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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 DottaandPaperclip
|
3a726e676f |
feat: enforce private task permissions across execution and data (#10633)
Enforce private task and project access across direct reads, search, execution, files, plugins, live delivery, and sharing mutations. Preserve downward-only sharing, current responsible-user authorization, and audited emergency access. Bind historical draft assets with migration 0314. Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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DottaandPaperclip
|
a1ab55a56d |
fix(agents): grant configuration access by default (#15283)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip manages agent work and permissions for a company. > - Agent setup can require one agent to configure another agent. > - New standard agents could create agents, but they had no direct configuration grant. > - Existing agents must keep their current permissions after an upgrade. > - The requested new-agent defaults include 13 more direct permissions for suggestions, skills, tools, audit, inbox, and task assignment. > - This pull request adds the 14-grant set at creation and approval activation, retains it through invitations, and keeps existing agents unchanged. > - The change keeps low trust and built-in agents on their narrower permissions. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What existing behavior does this improve?** The agent creation and approval flows, and the agent configuration authorization path. **Current behavior** A new standard agent can create an agent. It cannot make protected changes to a peer agent unless an operator adds an `agents:configure` grant. **Proposed behavior** Add direct grants for `agents:configure`, `agents:suggest-changes`, `skills:create`, `skills:suggest-changes`, `tools:manage_connections`, `tools:manage_profiles`, `tools:view_audit`, `audit:view_agent_actions`, `tools:use`, `tools:manage_runtime`, `inbox:manage`, `tasks:assign`, `tasks:assign_scope`, and `tasks:manage_active_checkouts` to new standard agents. Scope `tasks:assign_scope` to the agent’s reporting subtree. Keep existing agents and their grants unchanged. **Reason and benefit** New standard agents can complete agent setup and the requested tool, skill, inbox, and task workflows under existing route, scope, and approval checks. **Breaking changes** Existing agents keep their current permissions. There is no permission migration. Related PR: #12212 adds scoped grant routes. This PR changes the default grant. ## What Changed - Add the 14 requested direct grants in agent creation and approval activation. Keep them when invitation approval replaces grants, preserving explicit scopes. Remove them when an agent is deleted. - Apply defaults only to new agents. Remove the existing-agent permission migration, its snapshot, and its journal entry. Preserve existing scoped grants. - Add permission, scope, invitation, and existing-agent regression tests. Document all default and excluded permissions. - Prevent agent keys from creating, changing, or restoring host-executed process or local adapter command settings, and from restoring workspace commands through rollback. ## Verification - Run `node_modules/.bin/vitest run server/src/__tests__/agent-default-configure-grants.test.ts server/src/__tests__/invite-join-grants.test.ts packages/db/src/migration-snapshot-drift.test.ts`. All 15 tests pass. These cover new-agent defaults, unchanged existing grants, pending approval, invitation grants, and migration history. - Run `node_modules/.bin/tsc -p server/tsconfig.json --noEmit`. It passes. - Run `packages/db/node_modules/.bin/tsx packages/db/src/check-migration-numbering.ts` and `packages/db/node_modules/.bin/tsx packages/db/src/check-migration-safety.ts`. Both pass. - Confirm that this PR has no files under `packages/db/src/migrations/` in its final diff. - GitHub CI at `e8173b2c41` passes build, typecheck, server suites, browser shards, and canary verification. One unchanged OpenCode transport test reached its five-second timeout in the first Runner shard run. That test passes locally in 2.55 seconds. The shard passed on one retry. All 54 checks pass, with two expected skips. - Greptile gives this exact head 5/5. Security review passes. The PR has no unresolved review threads or merge conflicts. ## Risks - The 14 default permissions apply only to new standard agents. Existing permissions stay unchanged. Low trust and managed built-in agents are excluded. - New grants include connection, runtime, and active-checkout management. Existing company, responsible-user, scope, and approval checks remain in force. The default inbox grant carries a responsible-user-only scope so it cannot override another user's inbox settings. - Protected changes still need the responsible user's authority when that check applies. Company boundaries and approval gates still apply. - Agent-authenticated requests cannot configure process adapters or host command settings on local adapters. Known provider credential references remain allowed, as do narrow plain authentication overrides on new peers when the caller uses an AI connection pool. Arbitrary environment settings remain blocked. Board operators retain the host configuration paths. > I checked `ROADMAP.md`. This is a narrow fix to existing agent configuration behavior. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 series. This runtime did not expose its exact hosted model ID or context window. This revision uses OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex with tool use, code execution, and tests. The runtime does not expose the exact hosted model ID or context window. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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DottaandPaperclip
|
df984cbc2c |
fix: dispatch queued legacy messages with operator identity and task permissions (#13315)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Task conversations save messages that arrive during an active turn. > - Legacy adapters deliver these messages in a later turn. > - A run can stop before the saved queue is delivered. > - The Interrupt button previously required an active run, so it could not release this queue. > - This pull request lets a board operator send the saved queue after the run stops and retries queues missed during finalization. > - Manual dispatch must use the clicking operator and must not require permission to create agents. > - The task can continue without a duplicate message or a second execution owner. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What happened?** A legacy task retained a queued message after its run stopped. Interrupt was disabled because the queue had no active target. Finalization and deferred message admission can also leave a queue without a successor. **Expected behavior** Interrupt sends the saved messages when no runner is active. Messages that arrive during normal completion are delivered automatically. An uncertain previous execution still requires proof that its process or sandbox stopped. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Queue a user message during a legacy conversation turn. 2. Let the turn stop or simulate a server restart before queue promotion. 3. Open the task with a deferred queue and no active run. 4. Try Interrupt. Before this change, the button is disabled. **Paperclip version or commit** Reproduced against `8f40b4ad4`. **Deployment mode** Legacy conversation adapter. The same persisted queue state is covered with an isolated PostgreSQL fixture. Related public work: #13275 adds active legacy interruption. #13291 addresses automatic sandbox conversation recovery. This change handles explicit saved-queue delivery and late queue promotion. ## What Changed - Accept a null Interrupt target while retaining queue identity, revision, company, and assignee checks. - Save the operator's request on the existing queue. Reuse normal admission after verified stop, including older messages, different authors, and queues whose original wake came from the system. - Strip interruption authority from caller-supplied wake payloads. Only the board queue route can persist that authority. - Retry durable interruption requests after restart and deferred queues after legacy cleanup. - Let an explicit Interrupt retry cleanup for its stopped run, including old ephemeral leases that recorded success without a provider stop receipt. Preserve retained resources, other lease owners, and the automatic retry limit. - Preserve the server's waiting explanation when normalizing and combining queue entries. - Revalidate the consumed board queue receipt at dispatch so a different message author does not cause setup failure. - Use the Interrupt user's execution identity for the new run. Preserve original message authors. Validate the receipt independently at startup and inherit the resulting identity on retry. - Persist authenticated board authority for ordinary manual wakes too. Adopting someone else's queued messages cannot switch a manual run to that author's permissions. Strip caller-supplied authority markers and retain private conversation ownership checks. - Keep the clicking user when a manual wake is merged into an older deferred receipt. Update its requester and payload in the same transaction. - Use the same current-queue/revision API on task details and pipeline conversations; show Interrupt after a legacy target stops. - Keep manual wakes out of active runs, including unscoped agent wakes. They receive their own execution identity; a matching receipt requester is not sufficient because an exact retry can retain a different originating identity. - Authorize both existing-agent wake endpoints with `agent:wake`, available to active non-viewer company members. Keep `agents:create` for hiring. Validate the stored task and current assignee before an exact task retry. - Reject viewer Interrupt requests before saving intent or stopping execution. Keep external chat retry authorization and per-action agent/user permission checks. - Preserve edits and discards until dispatch. Prevent another queue promotion when the same agent already has a successor. Keep independent reviewer recovery available. - Suppress cancelled/failed run toasts for intentional operator interruption. Keep ordinary runtime error notices. - Add UI, route, admission, restart, successor ownership, and toast regression tests. Document the behavior. - Reuse the existing socket reservation helper for both credential-quorum test cases after CI exposed an ambient-port collision. This changes test preparation only; production credential staging is still called exactly once. ## Verification - Failing regression tests reproduced the message-author identity bug and an operator's `agents:create` rejection before the fixes. - All 316 focused tests pass across eight route, queue, identity, authorization, continuation, and responsible-user suites, including the 44-test rerun of queue admission and actual startup after the final manual-wake restriction. Regressions reproduce cross-user merging both with and without a task, and same-requester receipt ambiguity. The cross-company existence guard also passes both tests. - Startup integration tests reach adapter execution under the clicking operator and retain that identity through follow-up. Coverage includes mixed authors, adopted queues, system-origin queues, restarts, forged or stale receipts, viewers, suspended memberships, changed assignees, private conversations, and caller-supplied authority markers. - The earlier queue/cleanup/UI regression suite passed 402 tests. The final review corrections pass another 180 tests across queue admission/persistence, real heartbeat startup, UI API, conversation rendering, and pipeline suites. Regression tests reproduced both review findings before correction. The final head has a 5/5 review with no unresolved threads. Full CI passes on `c2002979c`, including every general and serialized server shard, all browser shards, Paperclip Runner verification, typecheck, build, canary dry run, and the aggregate gates. - Full `pnpm -r typecheck`, `pnpm build`, and UI token gates pass after the final application changes. CI identified an outdated task-page API mock after the shared helper extraction; the fixture now exercises the real helper, and all 131 task-page/API tests pass. The final application build passes with the additional manual-wake restriction. - CI exposed a pre-existing port collision in the Codex credential-quorum fixture. It reproduced locally; both listener cases now use the existing bounded reservation helper. All 41 credential tests pass on rerun. One intervening local run hit a separate ambient bind collision in the two-occupied-port case. - The full local `pnpm test:run` attempt was stopped after host contention caused focused-suite timeouts. The affected focused tests passed on rerun. An expiring trace fixture and a missing private-conversation state were corrected. The successful full CI run is the complete-suite verification. - Hosted Interrupt previously cleared the original queue and produced exactly one successor with neutral interruption feedback. It exposed the dispatch authorization defect. Retry on that earlier build was rejected for missing `agents:create` before creating another run. - Deployed the final application build (`38257f391`) to the scoped hosted instance and verified readiness. The latest PR commit changes only the credential test fixture; application code matches that deployment. A live Retry by the same operator without `agents:create` created one successor attributed to that operator, passing the former dispatch permission gate. Startup then stopped at `configuration_incomplete` because that operator has not configured their required personal Claude Code OAuth secret; the post-deployment run page confirms the operator identity and no provider work started, and the My secrets UI still shows the token as not set. Provider execution remains unverified pending that credential. No permission grants or credentials were changed. ## Risks Queue admission and finalization can race. The task lock, durable queue receipt, current comment IDs, and successor guard prevent duplicate dispatch. Process and lease stop checks, task pauses, approvals, ownership, and budgets remain in force. The API change only allows null on legacy Interrupt; native steering still requires an active run. No schema migration is required. Active non-viewer board members can now invoke existing agents without agent-creation permission. Agent self-invocation rules, raw provider-trace admin access, task retry scope, external chat authorization, and action-specific user/agent permissions remain enforced. ## Model Used OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex. The session does not expose an exact backend model ID or context-window size. Used reasoning, repository search, code execution, tests, and browser tools. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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Devin Foley
|
54dd0f4868 |
feat(agents): grant new agents hire permission by default (#12814)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - Agent permissions control which agents can create or hire other agents (`canCreateAgents`) > - Today only CEO-role agents get this permission by default; every other agent starts without it > - Teams that want agents to delegate and build out their own teams must flip the toggle on each hire, and most operators want delegation to work out of the box > - This pull request makes `canCreateAgents` default to enabled for new standard-trust agents, while low-trust agents keep a disabled default > - The benefit is that agent teams can grow without per-agent permission toggling, while low-trust containment and checkout protection stay intact ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Related (not fixed by this PR): #8064 also decouples an authority from `agents:create`. **Subsystem affected** Server agent permissions (`server/src/services/agent-permissions.ts`), authorization (`server/src/services/authorization.ts`), the shared `agentPermissionsSchema` validator, and the UI trust-preset helper. **Problem or motivation** New agents cannot hire other agents unless an operator enables `canCreateAgents` on each one. Only CEO-role agents get the permission by default. This blocks delegation-by-default workflows. Operators must toggle the permission for every hire. **Proposed solution** Default `canCreateAgents` to `true` for newly created agents. Apply and persist the default at creation only. Stored rows without an explicit value stay fail-closed at read and enforcement time. Keep the default at `false` when the agent's permissions record marks it low-trust (the `low_trust_review` preset or a trust boundary). Explicit values always win. Decouple `tasks:manage_active_checkouts` from `canCreateAgents` so the default-on flag does not let a peer agent write over another agent's checked-out issue. **Alternatives considered** Granting the default only at the route layer would leave stored rows and enforcement out of sync. Keeping the checkout authority coupled to `canCreateAgents` would void the active-checkout write protection once the flag is default-on. A per-company setting adds configuration surface without a clear need; explicit per-agent overrides already exist. **Roadmap alignment** Governance and trust-preset work already separates standard-trust from low-trust agents. This change follows that line: capability by default for standard trust, containment by default for low trust. ## What Changed - `normalizeAgentPermissions` now takes a `create`/`stored` context. Creation writes get the new default: enabled unless `permissionsImplyLowTrust()` detects the low-trust review preset or a trust boundary. Stored rows without an explicit value normalize to disabled (fail-closed). The role parameter is gone. - `agentPermissionsSchema` no longer injects `canCreateAgents: false` when the field is omitted. The server-side default applies instead. - `authorization.ts` normalizes raw agent rows for `agents:create`, so enforcement matches what the API reports for legacy rows. - `tasks:manage_active_checkouts` no longer rides on `canCreateAgents`. CEO role, explicit grants, and the manager chain remain the paths. - `agents:create` is denied outright inside any resolved low-trust execution context (agent, project, issue, or run policy). The default-on flag can never reach the legacy creator allow there. - The UI trust-preset helper sets `canCreateAgents: false` when an agent is switched to the low-trust preset, instead of carrying the old value forward. - `doc/CLI.md` describes the new default for `teams install`. - Tests pin the default matrix (standard, low-trust, explicit overrides) on the server and in the UI helper. ## Verification - `cd server && npx vitest run src/__tests__/agent-permissions-service.test.ts src/__tests__/agent-permissions-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/low-trust-red-team-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts` — 143 tests pass. - Broader sweep: 18 suites that touch `canCreateAgents` (hire, pending-approval, teams catalog, portability, built-in agents, plugin-managed agents) pass locally. - `cd ui && npx vitest run src/lib/trust-policy-ui.test.ts src/components/TrustPresetSection.test.tsx src/pages/NewAgent.test.tsx src/pages/Agents.test.tsx` — passes. - Typecheck is clean for the changed files in `packages/shared`, `server`, and `ui`. ## Risks - Behavioral shift: agents created after this change persist `canCreateAgents: true` unless low-trust. Pre-existing agents keep their stored value. Legacy or malformed permission records without an explicit value stay fail-closed at read and enforcement time; they never gain the authority retroactively. - Low-trust runs can no longer create agents at all, even when the agent carries an explicit `canCreateAgents: true`. Before this change, that combination could hire. The red-team suite and a new authorization test pin the denial. - Narrowing: a non-CEO agent with `canCreateAgents: true` loses implicit `tasks:manage_active_checkouts`. The manager chain and explicit grants still provide it. This narrowing is deliberate; without it, the default-on flag would let any peer bypass active-checkout write protection. - No migrations. No API shape changes. Low-trust defaults are covered by the red-team regression suite. ## Model Used - Claude Fable 5 (`claude-fable-5`), Anthropic — via Claude Code CLI with extended thinking and tool use (code search, editing, local test execution). ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge |
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Apolinario RatioandApolinarioRatio
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7787106e5c |
fix board key issue writes across assignees (#9025)
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Board users and board API keys coordinate agents by commenting on
and updating issues.
