PaperClipAI

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Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Jannes StubbemannandClaude Fable 5	1cfed0c0ff	security(invites): widen invite-token entropy and rate-limit public invite endpoints (#8979 ) ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - Companies onboard human members through shareable invite links; the `/api/invites/:token` endpoints are deliberately public so a recipient can view the invite and accept it without being logged in > - That publicness makes the invite token itself the only secret guarding company membership — and it was guessable: the token suffix carried only ~41 bits of entropy, and the endpoints had no rate limiting > - An attacker could therefore enumerate the token space online and accept an invite into someone else's company, gaining member access to its onboarding data, skills, and workspace > - This pull request widens invite tokens to 256 bits of entropy and puts a per-IP rate limit in front of every public `/invites/:token` sub-route > - The benefit is that invite links stop being brute-forceable while their shape, storage scheme, and UX stay exactly the same — existing links keep working ## Linked Issues or Issue Description No public issue exists; describing the problem in-PR (security/bug): What happens: Company invite tokens are public: anyone with the link can `GET /api/invites/:token`, fetch onboarding/logo/skills, and `POST /api/invites/:token/accept`. Two weaknesses combined to make them brute-forceable: 1. Token entropy ~41 bits. The token suffix was 8 chars over a 36-char alphabet (`8 * log2(36) ≈ 41.4` bits). That is online-enumerable. 2. *No rate limit on `/invites/:token`. The public endpoints had no throttling, so the ~41-bit space could be enumerated online. Impact: an attacker who guesses a live token can accept the invite and join the company as a member — unauthenticated, from any IP. Expected: invite tokens should be computationally infeasible to guess, and the public endpoints should throttle guessing attempts anyway (defense in depth). ## What Changed Entropy - `createInviteToken` now uses `crypto.randomBytes(32)` (256 bits) base64url-encoded, keeping the human-readable `pcp_invite_` prefix so link shape and UX are unchanged. The duplicate generator in `plugin-host-services.ts` is updated to match. - Tokens are stored hashed (sha256) in `invites.tokenHash`; the raw value is only returned once on creation. Storage scheme is unchanged. - Backward compatible: only newly minted tokens are affected; lookup is by hash of the presented value, so existing invite links keep working. Rate limit** - New generic in-memory per-IP sliding-window limiter (`server/src/services/invite-rate-limit.ts`, 20 req/min/IP), applied as a router-level middleware on `/invites/:token` so every current and future sub-route is covered (summary, logo, onboarding, onboarding.txt, skills/index, skills/:name, test-resolution, and POST accept). - Returns `429` with `Retry-After` and `X-RateLimit-*` headers. In-memory ⇒ per-process, which bounds enumeration per replica. Mirrors the existing `company-search-rate-limit` pattern; no new dependency. - Adds a `tooManyRequests(429)` error helper in `server/src/errors.ts`. ## Verification - `invite-token-entropy.test.ts`: prefix preserved, suffix ≥ 128 bits / 22 chars, charset, 1000 unique tokens. - `invite-rate-limit.test.ts`: allows up to limit then 429s with retry-after; per-IP isolation; forgets hits after the window. - `invite-rate-limit-route.test.ts`: `GET /invites/:token` and `POST /invites/:token/accept` return 429 once the per-IP threshold is exceeded. - Manual: create an invite, open the link (works once per token as before), then hammer `GET /api/invites/<token>` >20 times within a minute from one IP → `429` with `Retry-After`. - Server package typechecks clean for all touched files. ## Risks - Low risk. Token change affects only newly minted tokens; existing links resolve via the same sha256-hash lookup. - The limiter is in-memory and per-process: in multi-replica deployments each replica enforces its own 20 req/min/IP budget. That still bounds enumeration (per-replica) and matches the existing `company-search-rate-limit` approach; a shared store can be layered later if needed. - Legitimate users behind a single NAT/proxy IP share the 20 req/min budget for invite endpoints; the invite flow makes only a handful of requests, so headroom is ample. - No DB migration, no API shape change. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - Claude (Anthropic) — Claude Fable 5 (`claude-fable-5`), extended thinking enabled, agentic tool use (code search, editing, local typecheck) via Claude Code. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge Supersedes #8147. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-14 15:47:58 -07:00
Dotta Paperclip Claude Opus 4.8	ad961227f5	feat(secrets): add user-specific runtime secrets (#8825 ) ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Agent runs often need provider credentials, API tokens, and other environment-bound secrets. > - Company-level secrets work for shared credentials, but they do not model values that should differ by human operator. > - Without a user-scoped model, a run can dispatch without knowing whether the responsible human has supplied the needed value. > - Paperclip also needs run attribution to make those user-scoped runtime checks deterministic and auditable. > - This pull request adds user-specific secret definitions, per-user values, environment bindings, responsible-user attribution, and runtime resolution gates. > - The benefit is that teams can define the secret once, let each user provide their own value, and block runs before dispatch when required user secrets or active definitions are unavailable. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs #224 Refs #6057 This PR implements user-specific secret support as a core secret-management capability rather than a one-off adapter setting. It is related to existing public work on company secrets UI and runtime secret refs, but is distinct because the value is owned by the responsible user and resolved at run dispatch time. Related PR search before opening found existing secrets work such as #1550, #8256, #8614, #8634, and #8647; none of those add the full user-secret definition/value/runtime gate covered here. ## What Changed - Added user-secret definitions and per-user "My secrets" values, keeping stored values out of access metadata. - Added `user_secret_ref` environment bindings and UI affordances to pick them alongside existing secret refs. - Added responsible-user runtime resolution so user-secret refs resolve against the human responsible for the run. - Added pre-dispatch missing-secret gates so runs fail before adapter dispatch when required user values are absent or definitions are inactive. - Added low-trust allowlist hardening for user-secret runtime access. - Added issue, routine, run, and agent API key responsible-user attribution and fail-closed dispatch behavior when attribution cannot be resolved. - Added denial-copy mapping so responsible-user authorization failures surface as actionable run outcomes instead of opaque setup failures. - Added OpenAPI documentation for the user-secret routes. - Rebases cleanly on current `master`; migrations were renumbered incrementally as `0128_user_specific_secrets`, `0129_agent_api_key_responsible_user`, and `0130_run_responsible_user_invariant` after upstream `0126`/`0127` migrations. - Removed previously committed local design screenshots so the PR contains code/docs/tests only. ## Verification - PASS: PR head `2527febd106bcf3ca264ca0da7fca491084192d6` is based on `paperclipai/paperclip:master`. - PASS: `git diff --check` - PASS: `git diff --name-only public/master...HEAD \| rg '^(pnpm-lock\\.yaml\|\\.github/workflows/\|screenshots/)' \|\| true` produced no files. - PASS: migration journal audit confirmed unique indexes through `130` with tail entries `0126_issue_comment_derived_attribution`, `0127_environment_custom_images_instance_scoped`, `0128_user_specific_secrets`, `0129_agent_api_key_responsible_user`, and `0130_run_responsible_user_invariant`. - PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui typecheck` - PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` - PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/heartbeat-responsible-user-invariant.test.ts` - PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/heartbeat-active-run-output-watchdog.test.ts src/__tests__/heartbeat-stale-queue-invalidation.test.ts src/__tests__/heartbeat-workspace-finalize-branch.test.ts src/__tests__/issue-monitor-scheduler.test.ts` - PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/heartbeat-comment-wake-batching.test.ts src/__tests__/heartbeat-retry-scheduling.test.ts src/__tests__/heartbeat-accepted-plan-workspace-refresh.test.ts src/__tests__/heartbeat-plugin-environment.test.ts` - PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/low-trust-red-team-routes.test.ts` - PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/secrets-service.test.ts` (55 tests) - PASS: `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/secrets-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/secrets-service.test.ts` (89 tests after final Greptile cleanup fixes) - PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/heartbeat-issue-liveness-escalation.test.ts` (17 tests after the final rebase CI fix) - PASS: focused server Vitest batches covering heartbeat recovery, project env, plugin env, routines, low-trust, pipelines, monitors, watchdog, and stale queue paths. - PASS: GitHub checks are green on `2527febd106bcf3ca264ca0da7fca491084192d6`, including Typecheck + Release Registry, Build, General tests, serialized server suites, e2e, Canary Dry Run, verify, security checks, and Greptile Review. - PASS: Greptile Review completed successfully on `2527febd106bcf3ca264ca0da7fca491084192d6` with Confidence Score 5/5, and GraphQL review-thread audit returned zero unresolved non-outdated threads. ## Risks - Runtime behavior now depends on a run having a correct responsible user; missing or incorrect responsibility assignment can block runs before adapter dispatch. - `user_secret_ref` bindings intentionally expose metadata without values, but UI/API callers may need to handle the new binding kind explicitly. - External secret providers and IAM policies are not automatically provisioned by this PR; operators still need to configure provider-side access for non-local vaults. - The PR is broad across db/shared/server/UI/runtime paths, so release validation should include both API and UI secret workflows before merge. - The migration renumbering is intentionally incremental after upstream migrations; the branch migrations use guarded column/table/index/constraint creation so users who tested the older draft numbering should not hit duplicate DDL for the existing objects. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-5-based coding agent (`gpt-5`), Codex local adapter with shell/tool use and code execution. Context window and internal reasoning mode are not exposed by the runtime. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-05 05:58:20 -05:00
ForgottenandClaude Opus 4.6	abadd469bc	Add server routes for companies, approvals, costs, and dashboard New routes: companies, approvals, costs, dashboard, authz. New services: companies, approvals, costs, dashboard, heartbeat, activity-log. Add auth middleware and structured error handling. Expand existing agent and issue routes with richer CRUD operations. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-02-17 09:07:27 -06:00

