volume-exclusive Railway deployment, on for a
stateless one, and the on/off override;
  - a running legacy run keeps the lease live.
- Red, with the proof's instance check removed: the replaced-container,
live, stopped and successor cases fail.
- Wider: task-drain, idle-sleep, idle-local-work, owner-proof and
ownership suites, plus the maintenance quiet-window tests. Server
low-memory typecheck is clean.

## Risks

- **Clock skew.** The proof compares a record's `updatedAt` (often the
writer's clock) with the lease (database clock). The 30 s grace absorbs
ordinary skew.
- **A new exit path exists.** A server whose database is unreachable for
more than 60 s while it holds work now exits, after first quiescing.
This is the intended safety backstop.
- **Bounded trailing activity.** A lease that holds work issues one
statement every 30 s, plus at most one check when its work settles. An
idle server issues none.
- **Boots from before this release** have no row, and their records stay
unprovable. The board "mark owner gone" action for those follows in a
separate PR.

## Model Used

- Anthropic Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`), via Claude Code with
tool use.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-08 11:06:32 -06:00
DottaandClaude Opus 5.5 c966334ec3 fix(recovery): settle a run-less lease once its stamped holder is proven gone (#20026)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - The control plane recovers in-progress records after a server
restart through a shared ownership path
> - Run-less sandbox leases (login, probe, harness verification) were
released only by a five-minute idle sweep
> - That sweep releases by age: it leaves a dead holder's sandbox for
minutes and takes a live login session's sandbox
> - This pull request settles a run-less lease only when its stamped
holder is proven gone
> - The benefit is no stuck sandbox after a restart, and no live session
loses its sandbox

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Related: #19965 (named the owner of login/probe leases), #19964 (the
run-lease settle this mirrors). No duplicate PR was found.

**What happened?**

The final Daytona chaos wave `w-20261108T083036-s9401` recorded I2
`environment_login_probe_lease` (`pid_dead`) on 2 records. These were
the codex agent's harness-verification leases. A restart killed their
holder. The leases stayed `active` until the five-minute idle sweep
released them. The same sweep releases any run-less lease after five
idle minutes, also when its holder is alive.

**Expected behavior**

A run-less lease is released as soon as its stamped holder is proven
gone. A lease whose holder is alive is never released, however long it
is idle.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Start a Daytona wave: `node cli/node_modules/tsx/dist/cli.mjs
tests/restart-chaos/main.ts --env daytona --daytona-image <image>`
(K1/K4 faults).
2. Let a fault kill the server while an agent's harness verification
holds its sandbox lease.
3. See the reconciler report I2 `environment_login_probe_lease` until
the idle sweep releases it.

**Paperclip version or commit**

`master` at `8475826d2d`.

## What Changed

- New `settleEnvironmentLoginProbeLease`, registered on
`environment_login_probe_lease`. It runs only for a stamped holder that
is proven gone, and compares and swaps on that exact stamp.
- It moves the lease to `pending_cleanup` with the recovered-orphan
reason, so the cleanup sweep destroys the sandbox in its next tick.
- It leaves the lease alone when a legacy shutdown fence applies, or
when another live lease holds the same provider resource.
- The idle sweep for run-less leases now covers only legacy rows saved
before holders were stamped (no `leaseController` key). Stamped rows are
never released by age.
- `holderUnchanged` is now exported from the run-lease settle so both
settles share it.
- The controller stamp (`leaseController`, and every other
`ControllerProcess` stamp) now records the platform deployment when the
platform names one (Railway: project, environment, service, deployment,
volume). `controllerStamp` passes it to `proveOwnerGone`. A container
redeploy changes the PID space, and the old stamp would read
`different_process_space` (unprovable) forever. Now the existing
`deployment_replaced` proof shows the old holder gone. This also covers
`environment_run_lease_active` and the other kinds built on
`controllerStamp`.
- `currentDeploymentIdentity` in `owner-proof.ts` now delegates to
`currentControllerDeployment`, so there is one parser.
- Data doc: added the final Daytona wave, the six Daytona-only crash
points (4 pass, 2 not reached, no violations), and the cause of the
roughly 450 s codex TTFT. Runs waited behind the agent's harness
verification, which restarted after each fault; boot itself took about
32 s.
- Restart-chaos README: corrected which Daytona crash points a plain
task reaches.

## Verification

- Red, before the change:
`environment-login-probe-lease-ownership.test.ts` failed 3 of 6. No
settle happened, and the idle sweep released 3 live holders' leases.
- Green: `pnpm exec vitest run` passes for
`environment-login-probe-lease-ownership`,
`environment-run-lease-ownership` and
`heartbeat-orphaned-active-lease-sweep` (45/45), and for
`environment-lease-owner-stamps`,
`heartbeat-observed-workspace-preservation`,
`ownership-reconciliation-report`, `heartbeat/recovery` and
`workspace-recovery-warm-handoff`.
- Redeploy: a stamp from a replaced Railway deployment settles with
`deployment_replaced`. A stamp from the same deployment in another PID
space stays `active`. This was red when `controllerStamp` dropped the
deployment.
- Live-owner counter-cases: the current process, another live PID,
another PID space, and a lease re-stamped after the proof all stay
`active`. A read-only pass never settles.
- Not re-run live: the Daytona wave and crash points ran before this
fix. The next Daytona wave should show no
`environment_login_probe_lease` I2.

## Risks

- A stamped run-less lease whose live holder never releases it, because
of a bug in that process, is no longer released after five idle minutes.
It is released once that process exits. This is the intended trade:
never take a live holder's sandbox.
- On an ephemeral server without a platform deployment identity (not
Railway), a stamp from a replaced container is still unprovable. Such a
run-less lease stays `active` until the provider expires the sandbox,
and the reconciler reports it as unprovable. Before this PR, the
five-minute sweep released it by age. This is the same open gap as
unstamped legacy leases on an ephemeral server: there is no operator
action yet. It is listed as a Phase 2 follow-up.
- Legacy unstamped run-less leases keep the age fallback. These are rows
written before #19965, and no current code writes them.

## Model Used

- Anthropic Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`), via Claude Code with
tool use.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-08 06:43:45 -06:00
DottaandClaude Opus 5.5 68d5fb5a6e feat(chaos): check I6 and I8 per crash point; ready the Daytona points (#19984)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - The on-demand crash-point suite (#19946) kills the control plane at
named durable write boundaries and checks the plan's invariants
> - Its first full run measured I1–I4 and I7, but I5, I6 and I8 were
reported as not measured
> - #19960 (generation stamping) and #19863 (speed budgets) now record
what I6 and I8 need in the run log
> - The six Daytona-only points have not run yet, and three of them
cannot be reached by a plain task
> - This pull request checks I6 and I8 per point, names the I5 gap, and
readies the Daytona points for the coming Daytona wave
> - The benefit is that every invariant is either asserted or a named
gap, and a Daytona run explains any point it cannot reach

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #19831 (plan, Phase 5). Follows #19946 (the suite). Uses #19960
(event generations) and #19863 (speed budgets).

**Problem**
- The suite reported I5, I6 and I8 as "not measured".
- A Daytona run would report three points as `not_reached` with no
reason.
- A Daytona run without its key or image failed only after a 3-minute
boot.

**Expected behavior**
- I6 and I8 are checked at each point.
- I5 is a named gap with its reason.
- Daytona points say what they need, and a Daytona run checks its inputs
before it boots.

## What Changed

- `tests/restart-chaos/invariants.ts`: `runLogViolations` checks two
invariants from the run log, scoped to the wave's company:
- I6: a run that failed with an error that names a stale or
earlier-generation event;
- I8: each `run.performance.budget_exceeded` event, with the budget
evidence (metric, measured, p95, adapter, start kind).
Both are keyed by run or event id, so the per-point baseline diff
charges each one to the point that produced it. I5 is reported as
`notMeasured` with a reason (`I5_GAP`).
- `packages/shared/src/crash-point-registry.ts`: an optional
`prerequisite` on the three Daytona points a plain task cannot reach.
These are the teardown claim (needs a failed release), the reusable
destroy (needs a `reuse_by_environment` lease), and stop-and-retain.
- `tests/restart-chaos/crash-points.ts`:
- `--list` prints each point's `needs:`, and a `not_reached` result
names it too;
- `--env daytona` refuses to start without `DAYTONA_API_KEY` and an
image.
- Docs: the README and the plan describe the I5/I6/I8 coverage and the
Daytona points.

## Verification

- `pnpm exec vitest run --config tests/restart-chaos/vitest.config.ts
tests/restart-chaos/crash-points.test.ts`: 12 passed.
- `cd packages/shared && npx vitest run src/crash-points.test.ts`: 15
passed.
- `node scripts/typecheck-test-projects.mjs tests/restart-chaos` and
`npx tsc --noEmit -p packages/shared` both pass.
- I ran `runLogViolations` against a throwaway Postgres 18 with seeded
rows, then stopped and deleted it. It returned:
  - I8 for the budget breach, with its evidence;
- I6 for the run of this company that failed on
`stale_generation_event`.
It excluded the other company's stale run, the `process_lost` run and a
non-budget event.
- `node scripts/crash-points.mjs --list --env daytona` lists 19 points,
with `needs:` on the three. `--env daytona` with no key or image fails
at once with the missing names.
- No harness run: the harness slot is held for other work. The next
suite run exercises the new checks.

## Risks

- Test harness only; no product code.
- I6 is a proxy: it matches the run's error text and code. A failure
that names a generation for another reason would be reported, with its
evidence, for a person to judge.
- I8 can flag breaches on a loaded host. Each breach carries its
measured and budget values, so a load-caused breach is visible as one.

## Model Used

- Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`), Anthropic, via Claude Code with
tool use (shell, file edits).

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-08 00:06:01 -06:00
DottaandClaude Opus 5.5 46bf913fb9 docs(plans): record the Pi steer duplicate after a restart and its follow-up (#19982)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - A person can steer a running Codex or Pi turn, and since #19970 a
queued follow-up steers automatically
> - Restart recovery (#19962) delivers a steered message that the model
did not read before the restart, exactly once for Codex
> - Pi gives the run log no read evidence for a steer, so after a
restart a Pi steer that the model already read can arrive again
> - The fix needs changes to the closure-pinned Pi distribution, which
waits for the next Pi re-qualification
> - This pull request records the limit and the follow-up plan so they
are not lost
> - The benefit is that the next Pi re-qualification can include the
definitive fix

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What is the documentation problem?**
The Pi steering limit after a restart, and its planned fix, were only in
pull request text and session notes.

**Where?**
`doc/plans/2026-11-07-pi-steer-restart-limit.md` (new).

**What should it say?**
Codex delivers an unread steered message exactly once after a restart.
Pi can duplicate a message it already read, and never loses one. The
note also gives the reasons, the follow-up plan (option A), its costs,
and the rejected options.

Refs #19962, Refs #19970

## What Changed

- New `doc/plans/2026-11-07-pi-steer-restart-limit.md`. It covers the
limit, why Pi has no read evidence, the follow-up (forward Pi's native
user `message_start` through pi-acp, acpx, the sidecar and Rust into a
`userMessage` item), its re-qualification costs, and the rejected
options.

## Verification

- Documentation only. Read the note. The facts match
`packages/paperclip-runner/src/steering-delivery.ts`,
`patches/pi-acp@0.0.33.patch`, `pi-closure-pins.ts` and
`rules/acpx-profile-identity.mdc`.

## Risks

- None. Documentation only.

## Model Used

- Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`), Anthropic, via Claude Code with
tool use.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-07 23:51:57 -06:00
DottaandClaude Opus 5.5 051834bdc8 feat(chaos): add the on-demand crash-point suite and its manual CI workflow (#19946)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - A control-plane restart between two durable writes leaves an
in-progress record owned by a dead process
> - Random restart-chaos waves found these 20 ms–1 s windows only by
luck
> - #19937 added `crashPoint(name)`, and #19938 put it at 20 durable
write boundaries
> - Nothing yet runs a task, kills the server at a chosen point,
restarts it, and checks the plan's invariants
> - This pull request adds that on-demand suite, as a local command and
as a manual CI workflow (not a required check, per Decision 2)
> - The benefit is a repeatable work list: which boundary breaks which
invariant, for Phases 2–4

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #19831 (plan, Phase 5 and Decision 2). Refs #19861 (report-only
reconciler used for I1–I7). Stacked on #19938 (call sites), which is
stacked on #19937 (helper).

**Problem**
The named crash points cannot be exercised end to end. No command arms
one point, runs real agent tasks across it, restarts, and grades the
result.

**Expected behavior**
`node scripts/crash-points.mjs --points <glob> --kinds <id> --adapters
<list>` runs one wave per selected point and reports each point as pass,
fail (with failing R rules and violated invariants), not reached, or
harness error. A `workflow_dispatch` workflow runs the same thing on
demand.

## What Changed

- **Runtime arming.** `PAPERCLIP_CRASH_POINT_CONTROL=<file>`, in the
shared helper and the runner mirror. Each hit reads `<token>
<name>[:<nth>]`, and a new token resets the count. It is test mode only:
`NODE_ENV=production` ignores it, and the disarmed path is still one
comparison.
- **`tests/restart-chaos/main.ts --crash-point
<a>:<nth>,<b>:<nth>,...`** (config, types, ledger):
  - one booted server and no Vite UI;
- per point: take an invariant baseline, launch the point's batch, arm
the point, then on rest disarm it and check invariants as violations
that are new since the baseline;
  - every task is graded R1–R6 and T;
  - `crash-point.json` (v2) holds one entry per point.
- **`tests/restart-chaos/supervisor.ts`:**
  - every spawn gets the control file;
- a SIGKILL whose receipt names the child's pid is restarted like K1:
the control file is emptied first, the owned tree is killed, and a
replacement starts. A failed tree cleanup fails the fault;
- the isolated instance pins `PAPERCLIP_IN_WORKTREE=false` (a
`.paperclip/.env` above the checkout otherwise suppressed all
scheduling);
  - `RESTART_CHAOS_HEALTH_TIMEOUT_MS`.
- **`tests/restart-chaos/invariants.ts`:**
- the Phase 1 report-only pass with `record: false`: two real-clock
passes for I1 and I2, and one pass 15 minutes ahead for I3, I4 and I7;
  - spool kinds are read from the wave's instance;
  - an unfinished pass is a harness error;
  - each violation carries its wake and run state as evidence.
- **`tests/restart-chaos/crash-points.ts` and
`scripts/crash-points.mjs`:**
- select points by glob, kind and environment, and run them in one wave;
  - a per-point outcome: pass, fail, not_reached or harness_error;
  - `SUMMARY.md` with a violation evidence column.
- **`.github/workflows/crash-points.yml`**, manual only, under the
paid-workflow contract:
  - a credential-free `authorize` job;
  - a `suite` job in `runner-e2e-paid` whose first step reauthorizes;
  - a frozen install with `--ignore-scripts` and no shared cache;
  - only the selected adapters' keys;
  - the workflow is added to both security-test allowlists.
- **Docs:** "Crash-point suite" in `tests/restart-chaos/README.md`, and
"Built (Phase 5)" plus the first work list in the plan.

## Verification

- Focused tests:
- `pnpm exec vitest run --config tests/restart-chaos/vitest.config.ts
tests/restart-chaos/crash-points.test.ts`;
- `cd packages/shared && npx vitest run src/crash-points.test.ts`: 15
tests, including runtime arming in a real child process;
- `node --test scripts/__tests__/release-verify-workflow.test.mjs`: 72
tests;
  - `tests/runner-e2e/workflow-security.test.ts`: 19 tests.
- Typecheck: `node scripts/typecheck-test-projects.mjs
tests/restart-chaos` passes.
- Loop line: question "how long is one crash-point loop?" | loop: `node
scripts/crash-points.mjs --points <one>` (codex A1) | elapsed 2.7 min
end to end: boot 9 s, crash 9 s after arming, replacement ready in 6 s,
rest about 2 min | result: one point alone takes about 3 min. Before
this change it took about 15 min (one cold boot per point, Vite UI, host
at load 77).
- Full local run, 14 points, codex A1, 11.8 min in all:
- every point was reached (the server killed itself at each one, and the
replacement came back);
  - 11 pass;
- `workspace.finalize.after_start_before_copyback` and
`workspace.finalize.after_copyback_before_done` fail I2 and R6: a
`workspace_finalize` operation stays running after the run succeeded;
- `wake.claim.after_run_running_before_wakeup_claimed` reports I4. Its
evidence shows the wake failed with "…retrying once", and the retry
delivered the work, so this is the known refusal-regex false positive.
- The 6 Daytona-only points were not run.

## Risks

- Test harness and an on-demand workflow only. No product code changes.
- `.github/**` needs a CODEOWNER review. The workflow uses provider
keys, so it refuses non-default branches and actors that are not on the
allowlist, like `runner-full-stack-e2e.yml`.
- `PAPERCLIP_IN_WORKTREE=false` is pinned in every chaos wave, not only
crash-point waves. A chaos instance is never a worktree dev instance, so
scheduling must not be suppressed.

## Model Used

- Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`), Anthropic, via Claude Code with
tool use (shell, file edits).

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-07 23:41:15 -06:00
DottaandClaude Opus 5.5 b4842df1e4 docs(plans): Phase 2 Daytona wave results (#19947)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Phase 2 of the durable-ownership plan moves in-progress record kinds
to one shared ownership path, guided by chaos data.
> - The first data doc (#19927) covered local waves only. Remote
runners, leases and sandboxes need a Daytona wave.
> - This pull request adds the results of one Daytona wave to the data
doc.
> - The benefit is that Phase 2 and Phase 3 prioritize remote kinds from
measured data.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #19927 (data doc), #19934 (claimed-wake settle), #19863 (speed
budgets).

**What is the problem?**
The Phase 2 data doc had no remote data.

**Where is it documented?**
`doc/plans/2026-11-07-phase2-reconciler-data.md`.

**What should change?**
Add the Daytona wave's per-kind violations, settle latency, failures and
speed numbers.

## What Changed

- Added a "Daytona wave" section: 6 tasks with K1, K2 and two K4 outages
of about 575 s. 5 of 6 passed, and R6 was clean.
- Recorded the t03 failure: a Retry was cancelled by the company-wide
accounting gate (Phase 3 scope).
- Recorded the claimed-wake leak again (#19934 fixes it) and remote
settle times of 76–107 s.
- Corrected the earlier note about the image content-ID mismatch.

## Verification

- Wave `w-20261108T012041-s9301`; the numbers come from a copy of the
kept database and the read-only ownership sampler.
- This is a docs-only change.

## Risks

- Low. Docs only. The samples are small and the doc says so.

## Model Used

- Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`), Anthropic, in Claude Code with
tool use (shell, file edits).

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [ ] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-07 20:37:38 -06:00
DottaandClaude Opus 5.5 f35eb1e5ef fix(observability): judge the TTFT budget from run creation; report the wait behind a live turn (#19941)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Invariant 8 of the durable-ownership plan says turns must start
fast. #19863 added per-run speed budgets that write
`run.performance.budget_exceeded` to the run log.
> - The Phase 2 chaos data (#19927) showed follow-up TTFT about 3x over
the claude budget.
> - The cause is measurement scope. A follow-up comment posted during a
live turn waits for that turn to end, and TTFT is anchored at the
comment. The budgets came from idle follow-ups.
> - This pull request judges the TTFT budget from run creation and
reports the wait separately.
> - The benefit is that budget breaches point at real start-up slowness,
not at time spent behind a turn the user is already watching.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #19863 (speed budgets), #19927 (Phase 2 data), #19852 (startup
sub-spans), #19888 (warm default).

**What happened?**
In two local storm waves, C1 follow-up runs breached the claude warm
TTFT budget (p50 27.6–29.9 s against 9.5 s). Their spans show
`comment.to_run_created` at 6–62 s (waiting for the live turn), then
session resume at 1.4–3.8 s and submit-to-first-event at 2–5 s. Codex
without the wait was about 4.8 s, the same as the warm-follow-up
baseline.

**What did you expect?**
The budget should judge start-up latency, which is what its baseline
measured. The wait behind a live turn should be visible but not judged.

**Steps to reproduce**
1. Run a local chaos storm with C1 tasks.
2. Read `run.performance.budget_exceeded` rows with metric `ttft` for
`issue_commented` runs, and compare them with each run's
`comment.to_run_created` span.