> - `issue:comment` and `issue:mutate` are intentionally null-mapped
authorization actions, so they need explicit same-company fallback
handling.
> - Same-company board-key writes worked for unassigned or same-actor
issues but failed for issues assigned to another agent.
> - That blocked cross-agent coordination because a board key could not
comment on or patch another agent's issue even inside the same company.
> - This pull request adds the missing board-member issue-write fallback
while keeping viewers denied and sparse service calls fail-closed.
> - The benefit is that non-viewer board members can coordinate agent
work across assignees without restoring broad instance-admin elevation.
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
No public GitHub issue exists. Duplicate search performed:
- `gh search prs --repo paperclipai/paperclip "board key issue mutate"`
returned only this PR.
- `gh search issues --repo paperclipai/paperclip "board key
authorization boundary"` returned no issues.
Bug description:
### What happened
Same-company board-key actors received `403 "Issue is outside this
actor's authorization boundary"` when posting comments or patching
issues assigned to another agent.
### Expected behavior
Active same-company non-viewer board members can comment on and mutate
issues in their company, regardless of agent assignee; viewer members
remain denied.
### Steps to reproduce
Authenticate as a board API key for an active non-viewer company member,
then `POST /api/issues/{id}/comments` or `PATCH /api/issues/{id}`
against an issue assigned to a different agent in the same company.
### Paperclip version or commit
Observed against the current published 2026.626.0 package line and fixed
against current `master`.
### Deployment mode
Authenticated/tailnet board-key access.
## What Changed
- Added a board-actor fallback for `issue:comment` and `issue:mutate` in
`server/src/services/authorization.ts`.
- Restricted that fallback to fully contextualized issue resources with
issue id, status, and explicit assignee fields so sparse service calls
still fail closed.
- Allowed active same-company non-viewer board memberships and denied
viewer memberships for these issue-write actions.
- Added regression coverage for non-viewer board-key comment/mutate on
an issue assigned to another agent.
- Added regression coverage for viewer denial on both `issue:comment`
and `issue:mutate`.
## Verification
- `pnpm exec vitest run
server/src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts` passed: 35/35.
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` passed.
- `git diff --check` passed.
## Risks
Low-to-moderate authorization risk because this changes issue-write
access. The scope is constrained to active same-company board
memberships, excludes viewers, and requires route-shaped issue context
before granting access. Cross-company access and sparse/null-mapped
calls continue to fail closed.
> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.
## Model Used
OpenAI Codex coding agent using GPT-5-class reasoning with local shell,
GitHub CLI, and test execution tools in an OpenClaw/Codex environment.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [ ] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
Co-authored-by: ApolinarioRatio <ApolinarioRatio@users.noreply.github.com>
|
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|
b847e8b6f6 |
perf(server): reduce issue detail request overhead (#10414)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source control plane people use to coordinate AI-agent work > - Opening an issue fans out into several authenticated issue-detail reads, so repeated work on that path directly affects perceived latency > - Those reads repeated issue and authorization lookups, returned full private JSON even when unchanged, and performed non-critical bookkeeping writes on the request path > - Interaction reads also performed lifecycle writes even though `GET` must be read-only > - This pull request adds request-scoped reuse, private conditional responses, read-only interaction access, and bounded write debouncing without crossing actor, request, or company boundaries > - The result is less database, serialization, logging, and response-body work while preserving authorization and interaction lifecycle invariants ## Linked Issues or Issue Description This is the server-only latency phase. Related work is tracked separately in #10415 (aggregate view), #10416 (warm navigation, merged into the base), and #10463 (bundle split). This pull request intentionally excludes those scopes. **What happened?** Opening an issue detail view caused avoidable server costs: repeated issue and authorization reads within one request, full private JSON responses when a representation was unchanged, writes during interaction-list reads, production debug transport setup, and immediate bookkeeping writes for cloud tenant activity and board-key usage. **Expected behavior** All successful JSON `GET /api/issues/:id/*` responses should support strong private ETags and `304 Not Modified`. Repeated work may be reused only within the current request. `GET /interactions` must not modify stored interactions. Non-critical activity timestamps may be debounced without weakening authentication or stale instance-admin cleanup. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Start Paperclip in local development or self-hosted server mode. 2. Open one issue and request its detail subresources with the same authenticated actor. 3. Repeat a successful JSON request with its `ETag` in `If-None-Match`. 4. Observe `304 Not Modified`, no interaction writes from `GET /interactions`, and unchanged authorization boundaries. **Deployment mode / installation** - Local development or self-hosted server - Built from source - Core server behavior; not adapter-specific ## What Changed - Added strong ETags and `Cache-Control: private, must-revalidate` to successful JSON reads under `/api/issues/:id/*`, including standards-compliant `If-None-Match` handling. - Added request-scoped promise memoization for issue and authorization lookups; no authorization result survives the request. - Made `GET /interactions` read-only, moved supersession and terminal-state handling to mutation paths, and prevented plugin callers from accepting or rejecting interactions after an issue closes. - Removed the production debug-file logger transport while preserving development formatting. - Debounced cloud-tenant activity and board-key `lastUsedAt` persistence, while keeping stale instance-admin deletion unconditional and authentication checks per request. - Added focused tests for ETags, request isolation, authorization lifecycle behavior, interaction invariants, logger configuration, and retry-safe debounce behavior. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/private-json-etag.test.ts server/src/__tests__/issue-thread-interaction-routes.test.ts` — 2 files, 23 tests passed. - Focused Vitest run covering request memoization, authorization, interactions, plugin orchestration, logger, cloud tenant, board auth, and issue services — 9 files, 264 tests passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` — passed. - `git diff --check origin/master...HEAD` — passed. - Scope guardrails: 21 changed files under `server/src`; no lockfile, workflow, migration, UI, aggregate-view, or bundle-split changes. ## Risks - Strong ETags hash each successful serialized JSON response. This adds a small CPU cost but avoids transferring unchanged bodies. - Debounced bookkeeping timestamps can lag by the bounded debounce interval. They are non-critical usage metadata; authentication still runs per request, and stale instance-admin deletion remains unconditional. - Legacy pending interactions on terminal issues are projected as expired by reads and are finalized only by mutation paths. The stored record remains unchanged on `GET` by design. - No database schema or migration changes are included. > This is a focused performance correction and does not duplicate a planned core feature in `ROADMAP.md`. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex using `gpt-5.3-codex` for the initial implementation and `gpt-5.6-sol` for isolation, verification, and PR preparation, with reasoning, repository tool use, code execution, and GitHub CLI access. The runtimes did not expose authoritative context-window sizes. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> Co-authored-by: Dev Agent <dev@paperclip.ing> |
||
|
DottaandPaperclip
|
3e1ea39ff3 |
fix(inbox): honor saved policy for explicit targets (#11221)
<!-- Write all pull request text in Simplified Technical English
(ASD-STE100): short sentences, one instruction per sentence, simple
approved vocabulary, and the active voice. -->
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source control plane people use to manage
AI-agent companies and their work
> - Each user can let agents tidy that user's Mine inbox
> - The profile control saves either an open policy or an agent
allowlist
> - Explicit inbox archive requests checked only the separate
`inbox:manage` grant
> - This made the saved profile control ineffective for explicit user
targets
> - This pull request makes authorization honor the target user's saved
policy
> - The benefit is that the UI control and the API now enforce the same
user choice
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
**What happened?**
An agent received `403 inbox_cross_user_grant_required` when it archived
an issue with an explicit `userId`. The denial occurred even when that
user had enabled inbox management for the agent in Profile Settings. The
authorization service checked only `principal_permission_grants` for
explicit targets and ignored the saved user inbox policy.
**Expected behavior**
An explicit target is allowed when the target user saved an `open`
policy or an allowlist that contains the agent. An unsaved default-open
policy must remain limited to the responsible-user path. A scoped
`inbox:manage` grant must remain an administrative override.
**Steps to reproduce**
1. Save an inbox-agent allowlist for a user.
2. Include the acting agent in that allowlist.
3. Call `POST /api/issues/{issueId}/inbox-archive` with that user's
explicit `userId`.
4. Observe the incorrect `403 inbox_cross_user_grant_required` response
on the previous implementation.
**Paperclip version or commit**
Reproduced on `7ea2068ef8`.
**Deployment mode**
Self-hosted server.
**Installation method**
Built from source with pnpm.
**Agent adapter(s) involved**
Not adapter-specific. This is a core authorization bug.
**Database mode**
External Postgres in production. The regression tests use embedded
PostgreSQL.
**Access context**
Agent bearer authentication.
Related foundations: #9658 and #9724.
## What Changed
- Read the target user's saved inbox-agent policy before the
explicit-target decision.
- Allow saved `open` policies and matching allowlists for explicit
targets.
- Keep unsaved implicit-open policies responsible-user-only.
- Keep scoped `inbox:manage` grants as administrative overrides.
- Add service and route regressions for allow, deny, archive, unarchive,
and audit metadata.
- Update the implementation contract and agent-facing inbox API
guidance.
## Verification
- `pnpm exec vitest run
server/src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/inbox-archive-routes.test.ts` — 66 tests passed.
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` — passed.
- `git diff --check origin/master...HEAD` — passed.
## Risks
- Low risk. The change is limited to explicit inbox targets with a saved
policy.
- A missing policy row still denies explicit cross-user access.
- A non-matching allowlist and a disabled policy still deny access
unless a scoped administrative grant applies.
> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.
## Model Used
- OpenAI Codex based on GPT-5. The runtime did not expose the exact
model build or context-window size. The agent used reasoning, repository
tools, code execution, and focused test execution.