Author

SHA1

Message

Date

Jannes StubbemannandClaude Fable 5

1cfed0c0ff

security(invites): widen invite-token entropy and rate-limit public invite endpoints (#8979 )

## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - Companies onboard human members through shareable invite links; the
`/api/invites/:token` endpoints are deliberately public so a recipient
can view the invite and accept it without being logged in
> - That publicness makes the invite token itself the only secret
guarding company membership — and it was guessable: the token suffix
carried only ~41 bits of entropy, and the endpoints had no rate limiting
> - An attacker could therefore enumerate the token space online and
accept an invite into someone else's company, gaining member access to
its onboarding data, skills, and workspace
> - This pull request widens invite tokens to 256 bits of entropy and
puts a per-IP rate limit in front of every public `/invites/:token`
sub-route
> - The benefit is that invite links stop being brute-forceable while
their shape, storage scheme, and UX stay exactly the same — existing
links keep working

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

No public issue exists; describing the problem in-PR (security/bug):

**What happens:** Company invite tokens are **public**: anyone with the
link can `GET /api/invites/:token`, fetch onboarding/logo/skills, and
`POST /api/invites/:token/accept`. Two weaknesses combined to make them
brute-forceable:

1. **Token entropy ~41 bits.** The token suffix was 8 chars over a
36-char alphabet (`8 * log2(36) ≈ 41.4` bits). That is
online-enumerable.
2. **No rate limit on `/invites/:token*`.** The public endpoints had no
throttling, so the ~41-bit space could be enumerated online.

**Impact:** an attacker who guesses a live token can accept the invite
and join the company as a member — unauthenticated, from any IP.

**Expected:** invite tokens should be computationally infeasible to
guess, and the public endpoints should throttle guessing attempts anyway
(defense in depth).

## What Changed

**Entropy**

- `createInviteToken` now uses `crypto.randomBytes(32)` (256 bits)
base64url-encoded, keeping the human-readable `pcp_invite_` prefix so
link shape and UX are unchanged. The duplicate generator in
`plugin-host-services.ts` is updated to match.
- Tokens are stored **hashed** (sha256) in `invites.tokenHash`; the raw
value is only returned once on creation. Storage scheme is unchanged.
- **Backward compatible**: only newly minted tokens are affected; lookup
is by hash of the presented value, so existing invite links keep
working.