## What Changed

- `native-run-trace.ts`: the TTFT budget check measures from run
creation (start of `heartbeat.queue`, or end of the ingress span). The
TTFT span itself does not change.
- `native-speed-budgets.ts`: breaches can carry `inputWaitMs` (TTFT
only).
- `tests/restart-chaos/ttft-baseline-stats.ts` and `ttft-baseline.ts`:
the wait behind a live turn is its own measured step (`inputWait`), next
to the full TTFT and the TTFT from run creation. The TTFT table gains a
"Wait behind live turn" column. The full comment-to-first-token time
stays the user-visible metric.
- `doc/run-log-events.md` and the plan's speed-budget section describe
the rule.

## Verification

- `cd server && npx vitest run
src/services/native-runtime/native-speed-budgets.test.ts
src/services/native-runtime/native-run-trace.test.ts`: 43 pass, 2 new.
`pnpm exec vitest run --config tests/restart-chaos/vitest.config.ts
tests/restart-chaos/ttft-baseline-stats.test.ts`: 12 pass, 1 new. They
cover a follow-up under budget after a 60 s wait (no breach), a
follow-up over budget (breach with `inputWaitMs`), and queueing after
run creation still judged.
- Server typecheck passes.

## Risks

- Low. This is a run-log-only change (AGENTS.md §5.7): no Telemetry and
no span attributes change.
- A slow wait before run creation is no longer a TTFT budget breach. The
TTFT span still records it, and the breach payload names it. Admission
holds after run creation are still judged.

## Model Used

- Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`), Anthropic, in Claude Code with
tool use (shell, file edits).

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [ ] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-07 20:27:41 -06:00
DottaandClaude Opus 5.5 17b9e10252 docs(plans): Phase 2 reconciler data; let chaos K4 holds reach 600 s (#19927)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Control-plane restarts leave in-progress records that each subsystem
releases in its own way. The durable-ownership plan replaces those paths
with one shared path.
> - Phase 1 added a report-only reconciler. Its light local waves showed
zero violations, and that proves little.
> - Phase 2 moves kinds to the shared path. It needs data that shows
which kinds really leak, and the speed numbers to protect.
> - This pull request records that data from harsher waves. It also
fixes the harness so that K4 outages past the reconnect grace qualify.
> - The benefit is that Phase 2 moves kinds in order of measured risk,
against a known speed baseline.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #19831 (durable-ownership plan), #19861 (report-only reconciler),
#19863 (speed budgets), #19797 (K4 hold cap).

**What is the problem?**
Phase 2 needs per-kind invariant data and speed data from harsh restart
waves. Only light local waves existed. In addition, a K4 hold over about
405 s always failed its fault receipt, so the 600 s cap from #19797
could not be used.

**Where is it documented?**
`doc/plans/2026-11-07-durable-ownership-and-reconciliation.md` (Phase 2
rows) and `tests/restart-chaos/README.md`.

**What should change?**
Record the data in a dated plan doc. Let chaos K4 holds run up to 600 s
and still qualify.

## What Changed

- Added `doc/plans/2026-11-07-phase2-reconciler-data.md`. It covers 5
unmasked local waves (two storms, a crash loop, two K4 runs). It gives
per-kind violation counts with example rows, owner verdicts, TTFT, boot
and restart recovery against the budgets, Phase 3 gate notes, and what
is not covered (Daytona).
- Added a short pointer to that doc in the durable-ownership plan.
- `tests/restart-chaos`: new flag `--k4-hold-max-seconds` (120–600). It
raises the upper end of the seeded K4 hold. The default range (120–300
s) does not change.
- `tests/runner-e2e/controller-outage.ts`: the receipt's ready bound is
now a parameter (`CONTROLLER_READY_BY_MS`, default 420 s). Runner suites
keep 420 s. The chaos supervisor passes hold + 420 s, so a hold past the
Runner's reconnect grace qualifies.

## Verification

- `pnpm exec vitest run --config tests/restart-chaos/vitest.config.ts`:
12 files, 135 tests pass, including the new flag test.
- `pnpm exec vitest run --config tests/runner-e2e/vitest.config.ts
tests/runner-e2e/controller-outage.test.ts`: 36 pass, including the new
long-hold receipt test.
- `node scripts/typecheck-test-projects.mjs tests/restart-chaos` and
`tests/runner-e2e`: pass.
- Live: the K4 wave at seed 9203 failed 3 of 6 tasks with the old bound
(fault error "did not produce a qualifying replacement receipt"). It
passed 6 of 6 with this fix, with holds of 294–579 s.

## Risks

- Low risk. The changes are test harness code and docs only. The runner
suites keep the 420 s ready bound by default.
- The data is local only. The doc says which kinds the waves do not
reach.

## Model Used

- Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`), Anthropic, in Claude Code with
tool use (shell, file edits). The model ran the chaos waves and wrote
the analysis and code.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [ ] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-07 19:55:02 -06:00
DottaandClaude Opus 5.5 99529f9d71 feat(observability): local speed budgets and a run-log budget check (#19863)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - When someone messages an agent, the reply must start as fast as
possible, and restart-safety work must not slow it
> - The durable ownership plan makes this invariant 8 ("fast turns") and
asks Phase 1 to turn the Phase 0 baseline into p50/p95 budgets per
adapter
> - Without budgets, a regression in time to first token, agent boot or
restart recovery shows up only when someone reruns the baseline by hand
> - This pull request records the budgets and adds a per-run check that
writes a run-log row when a run exceeds its p95 budget
> - The benefit is that every later phase can show "no regression
against the budgets" from the run log, without new waits on the turn
path

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #19831 (plan, "Performance constraint", rule 4, and invariant 8).
Refs #19846 (the Phase 0 baseline these budgets come from). Stacked on
#19861.

**Problem**
The plan requires p50/p95 budgets per adapter for TTFT, agent boot and
restart recovery latency, and a check against them. Neither exists.

**Expected behavior**
Budgets are recorded in the plan and in code. A run that exceeds a p95
budget gets one run-log row that names the metric, the measurement and
the budget.

**Impact**
Phase 2–5 exit criteria can cite budget breaches from chaos waves and
staging. The check adds no wait before `turn.start`.

## What Changed

- New `server/src/services/native-runtime/native-speed-budgets.ts`: the
local budget table (codex, claude, opencode) for TTFT and agent boot
(cold and warm) and restart recovery latency. Each budget is 1.2× the
baseline, rounded up to 0.5 s. `evaluateSpeedBudget` judges one run
against p95. An unknown start kind uses the looser budget. Remote runs
and adapters without a baseline are not judged.
- `native-run-trace.ts`: the trace takes an optional `budget` subject.
It checks `task.time_to_first_token`, agent boot (end of
`heartbeat.queue` to the end of the first `runner.turn.submit` or
`runner.session.resume`) and restart recovery once each. It writes
`run.performance.budget_exceeded` through `defer`, so the write is
detached from the event path. `finish` now drains diagnostics that defer
more work.
- `native-session-executor.ts`: passes the adapter and environment to
the trace, labels cold or warm at the existing `provider_session` reuse
receipts, and checks restart recovery at a recovered run's first
provider event, measured from the startup recovery `ready` time.
- Docs: budget tables in
`doc/plans/2026-11-07-durable-ownership-and-reconciliation.md` ("Speed
budgets (Phase 1)"), and the new event in `doc/run-log-events.md`.

## Verification

- `npx vitest run
src/services/native-runtime/native-speed-budgets.test.ts
src/services/native-runtime/native-run-trace.test.ts` (in `server/`): 34
tests pass. They cover:
  - every budget has p50 ≤ p95;
  - the provider-to-adapter mapping;
  - p95 judgement, and the looser budget when the start kind is unknown;
- one breach for a slow boot, and none for a second submit or a fast
TTFT;
  - a deferred TTFT breach is written before the trace closes;
  - restart recovery is checked once;
  - remote runs and runs with no budget subject write nothing.
- `npx tsc --noEmit -p server`: no errors.

## Risks

- Low risk. This is a run-log change only (AGENTS.md §5.7, no extra
review). The OTLP and Telemetry paths are unchanged.
- The baseline samples are small (2–12 per cell) on a shared host.
Budgets carry 20% headroom, and the codex restart budget (8.0 s p95) is
tight. Expect some breach rows on a loaded machine. They are diagnostics
and change no behavior.
- Restart-recovery budgets use run 4 of the baseline, as merged in
#19846.
- Restart recovery is measured from the startup recovery `ready` time to
the first provider event, which matches the baseline definition.
- Previous-release story: no persisted run state changes. The new event
is additive.

## Model Used

- Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`), Anthropic, in Claude Code with
tool use and code execution.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-07 15:27:42 -06:00
DottaandClaude Opus 5.5 d5dd09c966 docs(plans): design turn-scoped ACPX MCP authority; correct the Claude baseline (#19912)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Follow-up messages must start fast. #19888 made Codex and OpenCode
follow-ups 2.6–5× faster by keeping their runners warm.
> - Claude (ACPX) did not gain, because ACPX relaunches the Claude
process and reloads its session on every follow-up (3.2–4.2 s).
> - That relaunch is a safety boundary: the ACPX MCP endpoint lives as
long as the process and cannot attribute a tool call to a turn, so
reaping the process is the proof against late calls.
> - Removing it needs a new authority model, which needs a reviewed
design before any code.
> - This pull request adds that design and corrects the Claude baseline.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #19888 (warm default), #19846 (TTFT baseline, finding 4).

**Docs issue**
The TTFT docs did not explain why Claude follow-ups relaunch, what
removing that would require, or the corrected Claude numbers.

**What is wrong or missing**
`doc/plans/2026-11-07-warm-follow-up-ttft.md` reported a Claude
follow-up at 10.5 s, measured under heavy host load. A quieter
re-measurement gives 6.3 s per-turn against 7.1 s warm. There was no
design for removing the per-turn relaunch.

**Proposed fix**
A design document for turn-scoped ACPX MCP authority, and a
corrected-baseline section in the warm follow-up doc.

## What Changed

- New `doc/plans/2026-11-07-turn-scoped-acpx-mcp-authority.md`, which
covers:
  - the measured cost breakdown;
- how the current boundary works (tool bridge bearer, call-ID
tombstones, `restart_idle_provider`, `run.attach`);
- a threat model (late tool calls from a settled turn, replay,
credential replay, cross-turn and cross-run confusion, restart replay);
- three candidate designs with their safety arguments: turn-scoped
credentials in a live session, a proof that no calls are in flight, and
an in-process session reload with per-generation credentials, which is
recommended for a spike;
- restart and chaos implications, the expected TTFT gain, and next
steps.
- `doc/plans/2026-11-07-warm-follow-up-ttft.md`: corrected Claude
baseline. Per_turn stays the default; the earlier 10.5 s was host noise.
Finding 4 now points to the design and drops the idle-retirement idea,
which would only bring warm level with per-turn.
- Docs only. No code changes until Dotta has reviewed the design and a
security review is done.

## Verification

- The Claude numbers come from `ttft-baseline.ts --adapters claude
--samples 6 --phases coldwarm --lifecycle <per_turn|warm>` on master
`fc6e1b0346` (load average about 9).
- The step breakdown comes from temporary timing in runnerd's ACPX
backend. It was not committed.
- `node scripts/check-maps.mjs` passes.

## Risks

- Docs only. The design proposes no behavior change until it has been
reviewed.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

- Anthropic Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`) in Claude Code, with
tool use (shell, file edit, test execution).

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-07 15:24:12 -06:00
DottaandClaude Opus 5.5 fc6e1b0346 perf(native): keep local Codex and OpenCode runners warm by default (#19888)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - When someone messages an agent, the turn must start fast. Time to
first token (TTFT) is a first-class metric.
> - The Phase 0 baseline (#19846) found that every local turn launches a
new runner and loads the provider session again, because `per_turn` is
the default lifecycle. That made a follow-up message slower than a new
task.
> - Warm runners keep the runner and provider session alive between
runs. #19874 fixed the defect that broke warm OpenCode follow-ups, and
#19879 bounds an idle warm runner whose controller dies.
> - This pull request makes warm the default for local Codex and
OpenCode agents, and migrates existing agents that only carried the old
creation default.
> - The benefit: follow-up TTFT p50 drops from 12.0 s to 4.7 s (Codex)
and from 21.7 s to 4.2 s (OpenCode), with no new restart-chaos failures.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #19846 (TTFT baseline), #19852 (startup sub-spans), #19874 (warm
completion contract), #19879 (warm reconnect grace).

**What existing behavior does this improve?**
The default runner lifecycle for native agents, and how a follow-up
message starts.

**Current behavior**
Agent creation writes `lifecycleMode: "per_turn"` into every native
agent. Every follow-up launches a new runner and restores the provider
session: 4.2 s (Codex) and 16.3 s (OpenCode) at p50 before the turn
starts.

**Proposed behavior**
New native agents store no lifecycle. On a local target, an unset
lifecycle resolves to `warm` with the default 5-minute idle window for
Codex and OpenCode. Other harnesses, remote targets and managed
providers without warm support stay `per_turn`. An explicit choice
always wins. Migration 0443 clears the stored creation default from
existing agents, except where an edit set "Turn by turn" explicitly.

**Reason and benefit**
Measured locally (`doc/plans/2026-11-07-warm-follow-up-ttft.md`). Warm
follow-ups are 2.6–5× faster for Codex and OpenCode, and restart
recovery latency is equal or lower.

## What Changed

- `native-lifecycle.ts`: an unset `agentMode` resolves to warm (5-minute
idle window) for local `codex_app_server` and `opencode_server` agents.
`runtime-selection.ts` passes `localTarget`. Explicit `per_turn` or
`warm` wins. An admitted session keeps its persisted policy. ACPX Claude
stays `per_turn`: it relaunches its provider process on every follow-up
by design, so warm did not shorten its follow-up (10.7 s warm vs 10.5 s
per_turn).
- Creation and configuration writes no longer store `lifecycleMode:
"per_turn"` for Codex, Claude or OpenCode. This covers
`normalizePaperclipRunnerAdapterConfig` (runs on every create and
update), `paperclipRunnerTransitionConfig` (switching to the native
runner), `agent-runner-selection.ts`, `codex-local` `build-config.ts`,
and the simplified new-agent setup (`paperclipRunnerCreationLifecycle`
in `@paperclipai/shared`). Grok, Pi and Cursor keep their explicit
value.
- Agent form: the Runner lifecycle field shows the unset state as
"Automatic". "Turn by turn" and "Warm session" remain.
- Migration `0443_native_warm_follow_up_default.sql`: clears
`lifecycleMode = 'per_turn'` from native Codex, OpenCode and Claude
agents unless `agent_config_revisions` shows an edit that set it to
`per_turn`. Each migrated agent gets an `agent.updated` activity entry
with the old value (`actor_id =
migration:native-warm-follow-up-default`). Creation records no revision,
so a "Turn by turn" pick made at creation cannot be told apart from the
old default. The product owner approved migrating those agents. Claude
agents follow the default, which is `per_turn` today.
- Restart chaos harness and TTFT driver: `--lifecycle
per_turn|warm|default` (saved in the wave plan). `default` removes the
catalog's pinned lifecycle, so a wave exercises the real default path.
- Docs: `doc/DEVELOPING.md` "Runner lifecycle default", and the results
in `doc/plans/2026-11-07-warm-follow-up-ttft.md`, which also documents
baseline finding 4 (Claude's resumed turn-start gap is ACPX's per-turn
process generation, not the provider).

## Verification

- `server`: `native-lifecycle.test.ts` (new default cases: local Codex
and OpenCode warm, Claude, remote, unknown target, unmeasured harness,
managed Claude, admitted per-turn session, explicit choices, non-native
adapter), `agent-runner-selection.test.ts`, `runtime-selection.test.ts`
(335 pass).
- `packages/db`: `native-warm-follow-up-default-migration.test.ts` on
embedded Postgres. Default agents are cleared, the explicit edit is
kept, other harnesses and legacy adapters are untouched, audit rows are
written once, and a rerun is a no-op. Without the explicit-edit filter
the test fails. `check:migrations` passes.
- `codex-local` `build-config.test.ts` (65), `ui`
`config-fields.test.tsx` (40), restart-chaos unit tests (134), `tsc
--noEmit` for `server`.
- `adapter-utils` `paperclip-runner-lifecycle-default.test.ts`:
configuration writes and adapter conversion store no lifecycle for
Codex, OpenCode and Claude, keep `per_turn` for the others, and preserve
explicit choices. It fails without the fix.
- End-to-end default check on this branch (`ttft-baseline.ts --lifecycle
default`, codex and opencode, 2 samples): the agents read back with no
stored lifecycle, and every follow-up reused the runner and provider
session (no `runner.process.launch`). Follow-up TTFT was 3.6–4.8 s. This
check found the per-write `per_turn` injection fixed here.
- Restart chaos (codex and opencode, A1/B1/B5, K1/K2/K6, seed 4242), 8/8
PASS each with no open signatures: forced warm, forced per_turn, and
`--lifecycle default` on this branch (agents created without a
lifecycle).
- `pnpm verify` selects broader CI (harness config is a global input),
so required CI supplies the broad coverage.

## Risks

- Behavior change: local Codex and OpenCode agents keep a runner and
provider process for up to 5 minutes after a run. Instance sleep waits
for that idle window. The process is reaped by the idle timer, by
graceful shutdown, or by the #19879 reconnect grace if its controller
dies.
- Migration: agents whose "Turn by turn" was chosen at creation become
Automatic. The activity entry records the old value; choosing "Turn by
turn" restores it.
- Previous-release story (`rules/upgrade-safe-run-state.mdc`): a task
session keeps the lifecycle policy it was admitted with, so sessions
saved before this change stay `per_turn`. New sessions get the default.
No run, checkpoint or launch state changes shape.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

- Anthropic Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`) in Claude Code, with
tool use (shell, file edit, test execution).

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-07 14:37:36 -06:00
DottaandPaperclip 5a70999306 Add a versioned online workspace migration command (#19882)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip preserves the files and recovery state produced by its
agents.
> - Canonical online migration can preserve selected local workspaces
while unrelated work continues.
> - Operators sometimes need a newer migration owner before the serving
web process can take that release.
> - The existing packaged maintenance entry requires stopped writers.
> - This pull request adds a finite online entry from one coherent
reviewed release tree.
> - The entry delegates capture and publication to the existing owners
and keeps tool and serving identities separate.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #19854, #19855 and #19872. The duplicate search found related owner
fixes and no separate versioned online entry.

**What happened?**

The finite online workspace importer was available as a library in the
serving image. The packaged all-phase migration entry required
maintenance mode.

**Expected behavior**

Run the reviewed online owner from a separate complete release tree
without replacing the web process, stopping unrelated work or changing
its release policy.

**Deployment mode**

A managed instance with its original local volume, database, existing
encryption key and shared S3 storage.

## What Changed

- Add strict inspect, single, cohort and exact single-journal resume
requests with explicit company, workspace, deadline and concurrency
bounds.
- Verify the private tool root and its own build stamp separately from
the serving source commit and deployment.
- Reuse the nonmutating full migration-manifest inspector and require
the additive controller host-identity column before publication.
- Hydrate existing configuration and key bindings, then use the original
ESM database pool and canonical storage, source locks and migration
owners.
- Keep multi-member inspection with the optional canonical cohort
preflight in a read-only transaction with denied storage. Releases
without that owner refuse cohort operations; single import and resume
remain available.
- Register the optional runtime bundle entry and document the supported
full-tree source mode, resource admission and reconciliation.
- Add hash-bound old-writer/reader compatibility and encrypted restore
tests.

## Verification

Final local revision: `c9345b72f27aee1158047dccd0b1060f9a0be6df`, on
master `fbe689938c3bf8c5849d2cd56b9da90029db9389`, macOS arm64 with Node
24.22.2.