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
|
||
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|
e43f187cad |
feat(secrets): add human-approved secret proposals (#9934)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the control plane people use to manage AI-agent companies. > - Agents can encounter credentials during work. > - Directly creating live secrets or bindings would bypass human governance. > - Proposal records must remain inert and separate from live secret resolution until an authorized human approves them. > - Approval must reuse the existing secret-create and protected agent-config write paths. > - This pull request adds the propose, review, approve, and reject lifecycle. > - The benefit is that agents can safely hand credentials into Paperclip without exposing plaintext or gaining authority to activate them. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Follow-on to #9921, which established run-bound agent secret access. **Problem / motivation:** Agents can receive credentials during work. There is no governed way for them to propose a credential or binding without exposing plaintext in work artifacts or immediately creating live access. **Proposed solution:** Store agent-authored proposals outside live secret tables. Encrypt each proposed value and register exact-value redaction when Paperclip receives it. Require an authorized human to approve or reject each proposal. Approval executes through the normal write paths as the human approver. Binding proposals can target only the proposer or its downward reporting chain under the restrictive V1 policy. **Alternatives considered:** We rejected live secrets with a `proposed` status. That design would put untrusted rows in resolver, list, and sync paths. It would also allow uniqueness squatting. We rejected direct agent binding writes because a binding is an agent-config write and must keep the existing human permission gate. **Roadmap alignment:** This change extends the run-bound agent secret-access foundation in #9921 with a governed proposal workflow. ## Security Verdict Q0 SecEng verdict: **PASS-with-required-changes**. The review accepted the separate proposal-table design and required the implementation to: - fail closed unless both encryption and exact-value run redaction registration succeed; - scrub ciphertext idempotently on reject, withdraw, and expiry, with audit-visible state; - treat agent justification as hostile input and foreground action, target, provenance, and approver permissions; - snapshot and re-check the target agent plus reports-to chain at approval to prevent org-chart laundering; - make cascade approval atomic and fail closed if either secret creation or binding authorization fails; - deny low-trust, `skill_test`, `task_bridge`, and non-run-bound sources consistently; and - execute approval through the normal human secret/config write paths, including protected-change gates. Those requirements are implemented and covered by focused service, route, and UI tests. Residual V1 risk remains the accepted 14-day encrypted retention window. Proposal-time redaction also cannot clean a value that leaked before the propose call. ## What Changed - Added `company_secret_proposals`, migration `0207`, shared proposal contracts, and a state-machine service for create, approve, reject, withdraw, cascade, expiry, and ciphertext scrubbing. - Added run-bound agent proposal routes and board review routes. The routes derive provenance from authentication and enforce source restrictions, company isolation, chain-of-command checks, approval-as-approver, wake-on-resolution, and dual audit trails. - Added durable per-run exact-value redaction registration so proposal values remain redacted on later read surfaces. - Added the Secrets **Proposals** tab and agent configuration **Proposed access** rows. The UI shows fingerprint and length only. It also frames agent justification as untrusted input, runs permission preflight, supports approve and reject actions, and confirms cascades. - Updated OpenAPI, agent skill guidance, API reference documentation, and focused server and UI regression coverage. - Rebased the branch onto current `master` and renumbered the proposal migration after `0206`. ## QA Acceptance Results Q5 QA verdict: **PASS — 9/9 acceptance criteria met**, with one Minor non-blocking follow-up. - **AC1:** proposed values never echo, never appear in live lists/resolvers, and expose only fingerprint + length to board reviewers. - **AC2:** restrictive `self_and_reports` matrix passes: self/downward allowed; upward/lateral denied. - **AC3:** secret approval uses the normal create path, honors rename overrides, records proposer/approver provenance, and scrubs ciphertext. - **AC4:** approved bindings materialize and resolve through the target agent's runtime list/fetch routes. - **AC5:** pending-secret bindings require cascade; cascade succeeds atomically and permission failures leave nothing applied. - **AC6:** reject, withdraw, dependent rejection, and expiry paths scrub ciphertext and preserve reasons/audit state. - **AC7:** token/source and approver denial matrix passes through live checks plus focused route tests. - **AC8:** proposal lifecycle events and reused `secret.created`/config-write events form the required dual audit trail; origin-issue notification and wake are queued. - **AC9:** both review surfaces render and execute correctly; UI approval materializes the binding. QA also confirmed zero plaintext occurrences for all exercised proposal values in server logs. The single finding is that the company-level `bindingTargetPolicy` toggle is not wired yet. V1 is hardcoded to the restrictive `self_and_reports` policy. The matrix is correct and the follow-up is tracked separately, so QA classified it as non-blocking. ## Verification - Focused server proposal and redaction suite: 83 tests pass. - Focused proposal review UI suite: 54 tests pass. - Embedded-Postgres migration reapply test: 1 test passes with the documented 30-second timeout. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/db typecheck` passes, including migration numbering and safety checks. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/shared typecheck` passes. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui typecheck` passes. - `pnpm check:token-gates` passes with all gates clean. - Q5 exercised the complete propose, review, approve, bind, and runtime-resolve flow over real HTTP, JWT, and database paths. It verified 9/9 acceptance criteria. ## Risks - Proposal ciphertext is retained encrypted for up to 14 days while pending. Terminal-state and expiry scrub paths reduce but do not remove server-compromise risk during that window. - The V1 target policy is restrictive but not yet company-configurable. A separate follow-up owns that change. - A new migration can require another renumber if another migration lands before maintainers merge this pull request. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex coding agent. The exact runtime model ID and context-window size are not exposed. The agent used reasoning, repository editing, terminal execution, Paperclip API, and GitHub CLI capabilities. Q3 UI work also records Claude Opus 4.8 assistance in its commit trailers. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal or instance-local Paperclip issues or links - [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
DottaandPaperclip
|
6ffe9df842 |
fix(auth): clarify protected-agent assignment blocks (#10893)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Task assignment policies control which agents can receive work. > - Protected-agent policy flags currently stop assignment. > - The existing error says that the assignment requires approval. > - Paperclip has no approval workflow for this policy. > - This pull request models the policy as a hard block and gives the operator an action that exists. > - The benefit is accurate API guidance without weakening the existing fail-closed behavior. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs #6386 **What happened?** A protected-agent assignment denial said that approval was required. No approval record or approval action existed for this policy, so the message sent agents and operators to a dead end. **Expected behavior** The authorization result must state that protected-agent policy blocks assignment. It must tell a company administrator to remove the block before retrying. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Set `authorizationPolicy.protectedAgent.requiresApproval` to `true` on a target agent. 2. Give another agent the `tasks:assign` permission. 3. Preview or attempt assignment to the protected agent. 4. Observe that the old response promises an approval step that does not exist. **Paperclip version or commit** `c54936e2e9` on `master`. **Deployment mode** Built from source. The behavior is in the core authorization service and is not deployment-specific. **Agent adapter(s) involved** Not adapter-specific. ## What Changed - Added canonical `protectedAgent.blockAssignment` and `protectedAgent.blockReason` policy fields. - Kept the legacy approval-named flags as fail-closed compatibility aliases. - Changed denial copy to name the hard block and the administrator action. - Added authorization and plugin-host regression coverage for canonical and legacy policy data. - Updated the V1 implementation contract with the protected-assignment rule. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts server/src/__tests__/plugin-access-authorization-host-services.test.ts` — 2 files passed, 61 tests passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/shared typecheck` — passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` — passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/shared build` — passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server build` — passed. - `pnpm check:token-gates` — all gates clean. - `git diff --check public-gh/master...HEAD` — passed. The repository-wide local wrappers exceeded the execution host resource limit before they printed a final summary. The PR check loop will use GitHub CI as the complete test and build authority. ## Risks - Low: assignment remains fail-closed. The change corrects the policy name and denial guidance. - Low: legacy fields remain supported, so existing plugin-owned policy data does not change behavior. - Low: the new policy schemas allow unknown keys for forward compatibility, as the existing authorization policy schema already does. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex, exact model ID `gpt-5`, tool-enabled coding agent with reasoning, shell, Git, and GitHub CLI access. The runtime does not expose the context-window size. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
||
|
DottaandPaperclip
|
dfcda67650 |
feat(auth): default-open visible issue writes (#10804)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Agents coordinate through company-visible issues, comments, child tasks, and assignments. > - The current authorization rules give these write channels different and narrow ownership grants. > - Those differences prevent standard-trust agents from coordinating on work that they can already read. > - A responsible human user must still bound every agent action. > - This pull request gives the four issue-write channels one default-open rule based on issue visibility. > - The benefit is consistent multi-agent coordination without weakening company, user, trust-scope, or run-lifecycle controls. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What existing behavior does this improve?** This improves authorization for comments, issue updates, child creation, and assignment on company-visible issues. **Subsystem affected** `server/` REST API authorization and issue routes. **Current behavior** Standard-trust agents can read company-visible issues, but narrow ownership, parent, or mention grants can still deny related writes. Each write channel also applies a different rule. **Proposed behavior** Allow standard-trust agents to comment, update fields, create child issues, and assign work when they can read the target issue and the responsible user is also authorized. Keep company boundaries, low-trust scopes, checkout conflicts, status rules, pause gates, budget gates, and explicit reopen rules unchanged. **Reason and benefit** Agents can coordinate on visible company work without relay issues or unnecessary manager runs. One shared rule also makes the authorization model easier to test and maintain. **Breaking changes** This intentionally broadens write access for standard-trust agents on visible issues. Existing company boundaries and governance controls remain in force. Related prior approaches: Refs #10233 and Refs #9768. This change unifies the comment case with visible issue updates, child creation, and assignment while preserving the responsible-user ceiling and excluded trust scopes. ## What Changed - Added a shared default-open authorization decision for visible issue writes. - Applied the shared rule to comments, issue updates, child creation, and assignment. - Preserved low-trust, `skill_test`, `task_bridge`, responsible-user, checkout, lifecycle, pause, and budget controls. - Preserved explicit resume/restore authority for direct peer lifecycle transitions on blocked, completed, and cancelled issues. - Added regression coverage for cross-company denial, user intersection, excluded scopes, comment-read structure, closed issues, child creation, assignment, and peer updates. - Updated the V1 implementation contract for the shared rule. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts server/src/__tests__/issue-agent-mutation-ownership-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/issue-comment-reopen-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/low-trust-red-team-routes.test.ts --reporter=dot` — 217 tests passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` — passed. - `git diff --check public-gh/master...HEAD` — passed. - Independent security review covered broken access control, object-level authorization, excessive agency, cross-company access, responsible-user intersection, excluded scopes, and lifecycle controls; its peer lifecycle-transition finding is fixed with regression coverage. ## Risks - Standard-trust agents gain broader write influence on issues that they can already read. - Future issue-visibility controls must keep `issue:read` as the canonical authorization hook. - Regression tests cover company boundaries, responsible-user intersection, excluded scopes, active checkout conflicts, closed-issue behavior, and non-transitive mention authority. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - OpenAI GPT-5 through Codex. The runtime does not expose the exact deployment revision or context-window size. Agentic reasoning, repository tools, shell execution, and test execution were enabled. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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|
DottaandPaperclip
|
30c49c8327 |
feat(decisions): add queues and prioritized attention feed (#10651)