**Rate limit**

- New generic in-memory per-IP sliding-window limiter
(`server/src/services/invite-rate-limit.ts`, 20 req/min/IP), applied as
a router-level middleware on `/invites/:token` so every current and
future sub-route is covered (summary, logo, onboarding, onboarding.txt,
skills/index, skills/:name, test-resolution, and POST accept).
- Returns `429` with `Retry-After` and `X-RateLimit-*` headers.
In-memory ⇒ per-process, which bounds enumeration per replica. Mirrors
the existing `company-search-rate-limit` pattern; no new dependency.
- Adds a `tooManyRequests(429)` error helper in `server/src/errors.ts`.

## Verification

- `invite-token-entropy.test.ts`: prefix preserved, suffix ≥ 128 bits /
22 chars, charset, 1000 unique tokens.
- `invite-rate-limit.test.ts`: allows up to limit then 429s with
retry-after; per-IP isolation; forgets hits after the window.
- `invite-rate-limit-route.test.ts`: `GET /invites/:token` and `POST
/invites/:token/accept` return 429 once the per-IP threshold is
exceeded.
- Manual: create an invite, open the link (works once per token as
before), then hammer `GET /api/invites/<token>` >20 times within a
minute from one IP → `429` with `Retry-After`.
- Server package typechecks clean for all touched files.

## Risks

- Low risk. Token change affects only newly minted tokens; existing
links resolve via the same sha256-hash lookup.
- The limiter is in-memory and per-process: in multi-replica deployments
each replica enforces its own 20 req/min/IP budget. That still bounds
enumeration (per-replica) and matches the existing
`company-search-rate-limit` approach; a shared store can be layered
later if needed.
- Legitimate users behind a single NAT/proxy IP share the 20 req/min
budget for invite endpoints; the invite flow makes only a handful of
requests, so headroom is ample.
- No DB migration, no API shape change.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

- Claude (Anthropic) — Claude Fable 5 (`claude-fable-5`), extended
thinking enabled, agentic tool use (code search, editing, local
typecheck) via Claude Code.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

Supersedes #8147.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-07-14 15:47:58 -07:00

ad961227f5

feat(secrets): add user-specific runtime secrets (#8825 )

## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Agent runs often need provider credentials, API tokens, and other
environment-bound secrets.
> - Company-level secrets work for shared credentials, but they do not
model values that should differ by human operator.
> - Without a user-scoped model, a run can dispatch without knowing
whether the responsible human has supplied the needed value.
> - Paperclip also needs run attribution to make those user-scoped
runtime checks deterministic and auditable.
> - This pull request adds user-specific secret definitions, per-user
values, environment bindings, responsible-user attribution, and runtime
resolution gates.
> - The benefit is that teams can define the secret once, let each user
provide their own value, and block runs before dispatch when required
user secrets or active definitions are unavailable.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #224
Refs #6057

This PR implements user-specific secret support as a core
secret-management capability rather than a one-off adapter setting. It
is related to existing public work on company secrets UI and runtime
secret refs, but is distinct because the value is owned by the
responsible user and resolved at run dispatch time.

Related PR search before opening found existing secrets work such as
#1550, #8256, #8614, #8634, and #8647; none of those add the full
user-secret definition/value/runtime gate covered here.

## What Changed

- Added user-secret definitions and per-user "My secrets" values,
keeping stored values out of access metadata.
- Added `user_secret_ref` environment bindings and UI affordances to
pick them alongside existing secret refs.
- Added responsible-user runtime resolution so user-secret refs resolve
against the human responsible for the run.
- Added pre-dispatch missing-secret gates so runs fail before adapter
dispatch when required user values are absent or definitions are
inactive.
- Added low-trust allowlist hardening for user-secret runtime access.
- Added issue, routine, run, and agent API key responsible-user
attribution and fail-closed dispatch behavior when attribution cannot be
resolved.
- Added denial-copy mapping so responsible-user authorization failures
surface as actionable run outcomes instead of opaque setup failures.
- Added OpenAPI documentation for the user-secret routes.
- Rebases cleanly on current `master`; migrations were renumbered
incrementally as `0128_user_specific_secrets`,
`0129_agent_api_key_responsible_user`, and
`0130_run_responsible_user_invariant` after upstream `0126`/`0127`
migrations.
- Removed previously committed local design screenshots so the PR
contains code/docs/tests only.

## Verification

- PASS: PR head `2527febd106bcf3ca264ca0da7fca491084192d6` is based on
`paperclipai/paperclip:master`.
- PASS: `git diff --check`
- PASS: `git diff --name-only public/master...HEAD | rg
'^(pnpm-lock\\.yaml|\\.github/workflows/|screenshots/)' || true`
produced no files.
- PASS: migration journal audit confirmed unique indexes through `130`
with tail entries `0126_issue_comment_derived_attribution`,
`0127_environment_custom_images_instance_scoped`,
`0128_user_specific_secrets`, `0129_agent_api_key_responsible_user`, and
`0130_run_responsible_user_invariant`.
- PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui typecheck`
- PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck`
- PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/heartbeat-responsible-user-invariant.test.ts`
- PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/heartbeat-active-run-output-watchdog.test.ts
src/__tests__/heartbeat-stale-queue-invalidation.test.ts
src/__tests__/heartbeat-workspace-finalize-branch.test.ts
src/__tests__/issue-monitor-scheduler.test.ts`
- PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/heartbeat-comment-wake-batching.test.ts
src/__tests__/heartbeat-retry-scheduling.test.ts
src/__tests__/heartbeat-accepted-plan-workspace-refresh.test.ts
src/__tests__/heartbeat-plugin-environment.test.ts`
- PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/low-trust-red-team-routes.test.ts`
- PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/secrets-service.test.ts` (55 tests)
- PASS: `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/secrets-routes.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/secrets-service.test.ts` (89 tests after final
Greptile cleanup fixes)
- PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/heartbeat-issue-liveness-escalation.test.ts` (17 tests
after the final rebase CI fix)
- PASS: focused server Vitest batches covering heartbeat recovery,
project env, plugin env, routines, low-trust, pipelines, monitors,
watchdog, and stale queue paths.
- PASS: GitHub checks are green on
`2527febd106bcf3ca264ca0da7fca491084192d6`, including Typecheck +
Release Registry, Build, General tests, serialized server suites, e2e,
Canary Dry Run, verify, security checks, and Greptile Review.
- PASS: Greptile Review completed successfully on
`2527febd106bcf3ca264ca0da7fca491084192d6` with Confidence Score 5/5,
and GraphQL review-thread audit returned zero unresolved non-outdated
threads.

## Risks

- Runtime behavior now depends on a run having a correct responsible
user; missing or incorrect responsibility assignment can block runs
before adapter dispatch.
- `user_secret_ref` bindings intentionally expose metadata without
values, but UI/API callers may need to handle the new binding kind
explicitly.
- External secret providers and IAM policies are not automatically
provisioned by this PR; operators still need to configure provider-side
access for non-local vaults.
- The PR is broad across db/shared/server/UI/runtime paths, so release
validation should include both API and UI secret workflows before merge.
- The migration renumbering is intentionally incremental after upstream
migrations; the branch migrations use guarded
column/table/index/constraint creation so users who tested the older
draft numbering should not hit duplicate DDL for the existing objects.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-5-based coding agent (`gpt-5`), Codex local adapter
with shell/tool use and code execution. Context window and internal
reasoning mode are not exposed by the runtime.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-07-05 05:58:20 -05:00

ForgottenandClaude Opus 4.6

abadd469bc

Add server routes for companies, approvals, costs, and dashboard

New routes: companies, approvals, costs, dashboard, authz. New
services: companies, approvals, costs, dashboard, heartbeat,
activity-log. Add auth middleware and structured error handling.
Expand existing agent and issue routes with richer CRUD operations.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-02-17 09:07:27 -06:00