- Entry and runtime packaging: **34/34 PASS**.
- Real PostgreSQL/filesystem compatibility: **6/6 PASS**, disposable
database wrapper exit 0 and cleanup complete. The frozen old source lock
owner contends with the new entry; unrelated work proceeds. The old
authority and snapshot readers decrypt and restore newly published
bytes.
- Pending and uploaded journal cases use the unchanged old persisted
format and preserve operation/snapshot IDs through resume.
- Full layered server source and test typecheck: **PASS**.
- Module boundaries and `git diff --check`: **PASS**.
- Actual source-mode module import under Node 24 succeeds without
starting the application.
- A separate temporary full-old-producer fixture did not get past module
setup: 90 seconds under Vitest and a 15-second direct Node control.
Neither is counted as an executed old-producer test or a product
failure. The smaller frozen old-writer/reader proof and old-format
journal cases are the local evidence.
- Hosted resume of the actual saved operation and Linux artifact
qualification remain operational acceptance gates. This PR does not
claim those ran.
- Review regression: a real successful import returned a null operation
ID (genuine RED). The repaired entry binds the exact returned snapshot
to its succeeded migration journal after commit (GREEN). Committed or
superseded snapshots are accepted; a missing readback requires
reconciliation rather than a blind retry.
- Final affected check: **40/40 PASS** across the entry, packaging and
actual PostgreSQL compatibility suites; wrapper exit 0 and cleanup
complete. Full layered typecheck and boundaries pass after the
user-requested rebase and current Runner rebuild.
- A second real postcommit database-read fault also has genuine
RED/GREEN proof. The succeeded journal, saved authority and original
bytes remain intact, and every readback error now preserves the
reconcile-required warning.
- Final-head [CI run
42404116001](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/42404116001):
**PASS**, with all 59 check contexts terminal (55 success and 4
intentional skips). Fresh Greptile review is **5/5** on
`c9345b72f27aee1158047dccd0b1060f9a0be6df`, with no unresolved threads;
check and thread pagination are complete.

## Risks

- The tool must come from one authenticated complete release tree with
its own dependencies. A copied bundle chunk can retain old absolute
paths and is not a portable release.
- Concurrency is not resource admission. The operator must check memory,
CPU and scratch headroom and start with one import or two cohort
members.
- Schema must be prepared by the existing schema owner. This entry never
applies DDL.
- Cancellation awaits the canonical owner. An SSH interruption does not
prove the process stopped; durable journals must be reconciled before
retry.
- The entry preserves remote obligations and source files. It does not
prove enrollment readiness or zero-downtime operation.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex, with reasoning, repository tools and code
execution. The exact serving snapshot and context-window size are not
exposed to this agent.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` /
`Closes: #` / `Refs: #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the
relevant issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-11-07 13:20:35 -06:00
DottaandPaperclip 965ca91dd0 Capture legacy workspace cohorts under one source fence (#19873)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Workspace migration preserves local files as authenticated portable
snapshots.
> - Workspaces that share Git storage require one complete source fence.
> - Independent imports contend on that fence and cannot safely run as a
batch.
> - This change adds an opt-in cohort owner that captures members
concurrently and publishes them atomically.
> - Existing source, recovery, snapshot and publication checks remain
authoritative.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What existing behavior does this improve?**

The administrative remote-workspace migration owner for workspaces in
one shared physical source component. Related changes: #19688, #19854
and #19855.

**Current behavior**

Each independent import acquires the complete source fence. Parallel
independent calls therefore contend instead of overlapping archive work.
A caller cannot use a surrounding transaction and assume that a
successful savepoint confirms the outer commit.

**Proposed behavior**

An explicit `migrateRemoteWorkspaceCohort` call selects one to eight
leaves from one proven component. It owns the full
source/lifecycle/copyback fence, uses the original pool for bounded
archive work, validates every member, publishes serially, and returns
success only after the outer commit.

**Reason and benefit**

This supplies a correctness-gated path for a controlled two-member
hosted qualification. It makes no wall-clock speedup claim. No running
app call site or scheduler selects cohorts automatically.

**Breaking changes**

The existing single-import API retains its guards and rejects a journal
owned by a cohort. New cohort journals require the same complete member
set on resume.

## What Changed

- Extract the existing reservation, capture, validation and publication
stages for reuse by both owners.
- Add an opt-in cohort API with default concurrency two and a maximum of
eight. Every member must share the same complete physical/Git/alias
component; selected roots must be leaves relative to each other.
- Persist exact cohort and operation membership in the existing journal.
Compare all selected fingerprints with the aggregate proof before the
first reservation under the complete fence, and recheck each member when
reserving its journal. Refuse foreign journals, incomplete or mixed
replay sets, lost fences and changed sources. Keep all authorities and
activity events unpublished if the outer commit fails.
- Share the merged nested-child verifier inside one complete fence.
Queue its prepare calls, retain its two-child bound and authenticated
immutable proof, and recheck local bytes and database bindings on every
pass.
- Document the API, exact-membership resume protocol, resource bounds
and required hosted qualification.

## Verification

- Integration head `fce1896010`: 32/32 PostgreSQL/filesystem cases
across the cohort owner, the complete merged nested-verifier suite, and
five existing parent-import cases.
- Final source-proof repair: 19/19 cohort-owner cases pass, including
real first- and last-member metadata changes before reservation,
changed-source partial-resume refusal, mixed local/imported refusal with
storage forbidden, cancelled/failed/finished admission, a late finished
timestamp, complete fences, queued child-proof reuse, cold restore,
cancellation, commit failure and exact replay. All local database checks
use the canonical owned wrapper, one Vitest worker and Node 24.22.2 on
macOS arm64/PostgreSQL 18.1.
- Final rebased head is based on
`fbe689938c3bf8c5849d2cd56b9da90029db9389`, including current
source-owner, database-schema and Runner contract changes. The 19-case
owner suite, full server layered source/tests/test-tree typechecks,
module boundaries and diff checks are rerun on that base; required CI
supplies the native Runner qualification.
- Selection-only `node scripts/local-verify.mjs --base
68db7ed9e3 --explain` exceeded its
60-second observation bound before producing a plan. It supplies no test
pass; required CI must supply broad coverage.
- Genuine replay RED: a committed two-member cohort accepted a
one-member replay. The repaired owner requires its full
succeeded-journal/snapshot membership.
- Genuine terminal-journal RED: read-only preflight accepted a
cancelled, finished saved member, and apply created two pending
snapshots and the missing peer journal before refusing later. The repair
rejects that state before preflight eligibility or snapshot work and
rechecks unfinished state before publication.
- Genuine source-proof race REDs: early workspace metadata drift could
strand a partial journal. A first repair checked each member only when
reserving it; an additional last-member regression showed that an
earlier journal could still be written before noticing the changed
member. The final owner compares the complete preimage in the existing
fenced preflight before the first reservation and retains
per-reservation checks. Both first- and last-member cases now leave zero
journals/snapshots and permit a fresh attempt. Changed sources after a
genuine partial reservation still refuse.
- Coverage includes parallel uploads, cold restore with originals
removed, complete source/copyback fences, exact partial-reservation
resume, actual read-only preflight with storage forbidden,
foreign/changed journals, peer failure and cancellation, fence
connection loss, and a real deferred outer-commit failure.
- Prior head `70bc2740d0` passed all CI after one explicitly bounded
same-head retry of server shard 4. Its first attempt observed an
unrelated heartbeat/plugin test still running at a five-second wait;
automatic test retry then hit the fixed-name environment uniqueness
constraint. The test and 1,100 relevant owner files matched the nearest
successful base gate. The one job retry passed the target test in
3,491ms and all 3,045 shard tests. Original failures remain recorded;
their initial cause is unknown. This does not supply CI acceptance for
the later repair head.
- Earlier prototype evidence remains historical: 286 PostgreSQL controls
and twelve cold restores passed on its prior base. Six macOS timing runs
were inconclusive under contention, including slower cohort runs. They
are not speedup or hosted acceptance evidence.
- Hosted acceptance remains a two-member same-component leaf canary with
no imported children, followed by same-host timing, peak-memory and
scratch-headroom observations before considering a larger batch.

Run the focused owner file from `server/` with the canonical temporary
PostgreSQL owner:

```sh
node ../cli/node_modules/tsx/dist/cli.mjs ../packages/db/src/test-postgres-command.ts -- node ../node_modules/vitest/vitest.mjs run src/services/remote-workspace-cohort-migration.test.ts --fsModuleCache --maxWorkers 1 --hookTimeout 90000
```

Final head `112ffeb20c272c6ef5e1e0956be889c85511f0d0` passed [required
CI](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/42402942287)
with 56 successful checks and four skips; the aggregate is green.
[Greptile reviewed this exact head at
5/5](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/19873#issuecomment-6710780943),
and a fresh paginated review-thread read has zero unresolved findings.

## Risks

- Concurrent archive work increases CPU, memory, scratch space, database
and storage load. Admission must count logical member workers and up to
two nested-child workers, not Node processes. Eight-member use remains
unqualified.
- The complete cohort fence lasts until all started work joins. Slow
callbacks can delay cancellation and associated source writers.
- The exact journal exception is internal and binds company, cohort,
workspace and operation IDs. Wrong or changed membership fails closed;
operators must inspect unknown outcomes before resuming the same full
set.
- Existing remote recovery holds, provider obligations, source files and
history remain preserved. A successful import does not settle those
independent obligations.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-6 (Codex), with reasoning, code execution and repository
tools. This runtime does not expose a more specific backend model ID or
context-window size.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-11-07 13:02:54 -06:00
DottaandClaude Opus 5.5 6cfb69b4b0 docs(plans): Phase 0 ownership inventory and TTFT baseline (#19846)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - A control-plane restart can land between two durable writes. It
leaves an in-progress record owned by a dead process. About 69
restart-chaos PRs fixed that shape one subsystem at a time.
> - The durable ownership plan (#19831) replaces those fixes with one
owner stamp, one prover, write-ahead intents and one reconciler. Phase 0
must first list every in-progress record kind and measure how fast turns
start today.
> - Without the inventory, Phase 1 cannot choose one stamp or one proof.
Without the baseline, no later phase can show that it kept turns fast
(invariant 8).
> - This pull request adds the Phase 0 inventory, the TTFT, boot and
restart-recovery baseline, and the run-log-only driver that produced the
baseline.
> - The benefit is one reviewed map of 83 record kinds to plan sections
A–G, and measured p50/p95 budgets per adapter.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #19831. Refs #19838 (the TTFT anchor that the baseline uses).

**What is the problem?**
Phase 0 of the durable ownership plan has no inventory of in-progress
record kinds and no speed baseline.

**What is the expected outcome?**
Two reviewed documents in `doc/plans/`, plus a repeatable way to measure
the baseline again in later phases.

**Why does it matter?**
Phase 1 cannot start without them, and every later phase's exit criteria
compare against the baseline.

## What Changed

- `doc/plans/2026-11-07-ownership-inventory.md`:
- 83 durable in-progress record kinds (94 reader rows) across native
runtime, environments, workspaces, accounting and the wake queue;
- each kind with its table and column, writer, states, owner, release
rule, proof, obligation, invariants and plan sections A–G;
- the overlaps, the merge decisions and the zero-downtime upgrade record
kinds.
- `doc/plans/2026-11-07-ttft-baseline.md`:
- TTFT, agent boot, pre-turn steps and restart recovery per adapter
(codex, claude, opencode), local, cold and warm, p50/p95;
- restart recovery from the overnight chaos evidence, the slowest steps
ranked, and the gaps.
- `tests/restart-chaos/ttft-baseline.ts`: an on-demand driver on the
chaos supervisor. It reads the run log only, never Telemetry, and always
stops its embedded Postgres.
- `tests/restart-chaos/ttft-baseline-stats.ts` and its unit tests: pure
percentile, boot, pre-turn ranking and recovery statistics.

No runtime behavior changes.

## Verification

- `pnpm exec vitest run --config tests/restart-chaos/vitest.config.ts
tests/restart-chaos/ttft-baseline-stats.test.ts`
- `node scripts/typecheck-test-projects.mjs tests/restart-chaos`
- The baseline numbers come from the driver run named in the report. To
reproduce them, follow the report's "Method" section.
- The owner spot-checked the inventory's file:line claims at
`f2d8a51027`. One example: `processLossRetryCount` has no writer, and
`heartbeat/recovery.ts:2675` is its only reader.

## Risks

- Low risk. This adds documentation and an opt-in test driver. Nothing
runs in CI except the pure stats unit tests.
- The driver spends a small amount of provider credit when someone runs
it by hand.
- The baseline sample is small (6 per cell). The local host was shared
with other worktrees, so the p95 tails include load. The report states
both.

## Model Used

- Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`), via Claude Code with tool use,
code execution and five parallel read-only subagents for the inventory.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [ ] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-07 10:47:31 -06:00
DottaandPaperclip 54b83b15a3 Reuse authenticated nested workspace verification (#19854)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip preserves the work that its agents produce.
> - Portable workspace migration can save nested workspaces before their
parent.
> - The parent must prove that a committed child snapshot covers any
files it omits.
> - The existing owner downloads and restores the same immutable child
archive before and after parent capture.
> - The fresh local-file checks are required, but the repeated immutable
archive check is avoidable within one live source fence.
> - This pull request reuses only an authenticated archive proof with an
unchanged reference and provider identity.
> - It also bounds independent child branches at two workers while
retaining every fresh local and Git check.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #19805 and #19688. A duplicate search found no separate fix for
repeated child archive verification.

**What existing behavior does this improve?**

Online Git parent migration after nested workspaces have committed
portable snapshots.

**Subsystem affected**

server/ — workspace migration and nested snapshot coverage.

**Current behavior**

Each parent verification pass downloads, authenticates and restores
every child archive, then captures the child's current local tree. The
second pass repeats the immutable download and restore. Independent
child branches also run in sequence. A large parent can exhaust its
existing budget before parent capture begins.

**Proposed behavior**

One private verifier belongs to the existing live source-owner
transaction. It can reuse a completed archive proof only when the full
snapshot reference, operation, child closure, ETag and byte length still
match. Missing or weak ETags and non-cancellation HEAD errors keep full
verification. Caller cancellation still stops work. A changed identity
forces fresh authenticated readback. The owner still captures current
local bytes and Git state in both passes.

**Reason and benefit**

Remove duplicate immutable work without treating an old local-file check
as current authority. Two independent topmost branches can overlap.
Recursive descendants stay serial within those branches, so the bound
does not grow with depth.

## What Changed

- Add a private per-fence verifier to the existing tree owner. It clears
its proof map at the end of the import and refuses a different owner
transaction.
- Reuse only completed ciphertext, GCM, plaintext, and canonical restore
verification with a matching fresh provider identity.
- Retain all current database, operation, recursive coverage,
local-file, Git and manifest checks on each pass.
- Bound independent branches at two. Abort queued work on failure and
await active peers before scratch cleanup or fence release.
- Use the verifier only in the existing online Git importer. Keep the
offline full-verification path and all capture deadlines unchanged.
- Document resource admission, fallback behavior and the hosted
acceptance limit.

## Verification

- Genuine baseline RED through the real parent importer: child GET
counts 2 + 2, canonical restores 4, maximum overlapping readbacks 1. The
four fresh local child captures already pass.
- Exact positive GREEN: child GET counts 1 + 1, canonical restores 2,
maximum overlapping readbacks 2. All four fresh local child captures
remain.
- The fixture uses real encrypted archives and the canonical S3
provider's local HTTP HEAD parsing with actual payload-derived ETags. It
uses fake fixture credentials only.
- Final focused suite: **13/13 PASS**, 148.36 seconds, at `eaf17d3340`.
This includes recursive max-two completion, failure/cancellation
joining, identity/ref/content changes, same-fence alias reuse and
stale-owner refusal.
- Both affected existing migration suites: **256/256 PASS**, 201.84
seconds, at initial head `eaf17d3340`.
- The HEAD-failure review repair has genuine two-case RED evidence and
three passing failure/cancellation controls. Full layered
source/test-tree typecheck and module boundaries pass at repaired head
`763648adad`. Final exact-head controls: **21/21 PASS**, 86.63 seconds
(all 16 new controls plus five existing parent cases).
- The first extended recursive fixture correctly failed because it
created a Git branch after taking an earlier snapshot. The fixture now
creates all branches before any import; the source-change guard remains
intact.
- Exact-head CI: 56 success, four expected skips, and one neutral
Paperclip Review. Required gates pass; Greptile is fresh 5/5. Its
optional aggregate-handler cleanup recommendation is resolved with the
intentional fail-closed rationale.
- Local verification is macOS arm64 / Node26.4.0. The observed hosted
parent still needs to complete within its unchanged budget after normal
delivery. No hosted timing improvement is claimed here.

## Risks

- Two simultaneous child verifications can use more I/O, memory and
scratch space. Operators must count logical verifications, even in one
process.
- HEAD availability and provider identity are required for proof reuse.
Providers without a usable ETag perform the full check.
- Reuse lasts only for one live transaction. A retry, changed reference,
changed provider identity, process exit or owner change requires fresh
verification.
- Faster verification does not waive changed child bytes or guarantee a
specific hosted completion time. No provider turn, authority marker,
source deletion or larger timeout is introduced.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex, with repository and code-execution tools.
The exact serving model revision and context-window size are not exposed
to this agent.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-11-07 10:45:17 -06:00
DottaandClaude Opus 5.5 0f5ce5050e docs(plans): plan durable ownership and reconciliation for restart safety (#19831)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - Agent runs must survive a control-plane restart: they must continue
on their own, keep their work, and offer a Retry that works
> - The 2026-11-06/07 restart chaos campaign found about 40 restart
failures and merged about 69 fixes (#19469 through #19807)
> - Most of these failures have one shape: a restart stops a process
between two durable writes, and each subsystem then decides on its own
whether the leftover record is safe to release
> - Each fix closed one crash window, and about 12 fixes rebuilt the
same "this owner is dead" proof
> - This pull request adds a plan for one shared ownership record,
write-ahead intents, one reconciler, and an on-demand crash-point suite
> - The plan also makes time to first token and agent boot hard
requirements, so restart safety never makes turns slow
> - The benefit is that we fix the whole class of failure once, and we
stop fixing one window at a time

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #19696, #19713, #19717, #19724, #19741, #19747, #19784, #19807

**What existing behavior does this improve?**
Recovery after a control-plane restart. Today each subsystem keeps its
own in-progress records and its own release rules.

**Subsystem affected**
Native runtime, runner, environments and sandboxes, workspaces,
accounting and budgets, and the wake queue.

**Current behavior**
A restart can leave a lease, a fence, a claim, a workspace operation, a
receipt, or a deferred wake that belongs to a dead process. If no
subsystem can prove that the owner is dead, the system fails closed. The
task then needs a Retry, the company holds new work, or a run stays
`running`. About 40 server files read a controller boot id, and about 25
files check process liveness in different ways.

**Proposed behavior**
One owner stamp and one liveness proof for every in-progress record.
Intents are written before outside effects. One reconciler brings every
record to a terminal state. Admission never waits on cleanup. Accepted
work is delivered exactly once. Time to first token and agent boot are
measured and stay within budgets.

**Reason and benefit**
Fewer restart failures, less duplicate code, and a fast first response
after a restart.

## What Changed

- Added `doc/plans/2026-11-07-durable-ownership-and-reconciliation.md`.
The plan contains:
- the five failure classes from the campaign, with example IDs and PR
counts
  - eight invariants
- a performance section with time-to-first-token, boot, and
restart-latency metrics and rules
  - the design (sections A–G)
  - an on-demand crash-point suite
  - six phases
  - risks
  - the decisions that Dotta made on 2026-11-07

## Verification

- This change adds documentation only. No code changes.
- Read the plan. Check that each failure class cites real merged PRs.
- Check the code claims:
- `git grep controller-process-identity -- server/src` shows three
users.
- `git grep task.time_to_first_token -- server/src` shows the existing
metric.

## Risks

- Low risk. The change adds one plan document and changes no code.
- The plan proposes later behavior changes. The largest is the removal
of the company-wide accounting gate. Each later phase will come as its
own pull request with tests.

## Model Used

- Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`), Anthropic, used in Claude Code
with tool use (shell, git, GitHub CLI). The model coordinated the chaos
campaign and wrote the plan from its evidence.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-07 08:36:05 -06:00
af0fe8fe81 Keep personal MCP connections functional while idle tenants sleep (#19427)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip manages work for AI agents.
> - Personal MCP connections should remain enabled while an idle tenant
sleeps.
> - Unfinished OAuth, transfer and delivery work must retain its owner
and deadline.
> - Cloud can receive bounded metadata and incoming work while the
tenant remains the company-scoped authorizer.
> - Current identity, revision and delivery acknowledgments establish
when ownership has transferred.
> - This change preserves useful wake, retries and revocation while
making settled ownership inspectable without writes.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs: #19377 and #19750. Hosted companion:
[paperclip-cloud#1217](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip-cloud/pull/1217).