<!-- Write all pull request text in Simplified Technical English (ASD-STE100): short sentences, one instruction per sentence, simple approved vocabulary, and the active voice. --> ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source control plane for companies of AI agents. > - Operators use the attention feed to find decisions that need action. > - The feed has eleven source kinds, but it has no durable queue or triage state. > - The feed also returns every item and lacks decision deadlines, snooze state, and decision-focused ordering. > - This pull request adds secure queue sidecars and enriches the attention feed with triage data, filters, cursor pagination, and decide-now ranking. > - The benefit is a bounded feed that can show the most urgent decisions first without weakening source visibility rules. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description This pull request replaces the closed [#10634](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/10634). It combines that queue foundation with the dependent attention-feed change as one review unit. **Subsystem affected** Database schema, shared contracts, server authorization and REST APIs, and the UI attention client library. **Problem or motivation** The attention feed can contain hundreds of mixed decision items. Operators cannot group them into durable queues, set a decision deadline, snooze an item, or request a bounded page ordered by urgency. The current client must download the full feed on each refresh. **Proposed solution** Store queue membership and triage state by stable attention identity. Re-authorize each source during queue reads and writes. Enrich attention items with queue, deadline, snooze, expiry, rule, and origin data. Add activity and queue filters, opaque cursor pagination, decide-focused ordering, and a decide-now count. **Alternatives considered** Adding queue fields to every source would duplicate schema and authorization logic across eleven source kinds. Client-only filtering and sorting would still transfer the full feed and would make pagination unstable. **Roadmap alignment** This change improves the core decision-attention surface and operator oversight. It does not implement the separate general-purpose work queue milestone in `ROADMAP.md`. ## What Changed - Added company-scoped queue, membership, triage, and append-only event tables with actor and run provenance. - Added queue CRUD, item membership, starter-rule discovery, and decide-by and snooze endpoints. - Kept source authorization on each queue mutation, read, and count. - Added attention fields for expiry, rule, origin agent, queues, decide-by attribution, and snooze state. - Added activity date filters, queue filters, opaque cursor pagination, and configurable page limits. - Added decide-now ordering by deadline, expiry, severity, and activity. - Added `decideNowCount` and excluded actively snoozed items from the default feed. - Updated the shared and UI client contracts. - Added focused server, route, OpenAPI, and UI client tests. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/attention-service.test.ts server/src/__tests__/decision-queues-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/openapi-routes.test.ts ui/src/api/attention.test.ts ui/src/lib/attention.test.ts` (72 tests passed) - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/db check:migrations` - `pnpm -r --filter @paperclipai/db --filter @paperclipai/shared --filter @paperclipai/server --filter @paperclipai/ui typecheck` - `git diff --check origin/master...HEAD` ## Risks - The migration adds four company-scoped tables and provenance foreign keys. Migration numbering and safety checks pass. - Attention reads can lazily create starter queues and memberships. Inserts are idempotent, audited, and transactional. - Cursor validity depends on the filtered feed. The API returns a clear validation error when the cursor item no longer exists in that feed. - Queue reads re-check source visibility. This favors correct authorization over fewer queries. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex, model `gpt-5`. The runtime used agentic reasoning, repository tools, code execution, and test execution. The runtime did not expose the context-window size. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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Devin FoleyandPaperclip
|
c274f10abc |
feat(server): computed owner instance-admin elevation for cloud-managed instances, behind platform floors (#10343)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - Cloud-managed instances authenticate tenant users through a trusted-header path (`resolveCloudTenantActor`) that deliberately never grants `instance_admin`, so every tenant user is company-scoped > - On a dedicated (single-owner) managed instance that leaves the paying owner unable to administer their own instance: instance settings, the environments admin surface, and the custom sandbox image flow are all instance-admin gated (the environments UI can't even show the provider/image of the platform sandbox because the restricted read view blanks `config` entirely) > - Re-granting the old blanket `instance_user_roles` row would repeat the mistake the shared-pool hardening fixed: DB rows go stale, resurrect via restores, and elevate through every auth path > - This pull request elevates only the stack `owner`, computed per request at the trusted-header boundary behind a new managed-tier feature flag, and ships that elevation together with code floors on the platform-owned surfaces an instance admin must not control on a managed instance > - The benefit is that dedicated-stack owners can administer their own instance while platform credentials, execution policy, backups, and runtime code-install stay platform-owned, and self-hosted behavior is unchanged ## Linked Issues or Issue Description No public GitHub issue exists for this change; the underlying issue is described here following the feature-request template. ### Problem or motivation - On cloud-managed instances, tenant users resolved from trusted headers are always company-scoped. For dedicated instances with a single paying owner, the owner cannot reach any instance-admin surface of their own instance (instance settings, environments administration, custom image setup), and the restricted environment read view hides even structural fields like the sandbox provider and image. - The previous hardening intentionally removed blanket elevation (and purges stale `instance_user_roles` rows on every trusted-header authentication). That protection must not regress for shared multi-tenant pools. ### Proposed solution - Owner-only, computed, flag-gated elevation plus code floors on platform-owned surfaces, in one PR so the elevation can never ship without the floors. ### Alternatives considered - Re-inserting an `instance_user_roles` row for owners (the pre-hardening model): rejected — DB rows go stale, survive restores, and elevate through every auth path; #7525 removed exactly this. - Widening only the environments read view without any elevation: rejected — it fixes one screen but still leaves a dedicated-instance owner unable to administer instance settings or custom images. - Elevating additional stack roles (`member`/`admin`/`support`): rejected — only the owner has an ownership claim over the whole instance; other roles stay company-scoped. ### Roadmap alignment - Extends the shipped "Cloud deployments" roadmap work (multi-tenant isolation, company-scoped cloud tenants, managed-instance bootstrap) without overlapping planned core items, and leaves self-hosted behavior unchanged. ## What Changed - **New feature key** `enableOwnerInstanceAdmin` (`packages/shared`): boolean flag in `instanceExperimentalSettingsSchema`, catalog tier `managed`, `cloudDefault: true`, `selfHostedDefault: false`. Inert on self-hosted instances — the elevation path only exists behind the cloud tenant trust token. - **Computed elevation** (`server/src/middleware/auth.ts`): `resolveCloudTenantActor` now returns `isInstanceAdmin: true` only when the trusted-header stack role is `owner` **and** the flag is enabled. The flag is resolved through the instance-settings service so the managed-config overlay applies (the control plane can disable elevation fleet-wide without touching tenant databases; a DB row edit or restore cannot resurrect it). Resolution fails closed on settings read errors. The `instance_user_roles` never-insert and the per-request stale-row purge are byte-identical. `member`/`admin`/`support` stack roles stay company-scoped. - **Authorization guard split** (`server/src/services/authorization.ts`): the blanket-allow now trusts the actor's *computed* `isInstanceAdmin` flag (only the attested resolver can set it for `cloud_tenant` actors) while keeping the `instance_user_roles` DB lookup excluded for `cloud_tenant` — a stale or hand-inserted role row still elevates nothing. - **Floor F1 — platform environment credentials** (`server/src/routes/environments.ts`): on cloud-managed instances, platform-provisioned environment rows (`managedByPaperclip` marker, plus the legacy managed-Kubernetes marker) use a single floored view for every reader on all environment routes (list, get, create, update, delete responses): `envVars` are never echoed and credential-shaped `config` keys (reusing the managed-config `SECRET_LIKE_CONFIG_KEY_PATTERN`) are dropped — for **all** actors including instance admins — while structural config (provider, image, template, region, …) and the managed markers stay visible. This also fixes the environments UI for managed sandboxes, which previously lost the provider/image entirely in the restricted view. The floor also covers writes: `PATCH /environments/:id` and `DELETE /environments/:id` on a platform-provisioned row are rejected (403, `environment_platform_managed`) for every actor including instance admins, and the guard binds to the persisted row's markers so a patch cannot strip the managed marker to lift the floor. The one recovery path is a metadata-only PATCH that solely clears the marker keys (null/false), for rows stamped through the old unrestricted API before the markers became reserved — and it never applies to a row whose slot markers are live platform state: the single local row (`environments_local_driver_idx`), which `ensureLocalEnvironment` adopts and stamps on cloud-managed instances from every caller (company creation, the heartbeat, run orchestration), and the single marked sandbox row (`environments_managed_sandbox_idx`) while a managed-sandbox bootstrap path is configured (managed-config `environments` section or `PAPERCLIP_EXECUTION_MODE=kubernetes`) and the provisioner therefore adopts and refreshes it on every boot. Clearing a live slot row's markers would let the next write reclassify it as tenant-managed and bypass the floor; conversely, when no sandbox provisioning path is configured the platform holds no claim on any sandbox row, so a platform marker there is stale by definition and the recovery patch applies. Every marker outside a live slot is clearable, so no legacy row is ever locked permanently. Custom-image setup and probes on the platform sandbox stay available to instance admins — those are the owner-facing flows this elevation exists for. The marker keys themselves are reserved: client create/update payloads that set `managedByPaperclip` or `managedKubernetesSandbox` are rejected (422, `environment_platform_marker_reserved`) on cloud-managed instances, so a tenant row can never be stamped platform-provisioned through the API and self-locked behind the write floor (the provisioner writes markers at the service layer, not through these routes). Tenant-created environments are otherwise unaffected. - **Floor F2 — executionMode** (`server/src/routes/instance-settings.ts`): on cloud-managed instances, `PATCH /instance/settings/general` rejects writes that would change `executionMode` (403, `execution_mode_platform_managed`). Same-value echoes pass so settings forms that submit the full general-settings object keep working. The boot-time execution-policy bootstrap path is untouched (it calls the service directly). - **Floor F3 — manual database backups** (`server/src/routes/instance-database-backups.ts`): floored off on cloud-managed instances (403, `database_backups_platform_managed`); backups are platform-owned there, and the result would also echo a server-side filesystem path. - **Floor F4 — adapter code install** (`server/src/routes/adapters.ts`): `POST /adapters/install` and `POST /adapters/:type/reinstall` are floored off on cloud-managed instances (403, `adapter_install_platform_managed`). Adapter packages execute in the server process, so a runtime install would let an instance admin read the platform trust anchors out of the process environment. This mirrors the existing bundled-only plugin install floor; adapter code on managed instances comes bundled with the platform image. ## Instance-admin surface audit Before widening who can hold `isInstanceAdmin`, every instance-admin-gated surface in `server/src` was enumerated and reviewed for whether its response or side effects could echo process environment values or platform credentials (tenant trust token, JWT signing keys, database connection strings, provider API keys): 29 distinct gate definitions covering ~90+ call sites, in four groups — sole instance-admin gates (12), instance-admin-or-company-permission gates (10), response-shaping/scope-widening sites (6), and the central `allow_instance_admin` short-circuit in the authorization service (58 `decide()` call sites). Findings and dispositions: - **Environment read/write responses** exposed platform sandbox `envVars`/credential-shaped config to instance admins → closed by floor F1. - **Manual backup trigger** echoed a server filesystem path and triggers a platform-owned operation → closed by floor F3. - **Adapter install/reinstall** loads externally fetched code into the server process (indirect, complete env exposure) → closed by floor F4. The sibling plugin-install path already had a bundled-only floor on managed instances and needed no change. - **Token-minting surfaces** (gateway tokens, custom-image terminal/connection tokens) mint credentials scoped to the instance's own resources, not platform trust anchors → acceptable for an owner-admin of a dedicated instance; unchanged. - All remaining gated surfaces return ordinary instance-scoped business data; none echo `process.env` or platform secrets directly. OAuth client secrets are referenced by env-var *name* only; SSH private keys are stored as secret refs before persistence and are not echoed. Operational note for managed platforms: this model assumes the process environment of a managed instance holds only that instance's own credentials. Platform operators should keep provider credentials per-instance (never fleet-shared) since an instance admin ultimately controls in-process code on their own instance. ## Verification - `pnpm vitest run server/src/middleware/cloud-tenant-actor.test.ts` — resolver matrix: owner × flag on/off, flag via managed overlay (on-over-DB-off and off-over-DB-on), member/admin/support × flag on, no-token self-hosted, fail-closed settings read, purge still runs and no role row is ever inserted (14 tests). - `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts` — computed flag elevates a `cloud_tenant` actor; a stale `instance_user_roles` row still never does; `session` actors unchanged (full suite, embedded Postgres). - `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/environment-routes.test.ts` — F1: no secret echo to admins on get/list, structural config visible to restricted readers, platform-row PATCH/DELETE rejected for admins (including a marker-stripping patch), marker-clear recovery allowed for stale legacy rows and for a marked sandbox row when no provisioning path is configured, but refused on the managed local row and on the sandbox slot row under a managed-config `environments` entry or the forced kubernetes execution mode, client marker-stamping creates/patches rejected, tenant rows still readable and writable, self-hosted read+write regression (60 tests). - `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/environment-service.test.ts` — `ensureLocalEnvironment` adopts a pre-existing local row on cloud-managed instances (marker stamped, other metadata preserved, idempotent — no rewrite on re-ensure) and leaves self-hosted rows untouched (22 tests, embedded Postgres). - `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/instance-settings-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/instance-database-backups-routes.test.ts` — F2 change-vs-echo matrix incl. self-hosted regression; F3 floor for both admin shapes (32 tests). - `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/adapter-routes-authz.test.ts` — F4 floor; self-hosted install/reinstall behavior unchanged (existing cases). - `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/first-admin-claim.test.ts server/src/__tests__/bootstrap-claim-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/managed-config.test.ts server/src/__tests__/health.test.ts server/src/__tests__/instance-settings-managed-overlay.test.ts server/src/services/managed-environments.test.ts server/src/services/execution-policy-bootstrap.test.ts` — first-admin bootstrap gate and managed-config behavior unchanged (91 tests). - `pnpm vitest run packages/shared/src/feature-catalog.test.ts` — catalog/schema sync tests cover the new key (selfHostedDefault must equal the schema default). - `pnpm run typecheck` — all 31 workspace projects clean. ## Risks - Self-hosted behavior is unchanged: every floor binds to `isCloudManagedInstance()` (tenant trust token present), the new flag defaults off with no elevation path, and regression tests pin the self-hosted branches. - The elevation is fail-closed and stateless: turning the flag off (managed overlay or DB) de-elevates on the next request; there is no role row to clean up and restores cannot resurrect elevation. - On a cloud-managed instance a pre-existing unmarked local row is adopted (stamped `managedByPaperclip`) by the next ensure and becomes platform-owned — the intended managed-product semantic: the platform owns the single local slot. Self-hosted instances are untouched. - F1 widens restricted readers' view of platform-provisioned rows from fully blanked `config`/`metadata` to structural-only `config` plus markers. Platform-delivered config is guaranteed secret-free by the managed-config contract (secret-shaped keys fail startup), and the floor re-drops secret-shaped keys defensively. - One extra instance-settings read per trusted-header request for owner-role actors (the resolver already performs several queries per request). ## Model Used Claude Fable 5 (Anthropic) — model id `claude-fable-5`, extended thinking enabled, agentic tool use via Claude Code; read-only explore subagents on the same model were used for the surface audit sweep. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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59fb27ff79 |
feat(inbox): let agents safely tidy user inboxes (#9724)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source control plane people use to manage AI-agent companies and their work > - The inbox is a per-user attention view, so archiving an item must not alter the underlying issue, assignment, or status > - Agents can help responsible users tidy resolved work only when the action is company-scoped, reversible, policy-controlled, and fully attributable > - The database and authorization foundations landed in #9654 and #9658, but the end-to-end archive routes, audit details, agent workflow guidance, and operator UI still need to ship together > - Separate stacked PRs #9659 and #9661 made the complete behavior harder to review and land as one coherent capability > - This pull request consolidates the remaining server, shared-contract, documentation, skill, and UI work on top of current master > - The benefit is a single reviewable change that lets agents safely archive responsible-user inbox items and lets users control or undo that behavior ## Linked Issues or Issue Description ### Subsystem affected Cross-cutting inbox management across shared contracts, server authorization/routes/services, shipped agent skills, and the board UI. ### Problem or motivation Agents may complete work whose issue remains in the responsible user's Mine inbox. Existing board-user archive behavior does not provide the agent-facing policy endpoints, target resolution, heartbeat-run attribution, typed denials, conservative workflow guidance, or UI needed for safe agent-managed cleanup. ### Proposed solution Allow authorized agents to archive or unarchive responsible-user inbox items under the user's open, allowlist, or disabled policy; preserve actor/agent/run attribution in issue detail and activity records; expose policy controls and agent archive attribution in the UI; and document conservative cleanup rules for agents and PR gardening. ### Alternatives considered - Reuse generic issue mutation permissions: rejected because inbox state belongs to a target user and requires user-scoped authorization. - Automatically archive every completed or closed item: rejected because completion signals can still require human review or a decision. - Keep the backend and UI as separate stacked PRs: superseded by this consolidated PR so the complete user-visible behavior can be reviewed and verified together. ### Related work - Builds on merged foundations #9654 and #9658. - Supersedes the remaining stacked changes in #9659 and #9661. - `ROADMAP.md` has no overlapping inbox archive or inbox authorization initiative. ## What Changed - Added shared inbox-agent policy types and validators plus company-scoped self-service policy routes and OpenAPI coverage. - Enabled agent archive/unarchive mutations with responsible-user targeting, policy enforcement, typed failures, attribution, idempotency, and detailed activity auditing. - Returned agent archive attribution in issue detail and documented reversible inbox cleanup semantics in the implementation spec and Paperclip skill. - Added conservative PR-gardening inbox tidy guidance that keeps GitHub access read-only and avoids archiving work that still needs human action. - Added the Profile settings policy control and Issue Properties attribution/unarchive UI with focused component coverage and narrow-pane handling. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/inbox-archive-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/inbox-agent-policy-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts server/src/__tests__/openapi-routes.test.ts ui/src/components/InboxAgentPolicyControl.test.tsx ui/src/components/IssueProperties.test.tsx` — 110 passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/db exec vitest run src/inbox-archive-agent-policies-migration.test.ts` — 1 passed. - `node --test .agents/skills/pr-gardening/scripts/pr-gardening.test.mjs` — 9 passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` — passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui typecheck` — passed. - `pnpm check:token-gates` — changed files are clean; the repository-wide command currently reports nine unrelated pre-existing `#9627` literals outside this PR's diff. ## Risks - Agent inbox mutations broaden an existing endpoint path, so authorization and target resolution must remain fail-closed; focused route and authorization tests cover allowed and denied paths. - Archive state affects only the responsible user's inbox presentation and remains reversible; it does not mutate issue status, assignment, or visibility. - The UI policy defaults to the existing open behavior, while allowlist and disabled modes can reduce agent access. - This PR intentionally builds on #9654 and #9658 and contains no new migration number or modification to an already-applied migration. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex using GPT-5.4, medium reasoning, repository tool use, shell execution, code review, and test execution. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (`feat/inbox-agent-archive-complete`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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DottaandPaperclip
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a04a77c9d3 |
feat(authz): govern agent inbox archive access (#9658)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source control plane people use to manage AI-agent companies and their work > - The inbox subsystem must let agents act for a responsible user without silently granting access to every company user's tasks > - Existing authorization had no inbox-specific action, target-user scope, or per-user agent policy > - Inbox archive data also needs company-safe ownership and replay-safe schema changes before API mutations can rely on it > - This pull request adds the database policy foundation and a fail-closed `inbox:manage` authorization decision > - The benefit is a least-privilege core for later inbox archive endpoints, including explicit cross-user grants and low-trust denial ## Linked Issues or Issue Description ### Subsystem affected Cross-cutting (`packages/db`, `packages/shared`, and `server`). ### Problem or motivation Agents need to manage inbox state for the user responsible for their run, but the control plane lacks an inbox-specific permission model and user-targeted grant scope. A generic mutation path would risk cross-user access or inconsistent policy enforcement. ### Proposed solution Add inbox archive ownership and per-user agent policies, introduce `inbox:manage`, and evaluate responsible-user defaults, disabled/allowlist policies, active membership, low-trust presets, and scoped cross-user grants in one authorization decision. ### Alternatives considered Reusing generic issue mutation permissions was rejected because it cannot express user-targeted inbox scope. Requiring grants for all self-user access was rejected because it would make the responsible-user path closed by default instead of using the requested per-user policy model. ### Roadmap alignment `ROADMAP.md` contains no overlapping inbox archive or inbox authorization item; this is incremental control-plane authorization work. ### Additional context This PR provides the authorization and schema foundation. Route and UI behavior can build on this decision without duplicating access-control rules. ## What Changed - Builds on the merged migration `0172_inbox_archive_agent_policies` (#9654) for company/user-scoped inbox archives and per-user agent policy rows. - Added replay-safe migration `0173_inbox_policy_agent_cleanup` with a GIN allowlist index and GIN-backed database cleanup that removes deleted agent IDs from policy allowlists. - Added Drizzle schema exports for inbox agent policies and responsible-user ownership on inbox archives. - Added the shared `inbox:manage` permission key and `scope.userIds` evaluation for user-targeted grants. - Added fail-closed inbox authorization for unresolved targets, inactive memberships, low-trust agents, disabled policies, allowlist misses, and ungranted cross-user access. - Added migration replay coverage and the full inbox authorization decision matrix. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run packages/db/src/inbox-archive-agent-policies-migration.test.ts server/src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts` — 50 tests passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/db typecheck` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/shared typecheck` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` - `git diff --check origin/master...HEAD` ## Risks - The merged `0172` migration changed inbox archive uniqueness from agent-owned to responsible-user-owned rows; `0173` is additive (index + cleanup trigger) and idempotent, and replay coverage verifies both remain safe for databases that already applied an earlier form. - `scope.userIds` uses the existing JSON grant-scope parser, so malformed privileged grant payloads continue to fail through the shared parsing behavior rather than a dedicated schema. - Cross-user grants intentionally act as board-admin overrides; responsible-user default access remains bounded by disabled and allowlist policies. - The authorization action is not yet wired to public mutation routes, limiting immediate behavioral impact while establishing the contract those routes must use. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex with `gpt-5.6-sol`, high reasoning effort, CLI tool use, code execution, GitHub CLI, and Paperclip control-plane integration. Context window size is not exposed by the configured adapter. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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DottaandPaperclip
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ea66ea81e6 |
fix(auth): honor responsible-user grants for company skills (#9571)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source control plane people use to manage AI-agent companies > - Company skills are governed resources, so board users and agents acting for responsible users must be authorized consistently before mutating skill configuration > - The responsible-user authorization intersection handled several task permissions but did not map company-skill mutation actions to the corresponding `skills:create`, `skills:update`, and `skills:delete` grants > - That gap caused valid skill import and mutation requests to be rejected even when the responsible user held the exact direct permission required by the route > - The branch also introduces the repo-sourced `prepare-paperclip-pr` skill so the standard PR preparation process is versioned and reviewable alongside the code > - This pull request adds the missing authorization mappings, covers board, agent, JWT-route, and denial behavior with regression tests, and adds the renamed PR-preparation skill > - The benefit is that governed company-skill workflows honor explicit grants without weakening the responsible-user permission intersection ## Linked Issues or Issue Description No public issue exists. Bug-report shape: - **Affected area**: company skill authorization and skill import routes - **Observed behavior**: agents acting under a responsible user could receive `403` responses for company-skill mutations even when that user had the matching direct `skills:create`, `skills:update`, or `skills:delete` grant - **Expected behavior**: the responsible-user authorization intersection should accept exact company-skill grants while preserving denials for missing or unrelated grants - **Reproduction**: authenticate as an agent with a responsible user, grant that user the relevant company-skill permission, then import or mutate a company skill - **Additional repository change**: adds the renamed `prepare-paperclip-pr` skill as the versioned source of truth for PR preparation Supersedes #9324, which added the PR-preparation skill under the old `prepare-pr` name. ## What Changed - Added `.agents/skills/prepare-paperclip-pr/SKILL.md` with the standard worktree, commit, rebase, guardrail, review-loop, and handoff procedure - Mapped company `skill_config:create`, `skill_config:update`, and `skill_config:delete` actions to direct `skills:create`, `skills:update`, and `skills:delete` responsible-user grants - Preserved restrictive behavior for unsupported resources, missing grants, and unrelated permissions - Added authorization-service regression coverage for board actors and responsible-user agent intersections - Added route-level JWT regression coverage for company skill imports, including allowed and denied cases ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts server/src/__tests__/company-skills-import-authz-routes.test.ts` — 42 tests passed - `pnpm -r typecheck` — passed - `pnpm build` — passed - `pnpm test:run` — server and UI groups passed; one unrelated CLI doctor assertion failed because the execution environment injects static `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`/`AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY`, which intentionally changes the result from `pass` to `warn` - `env -u AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID -u AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY NODE_ENV=development pnpm exec vitest run cli/src/__tests__/secrets.test.ts -t 'passes AWS doctor checks when non-secret provider config is present'` — passed, confirming the full-suite failure is environment-specific - GitHub CI — all required checks passed on head `0758393c`; one unrelated `packages/db/src/client.test.ts` 5-second timing timeout passed on the single allowed failed-job rerun after three consecutive local passes (42/42 tests) ## Risks - Low-to-moderate authorization risk: the change expands accepted responsible-user grants only for company-scoped skill configuration actions and is protected by explicit allow/deny regression cases - No database migrations, workflow changes, lockfile changes, or UI changes - The added skill is documentation consumed by agent tooling and does not alter runtime application behavior > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex coding agent; exact runtime model ID and context-window size were not exposed to the session. Used reasoning, terminal execution, Git/GitHub tooling, and test/build execution. - Earlier commits were assisted by Claude Fable 5 (`claude-fable-5`) and an OpenAI Codex coding agent, as recorded in the branch history/task workflow. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and documented the one environment-specific full-suite failure - GitHub CI — all required checks passed on head `0758393c`; one unrelated `packages/db/src/client.test.ts` 5-second timing timeout passed on the single allowed failed-job rerun after three consecutive local passes (42/42 tests) - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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DottaandPaperclip
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8b6a06ee25 |