**What happened?** Enabled personal MCP grants and subscriptions could
keep an otherwise idle tenant awake. Ignoring those records would lose
discovery, authorization, delivery and revocation obligations.

**Expected behavior** Unconsumed authorization codes, device requests,
file handoffs and delivery work retain their original deadlines. Settled
connections remain enabled and become quiet after the current external
owner acknowledges responsibility. Incoming useful work resumes normal
authorization and delivery; revocation still takes effect for the
current company.

**Steps to reproduce** Complete normal PKCE/device consent and company
selection, synchronize client/device and revocation state, retain the
connection while idle, then exercise useful tools/events and revocation.
Sleep eligibility requires current incoming/deadline ownership
throughout.

## What Changed

- Add bounded signed client/device metadata and revocation
synchronization with exact revision, identity and ACK checks, startup
recovery and finite legacy-device cutover.
- Preserve company selection, authorization and operation identity.
Register grant work before its INSERT in the same transaction; retain
rollback, expiry and retry behavior.
- Require current managed identity/resource before hosted publication.
Receipt-cleared re-enable must obtain a fresh source ACK before device
creation.
- Reuse read-only settings and inspection budgets; connect MCP owners to
normal startup, drain and shutdown.
- Bound metadata pages and the actual signed request body while
preserving the default limits of other operations.
- Generate migration 0440 after the merged Legacy migration. Preserve
all 438 existing executable migrations and the journal prefix; retain
the normal five newest snapshots.
- Preserve the merged transaction-owner forwarding and regression
coverage from #19750 through normal ancestry integration.

## Verification

- Current own Shared/SDK, database, eval-kernel and Runner builds
passed, together with all seven normal application TypeScript programs.
Missing generated package exports/workspace links were restored through
normal setup; the original setup failures were retained. No source,
compiler option, test assertion or timeout was weakened.
- Normal migration generation changed only the five intended MCP tables;
its SQL is byte-identical to the reviewed MCP delta. Fresh reference
databases and both retained master/Muse histories upgraded through 0440,
preserving historical hashes, row fields, schema and idempotence. Direct
assertions cover the Legacy null default and MCP null/zero defaults. Two
selected history cases passed; the other 21 database cases were
unselected.
- All six current MCP lifecycle cases passed with zero skips: normal
PKCE approval intent, ACK recovery after outage, mutation during
publication, disable/re-enable with original expiry, company-deletion
rollback/commit and key rotation.
- All 81 checks in five current whole files passed with zero skips:
OpenAPI 34, read-only settings 2, diagnostic catalog 25, PostgreSQL
diagnostics 7 and dependency scheduling 13. PostgreSQL fixtures ran
normal migrations before test imports.
- Earlier canonical proof at App `cd1c8c6` / Cloud `9f67531` includes
real 60-second rate and three 15-second quiet windows, useful work and
three revokes. Later paired proof at App `43af514` / Cloud `914eb0f`
plus its reviewed candidate includes normal DCR, PostgreSQL metadata, a
144,017-byte signed publication, actual ACK, cap/default-413 controls
and a real 15-second quiet window. The relevant producer/signing/wire
inputs remain byte-identical in this integration; shared changes are
qualified above. These remain source-scoped observations, not a fresh
full canonical run on the integrated tree.
- All known test owners, process groups and OS sockets closed; an
independent final PostgreSQL audit found no remaining test sessions. One
dependency-test trace recorded 46 opens and 45 close events. Its cause
is unknown; this is not claimed as proof of graceful closure.
- Fresh exact-head remote checks passed: 59 successful and 4 skipped
contexts, with a complete current 5/5 Greptile review and all seven
review threads resolved. Targeted local checks do not constitute a new
whole-repository test run.

## Risks

App and Cloud must agree on identity, revision, namespace, deadlines and
revocation. Partial rollout, unavailable authority or missing ACK must
retain awake debt. Shared startup/shutdown and settings changed since
the earlier canonical profile, so historical observations carry only
within their stated source scope. No deployed Railway/Neon suspension,
Cloud alarm, savings or complete hosted Dot/Muse acceptance is claimed.

## Model Used

OpenAI `gpt-6.1-sol` produced code and verification, with a Codex
coordinator reviewing and integrating the changes. The coordinator's
exact runtime model ID and context-window sizes were not exposed.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-11-07 02:12:48 -06:00
scotttong f5fb8ada3b Restore chat contacts, agent pins, and scrollable recent navigation (#19685) 2026-11-06 19:17:25 -08:00
DottaandPaperclip d1306f338b fix(runtime): preserve settled failed harness backups online (#19715)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip coordinates agents, tasks, and their saved execution
state.
> - A replacement server needs native provider backups in shared
storage.
> - The online pre-copy owner accepts successful runs with a committed
result.
> - A sealed backup from a failed or cancelled run can still contain
user history.
> - The existing owner defers those files even after their source
ownership is settled.
> - This change adds a separate preservation owner with exact source and
publication checks.
> - The copy retains the failed outcome and original files while making
the backup readable from a fresh home.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #19137 and #19108 for the existing pre-copy and encrypted backup
owners.

**What happened?**

Online pre-copy reports `source_not_successful` for a sealed legacy
backup from a settled failed or cancelled run. The provider files remain
tied to the old disk.

**Expected behavior**

Copy the exact recorded backup when the source has no remaining writer
ownership. Preserve the run status, warnings, result, allocation,
selected session, and local files.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Create a lease-stamped suspended native backup.
2. Settle its source as a failed run with a terminal-failure coordinator
and no owner.
3. Keep an unrelated execution active.
4. Run canonical online pre-copy. The previous owner defers the source.

## What Changed

- Add a narrow preservation owner for terminal source files. It checks
the physical finalization lock, task, coordinator, run, selected
session, source lease, and source fingerprints.
- Recheck that owner before the encrypted upload receipt and
current-backup publication.
- Reuse the finite workspace keepalive during long source checks and
defer source-local invalid archives.
- Add optional exact-root stamp verification. A valid previous backup
cannot authorize a changed current payload. Existing callers keep their
fallback behavior.
- Bind the archive input to the checked owner and record an activity
event after publication.
- Keep pending object receipts after an uncertain or failed publication.
- Add focused PostgreSQL and filesystem controls. Update the existing
migration runbook.

## Verification

- Real PostgreSQL baseline on unchanged production: the new positive
case fails with `source_not_successful` instead of publishing the
backup.
- Same case passes after the change and decrypts/restores the exact
provider history.
- Final head 4b6cf093be: three focused suites pass, 81 tests in 62.26
seconds, including existing storage and stamp consumers. The canonical
PostgreSQL wrapper exited zero and completed cleanup.
- Controls cover cancelled and failed sources, real committed results,
expired nonnull owners, physical owner/lock contention, late
source/owner changes, previous-tree fallback, and archive root/scope
binding.
- Both review regressions fail with the committed pre-fix owners: a real
30-second database idle timeout expires during a 32-second exact-source
check, and a stamp-valid invalid archive stops the pass. The fixed owner
keeps its transaction live and copies the next valid source. Source
hashes and automatic file restoration were recorded for each leg.
- Final-head strict server TypeScript and module-boundary checks pass
after the master rebase and required Runner/shared declaration rebuild.
- No source migration, provider mutation, or archive apply was executed.

## Risks

This path does not reconstruct missing backups or prove that missing
provider state is recoverable. Such sources remain blockers. It does not
take expired owners or report failed work as successful. Source hashing
adds bounded disk work while source row locks are held; unrelated
executions remain active in the PostgreSQL fixture. Existing archive
size limits, authenticated encryption, object readback, and publication
fencing remain in place. No schema, API route, scheduler, or
rollout-policy change is included.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex (GPT-6 family; exact runtime model ID and context capacity
are not exposed in this session), with reasoning, repository editing,
code execution, and tool use.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-11-06 21:08:27 -06:00
DottaandPaperclip 55c9c44e41 fix: preserve database-only failed controller evidence (#19714)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip preserves failed work as well as successful work.
> - Ephemeral enrollment must retain each selected controller source.
> - A failed source can already exist entirely in an encrypted database
checkpoint.
> - Its original inline snapshot does not create a local filesystem
dependency.
> - The migration owner must prove that both legacy files are absent
before accepting that case.
> - This change preserves the failed evidence without creating execution
authority.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs: #19678.

**What happened?**

Startup still reports `native_controllers_require_migration` for a
failed retained source with a valid database checkpoint, its original
inline snapshot, and no local controller or supervisor. The online
archive owner reports that the source is already absent. The existing
database-only preservation case accepts only a missing inline snapshot.

**Expected behavior**

Accept the exact database-only failed evidence after full checkpoint and
identity validation. Keep a present local payload blocked. Retain the
failed run, original snapshot, coordinator, task pointer and queued
work.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Store a valid encrypted checkpoint for a failed native run.
2. Keep its matching inline session snapshot and terminal-failure
coordinator.
3. Remove both legacy controller files.
4. Check local controller obligations.
5. The old owner reports an obligation even though the evidence is
already in the database.

**Paperclip version or commit**

The fix builds on current master `d5c4f7dd02`.

**Deployment mode**

Hosted native Runner with durable controller checkpoints. The local
regression uses the existing real PostgreSQL and encrypted checkpoint
fixture.

## What Changed

- Add a narrow database-only failed-source preservation case to the
existing migration owner.
- Require the decoded checkpoint, protocol header, admitted execution,
selected run and inline snapshot to match their exact scope.
- Require both the controller and supervisor paths to be absent. A file
or link keeps the local obligation blocked.
- Retain the earlier null-snapshot predicate and all original failed
execution evidence. Create no recovery metadata or executable authority.
- Exercise the actual startup and maintenance consumers. Document the
preservation boundary.

## Verification

- Final revision `1b1da543dafd576e3c420657e3c2c6d0c882172d`: all checks
are terminal, with 56 successful and four skipped, zero pending and zero
failures. The [required CI
aggregate](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/42329501690/job/128275664414)
passed. Build, types, server/Runner/serialized suites, end-to-end
aggregate and Snyk passed. [Fresh exact-head
review](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/19714#issuecomment-6701018015)
is 5/5 with no open threads.

- Review found that the first non-recovery assertion stopped at the
queued fixture's missing current binding. The fixture now binds the
exact native issue/session before calling the real resolver and asserts
`unsupported:metadata_format` from the selected failed source. That
corrected case passes in 4.58 seconds, with wrapper exit 0 and cleanup
complete. The production predicate is unchanged. The original startup
RED remains valid. The final source/test type graph, module boundaries
and diff checks pass. Fresh revision CI and review remain required.

- The actual startup regression failed before the source change: one
case, 16.62 seconds, expected the absent-files obligation to be false
but received true. The wrapper exited 1 and completed cleanup. This
failure is retained.
- The final focused owner run passed nine cases in 10.79 seconds. It
covers the new DB-only case, controller/supervisor presence, every
inline scope field, foreign checkpoint Runner/session identities, the
unchanged null-snapshot case, and existing online/offline archival
controls. The wrapper exited 0 and completed cleanup.
- The new case verifies unchanged run, coordinator, checkpoint and
task-session rows, retained queued work, no upload, and no invented
recoverable session.
- The full qualified server/test source type graph passes with
db/shared/Runner source aliases. Module boundaries and diff checks pass.
Required broad package builds and regression suites remain in CI.
- Read-only source diagnosis validated one exact existing checkpoint
with the canonical decoder and matching header, run, Runner and session
bindings. No source profile or secret values were emitted. No hosted
mutation, admission hold, cancellation, status change, or
writers-stopped claim was performed.

## Risks

- A false database-only classification could hide local bytes. Both
exact legacy paths must be absent, and every protocol and database
binding must match.
- Corrupt or mismatched checkpoints still fail closed. Existing failed
evidence does not become successful or executable.
- The original null-snapshot case is unchanged. Present local files
still require the existing preservation path.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex, with reasoning, tool use and code execution.
The host does not expose a more specific backend model ID or
context-window size.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-11-06 20:45:29 -06:00
DottaandPaperclip d5c4f7dd02 fix: preserve shared Git sources during online workspace migration (#19688)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip preserves the work produced by its agents.
> - Remote workspace migration must preserve legacy Git history and
local edits.
> - Linked checkouts can share administration and objects with other
tasks.
> - A task lock alone cannot exclude writers of a shared or borrowed
store.
> - The online source owner must derive and retain the full physical
ownership closure.
> - This change reuses task, project, lifecycle and finalizer locks for
that closure.
> - Idle legacy Git work can then migrate while unrelated remote turns
continue.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs: #19642.

**What happened?**

Online migration keeps legacy Git sources blocked because several task
checkouts can share a project base or a private Git cache. A read-only
source observation found 160 pending Git records, 120 distinct paths and
nine common stores. Its largest project cohort contained 126 records and
110 task owners. An ordinary-directory fence cannot preserve these
sources by itself.

**Expected behavior**

Derive the physical source owners from stable Git metadata. Hold their
existing source and lifecycle keys through publication. Retain all
history and recovery obligations. Reject foreign aliases, unknown stores
and changed sources. Let unrelated object-backed work continue.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Create a managed project checkout and linked task worktrees.
2. Keep a settled prepared recovery source on a sibling task.
3. Keep unrelated remote work running.
4. Request an online import of an idle leaf checkout.
5. The existing owner keeps the shared source blocked.

**Paperclip version or commit**

This branch builds on merged #19642 (`7ac99718a4`) and fresh master
`fb3cf1a072`. It adds the Git closure. It does not add a writers-stopped
shortcut.

**Deployment mode**

Hosted native Runner with remote workspace storage. Local qualification
uses owned synthetic Git repositories, disposable PostgreSQL databases
and the actual archive and storage owners.

## What Changed

- Read bounded stable Git pointers, common-directory metadata and local
alternates. Derive the complete physical source ownership cohort.
Preserve all object stores.
- Retain common and borrowed store owners in preparation, lifecycle,
runtime, expiration and actual reopen paths. Keep company boundaries and
the existing 128-key bound.
- Hold exact sibling native recovery proofs under their existing
physical finalizer keys. Recheck descriptors, allocations, recovery
actions and source identities before capture and publication. Preserve
original states and warnings.
- Require leaf-first nested imports. Reuse the existing immutable child
download, restore and source comparison before parent exclusion.
- Bind the self-contained archive owner to the held Git namespaces. Keep
its three walks, history normalization, fsck, bytes and digest format.
Reject bare, detached, network, unknown or changed Git storage.
- Check both foreign path fields. Keep foreign metadata private.
Document the proof, bounds, source observation and remaining eligibility
limits.

## Verification

- Final revision `2934e41c923b93e16508b978c849b747c86be645`: all checks
are terminal, with 56 successful and four skipped, zero failures and
zero pending. The [required CI
aggregate](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/42326464408/job/128266279210)
passed. Build, types, all server/Runner/serialized suites, end-to-end
aggregate and Snyk passed. [Fresh exact-head Greptile
review](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/19688#issuecomment-6699760104)
is 5/5 with no open threads. GitHub reports MERGEABLE and CLEAN.

- Review then found two correctness gaps: an ordinary managed directory
inside an unrelated host repository was blocked, and a Git parent could
miss a completed nested operation after its child snapshot became
missing or deleted. Three actual-owner regressions reproduced both gaps
in 9.70 seconds. The corrected owner passes 12 focused cases in 17.08
seconds. It imports and restores only the ordinary root bytes, preserves
the outer repository, rejects both missing/deleted child receipts before
a parent journal, and retains valid/changed child coverage and
private-cache contention. Its wrapper exited 0 and cleanup completed.
The first bootstrap attempt failed before tests ran because the host
exhausted its 32 shared-memory segment limit; no shared services were
stopped and no pass is claimed for that attempt. The final qualified
source/test type graph, module boundaries and diff checks pass.
- Receipt scans keep canonical path resolution. A lexical SQL prefix can
omit children reached through symlinked ancestors. The observed full
metadata closure completed in 1.17 seconds; no measured bottleneck
justifies weakening that alias proof. Writer admission still rejects
uncertain Git ownership before mutation. Expiration returns its typed
skip, and reopen returns its structured failure. Runtime and lifecycle
do not bypass an unknown source. No broad error-contract change was
added.

- Full CI at `720104ea975e` exposed five existing boundary cases across
three server shards. Four exact cases reproduced locally as failures in
25.98 seconds. Reopen now preserves its structured failure when source
inspection rejects the path, without reconstructing it. Runtime
recognizes only the exact regular ignore-only `.git/info/exclude`
fragment; migration still rejects that fragment. The original
arbitrary-path and file-URL import/delete-host/resume fixtures keep both
supported input forms and use the genuine offline setup path after their
sole writer finishes. The production mode gate is unchanged. A new
real-owner control proves the offline flag still rejects a running
legacy database writer.
- The final focused run passed all ten cases across four suites in 22.75
seconds, including all five CI failures, invalid-pointer admission,
fragment rejection, offline writer exclusion and actual nested reopen
lock ordering. Its wrapper exited 0 and cleanup completed. The known
invalid-pointer case remains fail-closed; the separate unexpected-I/O
diagnostic retains safe error metadata without command text or
credentials. Existing Git stderr redaction coverage remains intact. The
final metadata reader suite passed 20 cases in 2.68 seconds. The
qualified server/test source type graph, module boundaries and diff
checks pass. No production assertions or timeout defaults were weakened.
Fresh CI and review are required for the repair revision.

- A later review found that the ordinary early return still used only
one foreign path field. The actual ordinary providerRef-only regression
failed as incorrectly eligible. One source-path owner now enumerates
both local locators for company/foreign ordinary and Git scans, layout
checks, early admission, lifecycle/reopen/runtime and
expiration/move/preparation retention. Capture and display keep their
original preferred path. The actual owner canary passed 49 cases across
two suites in 109.15 seconds. It covers
cwd-only/ref-only/different/symlink locators, same-company mismatches,
foreign owners, lifecycle ordering, Git/recovery imports and
expiration/reopen. Three selected-locator fallback cases also failed
before their guard; the final eight-case control passed in 31.05
seconds, including the configured alias and valid import/private-child
controls. All wrappers exited 0 and completed cleanup. The
metadata/locator suite passed 19 cases. The final source/test type
graph, module boundaries and diff checks pass.

- Review found two P1 gaps. Both configured-directory symlink cases
failed before canonicalization. The actual parent import lost an
already-imported child's unique private cache and failed its archive
fence instead of retaining that owner. The corrected real-owner canary
passed four cases in 20.78 seconds: configured symlink runtime
provisioning, private-cache contention before the parent journal,
successful parent publication after release, and unchanged/changed child
coverage. The metadata suite passed 15 cases in 4.14 seconds. Both
wrappers exited 0 and cleanup completed.
- A fresh source read-only observation found 160 pending Git records and
nine common stores. An additional exact receipt query found 1,243
completed migration receipts and 557 nested source paths under pending
Git roots. All 126 records in the largest project were present in the
captured Git metadata set. For all 110 present candidate workspace
records, the derived closure fits the unchanged 128-key cap. The worst
case needs 110 issue keys and one project key, with 17 keys of headroom.
Its 173 imported children introduce no physical issue owner outside
those 110 logical task owners. This checks the observed key bound only.
It does not claim migration eligibility or a coherent snapshot.
- The initial stacked CI did not run four Runner test lanes: trusted
master passed new --package-lane/--native-server options to the old base
lane script. The branch is now rebased onto actual merged master and
retargeted before synchronization. It includes the canonical current
lane parser without an unrelated Runner patch. Fresh new-head CI is
required.

- The actual importer/source owner run passed 36 cases across three
suites in 187.75 seconds. It covers sibling prepared recovery, unrelated
running remote work, common-cache contention, changed
coordinator/allocation/path state during upload, exact nested coverage,
dirty unpushed work, and existing expiration/reopen owners. Wrapper exit
0 and cleanup completed.
- A separate previously hanging lifecycle-worker restore passed in 17.33
seconds with the unchanged 15-second test-body limit. An earlier run
timed out in three expiration/reopen cases and blocked cleanup; its
wrapper later exited 1. These failures remain recorded. They are not
counted as passes.
- Two boundary controls first failed: a foreign providerRef-only alias
was incorrectly eligible, and actual reopen did not admit its distinct
cache owner at the initial source boundary. The narrow guards now
inspect both foreign locators and derive physical Git keys before the
raw lifecycle transaction. The foreign alias and existing real nested
reopen contention passed. The private-cache control first retained
contradictory recorded source provenance and stayed fail-closed after
release. The corrected present legacy-worktree fixture passed in 12.61
seconds. These failed attempts remain recorded; they are not passes.
- The metadata reader and serialized/local archive controls use actual
Git repositories. They compare archive bytes and digests, remove every
original source, restore staged and unstaged work, and run fsck. The
metadata reader passed 13 cases in 2.85 seconds. The local/serialized
archive controls passed nine cases in 9.27 seconds. All processes exited
0. An additional actual importer control changed a relative commondir
pointer to the absolute name of the same store during upload.
Publication was rejected, the uploaded journal remained available, and
original files stayed intact (one case, 5.86 seconds; wrapper exit 0 and
cleanup complete).
- The final rebased full local server/test type graph passes with
db/shared/Runner source aliases because reused dependency declarations
predate new master exports. The first rebased attempt reported those
stale declaration fields/tables, and is not counted as a pass. Module
boundaries and diff checks pass. Standard package builds, types and
broad regression checks remain required in CI.
- No hosted import, admission hold, cancellation, provider mutation,
source filesystem write or shared-cache Git command was performed for
this change. The source observation is read-only and is not a locked
eligibility proof.

## Risks

- A missing writer owner could make physical source exclusion
incomplete. Existing mutation owners retain the same
company/task/project keys, and uncertain metadata fails closed.
- A project can contain a large cohort. Limits remain finite. A bound
failure keeps the source blocked.
- Bare, detached, unowned or network Git stores remain blocked online.
Missing archived sources retain their existing authenticated
reconstruction path.
- Exact recovery proofs preserve authority and obligations. They do not
infer provider termination or mark a prepared descriptor finalized.
- This change does not claim all observed Git records are immediately
eligible. Existing preparation, provider, recovery, runtime and
source-change blockers remain.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex, with reasoning, tool use and code execution.
The host does not expose a more specific backend model ID or
context-window size.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-11-06 20:08:19 -06:00
DottaandPaperclip 7ac99718a4 fix(workspaces): fence legacy sources for online migration (#19642)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip coordinates AI agents and preserves their saved work.
> - Remote workspace storage replaces legacy host directories with
durable snapshots.
> - Several legacy workspace records can name one physical project
directory.
> - A task lock alone cannot exclude a new task that selects that
directory.
> - Terminal recovery records can retain valid sources after physical
writers settle.
> - This change fences the source through its real preparation and
lifecycle owners.
> - Idle ordinary sources can then migrate while unrelated remote work
continues.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**

Online migration rejects ordinary legacy directories when several
workspace records name the same path. A source inspection found 45
aliases across three project roots with no root Git marker or previously
imported nested child. The instance also had unrelated running remote
work. Requiring the whole instance to drain prevented useful migration
of these idle sources.

Terminal native sources and superseded finalization attempts also remain
blocked after their exact physical and durable owners settle. Their
files, provider allocations and recovery records must remain available
through the change of file authority.

**Expected behavior**

Migrate an idle ordinary source under a derived physical source fence.
Let unrelated object-backed turns continue. Preserve provider and
recovery obligations. Keep unknown writers, shared Git stores and
uncertain source state blocked.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Create several local workspace records for one managed project
directory.
2. Give the aliases different source tasks. Leave their local writers
idle.
3. Keep a valid remote workspace turn running on another source.
4. Inspect or apply migration to an alias. The old owner returns
`overlapping_workspace_requires_maintenance`.
5. Retain a terminal native prepared source with a null coordinator
owner, or an old finalize attempt with an exact later committed receipt.
The old online path keeps these sources blocked.

**Paperclip version or commit**

Current tested head: `7478c817f09f7eed396922c0f7831af07ae6ff14`, based
on master `8621bcf53ee2e4bbefb7d193add42dd544ca06e8`. Related recovery
work: #19131.

**Deployment mode**

Hosted native Runner with remote workspace storage. Qualification uses
disposable local PostgreSQL databases, actual archive/storage owners and
synthetic source trees. The source observations were read-only.

## What Changed

- Retain the existing company/task source keys and add one physical
managed-project key. Heartbeat source selection, materialization, reopen
and lifecycle owners share it. Configured aliases of canonical task
directories retain their original task key.
- Fence runtime provision and each configured service CWD through both
startup owners. Check all unsettled service CWDs for physical source
overlap, even when workspace IDs differ. Runs with no services keep
their filesystem-free path.
- Derive a bounded ordinary alias closure. Lock every alias task and
lifecycle key. Reject foreign companies, changed membership, unproven
descendants, included Git metadata and other unresolved writer
obligations.
- Commit remote authority on the connection that holds source exclusion.
Refresh a stale selected local workspace after admission if migration
published remote authority. Publish activity after commit.
- Admit exact terminal native recovery sources under the existing
physical finalizer keys. Bind descriptors, allocations and owner
checkpoints to journaled fingerprints. Recheck them before capture and
publication.
- Add a separate company-scoped online entry for exact superseded
finalization receipts. Keep the offline entry's deployment prerequisites
and keep inventory read-only.
- Document the proof and the remaining Git/common-store extension. The
original files stay in place. No new scheduler, deployment action or
database migration is added.

## Verification

- Review found that the real reopen path could hold lifecycle exclusion
while waiting for a project source. The new actual nested-reopen
regression failed before the repair: lifecycle lock count was 1 while
another connection held the project fence. The repair acquires declared
and physical project sources before reconstruction and lifecycle. The
contention case, ordinary-fetch restore and runtime nested restore
passed. The lifecycle-worker restore first completed in 16.64 seconds
but exceeded its unchanged 15-second body limit; a bounded warm rerun
passed at that same limit. Both wrappers exited and completed cleanup.
The source type graph, module-boundary check and diff check pass. Final
7478 CI passed: 58 successful jobs, three skipped, one neutral and a
successful Snyk context. Fresh Greptile is 5/5 for exact7478, with no
unresolved threads. [Final
CI](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/42318150314/job/128240631573).

- Full CI on `e4283b3452` passed the other server, build and type
checks. One exposure owner case failed: two execution workspaces
received one preview pair after source admission serialized their
starts. The first local seven-case run reproduced that failure; adding
the owner argument alone did not change the hash payload. The completed
repair binds run-scoped reuse to its execution-workspace owner. All
seven existing real-process/fake-broker cases then passed in 13.81
seconds, with wrapper exit 0 and cleanup complete. Public scope IDs and
explicit project/agent sharing are unchanged. The final7478 head passed
all required CI and fresh review gates.

- The service/source/restore owner canary passed 25 cases across four
suites before the final no-service fast-path guard (41.33 seconds). This
includes actual project service processes with a different project ID
and no execution-workspace ID. Their startup waits for source ownership,
migration stays blocked while they run, and the source becomes eligible
after their verified stop. The final three-case runtime canary passed at
the final source inputs (18.70 seconds). It covers that fast path and
both service-CWD variants. Both wrappers exited 0 and completed cleanup.
- The boundary-repair canary passed 9 cases across four suites at
`7c18f1c170`. It covers the real rehome/conversion gateway, project
command provisioning, future task selection, stale imported authority,
foreign-company binding, and existing standalone filesystem callers. The
shared PostgreSQL wrapper exited 0 and completed cleanup. Duration:
94.15 seconds.
- The P1 diagnostic passed 46 cases across five suites at the pre-rebase
P1 revision. It covers the actual importer with an export warning
created by `recordNativeFinalizationFailure`, strict
prepared-source/action bindings, finalizer locks, source/lifecycle
races, unrelated remote execution, and bare Git with external
alternates. It uses the repository shared PostgreSQL wrapper,
`--fsModuleCache`, and a local-only 90-second hook allowance. Duration:
245.44 seconds. No product timeout changed.
- The canonical retained-directory compatibility check passed 22 cases
across two suites. Missing archived task directories still import from
authenticated restore points; they do not need a present-directory
source proof.
- Both initial P1 regressions were observed before the fix. The real
finalizer warning made the importer ineligible. The old archive owner
accepted a nested bare repository borrowing external objects. The new
cases pass and preserve the original warning, prepared descriptor,
allocations and files.
- Prior attempts remain non-passes: the first 23-case canary passed on
an earlier head; its exact-head rerun hit 30-second database
setup/cleanup limits. A read of the owned PostgreSQL server found a
template clone waiting on `DataFileExtend` for 58 seconds. A broader
owner run was intentionally interrupted during slow existing heartbeat
setup. One diagnostic invocation used an invalid CLI option and executed
no tests. A later review canary passed 21 cases and failed the new real
restore contention case: cwd-only admission missed the declared project
of an external worktree. Its fixture also omitted the required
file-repository authorization callback and produced an unhandled
rejection after the failed assertion. The repaired run passed 22 cases,
exited 0 and completed cleanup. These earlier failures are not reported
as passes.
- The recovery owner passed 37 PostgreSQL cases, including 14 new and 23
existing finalized-recovery cases. The operation reconciliation owner
passed 40 cases. The initial archive run passed 103 cases and found a
missing closed diagnostic entry; the corrected diagnostic and expanded
Git rejection cases pass in the P1 run.
- The full server type graph passes with the Runner source exports
mapped locally because this checkout has no built Runner declarations.
The latest module-boundary check and `git diff --check` pass. Standard
package build/typecheck and broad final-head regression coverage remain
required in CI.
- The initial CI exposed missing admission scopes for standalone
filesystem APIs and a changed foreign-company error. The latest repair
keeps those APIs independent of a database and holds physical fences at
their actual database-backed mutation owners. The branch also includes
the existing master fix for unchanged Runner default-model assertions.
New review findings and new-head CI are being checked.
- The local canary command and bounded source selection are documented
in `doc/plans/2026-11-06-online-ordinary-source-fence.md`. Source
observations only read data. A fresh bounded metadata probe found 254
pending legacy records and zero unsettled local-process services. No
live import, hold, cancellation, provider action or source filesystem
write was performed for this change.

## Risks

- Run-scoped reuse now includes execution-workspace ownership in its
private key. Explicit project/agent sharing keeps its previous identity.
- A missing writer owner could make a source proof unsafe. Admission
derives physical aliases, includes future project selection and retains
all existing source/lifecycle/finalizer locks. Unknown and changed state
fail closed.
- Cross-company physical alias checks use bounded minimal-path pages.
Lexical-prefix filtering cannot safely replace them because a symlink
can hide a foreign alias. Unknown paths or more than 10,240 foreign
records leave the source explicitly unproven. More than 1,000
same-company local records also fail closed.
- The project key can serialize local preparation within one project. A
first project waits; additional project acquisition fails on contention
to avoid a lock cycle. Remote authority keeps its remote preparation
path.
- Recovery preservation does not prove provider termination or
successful file recovery. Existing provider allocations, checkpoints,
task intent and recovery actions remain authoritative.
- This slice does not finish shared Git migration. Git
administrative/common-object/alternates closure and exact nested
imported-child coverage remain the next owned extension. No global
writers-stopped shortcut is used online.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex, with reasoning, tool use and code execution.
The host does not expose a more specific backend model ID or
context-window size.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-11-06 18:42:45 -06:00
DottaandPaperclip 72f7b42fe3 Preserve settled failed controller state during online migration (#19678)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip controls agent work across web-server releases.
> - Volume-free servers need retained controller state in shared
storage.
> - Successful settled sources already support online migration.
> - Some retained failed sources have no accepted result and must stay
available for recovery inspection.
> - This change copies those sources under task, coordinator and
publication fences while unrelated work continues.
> - The original files, failed status and recovery warnings remain
unchanged.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #19038. Refs #19631.

**What are you trying to improve?**
Preserve retained failed controller files without waiting for global
idle.

**What problem does this solve?**
The online producer skips terminal failed controllers. Their files can
still be needed for recovery inspection even when no accepted provider
artifact proves executable continuation.

**What would the improvement look like?**
A settled exact source can enter the existing encrypted archive store.
An accepted committed failed source can use the existing checkpoint
import. Busy, changed, unowned or foreign sources remain blocked.

## What Changed

- Add a source owner bound to the selected task session, run,
coordinator generation, admitted input and file digests.
- Check the task, physical finalizer lock, released coordinator,
canonical resume source and active related turns before upload and
before publication.
- Preserve failed sources through the existing encrypted archive format.
Do not treat archived bytes as execution authority or old-writer stop
proof.
- Allow the existing accepted committed checkpoint import for a finished
failed run without changing its status.
- Validate admitted input bindings before looking up local controller
files.
- Document the online preservation path and the final static writer
fence.

## Verification

- Real PostgreSQL: 125 cases passed across migration, controller
recovery and durable backup storage. One added assertion inspected an
unadmitted queued fixture; it was corrected while retaining the
queued-turn preservation and stale-publication assertions. The final
migration rerun passes 51/51; the other three affected suites pass
75/75.
- Genuine prepatch RED: online failed-source preservation and accepted
committed failed-source import both fail on the previous producer and
recovery owners.
- New cases cover independent restore after deleting the original
source, an expired but non-null coordinator owner, source mutation after
upload, a new related queued turn during upload, foreign input binding
and an accepted committed failed result.
- The full rebased server source and test-tree typecheck passes after
restoring its missing ignored workspace SDK link and building that
existing dependency.
- Module boundaries and whitespace checks pass.
- Rebased onto current master; both provider-artifact imports and the
new archive owner are preserved. Rebased type and module-boundary checks
pass. All six archive cases pass on the exact rebased head (39.68
seconds). All CI gates pass on exact head
81fc974cd9. Fresh Greptile review is 5/5
with no unresolved comments. No serving migration, deletion or
deployment is performed by this PR.

- Review memory fix: 64 KiB streamed hashes avoid retaining another
controller string at each publication fence. A 256 MiB source is hashed
three times while the original string remains live under a 512 MiB heap.
The old full-string comparison reproduces an OOM; the fixed two-case
suite passes. Full source/test-tree typecheck and module boundaries pass
on the new code. All six real-PostgreSQL archive cases pass again with
streaming enabled (17.31 seconds); ownership, queued-turn and
post-upload mutation guards remain covered.

## Risks

- This is a copy-only preservation operation. It does not prove the
original process has stopped. Final enrollment must arm static ephemeral
mode on the original volume, observe the old deployment stopped and
repeat data eligibility.
- A source change during upload leaves an unpublished pending object.
The normal retention owner handles obsolete attempts; the source remains
required until a verified current archive exists.
- An archive is forensic evidence. It does not make an unaccepted failed
provider result resumable.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 family, with reasoning and code execution. The host
does not expose the exact serving model ID or context-window size.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-11-06 18:38:50 -06:00
DottaandPaperclip 6be71028ad Prepare online ephemeral enrollment through signed Cloud control (#19660)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip manages agent work through a control-plane web server.
> - A replacement web server needs shared durable data and the original
signing identity.
> - Existing enrollment exports that identity only after a global drain
and offline migration.
> - Online enrollment needs a separate preparation operation while agent
work continues.
> - This change adds a purpose-bound Cloud control operation with
existing data and key owners.
> - The result is an audited preparation receipt, with no permission to
stop agents or detach storage.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #19038. Refs #19024.

**What are you trying to improve?**
Allow Cloud to prepare an already migrated tenant for volume removal
without the offline migrator or a global-idle gate.

**What problem does this solve?**
Cloud must preserve the original decision key before starting a
replacement with static ephemeral mode. A tenant session must never gain
key-export authority.

**What would the improvement look like?**
A fresh exact-action Cloud assertion obtains a private, deployment-bound
preparation receipt. Unfinished durable-data migration and invalid
replacement configuration block export.

## What Changed

- Add the signed `ephemeral-enrollment:prepare` control action and a
strict UUID-only POST route.
- Check existing durable-data eligibility and ephemeral configuration
before reading the original key. Never create a missing key.
- Audit only public preparation metadata. Keep HTTP diagnostics
secret-sensitive and the response non-cacheable.
- Bind the receipt to the attempt, stack, build commit, Railway
deployment, time, static mode and key digest.
- Always return `enrollmentReady: false`. Cloud still needs to arm a
replacement, verify old writers have stopped, repeat eligibility and
qualify native handoff before detaching the retained volume.

## Verification

- PASS: 80 focused tests across the preparation owner, signed route,
existing Cloud control, HTTP privacy and OpenAPI route coverage.
- PASS: 2 real PostgreSQL cases. Concurrent copies of one signed request
export once; the durable receipt still rejects reuse after clearing the
process fence. Normal run admission before skill pins is allowed;
missing durable skill installation remains blocked.
- Genuine prepatch RED: the same two PostgreSQL cases exported twice and
rejected ordinary admission. The fixed owner was restored automatically
after the comparison.
- PASS: server TypeScript check with workspace dependencies built.
- Fixed the first CI route-coverage failure by declaring this private
control endpoint in the existing explicit OpenAPI exclusion registry.
- Initial local HTTP execution lacked sandbox socket permission; the
reviewed run passed. Initial PostgreSQL fixtures enabled durable files
too late and reused an issue prefix; those fixture defects were
corrected before the red/green comparison.
- All required CI gates pass on
5346721847. Fresh Greptile review is 5/5
and all review threads are resolved. No deployment, volume detachment,
admission change or agent stop is performed by this PR.

## Risks

- The private response contains the original signing key. Only a fresh
stack-bound assertion for this exact action can obtain it. The Cloud
consumer must pass it directly to its existing vault owner and must not
expose it through admin responses or registry metadata.
- Eligibility is an observation. It cannot replace static writer
restrictions or qualified ownership handoff. This PR deliberately
supplies no detach or readiness authorization.
- Cloud transition integration is still required. This PR alone does not
enroll an instance.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 family, with reasoning, code execution and browser
tools. The host does not expose the exact serving model ID or
context-window size.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-11-06 18:00:28 -06:00
DottaandPaperclip 349b8b3f7b Migrate settled controller checkpoints while unrelated work runs (#19631)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip manages work performed by AI agents.
> - Server replacement must preserve retained Runner sessions.
> - Older sessions can retain controller checkpoints on the server
volume.
> - The existing importer requires all execution writers to stop,
including unrelated runs.
> - This change adds a separate online path for successful, settled
sources.
> - It locks the source task and finalizer while it reads and publishes
that source.
> - Unrelated work continues. The offline importer keeps its existing
authority.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**

A retained controller checkpoint cannot be converted by the existing
maintenance importer while another task runs. Requiring a busy server to
become globally idle prevents online migration.

**Expected behavior**

An operator can convert a successful retained source after its finalizer
releases ownership, while unrelated tasks continue. An expired owner
remains an owner. Related active work and uncertain evidence remain
blocked.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Retain a valid legacy controller for a successful run with an
accepted result and a released committed finalizer.
2. Start a different task.
3. Run controller preparation. The old importer refuses because
execution writers are active.

Related preservation contracts: #19038 and #19024. This change does not
replace workspace migration or authorize volume removal.

## What Changed

- Add `prestageNativeControllers` with task, finalizer, and source-run
row locks. Recheck related runs and exact checkpoint identity under
those locks.
- Allow legacy checkpoint material through normal settled-owner import
checks. Keep offline authority separate.
- Compare captured local controller and supervisor bytes before commit.
A changed source rolls back publication.
- Add `--controllers-only` to the existing finite native preparation
entry. This avoids re-reading provider archives during controller
conversion.
- Add PostgreSQL cases for unrelated work, expired owners, related
active work, source-lock contention, and source changes.
- Document the finite command and its limits.

## Verification

- Real PostgreSQL affected suites: 56 passed across controller migration
and recovery. A first per-server run was interrupted because it was
slow; the completed run used the repository's shared PostgreSQL test
wrapper.
- Initial online cases: 3 passed, covering unrelated work, an expired
owner, and related active work.
- Source lock and changed-file cases: 2 passed. Publication rolled back
on a source change.
- Final source-evidence regression: 2 passed. A first unproven source
deferred and a later valid source imported; changed-file rollback
remained intact.
- Server TypeScript check passed with the SDK and Runner declarations
built.
- Server package build passed, including the Runner vendor checks and
compiled command.
- Runtime bundling suite: 10 passed.
- Full repository CI and exact-head automated review remain required
before merge. This draft is not staging acceptance.