[codex] Add built-in agents and Reflection Coach bundle (#9206)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Operators need first-party agent capabilities for repeatable company work, not just manually created one-off agents. > - Built-in agents need to behave like normal company-scoped agents while preserving approval gates, permissions, budgets, and audit trails. > - Reflection and coaching work also needs bundled instructions, skill content, and a routine so the feature can be installed and reset predictably. > - The API, database, UI, portability, and tests all need to agree on the built-in lifecycle from not provisioned through setup, approval, ready, paused, and reset. > - This pull request adds built-in agent provisioning and the Reflection Coach bundle end-to-end. > - The benefit is a safer first-party path for Paperclip-managed agents without bypassing the same governance model used for operator-created agents. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description No public GitHub issue was found for this exact built-in agent and Reflection Coach bundle work. Problem/motivation: - Paperclip did not have a first-party built-in agent lifecycle for product-owned agents. - Bundled agent resources such as default instructions, skills, and routines needed managed ownership and reset semantics. - Approval-gated companies needed built-in setup to preserve requested adapter, budget, manager, and permission state through board approval. - The board UI needed clear built-in badges, setup affordances, readiness state, and bundle status without exposing secrets. Proposed solution: - Add a company-scoped built-in agent registry, provisioning/reset/reconcile/status APIs, and Reflection Coach bundled resources. - Track bundled managed resources in the database with idempotent migration behavior. - Reuse existing agent approval, authorization, budget, and activity-log paths instead of creating a bypass. - Add UI setup, badges, gates, bundle panels, and route coverage for built-in agents. Duplicate search: - Searched GitHub PRs for `built-in agents Reflection Coach repo:paperclipai/paperclip`; only this PR was returned. - Searched GitHub issues for the same query; no public issues were returned. ## What Changed - Added built-in agent definitions, lifecycle state derivation, provisioning, reset, reconcile, status, and routine-control routes. - Added the `built_in_managed_resources` migration and schema exports for bundled instructions, skill, and routine ownership. - Added the Reflection Coach built-in bundle with default instructions, skill catalog content, routine template, default permissions, and managed-resource drift handling. - Added approval-aware provisioning behavior that preserves requested adapter config, budgets, manager assignment, and built-in permissions through hire approval. - Added authorization and mutation gates for built-in agent and skill changes, including consented Reflection Coach change paths. - Added UI surfaces for built-in agent setup, roster/detail badges, readiness gates, bundle status, routine controls, and route filtering. - Added company import/export and validator coverage for built-in managed resources and low-trust/red-team presets. - Addressed Greptile follow-ups for pending approval reconciliation, consent-gate error propagation, config-read authorization fallback, approval-path manager preservation, and non-model adapter provisioning. ## Verification Local verification: - `git diff --check public/master..HEAD` passed. - `pnpm check:token-gates` passed with all gates clean. - `pnpm exec vitest run ui/src/components/ConfigureBuiltInAgentModal.test.tsx` passed: 1 file, 4 tests. - `pnpm exec vitest run ui/src/components/EntityRow.test.tsx ui/src/pages/Agents.test.tsx ui/src/components/BuiltInAgentGate.test.tsx ui/src/components/ConfigureBuiltInAgentModal.test.tsx ui/src/components/BuiltInBundlePanel.test.tsx ui/src/pages/InstanceExperimentalSettings.test.tsx ui/src/pages/Routines.test.tsx` passed: 7 files, 64 tests. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/built-in-agents.test.ts src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts src/__tests__/company-skills-routes.test.ts` passed: 3 files, 91 tests. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/db check:migrations` passed. - `pnpm -r typecheck` passed after the rebase; `pnpm --filter ui typecheck` passed after the final UI review fix. Remote verification on latest head `1c61f693a4ec881d739022b0e75a8ca8bf8c2cd8`: - Merge state: `CLEAN`. - Greptile: `5/5`, zero unresolved Greptile threads. - PR check rollup: all checks successful, neutral, or skipped as expected. - Passing gates include Build, Typecheck + Release Registry, all server shards, all workspace shards, all serialized server suites, e2e, Canary Dry Run, policy, review, verify, Socket, Superagent, and Snyk. ## Risks - This adds a new managed-resource table and migration; the migration uses idempotent create/add/index guards and passed migration safety checks. - Built-in agent provisioning touches approval and authorization paths; tests cover pending approval preservation, stale retry rejection, consent gates, and config-read fallback behavior. - Reflection Coach creates managed instructions, skill, and routine resources; drift/reset behavior is covered by service tests and redacted API responses. - Non-model adapter setup now provisions a `needs_setup` built-in row before command/endpoint fields are complete; this matches the server lifecycle and is covered by the setup modal regression test. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex coding agent based on GPT-5. Exact hosted model ID, context-window size, and reasoning-mode labels are not exposed in this runtime; tool use, shell execution, GitHub CLI/API access, and local code editing were enabled. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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b13eb5b2b5 |
Skill Studio: three-pane skill IDE with sandboxed test runs (#9241)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - The Skills Manager gives operators a reusable skill layer, but iteration still required manual edits, ad hoc prompts, and indirect run inspection. > - Skill authors need a focused workflow for editing skill files, saving representative test inputs, and running those inputs through an agent without exposing harness tasks as normal company work. > - The backend therefore needs durable test inputs, reusable run templates, hidden harness issues, scoped run execution, retention metadata, and read-containment rules around hidden work. > - The frontend needs a three-pane Studio that keeps skill files, saved inputs/templates, and run output/history visible together while preserving the existing design system and token rules. > - This pull request ships that Skill Studio surface end to end: database migrations, shared contracts, server APIs/services, hidden harness execution behavior, UI routes/components, and focused tests. > - The benefit is faster and safer skill iteration, with inspectable outputs and fewer ways for internal harness work to leak into normal task lists, costs, or adjacent read APIs. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description No public GitHub issue exists for this feature. Feature request summary: - Problem: Skill authors need to edit and test company skills in one place instead of switching between the skill detail page, task creation, run output, and manual prompt history. - Proposed solution: Add a Skill Studio workbench with saved inputs, reusable templates, hidden sandboxed test runs, live run status, output inspection, run history, rerun/delete controls, and frontmatter-aware editing. - Expected users: Paperclip operators and agent-company maintainers who create, fork, import, and tune skills. - Related public PRs: Supersedes #9205, which was replaced so the public PR branch name follows contributor policy. - Duplicate search: searched public GitHub issues and PRs for "Skill Studio"; no other active public issue or PR directly covers this feature. ## What Changed - Added database migrations for Skill Studio test inputs, test runs, test run retention, and reusable run templates. - Added shared Skill Studio types, validators, route helpers, frontmatter utilities, and status handling. - Added server services and routes for saved inputs, test runs, templates, reruns, terminal-run deletion, hidden harness issue execution, and run-detail hydration. - Strengthened hidden-issue read containment across issue-adjacent routes and cost rollups used by skill test harness work. - Added the Skill Studio UI with skill file editing, frontmatter editing, saved inputs, templates, run creation/cancel/rerun/delete flows, output rendering, history, route support, and responsive pane behavior. - Added focused backend, shared, and UI tests for the new APIs, routing logic, editor/run behavior, hidden-issue containment, and migration safety. - Rebased onto current `master`, removed the generated lockfile diff from the PR, and verified no workflow files are changed. ## Verification - [x] `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/db check:migrations` - [x] `pnpm check:token-gates` - [x] `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/company-skills-service.test.ts server/src/__tests__/company-skills-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/company-skill-test-runs-service.test.ts ui/src/lib/skill-studio.test.ts ui/src/pages/SkillStudio.test.tsx` — 5 files, 132 tests passed - [x] Greptile review on the latest PR head - [x] GitHub PR checks on the latest PR head ## Risks - Medium risk because this is a broad feature touching database schema, server orchestration, issue visibility, and a large UI surface. - Hidden harness issue containment is security-sensitive; this PR includes regression coverage for adjacent read paths and cost rollups. - The new migrations are additive and use idempotent guards where applicable, but deployed databases that previously tested draft migration numbers should still be checked carefully. - The UI depends on a new resizable panels package in `ui/package.json`; the lockfile is intentionally left to repository automation. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 coding agent with shell, git, and GitHub CLI tool use. Earlier feature commits include assistance from other Paperclip coding agents; this PR preparation, rebase, cleanup commit, and PR body were completed by OpenAI Codex in a Paperclip worktree. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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ad961227f5 |
feat(secrets): add user-specific runtime secrets (#8825)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Agent runs often need provider credentials, API tokens, and other environment-bound secrets. > - Company-level secrets work for shared credentials, but they do not model values that should differ by human operator. > - Without a user-scoped model, a run can dispatch without knowing whether the responsible human has supplied the needed value. > - Paperclip also needs run attribution to make those user-scoped runtime checks deterministic and auditable. > - This pull request adds user-specific secret definitions, per-user values, environment bindings, responsible-user attribution, and runtime resolution gates. > - The benefit is that teams can define the secret once, let each user provide their own value, and block runs before dispatch when required user secrets or active definitions are unavailable. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs #224 Refs #6057 This PR implements user-specific secret support as a core secret-management capability rather than a one-off adapter setting. It is related to existing public work on company secrets UI and runtime secret refs, but is distinct because the value is owned by the responsible user and resolved at run dispatch time. Related PR search before opening found existing secrets work such as #1550, #8256, #8614, #8634, and #8647; none of those add the full user-secret definition/value/runtime gate covered here. ## What Changed - Added user-secret definitions and per-user "My secrets" values, keeping stored values out of access metadata. - Added `user_secret_ref` environment bindings and UI affordances to pick them alongside existing secret refs. - Added responsible-user runtime resolution so user-secret refs resolve against the human responsible for the run. - Added pre-dispatch missing-secret gates so runs fail before adapter dispatch when required user values are absent or definitions are inactive. - Added low-trust allowlist hardening for user-secret runtime access. - Added issue, routine, run, and agent API key responsible-user attribution and fail-closed dispatch behavior when attribution cannot be resolved. - Added denial-copy mapping so responsible-user authorization failures surface as actionable run outcomes instead of opaque setup failures. - Added OpenAPI documentation for the user-secret routes. - Rebases cleanly on current `master`; migrations were renumbered incrementally as `0128_user_specific_secrets`, `0129_agent_api_key_responsible_user`, and `0130_run_responsible_user_invariant` after upstream `0126`/`0127` migrations. - Removed previously committed local design screenshots so the PR contains code/docs/tests only. ## Verification - PASS: PR head `2527febd106bcf3ca264ca0da7fca491084192d6` is based on `paperclipai/paperclip:master`. - PASS: `git diff --check` - PASS: `git diff --name-only public/master...HEAD | rg '^(pnpm-lock\\.yaml|\\.github/workflows/|screenshots/)' || true` produced no files. - PASS: migration journal audit confirmed unique indexes through `130` with tail entries `0126_issue_comment_derived_attribution`, `0127_environment_custom_images_instance_scoped`, `0128_user_specific_secrets`, `0129_agent_api_key_responsible_user`, and `0130_run_responsible_user_invariant`. - PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui typecheck` - PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` - PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/heartbeat-responsible-user-invariant.test.ts` - PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/heartbeat-active-run-output-watchdog.test.ts src/__tests__/heartbeat-stale-queue-invalidation.test.ts src/__tests__/heartbeat-workspace-finalize-branch.test.ts src/__tests__/issue-monitor-scheduler.test.ts` - PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/heartbeat-comment-wake-batching.test.ts src/__tests__/heartbeat-retry-scheduling.test.ts src/__tests__/heartbeat-accepted-plan-workspace-refresh.test.ts src/__tests__/heartbeat-plugin-environment.test.ts` - PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/low-trust-red-team-routes.test.ts` - PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/secrets-service.test.ts` (55 tests) - PASS: `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/secrets-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/secrets-service.test.ts` (89 tests after final Greptile cleanup fixes) - PASS: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/heartbeat-issue-liveness-escalation.test.ts` (17 tests after the final rebase CI fix) - PASS: focused server Vitest batches covering heartbeat recovery, project env, plugin env, routines, low-trust, pipelines, monitors, watchdog, and stale queue paths. - PASS: GitHub checks are green on `2527febd106bcf3ca264ca0da7fca491084192d6`, including Typecheck + Release Registry, Build, General tests, serialized server suites, e2e, Canary Dry Run, verify, security checks, and Greptile Review. - PASS: Greptile Review completed successfully on `2527febd106bcf3ca264ca0da7fca491084192d6` with Confidence Score 5/5, and GraphQL review-thread audit returned zero unresolved non-outdated threads. ## Risks - Runtime behavior now depends on a run having a correct responsible user; missing or incorrect responsibility assignment can block runs before adapter dispatch. - `user_secret_ref` bindings intentionally expose metadata without values, but UI/API callers may need to handle the new binding kind explicitly. - External secret providers and IAM policies are not automatically provisioned by this PR; operators still need to configure provider-side access for non-local vaults. - The PR is broad across db/shared/server/UI/runtime paths, so release validation should include both API and UI secret workflows before merge. - The migration renumbering is intentionally incremental after upstream migrations; the branch migrations use guarded column/table/index/constraint creation so users who tested the older draft numbering should not hit duplicate DDL for the existing objects. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-5-based coding agent (`gpt-5`), Codex local adapter with shell/tool use and code execution. Context window and internal reasoning mode are not exposed by the runtime. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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DottaandPaperclip
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fd2f82ac5b |