- PASS: 7 CLI cases after adding the controller-only dependency fixture
and explicit-mode coverage. The first CI run exposed missing mock/export
coverage; the fixture repair passed after rebase.
- The unrelated model-default failures were fixed on master; this branch
now includes that fix.

## Risks

- A source task can wait briefly on its own migration lock. A one-second
lock acquisition budget defers a contended source. No global admission
hold is acquired.
- Only successful sources with a released committed finalizer are
eligible. Failed or unsettled sources stay deferred and require their
preservation owners.
- The operator must run the command on the host that owns the original
files. The command does not certify enrollment readiness or detach any
volume.
- The existing offline path remains unchanged and still requires stopped
writers.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 family, with reasoning, tool use, and code
execution. The exact serving model ID and context window are not exposed
in this session.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-11-06 17:19:23 -06:00
DottaandPaperclip 124b2cd0ad fix(server): certify background deadlines for idle tenants (#19001)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Background services own future checks, retries, and recovery work.
> - An idle tenant can stop only when a durable wake covers its
remaining duties.
> - The current alarm catalog covers several domains but leaves these
owners blocked.
> - A saved future timestamp alone cannot prove that reconstruction or
admitted work has settled.
> - This pull request binds durable domain snapshots to the actual
registered worker revisions.
> - The tenant can hand off supported future duties and retain all
checks for uncertain or active work.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

No matching public issue was found. Related work: [domain deadline
handoff #18656](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/18656),
[owned blocker diagnostics
#18632](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/18632), and
[completed history proof
#18646](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/18646). The
separate [native idle-session change
#18988](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/18988) covers
runtime retirement. [Far-future retry re-probes
#13534](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/13534) changes
recovery responsiveness after an upstream success; this change preserves
existing retry decisions.

**What happened?**

Future status-card, external-object, skill-sync, watchdog, retry, and
quota duties lacked complete owner-bound coverage in the idle deadline
proof. A completed quota task could also retain its monitor policy and
timestamp and remain blocked after the scheduler had disarmed it.

**Expected behavior**

A settled registered owner can hand off its exact supported future
deadline. Active work, dirty reconstruction, transaction uncertainty,
changed revisions, claims, unknown state, and unsupported duties keep
the tenant awake. Completed history retains its data and stops recurring
work when the owner has no remaining duty.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Produce a supported future duty through its normal service.
2. Let the registered worker finish reconstruction and admitted work.
3. Request an owned idle report with the negotiated domain deadline
catalog.
4. Check the saved earliest deadline and generation before durable alarm
registration.
5. Stop and reconstruct the worker. Check that ordinary admission and
claims resume useful work once due.
6. Complete a quota task. Keep its saved policy and timestamp. Check
that linked unfinished work still blocks sleep and that settled history
does not.

**Paperclip version or commit**

The owned patch was qualified at
`699c8569fa34338dd75cdc5731381ec1e2efdb45`. Publication head
`491fac368ee72eaac8ae105d53e6bf6b305d8a6a` normally merges actual master
`039e0dad2c51c80251e1302a19c5566e039c357a`. All 43 owned files are
byte-identical. All 29 new upstream paths are preserved. The later
normal current-master integration is
`8c912e1ba4fc66397a7341ade59373af8075068f`, described separately below.

**Deployment mode**

Source checkout with real PostgreSQL 17 and a controlled local Node
process. No deployed alarm, tenant suspension, database suspension, or
fleet result is claimed.

## What Changed

- Add registered-worker reconciliation revisions and invalidate them on
stop.
- Keep status-card, external-object, and skill deadline interpretation
with their owners.
- Reuse the watchdog classifier against the supplied database snapshot.
- Validate the exact saved retry run and paired queued wake.
- Validate legacy quota source bindings and the current assignee or
reviewer policy.
- Preserve common issue scope, dependency, sibling, and state checks for
covered waits.
- Compose normalized owner snapshots within the existing bounded
deadline proof and recheck revisions after inspection.
- Bind actual service and worker instances from server startup. Missing
bindings preserve existing blockers.
- Retain completed quota policy and timestamps while independently
rejecting linked unfinished runs or wakes.
- Block unconsumed budget evaluation inputs through the owning queue
predicate. Accounting policy and settlement stay unchanged.
- Bind completed quota history through fixed-size UUID-array parameters,
preserve exact company/task/source associations, and guard external
references before the run-ID join.
- Batch watchdog subtrees and shared classifier facts without changing
the 64-query or two-second proof budget; preserve exact company pairing
for first-run evidence.
- Extend production-path regression controls and document supported
coverage and limits.

## Verification

Current integration head: `688abc6cac6016b9fb50e5832f81e2975ed5d49f`.
Fresh exact-head checks completed with **58 successes, three intentional
skips and one neutral review**, including aggregate `ci / verify`. The
complete current Greptile review is **5/5**. The complete current
Ponytail verdict is **Ship (4/5)**, with only optional cleanup of an
unused MCP proof input; both prior correctness findings are resolved.
All review threads and nested pages were inspected. The normal master
merges preserve the registered retry deadline owner and current startup
completion log after the same readiness await. The earlier focused
evidence below remains tied to its tested source revisions.


Current-master integration `8c912e1ba4fc66397a7341ade59373af8075068f`:

- Normally merge actual master
`46fb933b0155d183ce64a8bdc4950d1b58c926f6`. Every nonoverlapping tree
blob retains its owning parent across 14,044 paths. All 42 owner-only
files and 15 critical binding/proof/readiness files remain
byte-identical. Three automatic overlaps preserve the existing watchdog
binding, conservative unavailable-reader fallback and optional actual
owner arguments. The two scoped-deadline conflicts retain the entire
upstream resource-reservation/mid-pass admission/abort algorithm inside
the existing reconciliation revision/running/failure fence, with both
parent test sets.
- Actual TypeScript 7.0.2 server noEmit passed in 9.434 seconds, normal
source declaration layers in 12.102 seconds, and four selected
test/helper/config layers extending the actual CI configuration in 3.167
seconds. No compiler option weakening, heap override, donor declarations
or SDK replacement stub.
- Focused PG0 controls passed: 102 scheduler/proof/owner controls in
16.451 seconds, including all 21 scoped-deadline cases; 121 startup
controls; and all 107 unchanged instance-settings route cases in 6.456
seconds. The latter first hit a local prewire-guard
listener-registration race. Only the ignored guard was corrected to
register the same actual OS-bound server port immediately after native
listen returns. Closed, unknown, foreign, offhost and PG destinations
remain blocked. Original failure evidence is retained; product code and
assertions were unchanged.
- The exact current UI policy command now reports zero findings (0.362
seconds); its seven scanner controls pass. The earlier dependent PR used
an old scanner/source baseline under a newly enforcing trusted workflow
and reported 397 findings. Carrying the genuine current master resolves
that mismatch without editing unrelated UI sites or relaxing the gate.
- Every meaningful worker checked its executing PID/thread/preload hash
and matching receipt. PG0 controls opened no PostgreSQL sockets; all
owned processes exited. Original dependency-cache/DNS, ignored-harness
syntax/type and guard failures remain separate from product results.
- This is fresh semantic and focused runtime qualification, not a local
whole-repository or current-head PostgreSQL acceptance rerun. The
upstream workspace-busy parked-retry/terminal-holder notification path
remains unchanged by this merge and needs its separate current-graph
producer check. Historical six-case/scale results below stay tied to
their measured sources. A matching controlled default-cadence follow-up
is in #19191; no fresh current-head two-cycle or deployed suspension
claim follows from this merge.
- All 59 exact-head check contexts now pass (55 success, one neutral,
three intentional skips), plus the legacy security status. The complete
edited Greptile review is 5/5 for this exact commit, with all
root/nested pages inspected and no unresolved threads. Ponytail stopped
without completing its new turn; it supplied no new verdict or finding.
Prior actual findings remain addressed. Earlier scores/checks below
belong to their explicit earlier commits.


On frozen clean merged source `699c8569fa`:

- Real PostgreSQL acceptance: **6/6 passed**,83.483 seconds wall. Actual
retry producer creates the exact saved run/wake; stopped and
reconstructed owner resumes through current admission, one durable
start, real local process output and normal task completion. Includes
cancellation, drain arrival, retained quota history with queued-run/wake
negatives, watchdog review settlement and budget-input
empty/pending/consumed control using the actual owner.
- Affected coordinator, deadline, scoped-deadline, recovery and
composed-proof controls: **78/78 in five files passed**,32.114 seconds
wall, worker 1/no file parallelism.
- `pnpm exec tsc --noEmit -p server/tsconfig.json`: **passed**,17.467
seconds. Native TypeScript 7.0.2 and Node 24.22.2.
- PostgreSQL tests use one dedicated test database, matching
fixture/admin URLs, pool limit four, one worker, and no embedded
fallback. Every run recorded unchanged source hashes and a clean
checkout.
- The eight-second real-clock retry is a domain execution check. It is
below the Cloud minimum wake lead and is not a positive accepted hosted
sleep cycle.
- The completed quota-history product failure and original
fixture/protocol failures were preserved; the owning-reader fix passed a
real PostgreSQL red/green regression before the fresh merged six-case
pass.
- After runtime completion, the dedicated database had zero other
clients and no owned runtime processes. All three qualification process
PIDs exited. The coordinator independently audits and drops the
database.
- Comment-only cleanup has equal strict TypeScript parser ASTs across 15
files. The final lexical audit finds no added comments relative to
actual master. `git diff --check` passed.
- Earlier retry fixtures omitted responsible-user membership, advanced
JavaScript time past the real PostgreSQL lease clock, or produced stdout
without normal task completion. Corrected fixtures use real membership,
an eight-second real deadline, and ordinary task comment/completion. The
last case exposed legitimate disposition repair rather than duplicate
retry promotion.
- The quota and watchdog controls first ran before admitted work or the
existing 30-second reconstruction duty settled. The stronger tests
require an interim blocked report and then exact settled-owner proof.
Production deadlines were not changed. The separate
completed-quota-history defect was fixed in its reader and verified with
linked unfinished-run and wake controls.
- The status/object and skill owners reviewed the actual final startup,
route and post-backup bindings. Their domain source evidence carries
where token-equivalent. The master coordinator coalescing change was
reviewed separately. Historical domain PostgreSQL results are not
presented as fresh full-suite results on this head.

The later master merge adds retry predecessor cleanup checks under the
existing issue claim lock. The source audit confirms unchanged saved
deadlines and run/wake identities. The three actual retry
lifecycle/cancellation/drain cases passed on the batched candidate with
this parent (31.817 seconds). Those local dependency controls preceded
the current exact-head remote run. Native backup preservation and
TestOps changes from master are retained. No pass is inferred for
changed dependency behavior solely from unchanged owned files.

Review repair published as `643f1e7400`:

- The original reader returned `unknown` after seven actual watchdog
reviews settled across seven companies. The unchanged composed-report
regression passed after batching; the final reader passed in 61.841
seconds, including active queued-work and stopped-owner rejection.
- A separate two-company red/green control rejects terminal-run context
from another company as first-run grace evidence. Shared facts are
serialized once, with per-root IDs and review summaries.
- The affected recovery, proof and diagnostic unit controls passed 47/47
(14.575 seconds). Startup owner-contract fixtures passed 121/121 (10.589
seconds).
- Diagnostic PostgreSQL controls passed7/7 (12.406 seconds), including
the normal budget-input producer and its exact blocker reason. Initial
empty-state setup uses the same cleanup as per-case teardown when a
dedicated test database is reused.
- Actual repository `pnpm exec tsc --noEmit -p server/tsconfig.json`
passed 12.710 seconds with no heap override. Final source has no added
code comments; whitespace checks pass.
- The original query-budget failure, two-company discriminator, initial
cross-suite fixture failure and an interrupted incorrect local-driver
selector are retained separately. The interrupted run is not a pass.
Independent cleanup found zero owned clients or runtime processes.

Quota-scale repair published as `6696a37f8a`:

- The exact 10,000-row completed-history case reproduced
`MAX_PARAMETERS_EXCEEDED`:90,002 bound parameters exceeded the driver's
65,534 limit, and the composed report returned `unknown` despite settled
owners. Original failure and actual driver diagnostics are retained.
- Fixed pending-work queries use three typed UUID-array parameters plus
the result limit, keeping exact company/issue/source tuple bindings. The
primary run-ID column stays uncast; a guarded CASE validates the raw
external reference before conversion. The 10,000-row cap and
64-query/two-second proof budget are unchanged.
- The same 10,000-row composed-report case passed 18.860 seconds, with
unfinished run/wake rejection, malformed-reference safety and
conservative 10,001-row overflow. Its fixture derives retained history
from the actual quota producer and normal task completion, expands valid
persisted issue/source pairs, then starts the actual registered owners.
- The existing actual quota producer case passed 14.187 seconds,
including exact future deadline, retained completion history, unfinished
work, real foreign-company source references and noncanonical/malformed
references.
- Affected owner/proof controls passed 22/22 (26.444 seconds).
Production server noEmit passed 16.039 seconds.
- CI on 643 identified TS7034/TS7005 in the settled-watchdog fixture's
initially untyped collection. It is now explicitly typed. A separate
affected-entry semantic check extending the repository's actual
`server/src/__tests__/tsconfig.json` passed 15.093 seconds: six affected
tests, two owner files, ambient declarations and current imported
source, with unchanged strict/module/lib/path settings. The production
server config excludes that test directory and is not presented as
test-layer proof. No custom suppression or replacement SDK stub was
added.
- All runs were sequential with pool max 4, worker 1,
source/config/command hashes and cleared inherited
provider/LIVE/other-database variables. Cleanup found zero owned
database clients or local runtime processes. At prior head
`6696a37f8a5718cd0f79054969a0084462d41d47`, all required CI gates pass.
The exact-head inventory has 55 successes, one neutral review and three
intentional skips. Greptile is 5/5. The complete latest Ponytail verdict
confirms the quota finding is fixed; its only remaining note is optional
unused MCP proof state, not a behavior defect. All three review threads
are resolved. The earlier 643 result remains historical.

The repository-wide typecheck, tests, build and browser gates passed in
the prior `6696a37f8a5718cd0f79054969a0084462d41d47` CI run. The new
`8c912e1ba4fc66397a7341ade59373af8075068f` full CI also passes. They
were not run as a full local workspace command in the focused PostgreSQL
lease. Local evidence above uses bounded external databases and does not
claim embedded-cluster, live-provider or deployed-alarm qualification.

## Risks

- An unsupported or uncertain owner state must remain blocked. An
optimistic exemption could lose work while compute is stopped.
- Changes during reconstruction or inspection must invalidate the proof.
A memory-only timer is not durable alarm coverage.
- Current authorization, budgets, cancellation, accounting, and resource
ownership still apply on dispatch. The proof does not grant execution
authority.
- The supported writer model uses in-process transaction signals and
startup/resume reconstruction. Independent SQL writers and other
replicas need an explicit wake contract.
- Native, review, coalesced, and taskless retry variants remain
conservative until their owner cases qualify. Reviewer quota and hosted
alarm qualification remain open.
- The shared catalog remains opt-in. Legacy callers and missing owner
bindings retain their old blockers.

## Model Used

OpenAI `gpt-6.1-sol` was the configured model for the delegated service
implementations and reviews. OpenAI Codex, based on GPT-6, performed
managing review and integration. Both used repository tools and code
execution. The exact served backend snapshots and context-window limits
were not exposed.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal
Paperclip ticket id
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass on the final merged head
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green — exact current-head run passes
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups —
complete current-head review and all paginated threads inspected
- [ ] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-11-06 13:48:55 -06:00
DottaandClaude Opus 5.5 871a9b3180 test(restart-chaos): add Phase 1 control-plane restart chaos harness (#19477)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - The control plane owns task execution, recovery and Retry for every
agent run
> - Server restarts were the largest remaining source of stalled tasks
in the staging soak campaign
> - The soak could only observe restarts that staging happened to
perform, so a failure could not be repeated
> - This pull request adds a script harness that causes the restarts on
purpose and grades each task on fixed rules
> - The benefit is a repeatable restart failure with a replay command
and an evidence bundle for each fixer

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What existing behavior does this improve?**
The restart test coverage. Today the runner-e2e restart cells test one
fixed restart point per cell. They cannot run many tasks at once, cannot
choose a random fault time, and cannot replay a failure.

**Subsystem affected**
Test tooling (`tests/restart-chaos/`). It reuses the runner-e2e process
code in `tests/runner-e2e/`. Product code does not change.

**Current behavior**
Restart robustness is checked through a small set of fixed cells. A
random restart during a real task has no defined pass rule.

**Proposed behavior**
A harness starts an isolated control plane and seeds a "Chaos Lab"
company. It launches seeded workloads, injects K1, K2 or K4 faults at
seeded times, and grades each task on rules R1 to R6 plus a
deterministic task oracle. `--replay <wave>/<task>` repeats one task.

**Reason and benefit**
Fixers get a replay command and an evidence bundle for each failure
signature. The first smoke wave already found three product signatures
(dead Retry after a restart, a false over-budget stop after restarts,
and an OpenCode turn killed mid-turn that ends as a provider failure).

**Breaking changes**
None. The change adds new test files, one entry in the test-project
typecheck list and a gitignore entry.

## What Changed

- Add `tests/restart-chaos/`:
- `supervisor.ts` owns one isolated server. It reuses
`replaceController`, the process-tree stopper, the environment isolation
helpers, the config seed, the port reservation, the wrapper-owned
Postgres and `server-entry.ts` from `tests/runner-e2e/`. It does not
copy them. Faults: K1 (SIGKILL, immediate restart), K2 (SIGTERM,
restart) and K4 (SIGKILL, 2 to 5 minute hold). Postgres and the
controller runtime cache stay across a fault.
- `seed.ts` creates the company, encrypted provider secrets, native
Codex, ACPX Claude and OpenCode agents from the runner-e2e catalog, and
the `chaos-sandbox` project. The project is a git repository with a
Python CLI, one failing test and a four-minute `bench.sh`.
- `scheduler.ts` makes a seeded plan of workload, adapter, fault, fire
time, hold and nonce for each task. It saves the plan so that `--replay`
can run one task again.
- `observer.ts` polls each issue and its runs. When a task stops and
offers Retry, it sends `POST /api/issues/:id/retry` one time, with the
same body as `useTaskRetry.ts`.
- `grader.ts` grades R1 to R6 as pure functions. `workloads.ts` defines
workloads A1, B1, B5 and C1 and their oracles.
- `evidence.ts` and `ledger.ts` write an evidence bundle for each
failure, a JSONL ledger and `SUMMARY.md`. All results go to the
gitignored `tests/restart-chaos/results/`. Known provider key values are
redacted.
- Unit tests: `scheduler.test.ts` (determinism, replay and CLI parsing)
and `grader.test.ts` (R1 to R6 and the oracles on fixture timelines).
These tests need no credentials.
- Add `tests/restart-chaos` to the test-project typecheck list
(`scripts/typecheck-test-projects.mjs`), with a `tsconfig.layers.json`
like `tests/runner-e2e`. The harness runs through direct script
invocations, not `package.json` scripts.
- After the first Greptile review:
- A failed fault or an unexpected server exit now gets one bounded
recovery. If the recovery fails, the wave fails and does not hang.
- Incomplete cleanup is now a harness error, and the harness keeps the
instance.
- After the C1 follow-up comment, the observer needs a fresh rest window
before it grades the task.
- `--replay` now fires the recorded faults that crossed the task, at the
same offsets, including the faults that other tasks requested.
- A failed workspace-operation read is now a sweep error. It cannot give
a clean rest.
- R2 now checks that workspace files from before the first fault still
exist at rest.
- B5 now needs the completion record that `bench.sh` writes for each
task.
- After the second round of reviews:
- An idle `todo` or `in_progress` task with no live run and no named
wait is no longer treated as resting. The observer keeps watching it
until the task resumes or passes the R5 stall limit.
  - A failed injected fault now fails the wave with exit 2.
- T-oracle commands run agent-editable code. They now run under a macOS
Seatbelt sandbox with a scratch `HOME` and no network, and they cannot
read the operator's home directory. On other platforms these commands
are refused unless the operator explicitly allows them.
- R4 now counts every active run. A wake comment may be served again
only after a run that did not succeed.
- Evidence redaction now covers every environment variable name that
ends in `KEY`, `TOKEN`, `SECRET` or `PASSWORD`.
- If the pre-fault snapshot fails, only R2 for that task is left
unchecked. The wave continues.
- B5 also needs bench progress that the harness observed while it
polled.
- Add `doc/plans/2026-11-06-control-plane-restart-chaos.md` and its
campaign ledger.

## Verification

- `pnpm exec vitest run --config tests/restart-chaos/vitest.config.ts`:
38 tests pass. The tests include observer tests with a fake API, a real
`bench.sh` run, and a sandbox test that cannot read a canary secret.
- `node scripts/typecheck-test-projects.mjs tests/restart-chaos`:
passes.
- `server/scripts/typecheck-layers.test.mjs`: 45 tests pass, including
"covers every project under tests/".
- A supervisor check with no credentials passed. K1 was ready again in
about 6 seconds. K2 with a 3-second hold was ready again in about 9
seconds. Company data stayed readable.
- One paid smoke wave ran: `--env local --adapters codex,claude,opencode
--workloads A1,B1,C1 --faults K1 --tasks 3 --concurrency 2 --seed 7`.
The harness worked from start to end, and all three tasks crossed a
restart. The 0/3 result comes from product failures, which the campaign
ledger records. A scan found no provider key in the results.
- To run a wave:

  ```sh
  pnpm --filter @paperclipai/paperclip-runner build:runner-binaries
  set -a; source ~/.secrets; set +a
node cli/node_modules/tsx/dist/cli.mjs tests/restart-chaos/main.ts --env
local --adapters codex,claude,opencode --concurrency 4 --tasks 8
--faults K1,K2,K4 --seed 42
node cli/node_modules/tsx/dist/cli.mjs tests/restart-chaos/main.ts
--replay <wave>/<task>
  ```

## Risks

- Low product risk. The change adds test tooling only and does not
change product code.
- A wave spends provider money. The company budget hard cap
(`--budget-cents`, default 3000) is the only spend limit. The plan's
per-wave and per-night refusal is not implemented yet.
- Known gaps:
- `--env daytona` is reserved. It fails with a TODO in `seed.ts`. The
Daytona sandbox sweep for R6 is not implemented yet.
- The project requests isolated git-worktree workspaces. A B1 task still
ran in the shared fixture repository. Concurrent B1 and B5 tasks can
share files. The oracles use marker files for each task.
- Only K1, K2 and K4 at seeded random times are available. Boundary
triggers (B1 to B16), other faults and the UI probe come in Phase 2.
  - The paid smoke did not exercise B5 or K4.
- On macOS, B1 oracle commands need `python3` outside the operator's
home directory, for example `/usr/bin` or Homebrew. On Linux they are
refused until a sandbox is added.
- The B5 proof is best-effort against a deliberately adversarial agent,
because that agent can write to the workspace.
- Startup phase timings come from polling `/api/ready`. The server
records its own timings only as OpenTelemetry spans.
- `pnpm verify` and the CI Vitest jobs do not select these unit tests.
The root Vitest projects cover workspace packages only. CI typechecks
the files, but the tests run only through the vitest command above.
- After the smoke, rest detection and the review fixes changed. A
recovery action that the board owns now counts as a rest, and R6 reports
it. A paid wave did not run again after these changes.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

- Claude Opus 5.5 (Anthropic), model ID `claude-opus-5-5`, used in
Claude Code as an agent with tool use (shell, file edits) and extended
thinking.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-06 10:45:52 -06:00
DottaandPaperclip c0214826b3 fix(workspaces): preserve pending repository requests during import (#19439)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip manages agent work and its saved files.
> - An ephemeral web server needs remote workspace authority before the
old volume can detach.
> - A task can have a repository request that has never prepared a
checkout.
> - The offline importer currently treats that pending request as
unfinished file publication.
> - This blocks migration even when the target does not exist and there
is no saved commit, branch or failure.
> - This pull request preserves that request in the database and imports
the existing files separately.
> - The next authorized sandbox preparation can acquire the repository
through its existing owner.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**

On Core `253bf071f0a496554b61fff897ad3f11afaf8766`, offline migration of
a volume-backed workspace fails with `repository_preparation_unresolved`
for an untouched pending repository request. The requested directory has
never existed. The request has no pinned commit, branch or failure.

**Expected behavior**

Preserve the pending request and all existing files. Do not label the
absent checkout as part of a saved archive. Keep partial publication and
active preparation blocked.

**Steps to reproduce**

Create a local task workspace. Add an unmaterialized pending repository
request. Run the canonical offline importer after stopping writers. The
unchanged importer rejects the request before preserving the workspace.

Related migration work: #19429. A GitHub search found no duplicate
pending-repository import fix or matching public issue.

## What Changed

- Admit an untouched pending request only at the existing offline writer
fence and after proving its target is absent.
- Keep the database request unchanged and exclude it from materialized
snapshot descriptors.
- Recheck file absence and source identity before publication. Reject a
request that becomes ready during capture.
- Cover cold filesystem loss, real sandbox-side Git acquisition, and
eleven blocked states. Document the preservation contract.

## Verification

- Red: the new real PostgreSQL/filesystem regression fails on the
unchanged importer with `repository_preparation_unresolved`.
- Green: both affected migration/lifecycle suites pass, **236 tests**.
The cold test deletes the predecessor directory, restores saved bytes,
and acquires the pending repository through the full admission owner,
checking ready state and the pinned commit. Real Git runs against a
local HTTP origin through an exact-URL redirect at the sandbox transport
boundary. It does not claim live Daytona or GitHub qualification.
- Full workspace typecheck and build pass at the final head. Both
affected suites pass **236 tests**, including the full admission owner
and eleven blocked states. All final-head CI checks pass: **54 success,
2 skipped, 1 neutral**. Greptile is **5/5**, with no unresolved review
threads.
- The full local test command failed in `recovers lost inline and check
responses without duplicate GitHub publications` in the chat integration
suite. That exact case passes in a fresh isolated invocation. Its cause
remains unclassified; this is not a full-local-suite pass claim. The
original failure is retained alongside the isolated result.
- No candidate code has been applied to the serving instance.

## Risks

- The exception applies only to offline migration and a pending request
with no target, commit, branch or failure. Unreadable paths, symlinks,
partial directories and active/repair states retain their blockers.
- Requests retain normal repository authorization and acquisition
behavior. This change neither fetches repositories during migration nor
marks requests ready.
- A changed materialized source aborts publication and leaves original
files intact.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex, with reasoning and tool use. The exact
deployment variant and context-window size are not exposed in this
session.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-11-06 05:49:16 -06:00
DottaandPaperclip 253bf071f0 fix(workspaces): preserve resolved pending merges in snapshots (#19429)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Task workspaces must survive replacement of the web server.
> - Workspace snapshots therefore preserve both files and portable Git
state.
> - A resolved merge can still await its merge commit.
> - The archive rejected this state, so an existing workspace could not
migrate.
> - This pull request saves and checks the complete supported merge
state.
> - The benefit is that migration preserves the user's choice to
continue or abort the merge.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**

A legacy workspace contained a resolved merge with `MERGE_HEAD`,
`MERGE_MODE`, `MERGE_MSG`, `ORIG_HEAD`, and `AUTO_MERGE`. Its index had
no unresolved entries. The snapshot owner refused the operation. This
kept the original safe but blocked migration.

**Expected behavior**

Save this supported state without changing the source. Restore it
without the original repository, borrowed object store, or linked
worktree. Retain the merge parents, selected index, later edits, and
Git's normal safety checks.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Merge two branches that conflict.
2. Resolve and stage the conflict. Leave the merge uncommitted.
3. Capture the workspace. The base implementation rejects the merge
marker.

Related prior work: #19310 preserves an inactive rebase bookmark. No
duplicate open merge-preservation PR was found. This is a workspace
preservation fix, not a new roadmap feature.

## What Changed

- Admit only resolved pending merges with valid, bounded metadata and
available objects.
- Retain and verify the merge mode, message, parents, original head,
automatic merge tree, and index.
- Verify copied metadata and object closure before publication. Keep the
before/after source checks.
- Keep unresolved conflicts, autostash, rerere, mixed operations,
malformed state, and unsafe links blocked.
- Test real ordinary, linked, and borrowed repositories through local
and serialized capture. Delete all original sources before continuing or
aborting the restored merge.
- Document the supported state and the remaining refusal cases.

## Verification

- Six new continuation cases fail against the unchanged base at the
pending-operation guard.
- The first candidate restored and continued the merges, but six abort
assertions failed. The fixture rewrote the worktree without updating
Git's index cache. It now first verifies that abort protects later
edits, uses normal `git restore` to discard those fixture edits, then
aborts. No archive assertion was removed.
- The final archive and environment suites pass all 98 tests at
`3c87d13d1b`, including linked-metadata protections and pending merges
in ordinary, linked, borrowed, shallow, partial, and SHA-256
repositories. All 12 local/serialized continuation cases pass after
source removal.
- Full repository build and typecheck pass at `1544cc4a90`. The build
first found a nullability error; an explicit rejection return fixed it.
- The first full local test attempt stopped before tests ran because
omitted package postinstall steps left PostgreSQL library links absent.
Direct `initdb --version` reproduced the missing-library failure.
Restoring the package links made that probe pass; the full test rerun is
active.
- The initial typecheck also found missing excluded-plugin SDK links
after the same install. Running the repository postinstall link helper
corrected this, and the full typecheck now passes.
- All current-head CI gates pass at `3c87d13d1b`: 54 success, 2 skipped,
1 neutral. Fresh Greptile is 5/5 and no review threads remain open.
- Review requested shallow and SHA-256 coverage. The current commit adds
both plus partial-clone coverage; all 98 archive tests and the full
server typecheck pass.
- All six local chat shards pass. The monolithic local general-suite run
reports one viewer-permission test failure and remains active. That
exact test passes alone, and its full 505-test file also passes alone.
The original failure cause is unresolved; this is not a full local-suite
PASS. The complete current-head CI suite is green.

## Risks

- This widens capture eligibility only for the checked resolved-merge
state. No migration commits or aborts the source operation.
- A missing object or changed metadata still blocks publication and
retains the source.
- Unresolved merges and other operation formats remain unsupported.
Their preservation guard is unchanged.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, based on GPT-6, with reasoning, repository tools, and code
execution. The runtime does not expose a more specific serving model ID
or context-window size.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used with the available version and
capability details
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue
template
- [x] I have not referenced internal or instance-local Paperclip issues
or links
- [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal task
id
- [x] I have run the affected tests locally and they pass; full-suite
limitations are recorded above
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented the risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-11-06 04:20:32 -06:00
DottaandPaperclip c1d567ff6a fix(workspaces): isolate archived nested Git reconstruction (#19409)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Durable workspace import must preserve archived task files and Git
history.
> - A saved nested checkout can be a linked worktree whose branch
belongs to its old absolute path.
> - Archived import reconstructs that checkout in a new scratch
directory.
> - Ordinary linked recovery rejects the old branch at that new path. It
can also write into a cache used by other import workers.
> - This pull request reconstructs archived nested checkouts as private
standalone repositories.
> - Each import preserves saved files and extra history without changing
shared worktree registrations or branches.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**
Archived workspace import fails when a saved nested linked checkout has
a branch owned by the old path. The new scratch path fails the
linked-worktree ownership check. The existing cache lock is
process-local, so separate import processes also share mutable Git state
without a common lock.

**Expected behavior**
Archived import must create an independent portable copy of the saved
checkout. It must retain the saved commit, branch name, staged edits,
working files, ignored recovery files, settings, and extra saved
commits. It must keep the source cache unchanged and enforce source
authorization.

**Steps to reproduce**
1. Create a managed nested linked checkout with an unpushed commit and
staged and unstaged edits.
2. Save an encrypted restore point, including ignored files and an extra
history tip.
3. Restore its saved contents under a different absolute workspace path.
4. Before this repair, the new path cannot adopt the branch owned by the
old path.

**Paperclip version or commit**
The real Git regression fails before the repair at `fc1f5f3052`. The
final branch includes the merged interrupted-upload and nested-source
authorization fix from #19396.

**Deployment mode**
Archived remote workspace migration with real Git repositories,
disposable PostgreSQL, and encrypted object storage. Local integration
tests use the filesystem storage provider.

Builds on merged #19402 and #19396. Related #19374 concerns interrupted
clone staging; it does not implement private archived reconstruction. No
duplicate open repair was found.

## What Changed

- Enable private repository reconstruction only for archived migration.
Ordinary linked recovery keeps its path ownership guard.
- Add an object-only source to the managed checkout owner. A verified
cache supplies only the saved commit and authenticated bundle
prerequisites through scoped fetches. The private copy includes no
unrelated task refs or objects, hard links, object alternates, or
current cache files.
- Fetch missing authenticated bundle prerequisites before importing a
saved bundle in both private reconstruction and ordinary linked
recovery. A pruned cache can use the approved remote; unavailable
history still blocks restore.
- Keep every authenticated restore point's extra commit under a private
ref in root and nested private copies so portable archive capture and
garbage collection retain it. Ordinary recovery keeps its existing
history and expiration rules.
- Share the verified, bounded ignore-file copy between root and nested
reconstruction. Sources remain unchanged.
- Retain source authorization before and after reconstruction and the
final source-row locks from #19396.
- Test concurrent private copies, source rejection, foreign task refs
and objects, ordinary linked prerequisite recovery, a real migration,
and cold restore after removing all original repositories. Test hard
links, oversized excludes, unsafe info paths, and replacement during a
descriptor read.

## Verification

- Final affected run: 292 tests pass across ten suites. These cover real
Git repositories, encrypted restore points, disposable PostgreSQL
migration, portable archives, the restore-point ledger, source
rejection, and concurrent copies.
- Full repository typecheck and build pass after the scoped-object
repair. Final server typecheck and full build also pass after
restricting preserved refs to archive mode.
- RED then GREEN: a linked checkout at a different path; a pruned bundle
prerequisite still available from the approved remote; foreign task refs
and objects entering the archive; root extra history disappearing after
cold restore; and archive-only refs blocking ordinary standalone
expiration.
- Two concurrent private copies retain the saved head, branch, staged
and unstaged edits, ignored recovery bytes, settings, and modes. Source
refs, index, worktree registrations, and working files remain unchanged.
- Delete the original checkout, cache, remote, and private copies after
portable capture. Cold restore retains the saved files and extra history
after garbage collection. No alternates or unrelated task objects
remain.
- Ordinary linked recovery retains its path ownership check and recovers
pruned prerequisites. New and existing ordinary standalone destinations
have no archive-only refs and remain eligible for expiration after
normal object cleanup.
- Unsafe exclude tests reject hard links, oversized files, nonregular
paths, info-directory substitution, and replacement during the
descriptor read. They preserve the target and replacement source bytes.
- Preserve the failed attempts: an initial migration fixture changed its
home after constructing the source path. Later expiration fixture
attempts used a filtered current-head tip, omitted the local-source
callback, or used cleanup that generated Git server-info files or left
packed unreachable objects. Correct those setup assumptions before the
actual regressions fail. Final affected suites pass.
- Two earlier local full-suite attempts were interrupted before editing
valid review findings. Neither is reported as a full-suite PASS.
Final-head full CI passes; review is 5/5 with no open findings.

## Risks

Archived imports use additional private disk space for independent Git
objects. Missing, changed, or unsafe sources still block import. The
repair does not weaken the default linked-worktree ownership check,
change stored formats, or update live provider state. The shared
checkout addition is optional and has no effect for existing callers
that do not supply an object source.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-6 in Codex, with code editing, tool use, and test execution.
The exact runtime model identifier and context-window size are not
exposed in this session.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-11-06 00:56:06 -06:00
Dotta 92452524f4 fix(server): recover authenticated empty retention checkpoints (#19417)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Ephemeral server enrollment must preserve existing task files.
> - Archived task directories can depend on encrypted retention
checkpoints.
> - A missing object blocks migration even when its authenticated
contents were exactly empty.
> - Metadata counters alone cannot prove that no saved files existed.
> - This change verifies the exact candidate against the original
encrypted key envelope before normal migration publication.
> - The benefit is lossless migration of this bounded case without
resetting task history or weakening ordinary restore.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**
Migration stops at an archived empty directory when its retained
encrypted object is missing. The original encrypted key envelope still
authenticates the payload hash, byte length, company, workspace,
checkpoint ID, and generation.

**Expected behavior**
Administrative migration can reconstruct those exact original bytes when
storage confirms absence and every authenticated check passes. It must
keep missing nonempty, expired, corrupt, or ambiguous sources blocked.

**Steps to reproduce**
1. Capture and encrypt an empty task directory.
2. Retain its reference and encrypted key envelope.
3. Remove the old directory and storage object.
4. Run the normal remote workspace migration.

**Paperclip version or commit**
The regression fails before this change at `205ffcb606`. Related
preservation work is in #19396, #19402, and #19409. No duplicate open
fix was found.

**Deployment mode**
Administrative migration to external workspace storage. Tests use real
encryption, real filesystem storage, and disposable PostgreSQL.

## What Changed

- Let the encryption owner verify a candidate against the existing
scoped encrypted key envelope. Normal ciphertext validation keeps its
previous order and checks.
- Share the task-directory encoder with an exact empty payload
constructor.
- Add a default-off loader option for confirmed missing empty
checkpoints. Only the administrative migration caller enables it.
- Keep the original checkpoint reference and object unchanged. Publish
the recovered bytes through the existing snapshot and source-fence
owners.
- Reject forged counters, wrong identities, missing nonempty data,
present corruption, unreadable present objects, unknown absence, and
expiry.

## Verification

- Final affected run: all 238 tests pass across five crypto, snapshot,
retention, and migration suites. Full repository typecheck and build
pass; server typecheck and full build also pass after the cancellation
repair.
- RED then GREEN: exact missing-empty recovery and cancellation of a
stalled HEAD through the real storage-service boundary. Cancellation
retains the caller's original abort reason.
- Disposable PostgreSQL migration publishes a cold-restorable empty
archive. Archived status, task status, task binding, original reference,
and the absent original source stay unchanged. Replay keeps one
canonical snapshot.
- Negative cases reject forged empty counters, an authenticated
directory or file, every foreign identity field, expiry, present
corruption, unreadable present objects, unknown absence, and missing
nonempty data. Ordinary restore keeps its previous failure behavior.
- Initial verification retained one new fixture-path failure after 145
passes, and a typecheck rejected the fixture's widened schema literal.
Correct the fixture to use the returned staging path and its explicit
reference type. The final complete affected run passes.
- The new HEAD request runs only after a failed read with the
administrative option enabled. It uses the existing cancellation
contract and adds no polling or background work.
- Final-head full CI passes; review is 5/5 with no open findings. This
PR does not claim deployed enrollment or a live migration result.

## Risks

Recovery requires the original valid encrypted key envelope and an exact
format match. A format change or unavailable key continues to block
migration. Existing ciphertext hash, size, authentication, and ordinary
restore behavior remain enforced. This change has no schema,
provider-session, API, or UI contract changes.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-6 in Codex, with code editing, tool use, and test execution.
The exact runtime model identifier and context-window size are not
exposed in this session.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue
template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub references)
- [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal
Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
2026-11-06 00:50:28 -06:00
DottaandClaude Opus 5.5 958f9aa9f3 feat(issues): limit agent-created task trees to parent and child (#19312)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Agents split work into tasks. A task can have a parent task.
> - Today agents can nest tasks to any depth: parent, child, grandchild,
and deeper.
> - Deep agent-made trees are hard to follow, and an agent that works on
a child task makes grandchildren by default.
> - This pull request limits agent-created trees to two levels: a
top-level task and its children.
> - A request for a grandchild does not fail. The server puts the new
task beside the requester and tells the agent.
> - Board users keep full control. They can still nest to any depth.
Existing deep trees stay valid.
> - The pull request also records which task created each new task, so
the audit trail stays complete when the parent changes.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

No public issue exists. This is the feature description. Related: #16853
(budgets that include descendant work) also reasons about task trees;
this change does not alter its traversal.