[codex] Add built-in Hermes adapters (#8543)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Agent adapters are the boundary between the control plane and the runtimes that actually do work. > - Hermes support needs to be available as first-class local and gateway adapters while still preserving the adapter-manager override path for external packages. > - The adapter work touches runtime execution, UI adapter metadata, onboarding prompts, scoped credentials, release packaging, and smoke coverage, so the handoff needs concrete verification rather than only unit tests. > - This pull request adds built-in Hermes local and Hermes gateway support, keeps external adapter overrides compatible, and documents/tests the gateway flow end to end. > - The benefit is that operators can hire Hermes-backed agents without a manual plugin install, while self-hosted installs can still override/shadow the built-ins through Adapter manager packages. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description No public GitHub issue exists for this exact Hermes built-in adapter, gateway onboarding, and release-source work. Problem description: - Hermes local and gateway adapters need a public, reviewable source path in the monorepo so package artifacts and built-in adapter behavior match the application source. - Operators need built-in `hermes_local` and `hermes_gateway` adapter choices without losing the ability to install external Hermes packages as overrides. - Gateway onboarding needs secure defaults for API server URLs, API keys, and generated agent setup text. - Hermes-originated task bridge credentials need narrower API-key scope configuration. - Related public PRs found during duplicate search include #3027, #2363, #7544, #7950, #8095, and #8543. ## What Changed - Added the unified Hermes adapter package with local and gateway server/UI/CLI exports, config schemas, transcript parsing, model detection, and package metadata. - Registered `hermes_local` and `hermes_gateway` as built-in adapters across shared constants, server registries, CLI packaging, and UI adapter registries. - Kept the external adapter override path compatible so installed Hermes packages can shadow built-ins and restore the built-in parser when disabled. - Added Hermes gateway onboarding docs, board-operator docs, Docker smoke assets, and shell smoke harnesses for join/e2e validation. - Added scoped task-bridge API-key support, authorization checks, issue-origin handling, and tests for Hermes-created Paperclip tasks. - Hardened gateway transport and redaction behavior for API keys, headers, session data, and smoke diagnostics. - Updated release packaging/bootstrap checks for the Hermes packages while leaving `pnpm-lock.yaml` out of the PR per repository policy. ## Verification Targeted local verification recorded before PR handoff: - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/hermes-paperclip-adapter exec vitest run src/gateway/server/execute.test.ts` — 14/14 passed. - `pnpm test:hermes-gateway-smoke` — 6/6 passed. - Hermes package typecheck/build checks passed. - Focused server/UI adapter tests passed — 31/31. - Release helper Node tests passed — 18/18. - `git diff --check origin/master..HEAD` passed. Fresh Docker E2E smoke evidence: - Ran `pnpm smoke:hermes-gateway-e2e` on 2026-06-26 with a fresh state directory and fresh Docker container against a live Paperclip dev server. - Hermes direct execution reached `completed`. - Hermes stop/cancel path reached `cancelled`. - Hermes gateway created a Paperclip task, Paperclip ran the Hermes agent, and the task reached `done` with the expected marker response. - Temporary board auth keys, token files, smoke state, and Docker containers were cleaned up after the run. PR checks on head `b5eae40ce`: - GitHub Actions passed: `policy`, `review`, `Typecheck + Release Registry`, all general test shards, all serialized server shards, `Build`, `Canary Dry Run`, `e2e`, and aggregate `verify`. - External checks passed: Snyk and Socket Project Report. - External Socket Pull Request Alerts remained pending after the first-party CI matrix completed. ## Risks - Medium risk: this spans adapter registration, package publishing, gateway execution, onboarding docs, API-key scoping, and UI adapter metadata. - Migration risk is low: the scope-config migration adds a nullable column and does not rewrite existing keys. - Gateway execution depends on operator-provided Hermes API configuration; the smoke covers the Docker gateway path but real deployments may differ by network/auth setup. - Direct Greptile review on the latest expanded diff is file-count limited, although the commitperclip review gate passed. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 coding agent, tool use enabled in a local repository workspace. Context window size is not exposed in this environment. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Commitperclip review gate is green; direct Greptile review is file-count limited on the latest expanded diff - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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DottaandPaperclip
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93fdb9c218 |
[codex] Harden same-company CEO authorization (#8276)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Companies are the primary tenant boundary for agents, board users, settings, and portability operations. > - CEO agents need limited same-company management powers, but those powers must not cross into another company. > - The affected company routes mixed route-level access checks with validation middleware and repeated CEO checks, which left adjacent mutation and portability surfaces easy to drift. > - This pull request centralizes same-company CEO-or-board authorization for those company-scoped surfaces. > - It also adds regression coverage proving a CEO agent from one company cannot read, mutate, archive, delete, export, or import against another company. > - The benefit is tighter company isolation without removing legitimate same-company CEO operations. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Internal task: PAP-11205 / PAP-11347. Bug report: - What happened: same-company CEO authorization for company settings, branding, and portability routes was implemented per-route, making it possible for adjacent surfaces to drift and risking company-boundary mistakes. - Expected behavior: an agent API key must only manage the company that owns the authenticated agent, and only CEO agents should get the limited same-company management permissions. - Steps to reproduce: authenticate as a CEO agent from Company A and call Company B company routes such as `PATCH /api/companies/:companyId`, `PATCH /api/companies/:companyId/branding`, export/preview export, safe import preview/apply, archive, delete, or read. - Version/commit: fixed on this branch at `45edaccb8` on top of `public/master` `ddc193c2b`. - Deployment mode: server API behavior; no UI change. Related search results reviewed, not duplicates of this exact route hardening: - Refs #2212 - Refs #1083 - Refs #8053 ## What Changed - Added a shared `assertSameCompanyCeoAgentOrBoard` company route guard and reused it for company settings, branding, export, and safe import endpoints. - Moved request parsing after authorization on sensitive company mutation/export/import routes so unauthorized cross-company callers are rejected before route body validation side effects or service calls. - Tightened archive and delete ordering to assert route company access before board-only mutation authorization. - Added a cross-company company-route authorization regression suite covering read, settings, branding, archive, delete, export, export preview, import preview, and import apply paths. - Extended adjacent route/service tests to prove non-CEO and cross-company agent keys are rejected on the relevant company-scoped surfaces. - Addressed Greptile follow-ups by removing a redundant board assertion and inlining the portability authorization wrapper. ## Verification Local focused verification on rebased head `45edaccb8`: - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/companies-route-cross-company-authz.test.ts server/src/__tests__/company-branding-route.test.ts server/src/__tests__/company-portability-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/agent-permissions-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts server/src/__tests__/openclaw-invite-prompt-route.test.ts` - 6 test files passed - 127 tests passed Remote PR checks on rebased head `45edaccb8`: - Paperclip PR workflow: green, including policy, typecheck, build, e2e, canary dry run, workspace tests, server general tests, and all serialized server shards. - Greptile Review: success with 5/5 confidence on `45edaccb8`. - Greptile review threads: all resolved. ## Risks Low to moderate risk. This intentionally tightens company route authorization and changes whether some unauthorized requests fail at the authz layer before schema validation. Legitimate board users and same-company CEO agents remain covered by tests, but callers that depended on validation errors from unauthorized company routes will now receive authorization errors first. No migrations. No `pnpm-lock.yaml` changes. No `.github/workflows` changes. No screenshots or design images added. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-5.5-based coding agent with tool use, terminal execution, repository inspection, and GitHub connector access. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots (N/A: no UI change) - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes (N/A: no docs needed beyond this PR description) - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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Nicky LeachandPaperclip
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67f97e8fb0 |
fix(server): enforce read auth for single issue comments (#8346)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Issue comments are part of the control-plane audit trail and must respect the same company and issue authorization boundaries as issue reads. > - Mention-scoped commenting gives low-trust agents a narrow way to reply when an authorized assignee mentions them. > - The comment list route already enforces issue-read authorization, but the single-comment read route only checked same-company access before returning a known comment id. > - That created a broken object-level authorization gap for same-company low-trust agents outside the issue boundary. > - This pull request applies the existing issue-read guard to the single-comment route before loading the comment. > - The benefit is consistent comment-read authorization across list and single-comment endpoints, with regression coverage for the low-trust boundary. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs #7389 Bug fix context: - What happened: `GET /api/issues/:id/comments/:commentId` checked company access but did not enforce the issue-read authorization boundary before returning a single comment by known id. - Expected behavior: single-comment reads should use the same issue-read boundary as issue thread list reads. - Steps to reproduce: authenticate as a same-company low-trust agent outside an issue's readable boundary, then request a known comment id via the single-comment endpoint. - Deployment mode: applies to server authorization behavior in authenticated agent API usage. ## What Changed - Added `assertIssueReadAllowed` to the single issue-comment read route before `getComment` is called. - Added mocked route coverage proving peer agents outside the issue-read boundary get `403` and the comment is not loaded. - Added authorization and embedded route coverage for mention-scoped low-trust comment grants so the intended narrow reply path remains allowed. ## Verification - `NODE_ENV=test pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/issue-agent-mutation-ownership-routes.test.ts` — passed, 60 tests. - `NODE_ENV=test pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts` — passed, 26 tests. - `NODE_ENV=test pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/low-trust-red-team-routes.test.ts` — passed, 8 tests. - `git diff --check` — passed. ## Risks Low risk. This reuses the existing issue-read guard for a read endpoint. The main behavioral shift is that same-company actors who cannot read an issue can no longer fetch a known comment id from that issue, which is the intended authorization boundary. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used OpenAI GPT-5 via Codex, with repository tool use and command execution. Runtime context-window details were not exposed by the environment. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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Nicky LeachandPaperclip
|
364f0f5a8d |
fix(server): enforce issue read for issue thread lists (#8331)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Agents coordinate through issue threads, so issue comments and interactions are part of the task authorization surface. > - Low-trust and boundary-limited agents can receive narrow mention-scoped access, but that must not turn into broad same-company issue-thread reads. > - The comment creation path was narrowed to allow explicit mention replies without granting mutation access. > - The surrounding list/read routes still needed to enforce the same `issue:read` boundary before returning thread data. > - This pull request applies the issue read check to issue comment and interaction listing routes, and locks that behavior with server regressions. > - The benefit is that narrow cross-agent collaboration remains possible without exposing unrelated issue-thread history. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Bug fix: - What happened: same-company agents outside an issue read boundary could still hit issue-thread listing routes and receive thread data. - Expected behavior: issue comments and issue-thread interactions should only be listed after the actor is allowed to read the issue. - Steps to reproduce: configure a peer agent denied by the issue read boundary, then request `GET /api/issues/:id/comments` or the issue interaction listing route. - Paperclip version/commit: current `master` before this branch. - Deployment mode: applies to server authorization in all modes. Related public context: #7389, #7863, #8024. ## What Changed - Added issue read enforcement before listing issue comments. - Added issue read enforcement before listing issue-thread interactions. - Added server regressions for denied peer-agent issue-thread access while preserving mention-scoped collaboration behavior. - Removed an avoidable per-mentioned-comment issue reload in mention-grant authorization by passing the already-loaded issue assignee through the helper. - Documented cross-agent issue read/comment authorization behavior in the Paperclip API reference. - Added a resilient fallback for pinned external skills when GitHub tree fetches are temporarily unavailable during catalog builds. ## Verification - `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/issue-agent-mutation-ownership-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts` - 2 test files passed - 84 tests passed - Existing mocked recovery revalidation warnings were emitted by the route suite and the command exited 0 - Greptile: 5/5 on commit `b73fc323f192dc44f88374c16865008d4348923b`; no unresolved review threads. - `pnpm vitest run packages/skills-catalog/src/catalog-builder.test.ts` - 1 test file passed - 6 tests passed - CI: all visible PR checks are terminal green on commit `b73fc323f192dc44f88374c16865008d4348923b`. ## Risks Low risk. This tightens read authorization on issue-thread listing routes; any caller that depended on same-company access without `issue:read` will now receive 403 and must use an explicit grant or valid issue read path. ## Model Used OpenAI GPT-5 Codex, Codex coding agent environment, tool use and local command execution enabled, reasoning mode active. Context window not exposed by the runtime. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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Jannes StubbemannandClaude Opus 4.8
|
606e74d11f |
cloud_tenant: company-scoped tenants, never instance-admin (#7525)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies, and a single server instance can host many companies. > - The auth middleware (`server/src/middleware/auth.ts`) supports a `cloud_tenant` mode where a trusted hosting proxy injects per-request identity headers, designed originally for one-deployment-per-tenant setups. > - In that original setup, granting every cloud tenant the `instance_admin` role was harmless; on a **shared, multi-tenant pool** it means any paying tenant is admin of the whole instance and can reach every other tenant's data. > - A tenant only needs to own its own company — which it already gets via the company membership the same code path upserts — so instance-level admin is never appropriate for `cloud_tenant` actors. > - This PR removes the `instance_admin` grant from the cloud-tenant path and pins `isInstanceAdmin: false` on the resolved actor. > - Greptile review then surfaced a follow-up gap: deployments that ran the pre-hardening build still have stale `instance_admin` rows in `instance_user_roles`, which other lookups (BetterAuth session path, board API keys, and the authorization service's own DB re-check) would still honor. > - The follow-up commit closes that gap by purging stale rows at the cloud-tenant auth boundary and by teaching the authorization service that `cloud_tenant` actors are never instance admins. > - The benefit is that shared-pool hosting becomes structurally safe: tenants are company-scoped owners, never instance admins — including on deployments upgrading from the older behavior. ## Linked Issues - Refs #966 — managed SaaS multi-tenant hosting is the deployment shape this hardening protects. - Refs #5015 — same problem space: instance-admin-scoped credentials are too broad for multi-company instances; tenants need company-scoped access. Neither issue is fully closed by this PR; it removes the instance-admin grant from the `cloud_tenant` trusted-header path specifically. ## What Changed - `server/src/middleware/auth.ts` - Removed the `instanceUserRoles` insert that granted every cloud tenant `instance_admin`; `resolveCloudTenantActor` now returns `isInstanceAdmin: false` (was `true`). - `resolveCloudTenantActor` now **deletes** any stale `instance_admin` row for the authenticated tenant user on every trusted-header request, so grants left behind by pre-hardening deployments are purged at the source (closes the Greptile P2: stale rows could otherwise re-elevate the user via the BetterAuth session path, board API keys, or the authorization service). - The function is `export`ed so it can be unit-tested directly. - `server/src/services/authorization.ts` - `authorizationService` previously re-checked `instanceUserRoles` from the DB regardless of the actor flag, which would have elevated even hardened `cloud_tenant` actors while a stale row lingered. Actors with `source === "cloud_tenant"` are now never elevated to instance admin; other board actors keep the existing lookup. - `server/src/services/authorization.ts` + `server/src/middleware/auth.ts` (follow-up commit `dc57a71c7`) - CI on the merge ref surfaced that elevation removal alone strands real cloud tenant users: board actors only ever reached `issue:read` / `issue:mutate` through instance-admin elevation (`permissionForAction` maps both to no grant key). `decide()` now grants `cloud_tenant` actors with an **active membership in the resource company** the same read surface as a same-company agent (`agent:read`, `company_scope:read`, `issue:read`, `project:read`) plus `issue:mutate` for non-viewer members — cross-company access stays denied (new `allow_company_member` reason). - `resolveCloudTenantActor` seeds the standard role-default permission grants (`ensureHumanRoleDefaultGrants`) so granted actions (e.g. `tasks:assign`, `agents:create` for owners) work without elevation. - Master-side route tests that stubbed cloud tenant actors with `isInstanceAdmin: true` now seed a real membership and assert under the hardened contract (`issue-identifier-routes`, `multilingual-issues-routes`, `issue-comment-redaction`). - Tests - `server/src/middleware/cloud-tenant-actor.test.ts` (new): cloud tenant is never instance-admin, is scoped to exactly the one company from its stack, still upserts user/company/membership, purges stale `instance_admin` rows, returns null without the server token, and maps non-owner stack roles without elevating. - `server/src/__tests__/auth-session-route.test.ts`: end-to-end middleware regression — a user with a stale `instance_admin` row stops being elevated via the session path once they authenticate through the cloud-tenant path (with a control assertion showing the pre-purge elevation). - `server/src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts` (embedded Postgres): a `cloud_tenant` actor with a stale `instance_admin` row in the real DB cannot cross company boundaries, while a `session` actor with the same row still resolves `allow_instance_admin`. ## Verification Run from the repo root after `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile`: ```bash cd server npx vitest run src/middleware/cloud-tenant-actor.test.ts src/__tests__/auth-session-route.test.ts # 9 tests passed npx vitest run src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts # 16 tests passed (embedded Postgres) pnpm typecheck # clean ``` Also ran the broader auth-related suites locally (`auth-routes`, `authz-company-access`, `better-auth`, `adapter-routes-authz`, `express5-auth-wildcard`): 8 files, 58 tests, all passing. ## Risks - **This touches authentication and authorization paths directly.