**Subsystem affected**

Issues (tasks): create, child create and move in the issue service and
routes. Agent tools, chat suggestions and creation provenance use these
paths.

**Problem or motivation**

Agents create subtasks as deep as they want. An agent that runs on a
child task gets that child as the default parent, so its follow-ups
become grandchildren. The trees become deep and hard to read. The parent
link is also the only record of which task created a follow-up, so that
record is lost when the parent changes.

**Proposed solution**

Limit agent-created trees to a parent and its children. When an agent
asks for a grandchild, put the new task under the requester's parent and
return `parentAdjusted`. Do not reject the request. Keep board users
unrestricted. Record the originating task in a new server-set
`origin_issue_id` column. Keep `origin_run_id` as the originating run.

**Alternatives considered**

Reject grandchild requests with an error. We did not do this, because
agents then fail mid-task. Add a database constraint. We did not do
this, because existing deep trees must stay valid and nesting can return
later.

## What Changed

- Add `MAX_AGENT_TASK_HIERARCHY_DEPTH` (2) and the
`IssueParentAdjustment` type in `packages/shared`.
- Add `resolveNewTaskParent` and `planIssueParentChange` in
`server/src/services/issues.ts`. `create`, `createChild` and `update`
use the agent limit by default (`parentDepthPolicy: "flatten"`).
- The issue create, `/children` and PATCH routes pass `allow_nested` for
board users. For agents, the routes check authorization against the
parent that the server actually writes.
- The requester keeps its behavior when the server moves a task beside
it: `blockParentUntilDone` blocks the requester, and the new task
inherits the requester's workspace and privacy.
- The server never moves a task above a low-trust boundary root that
contains the requester.
- These subsystems keep any depth, because they find their work by
parent: watchdog reviews, monitor recovery, email-channel placement, and
routines that a person configured.
- An agent move of a task that has children skips only the parent change
and returns `reason: "has_children"`.
- Add `issues.origin_issue_id` (nullable, `on delete set null`, indexed)
in migration `0434`. Only the server sets it. The `createdFrom` detail
field, the `createdFromIssueId` filter and task-creation provenance read
it first.
- Chat prompts now let a chat agent create one task, a task with
children, or separate tasks. The conversation is never a parent.
- The runner `create_task` tool accepts an optional `parentTaskId`. A
chat agent can create a top-level task and then put subtasks under it.
The run must be able to read and change the parent. A conversation is
never a parent. The depth limit still applies. Project tools map the
field to `parentId` through the issue route. The protocol manifest,
semantic contracts and eval fixture are regenerated.
- Watchdog runs that have an active watchdog keep their requested parent
on all create paths, because their access is limited to the watched
subtree.
- Fix a bug that the test drive found: the chat (MCP) `create_task`
ignored the requested `status`, so a `backlog` task became `todo` and
started to run. It now uses the same rule as the native tool.
- Update `skills/paperclip`, `doc/SPEC-implementation.md`, and add the
plan `doc/plans/2026-11-05-two-level-task-hierarchy.md`.

## Verification

- `cd server && npx vitest run
src/__tests__/agent-task-hierarchy-depth.test.ts
src/__tests__/agent-task-hierarchy-depth-routes.test.ts`: 19 new tests
for service and route behavior, all pass.
- Related suites (64 files: issues service, thread interactions,
privacy, watchdogs, provenance, runner tool authority, decisions,
routines, project tools): 1208 tests pass. Two tests changed because of
the intended behavior and pass now. Two `email-channels.integration`
tests fail locally because the test cannot find a bundled skill file
from this worktree path. This change does not touch that code.
- `packages/db`: migration safety, snapshot drift and journal tests
pass.
- Typecheck passes for `server`, `packages/shared`, `packages/db`, `cli`
and `ui` (local `ui` errors come only from generated Storybook catalog
files that are absent).
- Local test drive on an isolated instance with real Claude agents: 29
of 29 use cases pass, including an agent on a child task (follow-ups
placed beside it, with the notice) and a chat that creates a top-level
task with three subtasks.
- I did not run the full `pnpm test:run` or `pnpm build` locally. CI
runs them.

## Risks

- Behavior change for agents: some follow-ups that were grandchildren
are now siblings. The parent of the requester is woken when all its
children finish, which now includes these tasks.
- The runner `create_task` input contract adds one optional field, so
the protocol manifest and the pack contract change. The tool output does
not change: it shows the actual `parentId`, and the activity log records
`parentAdjusted`.
- Migration `0434` adds a nullable column, a foreign key and an index.
It does not backfill rows.
- `IssueCreationSource.run` is now nullable.

## Model Used

- Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`) in Claude Code, with tool use
(shell, file edits, local test runs).

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [ ] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-05 21:22:33 -06:00
TonioandClaude Opus 5.5 9e9a628a57 feat(ui): turn Artifacts V1 on for every instance and hide its toggle (#19164)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - Artifacts show the output of agent work on the Artifacts page, in
the panel Artifacts tab, and in the task thread
> - #17228 added the Artifacts V1 presentation behind an experimental
setting that is off by default
> - The presentation is now ready for all users, so an opt-in toggle is
no longer necessary
> - A new default alone does not reach all instances, because each
experimental write persists every flag
> - This pull request removes the toggle and turns V1 on for every
instance
> - The benefit is one artifact presentation for all users, with an off
switch for hosting operators

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #17228
Refs #17263

**Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe.**
Artifacts V1 shows only on instances where an admin turned on an
experimental setting. Other users see the previous cards.

**Describe the solution you would like**
Show Artifacts V1 on all instances. Remove the toggle from Experimental
settings.

**Describe alternatives you have considered**
A new default without a change to the hook. This does not work, because
many instances have a stored false that nobody chose, and no toggle
would remain to change it.

## What Changed

- Removed the Artifacts V1 card from Instance Settings, Experimental.
- Changed `enableArtifactsV1` to default on in the schema, the feature
catalog, and the settings service.
- Changed `resolveArtifactsV1Enabled` to ignore a stored false. It
honours false only when the value comes from managed config.
- Kept the flag and the previous cards, so a hosting operator can hold
V1 off.
- Kept the key in the Cloud staging list, so a managed false does not
hold V1 off on staging.
- Updated unit tests, the Artifacts V1 plan, and the directions-lab
Today reference.
- Moved the attachment and upload e2e specs and the runner download
helper to the V1 rows.
- Added V1 tests for a Markdown review: expansion, deep link, and open,
raw and download actions.

## Verification

- `cd ui && npx vitest run`: one test file failed before its fix. That
file tests the previous cards, and it now mocks the hook to off. I reran
it with the other changed UI tests, and they pass. I did not repeat the
full UI run after the fix.
- `npx playwright test --config tests/e2e/playwright.config.ts
tests/e2e/text-attachment-tabs.spec.ts
tests/e2e/artifact-uploads.spec.ts
tests/e2e/artifact-tab-arrival.spec.ts`: 10 tests pass on V1.
- `tests/e2e/cloud-auth.spec.ts` failed once in CI on a task heading. It
does not touch artifacts, and 10 local runs pass.
- `cd server && npx vitest run src/__tests__/instance-settings`: 183
tests pass.
- `cd packages/shared && npx vitest run src/feature-catalog.test.ts
src/validators/instance.test.ts`: 35 tests pass.
- `pnpm run check:token-gates` and the `ui` and `server` typechecks
pass. I did not run the full repository check.
- In the artifact directions lab, with no stored settings, the Today
right panel renders the V1 rows.
- I did not test this on a live instance. After merge, confirm on
staging that the Experimental page has no Artifacts V1 card and that all
three surfaces show V1.

## Risks

- All users see V1 after the next release, not only staging users. To
revert, revert this pull request.
- Users cannot turn V1 off. Only a hosting operator can, through managed
config, and not on Cloud staging.
- An instance with a managed `enableArtifactsV1: false` stays on the
previous cards. The cloud harness source has no reference to this key,
but I cannot read the live fleet configuration.
- V1 surfaces render before settings load. An operator-held instance can
briefly show V1 before the previous cards.
- Admins who use the API can still write the flag. The write has no
effect on unmanaged instances.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

- Anthropic Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`) in Claude Code, with
tool use and code execution.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-05 08:14:49 +00:00
DottaandPaperclip f7a4c5678f feat(runtime): pre-copy completed harness history before enrollment (#19137)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - An ephemeral web server needs provider history in shared object
storage.
> - Offline enrollment must preserve old backups before it can detach a
volume.
> - A large copied dataset still exceeded the maintenance deadline with
parallel transfers.
> - Most of its bytes belong to successful turns with released runtime
authority.
> - This pull request pre-copies that history while unrelated executions
continue.
> - The final offline migration still verifies every source and grants
enrollment authority.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #19108, #19038, #18943.

**What happened?**

A copied instance has 1,953 local harness backups and 54.8 GB of
declared source bytes. A resumed parallel migration still reached its
25-minute deadline. It cannot safely enroll by moving all history during
maintenance.

**Expected behavior**

Copy eligible completed history while the server remains online. Defer
active, failed or changed sources. Keep all existing data and final
enrollment checks.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Retain many local native harness backups on a volume-backed instance.
2. Attempt a full offline conversion within the maintenance deadline.
3. Observe that most time moves historical bytes rather than current
execution state.

## What Changed

- Add finite `native-harness-prestage.mjs` preparation from a normal
runtime build. Require explicit opt-in and shared object storage.
Process one source at a time with a 90-minute deadline.
- Use the recorded released runtime owner of each successful, finished
turn. Do not assert that all writers stopped.
- Recheck checkout, related queued/running work, successful result
ownership, session, Runner, exact lease stamp and unchanged backup at
database publication fences.
- Defer source changes, malformed source JSON and unsafe backup roots.
Log each such source and its reason. Keep database failures and
cancellation fatal. Keep completed objects valid for retry. Never return
an enrollment-ready receipt.
- Reuse the bounded migration source walker. Keep offline admission and
final verification unchanged.
- Keep private lifecycle state, task ownership and provider policies
unchanged. Document the operator path and its limits.

## Verification

- A zero-source scan now checks the existing database obligation query.
A known mismatch blocks with a source-missing receipt; empty
fresh/already-durable scans and nonempty deferred scans remain valid
advisory results. The prior command fails the mismatch regression. All
16 command and runtime-bundle tests pass for this follow-up.
- At head `7ba3dbc7aa`, 87 focused command, database-timeout, storage,
archive, publication and runtime-bundle tests passed with real
PostgreSQL and filesystem restoration.
- The current follow-up passes all 68 backup and archive tests. A source
renamed after preparation fails the new regression on the previous head,
then defers and permits the next backup with this fix. An archive output
ENOENT remains fatal. Existing database-error and cancellation tests
pass.
- New race tests fail against the previous storage owner: a changed
backup, queued turn or revoked lease otherwise publishes.
- Tests prove unrelated executions stay running, same-task work defers,
failed history stays deferred, retry verifies existing objects, and
private bytes restore after deleting the old home.
- Command review fixes require the configured existing vault key, retain
it for the process, set database lock/statement/idle bounds, close
clients on cancellation, and cap shutdown at ten seconds. Abort
immediately sets failure status and prints one blocked receipt. A real
child with real shortened timers reproduces the old missing-receipt exit
and verifies the fix. Tests also use a real PostgreSQL lock.
- Malformed manifest or runner JSON and symlink replacement fail the new
preparation and publication-fence regressions on the previous code. The
fixed command defers each damaged source and copies the next eligible
backup. Separate tests keep database SyntaxError and cancellation fatal.
Offline migration still rejects damaged sources.
- The bundle test runs the emitted preparation entry with plain Node
without starting the app.
- A prior copied-data experiment completed with 1,738 new publications,
nine verified current objects and 206 deferred sources. Later checks
found different database and filesystem capture times: 43 source runs
were absent from the older database snapshot, and one required
historical manifest was absent from the retained filesystem archive.
This experiment does not prove a consistent restore or enrollment
readiness.
- Full current-head CI at ce63517d0c
passed: 54 successful checks, two skipped and one neutral, with no
failed or pending statuses. Typecheck, tests and build pass. CI:
https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/41970370960. The
earlier superseded run lost a spot runner after a shutdown signal; that
infrastructure cancellation is retained and is not counted as a passing
run.
- Greptile and Ponytail both rate this exact head 5/5; all actionable
review threads are resolved. Comment-only cleanup removes newly added
prose comments under CONTRIBUTING.md. TypeScript output with
removeComments:true is byte-identical for all seven changed TypeScript
files; 20 existing command, runtime and bundle tests pass after cleanup.
- Serving enrollment, full normal-image migration, empty-home
restoration and active-agent release handoffs remain separate acceptance
gates.

## Risks

- Preparation still consumes CPU, disk and storage requests. It uses one
transfer and at most two database connections. Check memory headroom for
a separate operator process.
- A task can gain work during upload. The final fence rejects that
publication and retains the previous current object.
- Deferred sources remain migration obligations. Preparation never
permits detaching the volume.
- Ordinary backup callers do not opt into the new preparation constraint
and keep their existing behavior.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-6.1 Codex, exact model ID `gpt-6.1-sol`. Used for reasoning,
code editing, shell tools and test execution. The runtime does not
expose its context-window size.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-11-04 23:15:46 -06:00
DottaandPaperclip f5f5184f23 fix(workspaces): preserve retained branches and private commit sources (#19147)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Ephemeral web servers must preserve existing task files before
volume removal.
> - An old private checkout can be absent while its recorded branch
still exists.
> - A deleted branch can also retain its exact commit in the original
private object source.
> - The importer currently rejects these surviving sources.
> - This pull request saves the verified committed tree and records its
exact source proof.
> - It keeps task state, branch ownership and recovery obligations
unchanged.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #19138, #19144, #18826.

**What happened?**

Existing Git workspace records can have missing checkout folders and
retained branch objects. The importer returns
`local_source_unsafe_or_missing`. A successful deletion receipt can also
have a valid private object source that the importer overlooks in favor
of a missing or changed project cache.

**Expected behavior**

Save the surviving committed tree from the exact recorded branch or
deletion receipt. Reject competing owners, live worktree registrations,
changed branches and invalid source identities. Do not use the current
default branch as a substitute.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Retain an isolated workspace branch in its managed project cache.
2. Remove its clean checkout but keep the branch and original workspace
record.
3. Attempt workspace migration.
4. Alternatively, retain a deleted commit in its recorded private source
while its shared source is unavailable.

## What Changed

- Pin a retained branch in its verified company and project Git cache.
- Require the recorded private path, no competing workspace owner and no
surviving Git worktree registration or index authority.
- For a user-owned branch, require its exact successful unforced removal
receipt after archival. Preserve the branch ownership metadata.
- Prefer a verified recorded private object source for successful
deletion receipts when that source still exists.
- Recheck branch and receipt proof before publication. Preserve
compatibility with existing migration journals.
- Allow missing active records only through the existing offline writer
fence. Keep their status unchanged.
- Add byte-restoration and rejected-authority tests. Document the source
limits.

- Revalidate and honor interrupted journals' original Git source path.
Reject detached registrations and retained orphan index data. Reuse the
cleanup producer command formatter for paths containing spaces.

## Verification

- 172 focused migration, concurrency and isolated-source tests pass with
real PostgreSQL and Git repositories.
- The previous importer fails the retained-branch and offline-active
restoration cases. The previous source selection also fails the
private-cache and clean user-owned receipt cases.
- Tests remove the old home and restore the pinned commit and task file
bytes. New shared default-branch work is excluded.
- Tests reject competing owners, registered worktrees, missing branch
ownership, deleted branches, changed branch tips, forced removal and
revoked receipts.
- Read-only re-inventory of 79 actual failed source records makes 78
eligible with committed owner overlays. One older local test repository
remains blocked. This is source-overlay qualification, not full
released-image acceptance.
- A separate bounded archive replay completed six imports before its
25-minute deadline. That timing failure remains open; it does not
establish complete migration.
- Local server typecheck has no changed-file diagnostics. Stale linked
declarations prevent a clean local whole-server result. Full clean CI
remains required.
- Serving enrollment and empty-home recovery remain separate acceptance
gates.

- Latest rebased head 9f42901683 passes 172 focused
migration/archive/concurrency tests. Four review regressions fail on the
previous source; the revoked journal source already rejected correctly.
The real cleanup fixture uses an unforced removal under a home path
containing spaces. The orphan-index fixture is locked to keep Git
maintenance from deleting its synthetic retained state before
inspection.
- The prerebase layered server typecheck passed. Current-head full CI
remains required after integrating master. The local environment reset
removed earlier temporary logs; the current red/green logs and source
now live in persistent worktree folders.

- Current-head full CI passes on run 41965901512 after one bounded
failed-shard retry. The first run failed an unrelated status-card
fake-clock deadline assertion by 150 ms; the same source passed the
retry. Its cause remains unestablished, and the first failure log
remains in Actions and persistent local evidence. No migration-related
test failed.

## Risks

- A retained branch saves committed data that still exists. It cannot
certify recovery of files that were already absent.
- User-owned branches remain user-owned. A clean removal receipt grants
preservation authority, not deletion authority.
- Any retained registration, conflicting record or changed proof keeps
migration blocked.
- This PR does not resolve the remaining source, recovery or migration
timing gates.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-6.1 Codex, exact model ID `gpt-6.1-sol`. Used for reasoning,
code editing, shell tools and test execution. The runtime does not
expose its context-window size.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-11-04 22:35:55 -06:00
DottaandPaperclip c8013d06ad fix(workspaces): preserve task-only warnings during offline migration (#19144)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Ephemeral web servers must save existing workspaces before volume
removal.
> - Offline migration checks file ownership and recovery authority.
> - The same gate also rejects task assignment and configuration
warnings.
> - Those warnings do not require the old filesystem.
> - This pull request preserves known task-only warnings while it saves
files.
> - File recovery and execution obligations keep their existing
blockers.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #18943, #19038, #19138.

**What happened?**

Offline workspace migration refuses tasks with assignment,
configuration, disposition or deliberate-wait warnings. It returns
`workspace_recovery_unresolved` even when the warning has no file or
execution recovery authority.

**Expected behavior**

Save local workspace bytes while retaining the task warning unchanged.
Continue to block unknown recovery kinds, file sources, export failures
and execution recovery work.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Retain a local workspace on a task with an active assignment or
configuration warning.
2. Stop all app writers through the offline maintenance entry.
3. Attempt workspace migration.

## What Changed

- Admit four known task-only warning kinds during offline file
migration.
- Keep file recovery markers, system recovery, native failure markers,
export-failure causes and unknown kinds blocked unless their exact
legacy source is already preserved.
- Keep the existing live-migration recovery exclusion.
- Recheck warning evidence before publication. Do not resolve warnings
or change their owners.
- Add restoration, rejection and publication-race tests. Update the
migration plan.

## Verification

- 112 focused migration and concurrency tests pass with real PostgreSQL
and filesystem archives.
- The four task-only restoration cases fail against the previous
importer with `workspace_recovery_unresolved`.
- Tests delete the old home, restore its saved bytes and compare each
warning row unchanged.
- File and execution markers, unknown kinds and export failures remain
blocked.
- A task warning that gains file recovery during upload prevents
publication.
- Local server typecheck has no changed-file diagnostics. Stale linked
dependency declarations prevent a clean local whole-server result. Clean
full CI remains required before merge.
- The PR was rebased onto the merged Git preservation fix after
resolving a plan-document conflict. The rebased head passed full PR CI
(41943153422). Current head ba18efc7b5 adds the reviewed deliberate-wait
case and reuses the canonical export-cause set; fresh full CI is
required. The earlier unmergeable head did not have a PR workflow run.
- Serving enrollment and full copied-data acceptance remain separate
gates.

## Risks

- The allowlist must remain narrow. New warning kinds are blocked by
default.
- A known task-only warning with file or execution recovery evidence
still blocks migration.
- This change depends on the existing offline provider fence. It does
not establish that old app writers stopped.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-6.1 Codex, exact model ID `gpt-6.1-sol`. Used for reasoning,
code editing, shell tools and test execution. The runtime does not
expose its context-window size.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-11-04 22:00:41 -06:00