** Mistakes here are security bugs in both directions; review accordingly. - **Behavioral change for existing `cloud_tenant` deployments:** tenants that previously (incorrectly) had instance-admin lose it — including the ability to see/manage other companies on the instance. This is the intended hardening, but any single-tenant deployment that relied on the cloud-tenant identity for instance administration must provision a separate admin identity. - **The purge is destructive by design:** if an operator's instance-admin identity is *also* provisioned through the cloud-tenant headers (same user id), its `instance_admin` row will be deleted on the next trusted-header request. Operators should hold admin through a non-cloud-tenant identity. - **Residual gap (documented, not fixed here):** a deployment that ran the old cloud_tenant build and then *disabled* cloud-tenant mode keeps stale rows until the affected user re-authenticates through the cloud path. A data migration was considered and deliberately avoided: there is no reliable SQL predicate for "cloud-tenant-provisioned user" (no source column), so a migration risks deleting legitimate admins. - No schema or migration changes; no UI changes. ## Model Used - Claude Fable 5 (claude-fable-5, 1M context), extended thinking + tool use, via Claude Code — this revision; original PR authored in an earlier Claude Code session. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above (none duplicate this; related issues Refs #966 / #5015 are linked in the issue section) - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots (no UI changes) - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes (no existing docs reference `cloud_tenant` mode) - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Harshit KhemaniandClaude Fable 5
|
d7f2f88323 |
fix(server): allow board members the null-mapped visibility actions agents already get (#7890) (#7935)
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - The authorization service (`server/src/services/authorization.ts`)
decides every actor's actions; `permissionForAction()` intentionally
maps read/visibility actions (`agent:read`, `issue:read`,
`project:read`, `company_scope:read`, `runtime:manage`, `secrets:read`)
to `null`, meaning "no explicit database grant required"
> - The board-actor path's `if (!permissionKey) return
deny(deny_unsupported_action)` guard caught those null-mapped actions
*before* any membership-based evaluation, contradicting the intentional
null mapping
> - Result (#7890): board users with active company membership see "You
have no agents" on the Dashboard — `filterAgentsForActor()` drops every
agent because `access.decide({action: "agent:read"})` denies
> - This pull request allows exactly those six actions for board users
with an active company membership, mirroring the agent actor path's
standard-trust policy so board and agent actors behave consistently
> - The benefit is board members can actually see their company's
agents, issues, and projects, while everything else (including
`agent:wake` and `issue:mutate`, which have no board analog today) keeps
its existing deny
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
Fixes #7890
## What Changed
- `server/src/services/authorization.ts`: inside the board path's
null-`permissionKey` branch, the six null-mapped visibility actions
(`agent:read`, `company_scope:read`, `issue:read`, `project:read`,
`runtime:manage`, `secrets:read`) now resolve via `getActiveMembership`
— active membership → `allow` with the pre-existing
`allow_simple_company_member` reason; no membership →
`deny_missing_membership`. All other null-mapped actions (`agent:wake`,
`issue:mutate`) keep `deny_unsupported_action`.
- `server/src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts`: three regression
tests in the existing embedded-postgres suite — member allowed the
visibility actions, non-member denied with `deny_missing_membership`,
and `agent:wake`/`issue:mutate` still denied.
## Verification
- `npx vitest run server/src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts` →
20 passed (17 pre-existing + 3 new) against embedded postgres.
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` → clean.
- Policy rationale: the agent actor path's standard-trust branch already
allows these same six actions company-wide (`allow_company_agent`); this
PR gives board members the identical set, per the issue's note that the
null mapping means "no explicit grant needed". `agent:wake` is self-only
for agents and `issue:mutate` is assignee-gated — neither has a board
semantic today (no route invokes them for board actors), so both
intentionally keep the unsupported-action deny.
## Risks
- This is authorization code, so reviewed conservatively: the change
only affects the board (session user) path, only for actions that
returned `null` from `permissionForAction()`, and only flips deny→allow
when an **active** company membership exists. Instance admins and
`local_implicit` boards were already allowed via earlier short-circuits.
- Viewer members keep the four read-only visibility actions but are
denied `runtime:manage` and `secrets:read` (`deny_missing_grant`),
matching the `tasks:assign` viewer carve-out in the same board block
(added in review follow-up
|
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DottaandPaperclip
|
dbebf30c89 |
Add low-trust review containment (#7530)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is a control plane for AI-agent companies, so execution policy and trust boundaries are part of the product's safety contract. > - Low-trust review work needs narrower authority than normal same-company agents because hostile PRs, comments, attachments, and generated output can carry prompt-injection payloads. > - The current V1 shape gives trusted workers broad company context, which is useful for normal execution but too permissive for a reviewer assigned to hostile content. > - This branch adds a `low_trust_review` preset, source-trust tagging, route-level containment, and quarantine handling so low-trust output does not automatically flow into higher-trust wake context. > - The branch has been rebased onto current `origin/master`, and the low-trust migration was renumbered to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql` to avoid collisions with existing `0091` through `0096` migrations. > - Greptile feedback was addressed by tightening low-trust detection, preserving project-level trust policy checks, fixing issue-kind promotion lookup, removing duplicate post-lease isolation assertion, documenting fail-closed source-trust behavior, bounding ancestry checks, enforcing runtime issue context for CEOs, awaiting accepted-plan monitor authorization, and making low-trust issue source-trust tagging atomic. > - The benefit is a first production slice of deny-by-default review containment with regression coverage for the main control-plane pivot surfaces. Fixes #7531. ## What Changed - Added shared trust-policy types and validators, plus database/source-trust fields for issues, comments, documents, and work products. - Implemented server enforcement for low-trust issue scope, agent self-view redaction, secret/plugin/runtime denial paths, promotion checks, and quarantined continuation/wake context. - Added focused low-trust regression tests for resolver behavior, source trust, route authorization, heartbeat preflight ordering, runtime containment, and quarantine redaction. - Added board UI affordances for selecting/reviewing the low-trust preset and surfacing source-trust badges in relevant issue views. - Added `doc/LOW-TRUST-PRESETS.md`, updated `doc/SPEC-implementation.md`, and committed the low-trust review contract plan under `doc/plans/`. - Rebasing note: the original `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql` migration was renamed to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`; the SQL uses `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS` so users who already applied the old-numbered migration are not broken by the renumbered migration. ## Verification - Rebased branch onto current `origin/master` and force-pushed with lease to `origin/PAP-10211-low-trust-agent` at head `2719f31e3`. - Confirmed the PR diff does not include `pnpm-lock.yaml` or `.github/workflows` changes. - Resolved upstream UI/comment conflicts by preserving deleted-comment tombstone behavior and low-trust source-trust badges/metadata. - Renumbered the low-trust source-trust migration to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`; the SQL uses `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS` so users who already applied an old-numbered copy are not broken. - `pnpm exec vitest run ui/src/lib/issue-chat-messages.test.ts server/src/__tests__/heartbeat-workspace-session.test.ts` - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/source-trust.test.ts server/src/__tests__/workspace-runtime-service-authz.test.ts ui/src/lib/trust-policy-ui.test.ts ui/src/components/TrustPresetSection.test.tsx` - `pnpm run typecheck:build-gaps` - `git diff --check` - GitHub checks pass on head `2719f31e3`: build, typecheck/release registry, general tests, serialized server suites, e2e, canary, verify, policy/review, Socket, and Snyk. - Greptile Review passes with Confidence Score 5/5 and zero unresolved Greptile review threads. - No design screenshots/images were added because the task explicitly says not to add them unless they are specifically part of the work. ## Risks - Medium risk: this touches shared trust-policy contracts, server authorization paths, heartbeat context generation, migration metadata, and UI preset controls. - Low-trust containment is intentionally deny-by-default; legitimate future review workflows may need explicit allowlisted exceptions. - Plugin/runtime/security surfaces are broad, so regression tests cover the current known routes but future integrations must route through the same containment layer. - The PR is ready for review; GitHub checks are green and Greptile is 5/5. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 coding agent, tool-enabled shell and GitHub CLI workflow. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] UI changes are covered by focused tests; no screenshots were added per task instruction not to add design images unless specifically required - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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DottaandPaperclip
|
38c185fb8b |
[codex] Add agent permissions and controls plan (#6386)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies by keeping task ownership, approvals, and operator control inside one control plane. > - Agent permissions and plugin-hosted company settings sit on the boundary between autonomy and governance. > - V1 needs scoped task assignment rules, plugin extension points, and clearer company access surfaces without weakening company boundaries. > - The branch builds the core authorization service, plugin SDK/host APIs, and UI simplifications needed to support those controls. > - Paperclip EE plugin surfaces were intentionally moved out of this core PR per review direction, so this PR now carries only the public core/plugin infrastructure work. > - The latest updates preserve the PAP-9937 branch changes that belong in this PR, remove the `design/` artifacts, and exclude the experimental `plugin-briefs` package. > - Greptile feedback was applied through the authorization/audit paths and the final cleanup commit was re-reviewed at 5/5 with no unresolved Greptile threads. > - The benefit is safer assignment control with extension hooks for richer permission products while preserving simple defaults for normal operators. ## What Changed - Added scoped task-assignment authorization decisions and routed issue/agent assignment mutations through the authorization service. - Added plugin SDK and host APIs for company settings slots, authorization policy/grant management, assignment previews, and bridge invocation scope propagation. - Simplified core company access UI and moved advanced controls behind plugin-provided settings surfaces. - Added retry-now affordances for blocked issue next-step notices. - Added protected-assignment enforcement for persisted agent/project/issue policies, including explicit-grant fallback behavior. - Added incremental principal-access compatibility backfill for active agent memberships and role-default human permission grants. - Added the Markdown code block wrap action fix from the latest branch changes. - Removed `design/` artifacts from the PR and removed `packages/plugins/plugin-briefs` from the final diff. - Addressed Greptile feedback for plugin actor sanitization, legacy membership handling, audit pagination, unknown grant-scope metadata, and startup test mocks. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/access-service.test.ts server/src/__tests__/company-portability.test.ts` -> 2 files passed, 54 tests passed. - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/server-startup-feedback-export.test.ts server/src/__tests__/access-service.test.ts server/src/__tests__/company-portability.test.ts` -> 3 files passed, 62 tests passed. - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts server/src/__tests__/plugin-access-authorization-host-services.test.ts server/src/__tests__/server-startup-feedback-export.test.ts` -> 3 files passed, 28 tests passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` -> passed. - `git diff --check` -> passed. - `node ./scripts/check-docker-deps-stage.mjs` -> passed. - `CI=true pnpm install --frozen-lockfile --ignore-scripts` -> passed with no lockfile update. - `pnpm exec vitest run ui/src/components/MarkdownBody.interaction.test.tsx` -> 1 test passed. - `git ls-files design packages/plugins/plugin-briefs | wc -l` -> 0. - GitHub CI on `40cd83b53` -> all checks passed, merge state `CLEAN`. - Greptile on `40cd83b53` -> 5/5, 102 files reviewed, 0 comments/annotations added, 0 unresolved review threads. - Confirmed the PR diff contains no `design/`, `packages/plugins/plugin-briefs`, `pnpm-lock.yaml`, or `.github/workflows` changes. ## Risks - Medium: task assignment authorization paths are behaviorally stricter for protected/private policy data, so existing plugin-authored policies may block assignment until explicit grants or approval flows are configured. - Medium: plugin-host authorization APIs expand the surface area available to trusted plugins and need careful review for company scoping. - Low: startup now performs a principal-access compatibility backfill, but the migration and runtime backfill use conflict-tolerant inserts. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 coding agent, tool-enabled workflow with shell, git, and GitHub CLI access. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |