Commit Graph
85 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
DottaandPaperclip 9db3a5726e refactor(tools): isolate GitHub access discovery (#17144)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip manages AI agents and their access to external tools.
> - Tool connections discover repositories through GitHub account
grants.
> - The tool-access service mixes GitHub response parsing with grant
authorization and persistence.
> - These responsibilities have different inputs and failure rules.
> - This PR puts GitHub discovery in one provider module.
> - The service keeps current authority checks and stored grant updates.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What existing behavior does this improve?**

The ownership and review of GitHub access discovery in the tool-access
service.

**Current behavior**

The 21,525-line service contains GitHub pagination, account metadata
validation, and grant lifecycle code.

**Proposed behavior**

A GitHub module returns normalized access metadata. Existing service
exports remain compatible. This is the first PR in a three-part refactor
stack. No behavior change is intended. A search found no existing
tool-access refactor PR or issue.

Stack order: this PR, #17146, then #17147. Each PR targets its
predecessor.

## What Changed

- Move six functions into `tool-access/github-access-discovery.ts`.
Their bodies are unchanged.
- Keep grant selection, credential resolution, refresh retry, membership
locks, revision checks, and webhook updates in the service.
- Add public-entry characterization tests for HTTP error classification
and invalid pagination.
- Record five candidate boundaries and the initial three-PR scope in the
dated plan.
- Reduce `tool-access.ts` from 21,525 lines / 829,519 bytes to 21,237
lines / 820,116 bytes. The new module is 294 lines / 9,722 bytes.

## Verification

- Before and after: `pnpm exec vitest run
server/src/__tests__/github-grant-metadata.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/project-repositories.test.ts` — 13 tests pass.
- Before and after: `pnpm exec vitest run
server/src/__tests__/tool-access-service.test.ts -t 'GitHub|github'` —
11 selected tests pass with disposable PostgreSQL; 455 cases are outside
this selection.
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` passes.
- Exact text comparison confirms all six moved bodies match the base.
`git diff --check` passes.
- The initial baseline attempt failed because the plugin SDK had not
been built. The normal workspace prerequisite build resolved it before
behavioral validation.
- Final-stack local verification: `pnpm -r --workspace-concurrency=2
typecheck` and `pnpm build` pass. CI is green at
`07e78dd1b1c26e0bd4234006766444c71e234451`. Greptile is 5/5 with no
actionable findings.

- Full local-suite limitation: `pnpm test:run` was interrupted after 79
minutes during the serial general-server phase, after CI had completed
the full test matrix. Before interruption, it flagged the unchanged
`company-search-service.test.ts` suite (26 database cases skipped). One
isolated rerun passed all 28 cases without code changes. The original
log and a pre-interruption copy are preserved. The original failure
cause was not reproduced. The full local suite and its later groups are
not claimed as passed; the complete CI matrix is green on this stack.

## Risks

- Import wiring could break existing consumers. Existing imports remain
supported and all four production call sites are unchanged.
- Provider requests retain their ordering, timeout, fixed GitHub origin,
and response redaction. The new module has no database dependency or
shared mutable state.
- Tests simulate GitHub responses. They do not qualify live GitHub
access.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 family, with code execution and repository tools.
The exact serving model ID and context-window size are not exposed in
this session.

## Checklist


- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-21 22:21:40 -05:00
DottaandPaperclip 92cfd701c3 feat: add governed Braintrust app connections (#17141)
Add hosted US and EU Braintrust OAuth and API-key connections through the existing governed MCP system.

Keep reviewed tool risks and catalog review policy in connector modules and a narrow registry. Preserve credential ownership, operator decisions, regional setup and changed-tool quarantine. Include official artwork, setup guidance, focused regressions and sanitized qualification evidence.

US OAuth has bounded live read/write, gateway, reconnect and cleanup proof. Remaining account-method and token-lifecycle qualification gaps are documented.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-21 16:19:58 -05:00
Devin Foley a1e2173ceb feat(apps): add Ditto connection (#16472)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Agents reach external services through the Apps catalog. Each
catalog entry is a reviewed `AppDefinition` that connects a provider's
hosted MCP server to Paperclip's shared vault, grants, policies,
gateway, and audit trail.
> - Ditto (`dittowords.com`) is a single source of truth for product
copy. Its hosted MCP server lets agents read style guide rules, search
and reuse approved text, and create, edit, translate and delete text,
components, variants and style guides.
> - Ditto is not in the catalog. Operators must use the generic "Connect
your own MCP server" flow. That flow has no branding, no guidance about
Ditto's `token` API-key scheme, and no warning about permanent deletes.
> - The generic risk classifier also reads several Ditto mutations as
reads: `translate_*` replaces variant text, and `link_*` and `unlink_*`
replace developer IDs.
> - This pull request adds the Ditto definition, its artwork, the
research and permission-review ledger rows, documentation, deterministic
tests, and one reviewed risk-classification rule.
> - The benefit is a branded, governed Ditto connection with browser
sign-in, an API-key option that uses the correct header, and correct
risk levels for every documented tool.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**Problem or motivation**

Product and engineering teams use Ditto to keep UI copy consistent. They
want their Paperclip agents to follow the Ditto style guide and reuse
approved strings when they write code. Ditto is not in the Apps catalog.
Operators must paste the MCP URL into the generic remote-MCP flow. That
flow gives no branding and no method guidance. It also does not tell the
operator that Ditto API keys use `Authorization: token <key>`, not
`Bearer`, and it does not warn that delete tools are permanent. The
generic classifier also marks five Ditto mutations as reads, so the
Permissions screen shows them with the wrong risk level.

**Proposed solution**

Add a catalog-only Ditto connection built from the connector playbook.
Browser sign-in uses dynamic client registration on Ditto's Auth0
authorization server and requests the reviewed scopes `openid`,
`profile`, `email` and `offline_access`. An optional method sends a
customer-created workspace API key with the `token` scheme. Both methods
share one `write` capability profile, so the delete and link warning
shows before sign-in. Add a reviewed `ditto` rule to `classifyRisk`:
`list_*`, `get_*` and `search_*` tools, `suggest_edit`, and tools that
Ditto marks read-only are reads; `delete_*` tools are destructive; all
other tools are writes.

**Alternatives considered**

A plugin was not needed because no custom UI, tables, workers, or
webhooks are involved. Requesting no scopes was not chosen, because
Auth0 issues a refresh token only for `offline_access`, so the
connection would expire with its first access token. Ditto's separate
documentation MCP server (`developer.dittowords.com/mcp`) was not added,
because it only searches Ditto's public docs.

**Roadmap alignment**

This extends the existing self-serve remote-MCP connection catalog and
does not overlap planned core work.

## What Changed

- Added the `ditto` provider to `scripts/ingest-app-definitions.mjs`
(category `content`, `token` API-key placement, guidance, warnings,
shared capability profile, description) and regenerated
`packages/shared/src/app-definitions/ditto.json` and the generated
registry.
- Added the Ditto row to the self-serve MCP research ledger with
`dcr_or_api_key` auth and risk tier S4, because the normal tool catalog
includes permanent deletes. Widened `SelfServeMcpResearchEntry.wave` to
include `4`, which existing entries already use.
- Added permission reviews for `ditto/mcp-oauth` (explicit scopes
`openid`, `profile`, `email`, `offline_access`) and `ditto/mcp-api-key`
(provider key), with evidence links.
- Added a reviewed `ditto` rule to `classifyRisk` in
`server/src/services/tool-access.ts`.
- Added Ditto's mark (`ui/public/brands/apps/ditto.png`, the avatar of
Ditto's official GitHub organization) and the brand manifest entry.
- Added gallery copy for the Ditto card.
- Added `doc/connections/DITTO.md` (sign-in sequence diagram, provider
and Paperclip endpoints including `/api/tools/oauth/callback`, scopes,
administrator setup, capabilities and policy, manifest, brand
provenance, validation hook) and linked it from the connections README
and the permission audit.
- Tests: Ditto definition shape, store visibility and artwork, URL
recognition, reviewed scopes, `token` header projection with the key
kept out of connection config, risk classification of every read-looking
Ditto mutation, the connect form's sign-in default, the warning before
sign-in, API-key gating, and the pinned catalog counts.

## Verification

- `pnpm exec vitest run packages/shared/src/app-definitions.test.ts
packages/shared/src/app-definitions-url.test.ts
ui/src/pages/apps/AppsConnect.test.tsx ui/src/pages/apps/Browse.test.tsx
ui/src/lib/app-brand-assets.test.ts
ui/src/pages/apps/AppLogo.brand-assets.test.tsx
server/src/__tests__/tool-access-service.test.ts` — 765 passed.
- `node scripts/check-app-brand-assets.mjs` and `node --test
scripts/app-brand-validation.test.mjs` — passed.
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/shared typecheck`, `pnpm --filter
@paperclipai/server typecheck`, `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui
typecheck` — clean.
- Manual: on a local instance, open Apps → Browse and confirm the Ditto
card and icon. Open `/apps/connect?source=ditto` and confirm that
sign-in is the default, that the warning shows before sign-in, and that
the API-key method is under Advanced.
- Live metadata probe: an unauthenticated `initialize` on
`https://api.dittowords.com/v2/mcp` returns 401 with
`resource_metadata`. The protected-resource and authorization-server
documents return the recorded endpoints. Dynamic client registration
succeeds, and the authorize endpoint redirects to Ditto's sign-in page
with the reviewed scopes and the `resource` parameter.
- Each of the 41 documented tool names was run through `classifyRisk`
with and without the new rule. Without the rule, `translate_text_items`,
`translate_library_components`, `link_figma_nodes_to_text_item`,
`link_text_items_to_component` and `unlink_text_items_from_component`
were reads.

## Risks

- Low risk to existing providers: the catalog change is additive, and
the new `classifyRisk` branch runs only for the `ditto` source template.
- Ditto delete tools are permanent, and linking a text item to a
component replaces its developer ID. Both methods warn the operator
before connecting, and the API-key helper text tells operators to set
delete and link actions to Ask first.
- Ditto API keys are not scoped, reach the whole workspace, and act as
the user who created them. Paperclip cannot narrow an issued key.
- The permission-review ledger records live proof for both methods as
not run. The lifecycle checklist in `doc/connections/DITTO.md` still
needs a documented pass with a Ditto workspace, including confirmation
that Auth0 issues a refresh token that `/v2/mcp` accepts.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

- Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`, 1M context) in Claude Code, with
tool use (shell, file editing, web research).

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
2026-10-21 11:29:48 -07:00
DottaandPaperclip 3ce8d976a9 Add experimental Paperclip Notebook MCP connection (#16984)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip connects agents to external tools through saved accounts
and per-action permissions.
> - Notebook exposes artifact management through an ordinary remote MCP
server with OAuth.
> - A private pilot needs a hidden, default-off catalog and execution
gate.
> - Local file publishing belongs to Notebook, which can accept bounded
file bytes through ordinary MCP tools.
> - Paperclip therefore needs the connector registration and generic
availability checks, with no file-transfer architecture.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**Subsystem affected**

Apps catalog, experimental feature metadata, connection setup, and
connector availability.

**Problem or motivation**

Users need to connect Notebook as their Cloud account, assign its tools
to agents, and retain Paperclip's normal Allowed / Ask first / Off
rules. The private pilot must remain hidden until an operator enables
it. Notebook should own its upload protocol and local publishing script.

**Proposed solution**

Register a personal remote MCP OAuth connection at Notebook's canonical
endpoint. Reuse existing OAuth discovery, credential storage, refresh,
reconnect, and removal. Enforce availability through generic catalog
feature metadata and saved application identity. Keep Notebook's
standalone uploader in its own service repository; it calls the ordinary
gateway and receives no saved OAuth credential.

**Alternatives considered**

A gallery-only filter permits retained tools and deep links while
disabled. A shared workspace publisher and private upload-ticket
transport add runtime behavior that a normal MCP connector does not
require. Notebook can receive file bytes directly through its own tools
instead.

**Roadmap alignment**

This extends Connected Apps and supports Artifacts and Work Products.
ROADMAP.md and related PRs were checked. This PR is standalone on
master. The separate OAuth lifecycle and file-transfer proposals (#17085
and #17086) are closed and are not dependencies.

## What Changed

- Register Notebook's personal MCP OAuth method, canonical endpoint,
scopes, catalog metadata, and branding.
- Declare managed `enablePaperclipNotebook` with false defaults and no
user-facing settings toggle or staging opt-in.
- Use generic availability metadata for gallery/setup, retained
connection identity, OAuth completion, health, tool/context discovery,
and dispatch. Resources/prompts recheck before credentials, including
retained handles. Removal remains available while disabled.
- Resolve catalog application identity from the saved application key,
so editable connection labels cannot bypass the hidden gate.
- Select a method's sole supported credential kind when no kind is
supplied.
- Keep UI changes to metadata-driven availability and existing
setup/reconnect controls.
- Document Notebook's service-owned upload script, inline publication,
ordinary action policies, and credential behavior.
- Add ordinary MCP OAuth, assignment, action-policy, disabled-state,
settings, and catalog tests.

No workspace contribution registry, private transfer endpoint, native
publisher, Runner file-reader change, or Paperclip CLI upload command is
included. The entire native-runtime and CLI trees match master. Upload
code lives in `paperclip-cloud/notebook/`.

## Verification

Source head: `65ef741e4f476c67425b57d2fb2d6d4c00e99b06`, directly on
master `53732c811bb69655eb43d3d12f2063ae4ca5ad67`. The diff is 42 files.
Shared execution changes only enforce generic catalog availability; tool
access also resolves saved application identity and the sole supported
credential kind. Neither module contains Notebook upload logic.

- Catalog/shared/settings/UI suites: 592 tests passed across 12 files.
Shared/server/UI typechecks passed using installed compilers.
- Fresh real PostgreSQL generic MCP suite: 84/84 passed at final source;
server typecheck and module boundaries pass. Coverage includes personal
OAuth, ordinary refresh/reconnect, assignments, Allowed / Ask first /
Off, hidden feature enforcement, and local credential removal. Four new
resources/prompts cases failed against the prior code and pass after
filtering saved application identity and rechecking before credentials.
They prove missing/relabelled setup markers and stale eligibility cannot
dispatch or read secrets while disabled; an ordinary provider remains
available with the flag off.
- The full tool-access service suite passed 463/464 cases. One unchanged
Google Workspace `slides.write` case timed out at 15 seconds; it passed
on one isolated retry without source or timeout changes. Its exact test
block matches master. The cause is not established; final-head CI must
qualify the complete suite.
- Maps, module boundaries, token gates, and whitespace checks passed.
Byte comparisons confirm the former transfer/runtime/CLI surfaces match
master.
- Fresh exact-head Greptile is 5/5 with zero unresolved findings after
an exhaustive feedback audit. Current-head CI workflow
[39625691137](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/39625691137)
succeeded, including both required checks (`ci / verify`, `ci / e2e`),
Build, and browser E2E. Supplementary security/advisory scan status is
recorded in the PR Checks panel and qualification receipt; prior-head
scans are not counted. The superseded `4bd7af9b2e` completed CI
successfully, but Greptile found the valid resources/prompts
availability gap described above. It was fixed, replied to, and
resolved; earlier-head results do not qualify this revision.

Preserved environment failures: the first socket-restricted UI/route run
had 93 listener setup failures, and the same 93 cases passed with
local-socket access. The package-manager launcher could not fetch its
signature metadata; installed compilers passed without dependency or
configuration changes. The full service timeout and isolated retry
remain recorded separately. The superseded `585e870e73` CI also failed
an unchanged agent-chat project-plan revision assertion after task
creation; the complete spec and relevant runtime sources match master,
and a same-master prior run passed. Its cause is not established. Logs
are preserved; no test or timeout was weakened and no old-head rerun was
requested. The subsequent heads run full CI independently; no prior-head
pass substitutes for current qualification.

The Notebook uploader requires a separate service release. This public
PR adds no uploader runtime to Paperclip and claims no newly deployed
browser/agent acceptance. The Notebook-owned upload path is qualified
separately. Code-owner review remains required before merge.

## Risks

- The feature flag gates the curated connector; it does not create a
Notebook service-side team allowlist or block arbitrary standard MCP
URLs.
- Publishing, sharing, and deletion retain the existing assignment and
action-policy boundaries.
- The hidden feature must be checked for retained tools and saved
identity, including when connection labels change.
- Disconnect removes local credentials. It does not revoke the remote
Notebook authorization; the owner can revoke it in Notebook.
- Ordinary refresh uses the existing client. A lost response after
refresh-token rotation can require reconnect.
- The standalone Notebook script and its bounded upload tools must ship
together in the Notebook service before that documented convenience path
is available.
- No database schema, workflow, lockfile, shared transfer, or Runner
change is included. No merge, deployment, or rollout is performed by
this update.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-6 in Codex, with reasoning, repository inspection, code
execution, and tool use. The runtime did not expose a more specific
model ID or context-window size.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-21 11:07:18 -05:00
DottaandPaperclip 6c9b87d092 trace(server): expose repository admission waits (#17040)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip manages work performed by AI agents.
> - The controller prepares a task workspace before it starts a provider
turn.
> - Repository admission also runs when a checkout already exists.
> - One observed reuse took 16.877 seconds. Its child spans explained
only 3.556 seconds.
> - The missing detail covered repeated authority checks, catalog work,
and publication waits.
> - This change exposes those operations under the existing execution
attempt.
> - Operators can expand the slow phase before choosing a performance
fix.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #16963, #16330, and #16515. The provider-routing work in #17019 has
a different scope.

**What existing behavior does this improve?**

Repository-admission traces for new and reused checkouts.

**Subsystem affected**

server/ orchestration and operator-configured OpenTelemetry tracing.

**Current behavior**

The admission span can contain a long interval without child spans.
Existing project checks, HTTP requests, and checkout lookup do not
explain current-task checks, database awaits, credential refresh, or
publication locks.

**Proposed behavior**

Expose nested spans for current binding and task access, individual
identity reads, catalog construction, credentials, grant transactions,
filesystem validation, Git inspection, and directory-lock acquisition,
work, and release.

**Reason and benefit**

The trace can distinguish repeated checks, remote calls, database
awaits, and directory contention. A database-await span includes driver,
network, pool, and server time. It is not isolated SQL execution time.

**Breaking changes**

None. No API, schema, permission, retry, lock, or repository behavior
changes.

## What Changed

- Add fixed admission phases beneath the existing execution attempt.
Keep the existing project, checkout, and HTTP detail.
- Trace current-task authorization stages only under workspace access.
Unrelated decisions cannot consume that detail budget before admission.
- Trace GitHub catalog reads, credentials, provider metadata, grant row
locking and writes, transaction settlement, and webhook work.
- Separate directory-lock acquisition, the protected operation, and
release without changing the adapter lock contract.
- Document the hierarchy and timing limits. Keep endpoint gating, span
caps, and hashed run correlation. Add no span attributes or exception
text.

## Verification

- Nine new tests passed with real PostgreSQL, real Git, and SDK-exported
spans. They cover directory contention, grant-row blocking, all three
binding checks, reuse without cloning, dirty files, private-task denial,
receipt repair, conflict retry, endpoint-off behavior, and parent IDs.
- Twenty earlier unrelated authorization decisions do not exhaust the
admission detail budget.
- Existing authorization and trust suites: 105 tests passed. Existing
timing/context suites: 26 tests passed. Existing repository-access
tests: 6 tests passed.
- `pnpm -r typecheck` and `pnpm build` passed on commit
`5a986d8c86644dfb7ee39b3b832e2d7c86532598`.
- `pnpm test:run` could not complete locally. The temporary
five-connection cluster returned `sorry, too many clients already` in
chat fixtures, and the run was interrupted. It is not a pass. The
complete standard CI workflow passed on the same commit, including all
12 server shards and all three chat shards.
- Final current-head checks: 54 success, two neutral, two skipped, zero
pending or failing. The [CI
aggregate](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/39522187940/job/118971261973)
passed.
[Greptile](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/17040#issuecomment-6305066520)
and [Paperclip
Review](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/17040#issuecomment-6305017182)
both assessed this exact commit at 5/5 with no actionable findings or
unresolved threads.
- `node scripts/check-module-boundaries.mjs` and `git diff --check`
passed.
- This macOS host exhausted its SysV semaphore quota. Database tests
used a temporary command-scoped initdb preload with five connections,
fewer workers, and a larger lock table. No repository test
infrastructure or shared host settings changed. Initial skipped tests,
focused-fixture failures, and clock-order assertion failures were
corrected and rerun; they are not counted as passes. The complete local
run remained connection-limited and was interrupted.
- Local SDK export proves parentage and privacy. Hosted Honeycomb
ingestion remains unverified until deployment. No deployment occurred.

## Risks

Span recording requires an operator-configured OTLP endpoint. Each fixed
detail name remains capped at 16 occurrences per attempt. Later
operations still execute under their enclosing phase. Timing wrappers
preserve the existing operations and their errors. No migration is
required. The change does not itself reduce admission latency.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, based on GPT-6, with tool use, code execution, and
delegated agents. The exact hosted model identifier and context-window
size are not exposed in this session.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-20 19:50:51 -05:00
Devin FoleyandPaperclip 24758b9da1 Avoid loading tool schemas for effective assignments (#16969)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Tool profiles define which tools an agent can use.
> - Run preparation and connection checks resolve these assignments from
the database.
> - These callers need tool IDs and names, but the existing lookup also
reads complete schemas and provider metadata.
> - Repeated lookups transfer data that these callers discard.
> - This pull request adds a small assignment projection through the
same permission resolver.
> - The benefit is less database transfer and JSON work with current
permission checks and the same public response.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What existing behavior does this improve?**

Effective tool assignment reads during run preparation, native runtime
setup, and connection policy checks.

**Subsystem affected**

server/ — tool access and orchestration services.

**Current behavior**

Internal callers use the public effective-profile lookup. Its catalog
query reads complete tool rows, including input schemas, output schemas,
annotations, and provider metadata. These callers only use catalog IDs
and names.

**Proposed behavior**

Internal callers use an assignment lookup that selects catalog identity
and selector fields. Both lookups share one resolver. The public
effective-profile endpoint keeps its complete definitions.

**Reason and benefit**

Large catalogs increase database transfer and JSON work for every
assignment lookup. The smaller query avoids that payload without caching
permissions or changing query frequency.

**Breaking changes**

None. No route, schema, migration, permission rule, or public response
changes.

Related: Refs #16761, Refs #16723. The former narrows profile summary
reads. The latter changes how the gateway presents tool definitions.
Neither narrows this internal effective-assignment lookup.

## What Changed

- Share effective-profile resolution between full definitions and
assignment records.
- Select the existing catalog identity and selector projection for
internal assignments.
- Use the assignment lookup in run preparation, native runtime setup,
and connection policy checks.
- Add real PostgreSQL tests for selectors, exclusions, current profile
and binding state, company boundaries, and returned payload size.
- Document the database read contract.

## Verification

- Five focused test files passed: 521 tests. They cover tool access,
connection intents, runtime preparation, native runtime context, and the
new assignment lookup.
- `pnpm -r typecheck` passed.
- `pnpm check:module-boundaries` passed.
- The PostgreSQL fixture compares the full authorization result with the
assignment result. It checks all selector types, excludes removed tools,
and observes catalog, profile, and binding changes on later calls.
- The payload test measures rows returned by PostgreSQL before
application mapping. With large schema and annotation fields, the
assignment result is less than 1% of the full catalog payload. This is a
synthetic fixture result, not a fleet savings estimate.
- `pnpm build` passed.
- The full local suite is in progress. It found two Git fixture failures
that also reproduce on unchanged master with `init.defaultBranch=main`.
Both pass with a process-only `init.defaultBranch=master` setting. The
global Git configuration was not changed. This earlier failure remains
recorded; it is not counted as a clean first pass.
- Apex review: 5/5, no actionable comments. All 54 CI checks passed; two
conditional jobs were skipped.
- The broader local run also reached two UI test timeouts and one
adapter test timeout. All three passed when rerun in isolation with
unchanged source. The exact cause of these timeouts is not established.
No UI or adapter implementation is changed by this PR. The CLI
import/export journey passes its assertions but its local teardown fails
with `ENOTEMPTY` while a runtime context asset is written. Its CI check
passed. The complete local suite is not reported as a clean pass.

## Risks

- Both lookups share permission resolution. Existing tool access tests
and result parity checks cover that extraction.
- Future assignment callers must use the fields in the smaller result.
Typechecking rejects attempts to read full schemas from it.
- The lookup still scans the active company catalog and resolves current
connections on every call. This change reduces returned bytes; it does
not reduce query count or introduce a cache.
- No database migration or operational configuration change is required.

## Model Used

- OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex, with tool-assisted source inspection,
implementation, and test execution. The exact model variant and context
window are not exposed in this session.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-20 08:42:59 -07:00
DottaandPaperclip 92b238137b Connect and configure GitHub Copilot through Apps (#15705)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Apps and AI Connections store credentials and govern access to agent
runtimes.
> - Users need a supported saved-token connection and config values that
survive save and reopen.
> - The release must preserve saved-token access and task lifecycle
guarantees.
> - This pull request will connect Copilot through the normal Apps and
AI Connections path.
> - The benefit is a reviewable part of the Copilot production release.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #15701 and #15703. Supersedes setup work in #15562. Base: #15703.
Next: #15706.

## What Changed

- Require configuration update authority before Copilot
credential-bearing model discovery; default to the saved environment and
preserve explicit selection for editors.

- Keep Copilot discovery passive during reconnect reconciliation;
refresh on explicit opening, account/environment changes and reconnect.

- Add GitHub AI token connections with encrypted storage, ownership,
grants and audit logging.
- Keep repository access separate from Copilot runtime authentication.
- Probe the selected environment without sending a model prompt and
preserve authenticated model selection through save/reopen.
- Keep fresh execution admission consistent with normal Copilot setup;
persist task model choices without changing provider or permission
policy.
- Refresh authenticated models after reconnecting the same saved Copilot
account, including recovery from a previous authentication error.
- Apply the additive provider-default constraint migration through the
normal generated migration workflow.

## Verification

Runtime #15701 is merged at `d855e550ad8d2a267312983f26457aabf5393c3a`.
History #15703 is merged at `df80616d98119cbf5abd40549794d9980a5fabf6`.
Remaining source
[`42bcbd61299655f7e37aabe6bb5f19bba770ad1d`](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/commit/42bcbd61299655f7e37aabe6bb5f19bba770ad1d)
contains the four-file authorization repair. The remaining PR trees
preserve six nonoverlapping files from the newer public mainline
managed-settings fix and the CI-owned lockfile. No unrelated provider is
enabled.

The security finding is repaired: existing-agent discovery requires
`agent_config:update` before connection selection or token resolution.
The saved environment is the default. Authorized editors can select a
prospective environment. Both denied board-viewer and agent-reader
regressions fail on the original source. All49 route tests and server
typecheck pass with the fix. Denied requests perform no connection
selection, credential resolution or probe. Current-head security scans
pass on both remaining PRs; the repaired thread is resolved.

Copilot CLI1.0.88 and profile47 retain digest
`sha256:55044aa235e88b3fe36ec8a556ee1e3382590870aab907e4462ef7d64af49cea`.
The [qualification
record](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/blob/42bcbd61299655f7e37aabe6bb5f19bba770ad1d/doc/plans/2026-10-20-copilot-qualification-v47.json)
reports20/20 Product cells,154 assertions and7/7 protocol cases,46
assertions against frozen normal installed source
`c2616370800f5f6df45246b0890ba35a7cd2faab`. The exact qualification
model is `gpt-5.6-luna`. Every passing Product case confirms cleanup.
Original failures remain recorded; automatic behavior retries are
disabled. The route-only authorization repair changes no bound
runtime/profile bytes and does not relabel the frozen campaign.

The ordinary installed remote journey passed saved-token selection,
model discovery, normal UI save/reopen, metadata-only Test, completed
task, accepted receipt and exact19-byte browser download. An open model
catalog caused no additional discovery requests during117seconds. Actual
installed runtime smokes passed on macOS ARM64, macOS x64 under Rosetta
and native Linux x64 on Daytona. Raw token browser entry was not
exercised; encrypted connection creation used the normal API.

The first Daytona file attempt timed out during delayed semantic
dispatch; its precise stalled layer remains unresolved. Independent
ordinary remote delivery and the other19 Product cells passed before one
instrumented recheck passed8/8 with unchanged source,prompt,assertions
and deadlines. No causal latency repair is claimed.

Before the authorization repair, all four final PR heads passed required
verify/E2E and fresh Greptile5/5 reviews with zero unresolved threads.
Current-head CI/review is running for the two repaired heads. Local
focused checks retain129 connection,59 runner,72 shared-eval and88
recovery/workspace passes, plus migration safety and token gates. The
additive Copilot migration is361; released master history is preserved.

[Cloud normal-package
run39414239704](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/39414239704)
builds the pre-security source4f3f. All four native producers and Linux
package assembly pass; the final clean installed consumers are
finishing. All18 retained archives match their hashes;37,863 regular
files contain zero selected credentials. That package does not contain
the later route repair. The actual final published package must include
it and pass the local/Daytona live canaries. The frozen Daytona image
remains published and independently verified. No separate full-image
scan is claimed. Docker builds run in the cloud.

**Remaining:** current-head CI/review, setup and qualification merges,
final publication, and ordinary local/Daytona canaries against the
actual shipped package. The user explicitly authorizes the maintainer
review override; CI remains a merge gate. No production deployment is
claimed. Provider USD remains unknown and GitHub-attributed.

## Risks

Bad credentials, missing entitlement, runtime installation and
unavailable models must remain distinct failures. A connection must not
adopt ambient credentials. The constraint migration changes accepted
provider values, with no credential-storage migration.

Current-master NewAgent fixture extraction is retained. Copilot cases
use that shared support and test both passive discovery and explicit
reconnect under the same setup lifecycle.

The onboarding retry regression shares the component suite’s
saved-connection, authenticated-model, draft, agent-list, hire and
render lifecycle fixtures. Keeping it beside the existing onboarding
failures makes adoption versus duplicate hire observable under the same
lifecycle; this is the concrete cohesion reason for the existing large
test file.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, based on GPT-6. The exact serving model ID and context
window are not exposed in this task. Used for code changes, review and
tool-assisted verification.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-20 07:02:22 -05:00
Nicky LeachandPaperclip 313fb265db feat(plugins): invalidate runtimes when connector access changes (#16605)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Runtime preparation depends on access and credential state as well
as tool definitions.
> - Grant, membership, secret, and endpoint changes need committed
invalidation.
> - Their writers must acquire locks before journal fanout can lock
agent rows.
> - This pull request adds access hooks with the corresponding
transaction guards.
> - Plugins can refresh preparation immediately while task-time
authorization remains authoritative.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**

Grant changes, credential rotation and revocation, company access
changes, and connector endpoint configuration do not request runtime
synchronization. Journal fanout exposes lock inversions between
credential persistence, access cleanup, and connection assignment
writers.

**Expected behavior**

Committed access changes request runtime preparation without polling or
credential values in the journal. Agent-specific secret bindings and new
personal delegations affect their target agent. Company access changes
remain conservative. Provider bookkeeping does not create preparation
work.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Change an audience, delegation, membership permission, referenced
credential, vault configuration, or endpoint instruction.
2. Expect a committed runtime event in the correct company and scope.
3. Run reconnect, credential refresh, SSH setup, or membership cleanup
concurrently with related writes.
4. Expect both operations to preserve access checks and finish without a
lock-order cycle.

**Additional context**

Final feature extraction from #16503. The earlier slices, #16604, and
the separate delivery-test correction #16871 are merged. This PR is now
the active change against master. The rebase preserves the merged
assignment and definition recipient rules, Unicode selector semantics,
and profile/reference transaction guards.

## What Changed

- Add migration 0356 for grants, audiences, delegation,
membership/permissions, secret bindings, referenced credentials and
vaults, and chat/email endpoint configuration.
- Keep events content-free. Ignore health, delivery, publication, Vercel
verification, and GitHub webhook bookkeeping while retaining credential
and repository-access changes.
- Target agent secret bindings and all personal delegation changes to
their old and new target agents. Coalesce delegation changes per
transaction.
- Lock existing grants before connections and credential persistence in
OAuth and cleanup writers.
- Reject superseded refresh leases before rotating stored credentials.
Ignore lease acquisition and release when access metadata is unchanged.
- Serialize audience replacement, validate membership, and preserve
unchanged audiences.
- Lock membership before permission-only saves and grant before Railway
SSH setup. Individual delegation revocation locks its grant and target.
Whole-grant and membership cleanup lock company recipients before
deleting scoped delegations.
- Lock grants and connection inputs before static-key reconnect writes.
Lock company agents before cascading secret deletion; use a nonblocking
secret lock and bounded retries to avoid a new cycle with credential
writers.
- Add PostgreSQL concurrency coverage for access writers and endpoint
publication/configuration behavior.
- Preserve the owner lock for plugin instance-secret removal; these
secrets cannot use ordinary bindings.
- Align Slack search refresh, callbacks, and disconnect with
grant-before-connection locking. Recheck newly discovered grants without
waiting before provider work.
- Retry complete membership transactions when a credential deletion
candidate is busy. Cover all four cleanup entry points and process
company access in ID order.
- Document final invalidation coverage and task-time authorization
boundaries.

## Verification

- Current head: `78aace55bef7f52bc5742b131e0b3961eb5c0f11`. All 1,061
tests across 23 affected suites pass. The named Slack authorization
integration scenario also passes; it exercises authorization, refresh,
disconnect, and rejection of a late callback. Server/database
typechecks, migration safety and numbering, five-snapshot retention,
feature maps, and diff checks pass. The complete PR diff was reviewed
for secrets and personal data before push. Final acceptance: [CI run
39308303837, attempt
2](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/39308303837) is
green, with 55 successful checks and two optional Storybook skips. The
current-head Greptile reassessment returned **Apex 5/5** at 19:16 UTC on
2026-10-19. Its full summary reports no actionable issues. Security
passed, all threads are resolved, and GitHub reports no merge conflicts.
The reassessment was requested as a standard review after the fixes;
Greptile retained the Apex tier.
- On this head, [CI run
39308303837](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/39308303837)
failed the unchanged adapter-utils HTTP/2 fixture with `EADDRINUSE`
before READY. Its closed probe left a port handoff race. That test and
its gateway are byte-identical on master. No upstream fix was found. The
deterministic fixture correction is isolated in #16888; no adapter test
changes are included here. The failed jobs recovered on retry without a
feature source change. The original failure remains documented here, and
#16888 carries the fixture correction separately. That retry
demonstrates recovery; the held-probe negative control establishes the
port handoff race.
- Rebased onto master `194fc11406`, including merged #16604 and #16871.
Replayed only the access-hook commit. Resolved OAuth, test, and
documentation conflicts while retaining both sets of tests. Migration
0356 preserves the merged assignment/definition recipient rules, Unicode
selector semantics, and profile/reference guards.
- Apex returned 3/5 on `0fb65bc27`. Negative controls reproduce its
Slack delegation and member-cleanup deadlocks (`40P01`) and unwanted
Vercel/GitHub bookkeeping events. Slack grant writers now take their
locks before the connection. A separate late-grant control reproduces
`40P01` without the post-lock recheck; the complete guard passes. All
four membership cleanup commands retry from a fresh transaction when the
credential is busy. Tests verify successful cleanup and no journal rows
from failed attempts. Credential IDs and repository-access changes still
notify runtimes.
- Earlier review corrections remain covered: static-key reconnect and
cascading secret removal each reproduce `40P01` without their guards.
Grant lease acquisition/release is ignored. Secret removal releases
agent locks when a credential writer is busy. Instance-secret removal
retains the owner lock and passes its public plugin API contention
regression. Delegation updates and revocations target old/new agents;
unrelated-peer, coalescing, unchanged-update, and rollback cases pass.
Three negative controls verify the required whole-grant and membership
cleanup guards after narrowing delegation scope.
- Preserve prior acceptance failures: the first rebased 20-suite run
passed 1,025/1,026; its only failure was a draft uninstall fixture
blocking a random peer. Blocking the assigned agent corrected that
assumption, and all 44 access/assignment tests passed. Later, all 1,044
tests across 21 suites, [CI run
39302185527](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/39302185527),
standard Greptile 5/5, and security passed on `0fb65bc27`. That did not
clear the later Apex findings described above. Draft run 38975428081
failed a server shard; its cause was not re-investigated. A later green
run does not establish that earlier cause.
- Local fixture corrections are recorded separately from product
failures: an assignment filename filter initially matched no file; the
actual suite was included in full runs. A delegation fixture omitted its
required creator, and a guard run omitted a query import. The new
global-access cleanup fixture now uses its own user to avoid earlier
fixtures' memberships. All were corrected before publishing their final
iterations.
- Local checks target affected services and real PostgreSQL boundaries.
A full local build and repository-wide test run were not performed.
Hosted CI supplies broader verification. Provider responses in tests are
controlled; live provider behavior was not qualified.

## Risks

Migration 0356 adds triggers without changing table schema. Apply it
through the normal migration flow. Most access changes retain
synchronous company-wide invalidation. Company fanout takes O(eligible
company agents) locks and journal rows, without a fanout ceiling or
mutation quota. Agent secret bindings and individual delegation changes
retain narrower recipients. Events contain no credentials.

Physical removal of non-instance secrets takes ordered locks on all
company agents before cascading into bindings. This costs O(company
agents) locks even for an otherwise unreferenced secret. Instance
secrets cannot use ordinary bindings and retain their owner lock. A busy
secret lock releases the transaction guards and retries up to three
times. Continued contention returns a retryable conflict. Provider
deletion stays outside that transaction; a retry resumes removal of an
already disabled secret.

Membership cleanup uses nonblocking credential guards and retries the
full membership transaction. Slack search adds two grant queries, scoped
to the subject and connection. Its retries occur before provider work or
credential persistence. Each retry loop is limited to three attempts.
Invalidation requests preparation; task-time authorization and provider
session activation remain authoritative. Provider calls use fixtures; no
live provider qualification is claimed.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-6, with reasoning, repository inspection, code
execution, and testing. The exact deployment model ID and context window
are not exposed in this session.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-19 12:49:11 -07:00
Nicky LeachandPaperclip 194fc11406 feat(plugins): invalidate runtimes when tool definitions change (#16604)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Lifecycle plugins must refresh runtime preparation when tool
definitions change.
> - Standing assignments alone do not cover catalogs, profile entries,
or policies.
> - New journal hooks must preserve the order used by setup
finalization.
> - This pull request adds tool-definition invalidation and its required
writer guards.
> - It leaves credentials and provider access changes for the next
independent capability.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**

Catalog, profile-entry, policy, gateway, and connection-configuration
changes do not request agent runtime synchronization. A new
profile-entry trigger also exposes a deletion/finalization deadlock if
the child row is changed before its parent is locked.

**Expected behavior**

Committed tool-definition changes advance runtime revisions without
polling. Bookkeeping does not. Entry changes and profile replacement use
a consistent parent/reference lock order and commit atomically.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Change a catalog descriptor, profile entry, policy, or connection
configuration.
2. Expect committed runtime events for the affected agents.
3. Run profile-entry deletion concurrently with setup finalization while
both wait for an agent row.
4. Expect both operations to complete without PostgreSQL deadlock 40P01.

**Additional context**

Extracted from #16503. Catalog publication #16602 and standing
assignments #16603 are merged. This PR is rebased onto master and is the
active review. It addresses the original Apex profile-entry deletion
finding. Credential/access hooks #16605 remain a draft without review
requests.

## What Changed

- Add migration 0355 for application/connection configuration, catalog,
profile-entry, policy, and MCP gateway invalidation.
- Preserve transaction coalescing and ignore health bookkeeping and
trust-rule usage counters.
- Keep credential-only fields outside this migration's coverage.
- Preserve merged recipient scoping for bindings and installations.
Profile-entry edits resolve old/new standing profile bindings. Policy
edits resolve old/new agent selectors with their intersection/list
semantics.
- Lock old and new profile-entry references before parent profiles and
child mutations. Recheck the reference set under the parent lock, retry
changed snapshots up to three times, and merge unspecified fields from
the locked profile.
- Make entry add/edit/delete and profile replacement transactional,
including validation and profile reads on the reserved connection.
- Lock policy rows in ID order and change priorities in one statement so
scoped agent locks are ordered across the full set.
- Lock the managed profile before connection removal deletes its entries
in the same transaction.
- Update assignment tests whose old absence assertions are superseded by
expanded configuration coverage.
- Document the supported capability and the remaining credential/access
boundary.

## Verification

- Final head: `809fcb11794bfb12c545af0a2f96ab9bc2b570a2`. It is rebased
onto master with merged #16623. GitHub reports no merge conflicts. [CI
run
39293925136](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/39293925136)
has 55 successful checks and two optional Storybook skips.
- Standard Greptile returned an independent 5/5. The final Apex review
returned 5/5 on this exact head at 17:47 UTC on 2026-10-19. Its summary
explicitly clears this PR for merge independently of draft #16605. The
security scan passed. All review threads are resolved.
- Two real-PostgreSQL negative controls reproduce `40P01` without the
old-reference guard or the concurrent-snapshot check. Both regression
tests pass with the final correction. Server typecheck, migration safety
and numbering, five-snapshot retention, journal history, feature maps,
and diff checks pass. The actual PR diff was scanned for secrets and
personal data before push.
- The final 15-suite local run passed 821/822 tests. The one failure was
in the unchanged runtime-delivery test: a startup callback changed its
global callback count during an independent transaction. The test-only
correction is isolated in #16871. That PR passes all 17 runtime-hook
tests, server types, hosted CI, and standard Greptile 5/5. Its
notification-disabled control fails at the independent event-delivery
assertion. No changes from #16871 are included here; this feature head
passes hosted CI independently.
- Earlier affected-suite runs passed 814 tests after rebase and 820
tests after recipient and whitespace corrections. Four affected suites
passed 514 tests before the second reference-contention regression was
added. Single-connection tests cover entry add, edit, delete, and
replacement. Validation and profile reads use the reserved transaction
connection.
- Review fixes have negative controls: the old code hangs with a
one-connection pool; parent-lock omissions deadlock entry deletion or
app removal against setup finalization; per-row policy reorder deadlocks
under contention; unscoped triggers journal unrelated peers; default SQL
trimming misses JavaScript whitespace. Corrected cases pass. Selector
tests cover all 25 ECMAScript whitespace characters. Recipient tests
cover repeated edits, old/new targets, ignored bindings, rollback,
coalescing, and company scope. The definition suite now has 28 cases.
- Earlier standard scores that depended on #16605 were not accepted as
independent clearance. The first Apex review returned 4/5 for
replacement versus application deletion. The final correction locks old
and new references, checks the reference set again under the parent
lock, and retries before any mutation. The final independent reviews
clear that correction.
- Preserve prior failures for acceptance: draft run 38975432017 had
failures whose causes were not re-investigated. Run 38990400765 exposed
the unrelated durable-resume watchdog race, fixed in merged #16623. In
run 39287657148, two jobs reported cancellation without a failed-test
summary; the cause remains unknown. Both passed on retry without source
changes. Initial local fixtures and SQL bindings also needed correction:
an internal helper name was replaced with public `archiveConnection`,
unchanged priorities were changed to exercise reorder, a driver
timestamp was bound as ISO text, and a superseded company-fanout
assertion was updated. These recovered checks do not establish a cause
for the unexplained CI failures.
- Local checks target the affected services and real database
boundaries. A full local build and repository-wide test run were not
performed. Hosted CI supplies the broader checks. Provider responses in
tests are controlled; live provider behavior was not qualified.

## Risks

Migration 0355 adds statement triggers without changing table schema.
Apply it through the normal migration flow. A tool-definition event can
advance a runtime revision without changing the bounded assignment
snapshot. Consumers still need authorized readers for definitions.
Credential-only changes, grants, secrets, and endpoints remain for the
access-hook migration. Profile replacement now rolls back as a unit if
any entry fails. Binding and install notifications retain scoped
recipients. Profile-entry changes use standing bindings, and policies
use old/new agent selectors. Unscoped policies, company-bound profiles,
and other conservative definition changes retain synchronous
transaction-atomic company-wide fanout: O(eligible company agents) locks
and journal storage, without a fanout ceiling or mutation quota. This
retains the accepted tradeoff from #16603 for company-wide changes.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-6, with reasoning, repository inspection, code
execution, and testing. The exact deployment model ID and context window
are not exposed in this session.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run local checks; results and the isolated test failure are
recorded above
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-19 10:56:08 -07:00
DottaandPaperclip 23b2ceb0d1 feat(connections): add unified Google Workspace connector (#15545)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Connected Apps supply governed tools to those agents.
> - Google services currently require separate connections or one broad
request.
> - Users need one account and control over which services it can
access.
> - A picker must change the OAuth request, not just the screen.
> - This pull request binds selected services to consent and tool
access.
> - The benefit is simpler setup without enabling unselected tools.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**Subsystem affected**

Connections catalog, OAuth grants, and the MCP tool gateway.

**Current behavior**

Google setup uses separate service profiles. A combined request alone
cannot express the user's choice before Google consent. Accumulated
Google grants can be broader than a new request.

**Proposed behavior**

Offer one Workspace connection. Let users choose Gmail, Drive (including
Docs, Sheets, and Slides), and Calendar. Start all three with read and
write access. Let users disable groups or choose read-only access. Do
not offer Chat, Contacts/directory, or cross-service Search in new
setup. Bind selected scopes to durable OAuth state. Cap effective tool
access to both the saved request and provider-reported consent.

**Reason and benefit**

Users can choose services without managing several accounts. Existing
company, identity, agent, and action-policy controls remain in force.

**Breaking changes**

No database migration. Existing service connections and grants remain
supported. New Workspace requests require the companion broker change in
https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip-cloud/pull/823. Old brokers
reject narrowed requests safely.

Related work: #14740 reduced Google scopes; #14774 introduced the
earlier catalog hold. #15412 proposes a separate Gmail REST
implementation. This maintainer-requested change extends the existing
Connections and governed tool gateway paths. It does not replace them.

## What Changed

- Add one Workspace catalog entry and a namespaced action catalog.
Retain legacy definitions and saved accounts.
- Use the approved production service picker in Apps and task-hosted
setup. Keep dropdowns between names and toggles. Block empty selection.
- Derive exact scopes from a closed registry. Default selection requests
nine scopes. New requests exclude Chat, Contacts/directory, and Search
scopes.
- Bind selected scopes through managed and customer-owned OAuth state,
callback, claim redemption, and refresh.
- Cap accumulated Google grants to the saved selection. Recheck
grant-specific permission at discovery, listing, and dispatch, including
cached actions.
- Restore the current subject's saved request on reconnect. Block on
grant-load failure. Preserve draft selection on cancel and retry. Do not
create an account on picker cancellation.
- Preserve healthy services during partial outages, without combining
grants across identities. Keep writes from being automatically replayed.
- Preserve the original 21-scope legacy Workspace envelope contract as
individual profiles evolve.
- Add production-component Storybook stories, request validators,
consent regression tests, and rollout guidance. Integrate the stories
with the current feature catalog while preserving their IDs.

## Verification

- Integrated branch merges current master and has no merge conflicts.
- Full workspace build passed on the integrated checkout.
- Token gates passed. Storybook catalog structure check passed: 283
files and 2,750 stories.
- Final affected app suites: 914 passed. This includes 502
database-backed service/gateway tests and 412
UI/shared/validator/broker-handoff/governance tests. The production
picker tests cover defaults, identity-specific reconnect, and
failed-load recovery.
- Full workspace typecheck passed after adding required current-master
Storybook annotations. The final UI build also passed.
- The full repository suite is still running and includes the two
pre-fix retry assertions. Both were updated for the current gateway's
explicit-retry contract and pass in the clean 502-test database run. No
complete final-head full-suite pass is claimed.
- The initial local database startup failure came from missing
native-library symlinks in the fresh dependency install. The package's
postinstall repair fixed it; the clean database-backed run has no
skipped tests.
- Broker focused suite: 47 passed, including real signed session →
callback → claim redemption and wrong-scope rejection. Full broker suite
before the final test-only follow-up: 3,562 passed, 103 skipped.
- Real integrated-app walkthrough: Connectors → Workspace →
customer-owned app → service picker. Verified all three defaults,
empty-selection blocking, cancel/reopen with the selected read-only
access preserved, preserved form values, and zero saved connections
after cancel. Credentials were synthetic; no Google grant was made.
- Current-head CI and Greptile review remain pending. Previous-head
results are not treated as current.

## Risks

Ship the companion broker before app instances send narrowed requests.
Enable the intended Workspace client/profile separately on the target
broker. This pull request does not deploy a tenant app, start a fleet
rollout, alter Google Console, or upgrade the pinned reviewer stack.

The three-group picker is not proof of live provider access. Before
production, verify a real selected-service grant, reconnect, refresh,
allowed reads/writes, and denied unselected actions on the isolated
staging reviewer app. Google verification and preview enrollment remain
separate requirements.

Legacy service profiles stay compatible. New grant metadata keeps
provider scope evidence separate from requested scope evidence. Missing
or unsupported evidence fails closed. No scope union across user or
organization grants is allowed.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-5-based coding agent, with repository editing, code
execution, and browser tools. The exact serving model ID and
context-window size were not exposed.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue
template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links
- [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal issue
ID
- [ ] I have run all final-head tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-19 12:07:30 -05:00
Devin FoleyandPaperclip 5dced3c766 perf(tools): narrow profile and attention catalog reads (#16761)
Read only the catalog, connection, and invocation fields needed by profile summaries, reviews, and attention counts. Preserve company scope and response contents while reducing query payloads.

Verified with 445 affected service tests, workspace typecheck/build, full CI, and Greptile Apex 5/5 on the reviewed head. Local full-suite limitations and isolated rechecks are documented in the PR.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-18 13:56:04 -07:00
Nicky LeachandPaperclip 5f5602bba7 feat(plugins): synchronize standing connection assignments (#16603)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Lifecycle plugins prepare agent runtimes outside the control plane.
> - They need committed connection assignment changes without polling.
> - A reader and its revision hooks must cover the same fields.
> - This pull request adds a bounded standing-assignment snapshot and
its matching hooks.
> - Plugins can react to assignment changes while execution keeps its
existing access checks.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**

The agent runtime reader does not expose standing connection
assignments. Changes to connection installs, active profiles, and
connector feature switches do not request synchronization. Adding
company-wide invalidation also exposes lock inversions in assignment
writers and AI adoption.

**Expected behavior**

The owning lifecycle plugin can read a bounded assignment snapshot.
Every committed change to its stored fields advances the runtime
revision. Rollback removes both the change and its event. Assignment
writers finish without a lock-order cycle.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Install a connection or bind an active profile to an agent.
2. Read its runtime inputs through the owning lifecycle plugin.
3. Rename or disable the connection, revoke the assignment, or switch
connector features.
4. Expect a committed runtime event and an updated snapshot without
periodic polling.

**Additional context**

Extracted from #16503. Catalog publication #16602 and the separate test
maintenance PRs #16601 and #16610 are merged. This PR now targets master
and is the active review. Tool-definition hooks #16604 and
access/credential hooks #16605 remain drafts without review requests.

## What Changed

- Add SDK types and an owning-plugin runtime snapshot for installed
connections, active profile IDs, and effective connector feature
switches.
- Reject more than 512 connections or 128 active profiles instead of
returning partial data.
- Add migration 0354 for the exact stored fields used by the snapshot,
with transaction-coalesced invalidation. Agent-targeted bindings and
installs notify only their old/new target agents;
project/routine/issue/gateway bindings are outside the snapshot and
produce no notification.
- Use ordered agent locks that are compatible with foreign-key
references and exclude runtime readers. Prelock complete old/new target
sets before replacing assignments or restoring managed profiles.
- Record one company baseline at delivery startup for process-managed
feature overlays.
- Lock assignment inputs before install saves, task completion, and
email assignment. Setup finalization reads the locked connection state
and prelocks company agents before activating, re-enabling, or reviving
a profile.
- Make profile binding and reassignment writes transactional and lock
parent profiles first. Keep target validation and profile/detail reads
on the reserved transaction connection, including with a one-connection
pool.
- Lock company agents in order before validated AI adoption. Keep
adoption and shared configuration writes at `FOR NO KEY UPDATE`,
avoiding an upgrade that can deadlock foreign-key inserts during gateway
creation. Configuration fields cannot change agent identity; lifecycle
transitions and deletion retain their existing locks.
- Document supported coverage and the inputs reserved for later PRs.

## Verification

- Thirteen affected suites passed: 757 tests covering runtime
hooks/assignments/skills, concurrent skill publication, tool
access/catalog, task connection intents, lifecycle delivery, email, AI
accounts, migration histories, snapshot drift, and the agent lifecycle
module. This includes the merged catalog PR's OAuth and
overlapping-refresh regressions.
- The assignment suite passes all 24 cases, including bounded snapshots,
company/agent isolation, rollback, health-field no-ops, process-start
feature overlays, and real lock contention.
- Four one-connection PostgreSQL regressions reproduce the earlier
helper-read hangs before the correction; bind, unbind, delete, and
reassign complete with it. The earlier adoption/gateway probe exposed
both lock upgrades: changing only validation still deadlocks in shared
configuration. Current scoped coverage verifies adoption with
agent-targeted binding writes; gateway-only bindings no longer
invalidate this snapshot.
- The original ordered-adoption regression reproduces PostgreSQL `40P01`
without ordered company-agent locking. Scoped-recipient tests reproduce
unrelated-peer journaling before the trigger correction and verify
repeated bind/unbind operations leave peers untouched, ignored binding
types produce no events, both reassignment recipients are reached, and
coalescing remains intact.
- Six replacement contention cases cover installs, existing setup,
activation, re-enabling, profile revival, and profile reassignment.
Negative controls reproduce `40P01` without the corresponding
target/company prelocks; all cases pass with the guards. Activation
decisions use the connection row reread under lock.
- An initial contention fixture failed because its settings connection
lacked an MCP URL. Supplying the fixture URL and controlled lookup
corrected that test setup error.
- Server typecheck, database migration numbering/safety, five-snapshot
retention, feature-map structural validation, and `git diff --check`
passed. Migration metadata preserves historical journal entries and adds
no schema change. The complete diff was reviewed for secrets and
personal data before push.
- Earlier hosted PR CI runs 38983440861 and 38985530069 passed; the
superseded promotion run 38983440470 was cancelled. Superagent
acknowledged the recipient fix and accepted the documented company-wide
cost at `359b5b2f30a8a0248177367e458663d5379810d1`. Its two standard
Greptile summaries were conditional on a later setup correction and were
not counted as independent acceptance; the setup correction is now
included here.
- At `7da246aab46274db1a120a0546abbb404c5427c7`, hosted PR run
38986958988 passed: all 55 checks succeeded, with two optional Storybook
checks skipped. Superagent passed, all review threads are resolved, and
standard Greptile independently returned 5/5 with no blocking findings
(review completed 2026-10-17 00:40 UTC). Apex independently returned 5/5
with no actionable findings (completed 2026-10-17 00:50 UTC). CI was
rechecked after Apex and remains green; the branch is mergeable against
master. Full local build and repository-wide tests were not run.

## Risks

Migration 0354 adds database functions and triggers without changing
table schema. Apply it through the normal migration flow. Agent-targeted
bindings and installs only notify their affected agents. Explicit
company-wide assignments, connection metadata, profile
activation/removal, and connector feature switches retain synchronous,
transaction-atomic company fanout. Each such transaction takes ordered
row locks and inserts up to one connector runtime event per eligible
company agent: O(number of eligible agents) work and journal storage,
with no company-size cap or cross-transaction mutation quota. This
remains an intentional scope tradeoff for this PR; deferred fanout is
not implemented. Many of these conservative changes can request
preparation even if an individual snapshot stays unchanged. Snapshot
limits fail closed. This PR provides desired assignments, not
credentials or task authorization. Later PRs must add mutation coverage
before consumers can rely on immediate synchronization of tool
definitions or credentials.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-6, with reasoning, repository inspection, code
execution, and testing. The exact deployment model ID and context window
are not exposed in this session.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-16 17:55:47 -07:00
Nicky LeachandPaperclip 190080642e perf(tools): publish catalog refreshes in bounded chunks (#16602)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - MCP discovery publishes tools that setup and access profiles use.
> - Large catalogs currently write one row at a time.
> - Repeated page entries can produce duplicate results, and profile
writes can partly commit.
> - This pull request publishes tools in bounded chunks and makes
profile synchronization atomic.
> - The result supports large catalogs before connector runtime hooks
are enabled.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**

Catalog refresh performs one database write per tool. Repeated tool
names across discovery pages appear more than once in the result.
Default-profile synchronization uses separate statements, so failure can
leave a profile without its binding. OAuth callbacks also acquire
connection/application locks in the reverse order from publication and
setup, allowing a concurrent refresh to deadlock.

**Expected behavior**

Publish at most 500 tools per catalog statement. Keep one result per
tool name, using its last descriptor. Preserve existing IDs, first-seen
timestamps, disabled actions, and unchanged review decisions. Commit or
roll back default-profile changes together. OAuth persistence must
acquire application then connection locks before secret or connection
writes.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Refresh a synthetic MCP catalog with 2,500 tools.
2. Return the same tool on two discovery pages with different
descriptions.
3. Fail the profile-binding insert during default-profile creation.
4. Overlap personal, organization, or managed OAuth persistence with
setup finalization or discovery of a new tool.

**Additional context**

This is the first feature extracted from #16503. The separate test-only
maintenance PRs #16601 and #16610 are merged. This PR now targets master
and is the active review. Standing assignments #16603, tool definitions
#16604, and access/credential hooks #16605 remain stacked drafts without
review requests.

## What Changed

- Deduplicate discovery results by tool name and keep the last
descriptor.
- Upsert catalog rows in transactions of at most 500 tools.
- Preserve row identity and operator-disabled status on conflict.
Determine default-access candidates from the rows read under each
publication lock, so an overlapping refresh cannot restore an action
turned Off after another refresh finishes.
- Lock the application before the connection during publication, setup
finalization, removal, and all three OAuth persistence paths. The OAuth
ordering fix is included here so this PR is independently safe; it does
not depend on #16605.
- Synchronize the managed default profile, its entries, bindings, and
managed policies in one transaction.
- Add PostgreSQL publication tests and document partial-failure
recovery.
- Target the existing callback failure injection at profile creation
instead of a transaction ordinal.

## Verification

- `pnpm exec vitest run
server/src/__tests__/tool-catalog-publication.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/tool-access-service.test.ts`: 436 tests passed with
the OAuth and overlapping-refresh corrections on top of the merged
#16610 fix.
- The new tests exercise real PostgreSQL with 250 and 2,500 tools,
repeated discovery pages, preserved choices, lock contention, and
failures between chunks and during profile creation.
- Four selected regression cases fail with the production source
restored to the parent commit. The implementation was then restored and
rechecked.
- Six additional real-PostgreSQL regressions cover personal,
organization, and managed OAuth persistence against both setup
finalization and new-tool discovery. All six reproduce PostgreSQL
deadlock `40P01` with the OAuth ordering fix removed; all six pass with
it restored. Discovery uses synthetic credential headers to isolate
publication locking from credential rotation.
- Apex initially returned 3/5 on
`0d6013a9649388041975406fe4b0247cd0e695aa`, identifying an
overlapping-refresh permission race. Two new PostgreSQL regressions
cover both absent and quarantined tools; both prove an agent goes from
deny back to allow without the correction, and remains denied with it.
The test pauses one refresh after its initial catalog snapshot,
completes another refresh, turns the action Off through the service, and
resumes the stale refresh.
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck`: passed.
- `node scripts/check-maps.mjs`: passed (structural validation only).
- `git diff --check`: passed.
- Reviewed the complete diff for secrets and personal data before push.
- Earlier hosted run 38975428064 failed the maximum-size newline
skill-audit watchdog; other interrupted jobs reported runner
shutdown/cancellation. The original watchdog failure did not identify
whether startup or auditing timed out, so its exact cause remains
unknown. The separate merged #16610 isolates the audit deadline from
module startup and preserves the audit hang guard. This branch is
rebased onto that fix.
- Full local build and repository-wide tests were not run. At the
previous head `0d6013a9649388041975406fe4b0247cd0e695aa`, all 55 hosted
checks succeeded (two optional Storybook checks skipped), and standard
Greptile returned 5/5 before Apex identified the permission race above.
At corrected head `dc120d2bc879c54c14347db30e74c753bcff61e6`, all 55
hosted checks succeeded (two optional Storybook checks skipped), and a
fresh standard review returned 5/5 with no open findings. The second
Apex review also returned 5/5 on that exact head (successful Apex check
completed 2026-10-16T23:36:44Z). Both earlier findings are addressed,
there are no open review threads, and the branch is mergeable against
master.

## Risks

Each successful catalog chunk remains committed if a later operation
fails. A retry completes publication. Provider discovery occurs outside
database locks. Default-profile changes commit separately from the
catalog chunks and roll back together on failure. Tests use a controlled
MCP response; they do not qualify a live provider. There is no schema
migration or new plugin API in this PR.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-6, with reasoning, repository inspection, code
execution, and testing. The exact deployment model ID and context window
are not exposed in this session.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-16 16:40:12 -07:00
DottaandPaperclip 90924d61b3 fix(tools): batch profile selector validation (#16521)
Batch company-scoped profile selector validation while preserving both existing write boundaries and exact selectors.

Verified with 81 affected local cases, full repository typecheck/build, current-head CI/E2E, Superagent and Apex 5/5; no unresolved findings.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-15 21:12:10 -05:00
Devin FoleyandPaperclip 0b62c736a0 feat(connections): add generic Daytona API and Toolbox access (#16483)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Apps connections give agents controlled access to external services.
> - Daytona provides sandbox, file, command, Git, and account APIs.
> - Operators need to assign this access without exposing a server
credential.
> - A small task-specific tool list cannot serve general Daytona work.
> - This pull request adds the published HTTP actions through the
existing connection gateway.
> - Operators keep control of identity, agent access, and each action.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**Problem or motivation**

Paperclip has a Daytona sandbox provider for its own execution
infrastructure. It lacks a normal Apps connection for agents to manage
an operator's Daytona account. Reusing the server's provider credential
would bypass normal connection ownership and action permissions.

**Proposed solution**

Add a Daytona connection with personal or shared vault credentials.
Generate its action catalog from the official platform and Toolbox API
specifications. Use the existing run-bound gateway, grants, action
policies, approvals, revocation, and audit paths. Sandbox IDs come from
Daytona; tools need no Paperclip task or lease ID.

**Alternatives considered**

A four-action diagnostic subset cannot support general provider work.
Launching the provider CLI would expose host filesystem behavior. Native
OAuth is not included because a supported third-party registration path
was not verified. The native method uses an organization API key.
Existing Composio setup is a separate possible OAuth route and is not
qualified by this change.

**Roadmap alignment**

This extends the existing Apps and Connections provider coverage in
`ROADMAP.md`. It uses that system's credential and permission model.
GitHub searches found no existing Daytona Apps connector PR or issue.

## What Changed

- Add the Daytona catalog entry, provider source override, official
theme logos, permission review, and setup documentation.
- Generate 274 HTTP actions: 169 platform and 105 Toolbox operations.
Record two WebSocket upgrades separately; do not advertise them as HTTP
tools. Record source URLs and hashes.
- Add provider-focused execution for sandboxes, snapshots, volumes,
files, Git, commands, computer use, and account resources. Provider
authority still limits which endpoints accept an organization key.
- Validate action arguments. Resolve Toolbox targets through the fixed
platform API. Check sandbox identity and organization before using an
approved Daytona proxy. Keep normal guarded network requests and vault
resolution.
- Transfer file bytes without reading or writing host files. Share one
caller deadline across prerequisite reads, dispatch, and response
reading. Bound requests and responses. Do not automatically retry writes
with unknown outcomes. Redact the selected credential from results and
errors.
- Classify credential access, access changes, interactive input, command
execution, file permissions, and deletion (including TTL and
auto-delete) as destructive actions. Keep new and changed actions under
catalog review.
- Upgrade saved catalogs and retire the earlier diagnostic names. Hide
retired actions from the UI and agent discovery even when provider
refresh fails. Preserve existing action choices and historical records.
Reject stale same-name contracts during agent discovery and dispatch
before a board refresh.
- Add database-backed gateway and catalog-upgrade regressions, schema
generator tests, a browser setup check, and both capability map updates.

## Verification

- Passed on the review-fix head: 57 focused Vitest cases (18 Daytona
database/client cases, five HTTP boundary cases, and 34 shared catalog
cases), four generator tests, `pnpm -r typecheck`, and `pnpm build`. The
five HTTP cases use a real local server through the pinned production
transport. The normal browser setup check and 17 generator/artwork cases
passed on the initial PR head; those UI and artwork paths are unchanged.
- Passed on this branch: brand asset validation, token gates, map
structure checks, and `git diff --check`. All latest-head GitHub checks
pass on `ea979ccb3a64dc9508807823540f935c4316ea35`. Apex is 5/5, with
all five findings addressed and zero unresolved threads. The branch has
no merge conflicts.
- The initial catalog-generation command could not find the external
research corpus. The supported `--definitions-only` mode regenerated the
definitions successfully. Unrelated generated drift was excluded.
- An earlier full local Vitest attempt on the preview branch failed when
bundled PostgreSQL could not start on macOS. After replay onto current
master, all three unchanged event-sequencing cases pass with bundled
PostgreSQL; the earlier startup cause remains uncertain.
- The first full-suite command on this branch used my external test
database override. Chat fixtures require a current migrated schema and
failed because `agents.lifecycle_state` was absent in that disposable
database. A focused comparison reproduces failure with the override and
passes with normal setup. That attempt was stopped, and the full suite
restarted without the override. Focused Daytona cases use their own
migrated PostgreSQL 16 databases.
- The clean local full-suite attempt recorded embedded PostgreSQL
startup failures in two unchanged native-runtime cases and two failures
in unchanged Git fixtures. It was stopped after these failures were
isolated; no full local suite pass is claimed. The 15 matching
native-runtime cases pass separately. The Git cases fail with the local
`init.defaultBranch=main` setting and pass with `GIT_CONFIG_COUNT=1
GIT_CONFIG_KEY_0=init.defaultBranch GIT_CONFIG_VALUE_0=master` limited
to the test command. No global Git setting was changed. Full Linux CI is
green.
- Fixtures use real database persistence and run-bound gateway sessions
with provider responses replaced by fixtures. They cover personal/shared
vault ownership, reads and writes, file bytes, Off policies, revocation,
organization mismatch, untrusted proxy rejection, output bounds, saved
catalog upgrades, failed refresh, and permission preservation.
- The first Apex review found five valid issues: multipart transport
compatibility, destructive classification, caller deadlines, audit
filters, and stale saved contracts. All five were fixed with regressions
before the second review. A typecheck then found the nullable saved
schema hash; admission now accepts that stored type and rejects null as
stale.
- The browser check covers setup controls without submitting a provider
key. No real Daytona account, provider write, native OAuth flow, or
agent model run is qualified. Live provider read/write proof remains
pending a test account.

## Risks

- Daytona keys have broad Toolbox authority, including keys with no
selected resource scopes. Only assign this connection to trusted agents
and review its action permissions.
- Remote writes or commands can continue after a timeout. Calls do not
automatically retry an uncertain outcome.
- The bridge targets Daytona Cloud. Proxy hosts are restricted; an
unrecognized future regional host fails closed.
- Files and responses have an 8 MiB bound. Each action has one caller
deadline, capped at 30 seconds across all provider requests and response
reading. Interactive WebSocket sessions are not exposed as HTTP actions.
- The generated JSON snapshot exceeds 1,000 lines because it holds the
provider input contracts. Generator logic and execution code remain in
separate small modules. Updates require explicit regeneration and
catalog review.
- No database migration or lockfile change is required.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-6. The runtime identifies the model family but does
not expose the exact backend model ID or context window. Used reasoning,
repository inspection, code editing, shell tools, database verification,
and browser tests.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-15 14:05:26 -07:00
Leia MarshallandLeia Marshall e4ce989099 Add opt-in Gmail archive capability (#16331)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip separates Gmail capabilities by reviewed OAuth scope and
tool policy.
> - Existing Gmail connections support reading and draft creation but
not bounded archiving.
> - Gmail archive requires `gmail.modify`, so it must not widen existing
read or draft grants.
> - This change adds an opt-in archive profile and limits it to removing
only the `INBOX` label.
> - A final pre-dispatch check preserves that boundary for approved and
replayed calls.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What existing behavior does this improve?**

This improves the existing Gmail connection and tool-governance
behavior.

**Subsystem affected**

Cross-cutting: `packages/shared` and `server`.

**Current behavior**

Paperclip can read Gmail and create drafts. It does not provide an
opt-in, bounded action for archiving a thread.

**Proposed behavior**

Paperclip offers a separate Read & archive connection. It exposes
`unlabel_thread` only for that connection and accepts only `threadId`
with `labelIds: ["INBOX"]`.

**Reason and benefit**

Users can archive processed Gmail threads while sending, trashing, and
other label changes remain disabled.

**Breaking changes**

None. Existing read and draft methods keep their current scopes and
defaults.

Related work: #15545 adds a unified Google Workspace connector and keeps
Gmail draft-only. #15412 adds a separate Gmail REST server without label
mutations. Neither PR adds this bounded archive capability.

## What Changed

- Added the `gmail.archive` connector profile.
- Added managed and customer-owned archive connection methods.
- Added an Inbox-only schema and final pre-dispatch argument guard.
- Classified archive as destructive and added Ask-first defaults for the
archive methods.
- Added permission-review records and focused tests.

## Verification

- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server build`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/shared typecheck`
- Focused Vitest suites: 42 tests passed.
- App-definition ingestion: 103 definitions and 0 review flags.
- `git diff --check`

## Risks

The main risk is accidental scope or operation expansion. The new
profile is opt-in. Existing profiles retain their scopes. The gateway
validates the exact Inbox-only payload immediately before dispatch.
Production rollout requires separate OAuth configuration and fresh
consent.

## Model Used

Unverified — reliable runtime model metadata was not available. Confirm
the model attribution before publishing.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a concise design rationale
- [x] I have specified that model attribution is unverified
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and found no Gmail archive entry
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have described the issue in this PR
- [x] I have not referenced internal or instance-local issues
- [x] My branch name describes the change
- [x] Local tests and builds pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation and permission records
- [x] I have documented risks
- [ ] All hosted CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile and human review are complete

---------

Co-authored-by: Leia Marshall <leia@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-15 09:24:31 -07:00
Devin FoleyandPaperclip 833769ab55 perf(chat): schedule Telegram maintenance from commits and deadlines (#16094)
Replace periodic Telegram discovery and maintenance scans with bounded startup recovery, connection-specific commit notifications, and durable action deadlines. Preserve ownership, inactive subscription parking, retry and cleanup recovery, and atomic credential binding updates.

Verified full typecheck/build, 30 focused scheduler tests, 12 database-backed recovery cases, all current-head CI checks, and Greptile 5/5 with no unresolved threads.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-13 07:55:27 -07:00
DottaandPaperclip ed2c22ea8c feat(connections): simplify dedicated GitHub App setup (#15416)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip manages agent work and the tools each agent can use.
> - GitHub bots need their own App identity and restricted repository
access.
> - Manual App configuration and repeated setup gates make that
connection hard to finish.
> - GitHub can create an App from a manifest, but people must approve
creation and repository access.
> - Each Paperclip stack should own configuration, credentials,
signature verification, and task admission.
> - This change uses Cloud as an encrypted callback and event gateway,
then completes setup in the stack.
> - GitHub review bots have their own experimental setting. Chat
connector opt-in does not control them.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What existing behavior does this improve?**

Dedicated GitHub App setup, bot settings, and task-scoped GitHub
replies.

**Current behavior**

Users must configure an App, copy credentials, repeat repository
selection, and complete manual verification gates. Review settings are
hard to scan. Mentions in descriptions can be missed, and automatic
completion text can produce an extra GitHub comment.

**Proposed behavior**

Choose an agent and connect GitHub under a personal account or
organization. GitHub asks for creation and installation consent.
Paperclip resumes the same draft, stores secrets locally, imports
access, verifies delivery, and opens Settings. Each accepted request has
one editable App-owned comment for progress and results. Review
assessments produce deterministic checks for the reviewed commit.

**Breaking changes**

GitHub bots require their own default-off experimental opt-in. The
setup-method and delegated-agent screens are removed. Per-person
automatic-run flags remain readable but are replaced by author filters.
Existing connections, direct webhooks, saved restrictions, and manual
existing-App recovery remain supported.

Companion gateway:
https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip-cloud/pull/688 (merged). The
roadmap and related PRs were checked; no duplicate dedicated-App wizard
was found.

## What Changed

- Add an independent **GitHub review bots** setting across the catalog,
routes, identity admission, and task controls. Existing bots continue
running when the UI setting is off.
- Replace setup with Choose agent and Connect GitHub. Support personal
and organization owners, inline low-trust conversion, saved drafts,
known organization suggestions, automatic completion, and same-App
recovery.
- Keep manifests, OAuth PKCE, credential exchange, vault storage,
installation verification, and original webhook-signature validation in
the stack. Use the Cloud sealed gateway for public callbacks and
outbound local delivery.
- Add resumable owner metadata in migration 0323. Retry a failed
registration renewal through the same durable replacement rather than
creating another App route.
- Support authorized mentions in issue and PR bodies, comments, inline
comments, and review summaries. Preserve attachments, edited-source
identity, duplicate protection, and lifecycle invalidation. Filter
requests explicitly addressed to another connected bot.
- Give agents task-scoped review, comment, and update tools. Update one
working comment through progress and final output. Close coalesced
requests and recover delayed acknowledgements, including deleted earlier
working comments. Preserve automatic replies for legacy connections
without saved review configuration. Preserve partial publication
evidence and quarantine uncertain automatic fallbacks without blocking
Board messages or questions.
- Reorganize Settings and Access with rich slash-skill instructions,
numeric passing scores, clear automation controls, formal-review
tooltips, member and contributor sections, and verified App branding
links. Preserve invalid score drafts and automation choices across tabs.
- Paginate repositories in 20-row batches with search and a true
connection-wide toggle. Batch verification at GitHub's 500-ID token
limit. Keep saved repository overrides while hiding their editor.
- Give each review a detail URL that remains usable beyond the newest
100 records. Synchronize the manager OpenAPI contracts and add recovery,
authorization, UI, and browser regressions.
- Reconcile the current master branch and retain its agent avatar,
feature catalog, and extracted heartbeat preparation code. Preserve a
saved test-drive port and recover from an occupied high port.

## Verification

- Focused UI, independent experimental-setting, and CLI tests: 199
passed.
- `pnpm -r typecheck`, `pnpm build`, and `pnpm check:token-gates`
passed. The broad local Vitest attempt was interrupted after resource
timeouts and stale expectations; the affected regressions passed focused
reruns. The latest-head full CI matrix passed, including all browser
shards, server/chat suites, builds, typechecking, canary packaging, and
Docker context integrity. A Docker Hub 429 required a CI retry; it
passed without changing the code.
- Final review repairs: 127 attachment/event tests and server typecheck
passed. All 13 final integration regressions passed under the normal CI
timeout, covering legacy reply compatibility, deleted coalesced
comments, inline-only review completion, progress edits, and native
final recovery. Restart-safe description/review attachments passed the
attachment suite.
- Final regressions: four reply/lifecycle tests, both native GitHub wait
tests, 171 feature-gate/reply-contract tests, the routed review preview,
and five scheduler/reply regressions passed. The final fixture repair
also passed all six setup-continuation cases and all three complete
chat-test shards in CI, covering terminal receipts and retries under the
normal CI timeout. One loaded-host receipt run exceeded its local
timeout; the exact case passed in an isolated rerun and the complete CI
shard.
- GitHub integration tests cover personal and organization setup, retry
recovery, edited mentions, attachment provenance, coalesced requests,
delayed acknowledgements, partial review writes, old review URLs, and
company boundaries.
- Browser qualification: both GitHub journeys, all five provider
setup/management journeys, and the GitHub uncertain-send recovery
journey passed. GitHub setup, reconnect, and task replies run with chat
disabled; chat enabled alone cannot expose GitHub bots. The disposable
qualification database was removed after testing.
- Earlier live qualification verified App-owned issue replies, native
slash-skill invocation, progress comment edits, and a 5/5 PR review with
a passing current-head check in the dedicated permissions-smoke
repository. These live checks did not use personal credentials as bot
execution authority.

## Risks

- Deploy the merged Cloud gateway protocol before the stack update. Each
callback and encrypted event must retain the original instance and
tenant binding.
- Migration 0323 uses idempotent column additions for test installations
that already applied the earlier draft migration number.
- A verified connection does not prove runtime isolation or a completed
review. Runtime checks remain separate.
- Required merge checks must be configured in GitHub. A passing numeric
score does not formally approve a PR; approval and request-changes tools
remain opt-in.
- Existing-App credentials cannot silently renew an uncertain manifest
exchange. Recovery preserves the existing App, draft, connection, and
agent.
- Repository changes save immediately. Global toggles affect all
currently available repositories, including unloaded rows, without
granting new installation access.
- A failed or uncertain tool write suppresses automatic fallback text;
the governed outbox retains its evidence. Deleted or replaced response
comments are not recreated through a personal credential fallback.
- GitHub logo upload remains an optional human action in GitHub App
settings. Runtime provisioning, delegated setup, screenshot publication,
and production push delivery remain deferred.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, based on GPT-6, with tool use and code execution. The
exact runtime model identifier and context size are not exposed in this
session.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub references)
- [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal
Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass (focused suites; complete
test matrix is checked in CI)
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-09 17:01:20 -05:00
DottaandPaperclip 0726a00e80 feat(apps): qualify Bitly, Context7, Hugging Face and Resend MCP (#15686)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip lets people manage AI agents and govern their tools.
> - Apps already supports provider-hosted MCP servers.
> - Useful providers still need real setup and read proof before Browse
exposure.
> - Browser testing found a Bitly token-format failure and an OAuth
callback that replaced an explicit empty agent selection.
> - This PR qualifies four provider methods and fixes those shared OAuth
paths.
> - Providers that still need login or approval remain withheld from new
Browse listings.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs: #15621, the merged hosted MCP qualification batch. Searches found
no duplicate Bitly or Context7 implementation PR.

**What existing behavior does this improve?**

Apps setup, provider MCP discovery, token exchange, and saved agent
access through an OAuth callback.

**Subsystem affected**

Shared Apps definitions, the server tool-access service, and the UI
setup/recovery route.

**Current behavior**

Bitly's callback can fail with `oauth_access_token_missing` when its
token response is not JSON. Curated MCP callbacks can treat an
explicitly saved empty install set as access for all agents. Context7 is
hidden and Hugging Face lacks a curated anonymous method. Saved drafts
for hidden providers cannot finish setup through their catalog wizard.

**Proposed behavior**

Request JSON token responses. Record explicit remote MCP install choices
in the install transaction and preserve them at callback. Keep managed
subject/default access when no choice was saved. Expose the qualified
Bitly and Context7 methods, add anonymous Hugging Face Hub access, and
record Resend qualification. Resume hidden providers only through an
exact matching company-visible saved draft.

**Reason and benefit**

People can connect useful hosted tools through the existing Apps flow.
An explicit zero-agent selection survives authorization. Public
documentation lookups need no OAuth app, account, or key.

**Breaking changes**

Explicitly saved empty MCP install choices now remain empty. Existing
managed defaults without a saved choice retain their behavior. No schema
migration or API shape change.

## What Changed

- Qualify Bitly OAuth, Context7 public MCP, Hugging Face public MCP, and
Resend OAuth with real browser setup, useful UI reads, and reload
checks.
- Negotiate JSON OAuth token responses and preserve explicitly saved MCP
agent reach with a transactional config marker.
- Add durable provider overrides, permission reviews, dated text-only
evidence, and official branding provenance. Remove all seven evidence
images and their report references.
- Restore Finish setup for hidden-provider drafts with
company/application/provider checks; keep fresh setup withheld. Preserve
success after the exact resumed draft becomes active, and restore valid
completed URLs to that exact saved Permissions page; reject initially
active, disabled, or archived resume targets. Align the Context7 route
assertion with its new qualified availability.
- Retain hidden ClickUp, Klaviyo, and monday.com research with exact
login/approval gates. monday.com requires provider callback
allowlisting.

## Verification

- Connector service suite: 420 passed, including
default/empty/agent/company reach and managed OAuth lifecycle coverage.
- Shared catalog: 36 passed. Override tests: 3 passed. Brand checks: 101
identities passed.
- Focused UI setup/recovery, Browse, and OAuth-helper suites: 306
passed. Actual hidden-draft resume/reload passed; a public Context7
draft seeded in the isolated app completed through the active-state
refetch and persisted with zero agents after reload. The completed URL
refresh and View connection open the exact saved Permissions page. Fresh
hidden setup, normal initially active resume, disabled/archived status,
and provider mismatch are rejected; a draft at the completion stage
stays in setup.
- Recursive typecheck and build passed again after rebase. The full
local Vitest run began before rebase and was cancelled as superseded
while still in the general-server phase; it is not a completed pass.
Exact-head CI supplies broad coverage. The focused connector service
suite passed against the final code. UI typecheck, build, and token
gates passed again after the draft-recovery fix.
- Targeted mock MCP Playwright journey: 1 passed (34.9s). It now
verifies View connection reaches the exact saved Permissions route, both
discovered actions, and reload persistence. This replaces the stale
Browse expectation found by CI.
- All CI gates passed on final commit
`32bb4c6422411eee632486950e45e2735102d1b3`. The inherited-pause test
timed out in the cleanup run and passed on one retry without code
changes; the entire file also passed locally, 36/36. Its exact timing
cause remains unresolved. A signoff timeout on the preceding
production-code commit also passed on its single retry. Greptile
reviewed the final commit at 5/5 with no open findings.
- Actual UI reads: Bitly current-user read; Resend List Domains
including a fresh setup after the final callback refinement; Context7
React docs; Hugging Face public docs search. No provider writes or real
agent runtimes ran.
- [Text-only qualification
report](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/blob/32bb4c6422411eee632486950e45e2735102d1b3/doc/connections/easy-mcp-batch-2-2026-10-09.md)
include evidence limits and exact blockers. Account/profile/domain
results are omitted.

## Risks

- Bitly `mcp.all` and Resend `full_access` remain broad provider grants.
Qualification kept writes Off and selected no agents. Read proof does
not establish write behavior or refresh rotation.
- The explicit-choice marker applies to new install saves; older
unmarked flows keep their existing defaults. Its JSONB merge avoids
overwriting concurrent config fields.
- Public provider catalogs and rate limits can change. Unqualified
providers remain withheld from new Browse entries; retained connections
remain available for recovery.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, based on GPT-6, plus OpenAI `gpt-6-luna` subagents for
provider research, browser testing, and review. The exact primary
serving variant and context-window size are not exposed by this runtime.
Used reasoning, code execution, and browser tools.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-09 11:52:33 -05:00
DottaandPaperclip 2b688a8fe3 feat(connections): add verified MCP providers and setup fixes (#15621)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Apps give agents governed access to external tools.
> - Several provider MCP servers lacked a supported catalog entry or
failed during setup.
> - Real browser tests identified specific registration, session, and
form defects.
> - This pull request adds seven catalog entries and fixes the shared
paths used by eleven verified providers.
> - Users can connect these providers through the existing Apps flow and
control each action.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What existing behavior does this improve?**

The Apps catalog and remote MCP setup, discovery, and action tester.

**Subsystem affected**

Shared app definitions, the server tool services, and the Apps UI.

**Current behavior**

Seven providers lack a catalog entry. Airtable can select an advertised
client-metadata flow that fails. Calendly rejects the registration name.
Tavily needs an initialized session before a call. Firecrawl exposes
invalid defaults for optional nested form objects. HTTPS setup can
display a callback that differs from the server callback.

**Proposed behavior**

Add Calendly, Exa, Firecrawl, GSC Wizard, Parallel Search, Tavily, and
Windsor.ai. Preserve Airtable, Linear, Make, and PostHog. Use reviewed
provider options through the shared MCP and OAuth paths. Display the
callback supplied by the server. Omit untouched optional object inputs.

**Reason and benefit**

Eleven providers passed bounded reads through the real Paperclip browser
action tester. This PR includes that verified set and its required
shared fixes. Unfinished providers remain outside this change. AgentMail
keeps its existing integration.

**Breaking changes**

No database migration. Existing OAuth credentials and action policies
keep their ownership and access rules. Airtable's reviewed method
re-registers a retained client-metadata binding through DCR. Tavily's
reviewed method initializes sessions before dispatch. The existing
customer, managed, and Vercel OAuth gateway paths now refresh on
upstream 401 and return `oauth_refreshed_retry_required` (409),
requiring an explicit caller retry. They do not replay the rejected call
automatically; the next invocation initializes a fresh credential-scoped
session when required.

Related catalog work: #15545. This branch preserves current master
catalog entries and does not add another Google Workspace integration.
Open and closed provider PRs and public MCP issues were searched. No
duplicate for this verified set was found. The change extends the
shipped Connected Apps roadmap item.

## What Changed

- Add seven catalog entries with official provider branding and reviewed
permissions.
- Update Airtable, Linear, and Make metadata and show Make in Apps.
- Add authoritative provider source overrides that use the existing
generation and review checks.
- Add the reviewed Airtable DCR option and compatible Calendly
registration names.
- Initialize Tavily sessions before discovery and calls, including
retained connections. Keep credential-scoped session caching and single
call dispatch.
- Use the server's callback URL in the OAuth setup UI.
- Omit untouched optional object defaults; keep supplied empty strings,
false, zero, and object values intact in the action tester, with strict
required-child validation.
- Require an explicit retry after OAuth refresh instead of replaying a
tools/call with missing session headers.
- Record all eleven successful reads, write policies, auth-method
limits, and qualification caveats. Omit credentials and private account
data.
- Find chat connector cards through catalog search in browser tests, so
pagination does not hide Slack or other later entries.

## Verification

- Real browser qualification: eleven bounded reads passed. Catalog
refresh and reload proof are recorded in
`doc/connections/verified-mcp-qualification-2026-10-08.md`.
- Provider writes and actual agent-adapter sessions were not run.
Alternative documented auth methods and expiry refresh remain
unqualified.
- `pnpm -r typecheck`: passed.
- `pnpm build`: passed.
- Focused shared/catalog tests: 41 passed. Source override tests: 3
passed. Catalog regeneration fixture suite: 9 passed. Latest form
regression suites: 31 passed. Gateway suite: 38 passed. Other focused UI
suites passed before these last fixes.
- UI token gates and both token sync checks: passed.
- The catalog regeneration fixture includes the authoritative provider
overrides; its full suite passes. The focused OAuth socket case passed
on isolated rerun.
- Complete local UI suite: 7,866 passed. CLI suite: 511 passed, 6
skipped. Complete shared suite: 892 passed.
- The unchanged AgentMail/ClickUp discovery fallback suite passes all 45
cases. An OpenAI login test passed on isolated rerun.
- Local broad database coverage is limited by macOS PostgreSQL
shared-memory exhaustion (`shmget: No space left on device`, not disk
space). The broad run was interrupted after diagnosis; no host settings
or other running services were changed.
- CI found that the Slack browser test assumed its catalog card was on
the first page. The test now uses catalog search; the Slack case passes
locally. Adjacent GitHub and iMessage cases could not start locally
because embedded PostgreSQL initialization failed before browser
assertions.
- Final commit
[`febe4520e`](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/commit/febe4520e13d4b3a4121eafc3d22540c2b11379d):
all 54 checks passed, with none pending or failed. [CI
run](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/37847182065)
passed typecheck, build, all general and serialized test suites, all
eight browser shards, runner checks, canary dry run, and the aggregate
verification gate.
- Greptile reviewed that exact final commit at 2026-10-08 21:33 UTC and
returned 5/5 with no outstanding findings or unresolved threads.
- PR UI preview against the existing local test server: Calendly
catalog/setup observed; Firecrawl read passed after expanding More
options with nested optional inputs untouched. This retest proves
frontend behavior, not the revised OAuth backend against a live
provider.

<details>
<summary>Browser evidence</summary>

![Calendly
catalog](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paperclipai/paperclip/codex/verified-mcp-connectors/doc/connections/verified-mcp-qualification-2026-10-08/calendly-catalog.jpg)

![Calendly
setup](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paperclipai/paperclip/codex/verified-mcp-connectors/doc/connections/verified-mcp-qualification-2026-10-08/calendly-setup.jpg)

![Firecrawl
read](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paperclipai/paperclip/codex/verified-mcp-connectors/doc/connections/verified-mcp-qualification-2026-10-08/firecrawl-read.jpg)

</details>

## Risks

- Provider registration and consent behavior can change. Airtable's DCR
option is explicit and keeps the existing issuer, resource, redirect,
and PKCE checks.
- Tavily uses initialized sessions without automatic call retries. After
a successful OAuth refresh following 401, callers now receive a
retry-required result. A later explicit retry can still require
reauthorization if the provider rejects the refreshed token. Provider
writes are not live-qualified.
- Optional object cleanup affects the shared action tester. Regression
tests cover absent objects, required children, defaults, and populated
values.
- GSC Wizard's underlying Google data scopes and Google flow completion
were not independently verified. Its account reported paid/trial
metadata of unknown origin. No purchase was performed.
- No database migration, new AgentMail integration, or change to
existing action grants is included.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex assisted with implementation, research, tool
use, and code execution. The root backend model ID and context window
are not exposed in this session. The cheaper subagents used OpenAI
`gpt-6-luna`. No model context size is inferred.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [ ] I have run tests locally and they pass — targeted checks and
complete UI/CLI/shared suites passed; the broad local database run was
blocked by the macOS PostgreSQL startup limitation documented above. The
full database/workspace suite passed in CI.
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-09 08:10:46 -05:00
Devin FoleyandPaperclip 3d0e74e743 Keep proven external connection failures out of Sentry (#15590)
Apply the reviewed change for Keep proven external connection failures out of Sentry.

Validation: local typecheck/build and focused regression tests, passing exact-head CI, Greptile 5/5, and independent source review. The PR records full-suite evidence and any local environment limitations.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-08 10:19:40 -07:00
DottaandPaperclip d66acb7ac1 feat: automate Slack bot app setup and installation (#15413)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Chat connectors give each agent a customer-owned bot and task-backed
conversations.
> - Manual Slack setup requires app creation and copying durable
credentials.
> - Operators need a shorter setup that an assisting agent can use
safely.
> - This pull request creates the app through Slack's Manifest API and
installs it through OAuth.
> - Durable registration state supports recovery without creating
another app.
> - A four-screen wizard, automatic avatar upload, and OAuth account
linking reduce setup work.
> - Connector settings and per-turn tool guidance support daily use
after installation.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**Subsystem affected**

Native Slack bot setup, company secret storage, chat connector
management, and agent tool guidance.

**Problem or motivation**

New Slack bots require manual app creation and copying a signing secret
and bot token. Interrupted setup can create duplicate apps. The setup
and management screens contain unnecessary controls. Agents also need
guidance for native questions, files, thread replies, and governed Slack
actions.

**Proposed solution**

Use a temporary app-configuration access token to create a
customer-owned app. Save durable secrets in the vault. Bind OAuth to the
initiating actor, company, endpoint, registration revision, scopes, and
configured origins. Preserve manual and existing-app recovery. Link the
installing user's account, send a welcome DM, and advance from saved
server evidence. Keep request-URL recovery instructions available if
automatic connection detection waits.

**Alternatives considered**

The Slack CLI adds installation requirements. Socket Mode changes
transport. A shared Paperclip-owned app changes app ownership. These
alternatives are outside this change.

**Roadmap alignment**

This extends existing chat connectors and secrets capabilities. Related
public work: #14037 and #13954 cover Slack MCP prerequisites and user
OAuth. No duplicate bot-registration PR was found.

## What Changed

- Share one reviewed manifest builder between automatic registration and
manual setup.
- Add replay-safe migration 0318 and company-bound registration state
with vault references and uncertain-creation recovery.
- Add registration, installation, callback, and resume APIs with
short-lived, single-use OAuth state.
- Save installation credentials before downstream checks and preserve
bot identity constraints.
- Reduce automatic setup to four screens. Keep advanced app details,
manual recovery, and existing-app setup.
- Upload the agent avatar with the Paperclip dark background. Link the
OAuth installer's account and send setup DMs.
- Show agent and connector-owner avatars. Simplify settings, access, and
conversation screens.
- Discover joined Slack channels and enable them by default. Start a
task from a bare mention and admit same-thread follow-ups.
- Refresh Slack tool guidance each turn. Add native-form, file,
approval, and delivery regressions plus manual model probe definitions
and sanitized acceptance records.
- Update deployment/database docs, OpenAPI, redaction, removal cleanup,
production Storybook stories, and provider browser tests.
- Merge current master and move the registration migration after its
latest migration without rewriting published commits.

The completed Slack success view intentionally has a single centered
**Done** action and no **Save & exit**, as explicitly requested by the
product owner. `DESIGN.md` records this exception; unfinished setup
steps retain the aligned wizard footer.

## Verification

- Passed after the master merge: repository typecheck, full build,
Storybook build, design-token gates, module-boundary gates, and
migration generation.
- Passed: all 352 focused Slack deterministic tests and all 14 affected
provider browser tests. Browser tests use controlled provider fixtures
and a separate throwaway instance.
- Passed on current head `c5d01e0e2`: the complete GitHub test matrix
(general server, chat, all workspaces, serialized server, and Runner),
all eight browser shards, typecheck/release registry, build, canary dry
run, security checks, and policy gates. There are 52 passing checks and
no pending or failing checks.
- Greptile completed on the exact current head with 5/5 and no
actionable findings or open review threads.
- Local repair verification passed 93 focused tests, including same-app
reinstall after revocation and rejection of consent started before
revocation, the AgentMail browser journey, and repository typecheck.
Local build and Storybook build also passed. The redundant local
full-suite rerun was stopped after the complete current-head CI matrix
passed.
- Real Slack setup and agent replies were exercised in the authorized
isolated test drive during the setup iteration.
- The ten additional model probes were attempted with legacy
`codex_local`, `gpt-5.6-sol`: five passed, two failed, and three were
partly verified. Native runtime is not qualified. See
`server/src/services/connectors/slack/evals/2026-10-08-acceptance.md`
for evidence and limits.
- Passing model probes cover native forms, downloaded file bytes, bare
mentions with thread replies, explicit posts/reactions, and saved
approval denial.
- The controlled uncertain-write probe found wrong delivery-check IDs.
The canvas fallback attempt used an invented tool name. Search
pagination/native search, a private-source denied-tool receipt, and
distinct board/webhook origins remain unqualified.

Reviewer path: enable Chat connectors, start Slack chat setup, select an
agent, enter an app-configuration access token, and approve Slack
installation. Send a message to the bot and confirm that setup advances
to success. Inspect settings and allowed channels. See
`doc/connections/SLACK-AUTOMATIC-SETUP.md` for deployment and recovery.

## Risks

- Slack app creation has no provider idempotency guarantee. A timeout
after dispatch stays uncertain until the operator checks Slack.
- OAuth needs a stable public HTTPS board origin. Webhook ingress may
use a separate configured HTTPS origin. Workspace policy can delay
installation.
- Migration 0318 can replay safely on instances that applied the earlier
development migration.
- OAuth installation now links the installer to the initiating Paperclip
user. Identity checks and company access rules still apply.
- Joined channels now enable bot responses by default. Linked-user
authorization and per-action approval rules still apply.
- Model behavior has the documented delivery-check and canvas fallback
failures. A passing CI run does not establish that every model probe
passed.
- Removing the connection does not delete the customer's Slack app. No
new first-party telemetry is added.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 family, with reasoning, repository tools, code
execution, and browser verification. The runtime does not expose a more
specific authoring model ID or context-window size. The live bot probes
used OpenAI `gpt-5.6-sol` through `codex_local` in legacy mode.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-08 06:33:31 -05:00
f77fcbf4bf feat(apps): add Telem.AI web search connection (#15379)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Research agents need current web information.
> - The Apps catalog connects agents to remote MCP tools through the
normal access rules.
> - Telem.AI supplies web search and page reading through one API key.
> - This PR adds its catalog entry, optional search settings, artwork,
and setup guide.
> - The connection keeps an operator's saved header policy when they
reconnect.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #15302. Related catalog work: #13881.

This PR continues #15302 by Yifei Ai (@aiwen324). Thank you for the
connector and its review fixes. All seven original commits are
preserved. GitHub denied the attempt to push to the contributor's fork,
so this branch retains the repair commit and merges current master.
Master now includes the same test fix.

For a squash merge, keep the original author in the final commit
message:

```text
Co-Authored-By: Yifei Ai <aiwen324@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
```

A search found no separate public Telem issue or competing Telem PR. The
existing Apps path matches the roadmap.

**Agent or provider**

Telem.AI provides web search and page reading through a hosted MCP
server.

**Why this adapter is useful**

Agents can use multiple search providers through one governed
connection. Operators can set the search tier, auto routing, and
provider lists.

**How the agent is invoked**

The remote MCP server uses Streamable HTTP at
`https://mcp.telem.ai/mcp`. The API key uses an `Authorization: Bearer`
header. See the [official MCP
guide](https://docs.telem.ai/integrations/mcp/).

## What Changed

- Add the Telem.AI definition, research entry, permission review, and
generated registry entry.
- Add four optional settings. Unset settings send no request header.
- Add official light and dark artwork, source records, and a setup
guide.
- Forward company, issue, agent, run, project, and correlation IDs by
default. Preserve a saved policy, including disabled forwarding, on
reconnect.
- Add catalog and connection tests.

## Verification

Current head: `b4164477fb1b312a504789bf17b51c963244c0fd`.
Merged master: `228f0e2807c5b59d2aa129cf2d80b9777ebabf07`.

- Resolved five shared catalog conflicts after the Superagent connection
merged.
- Keep both providers in the research ledger, generated registry,
generator, branding manifest, and connection guide index.
- Correct the combined catalog totals: 52 self-serve candidates, 55
research entries, and 68 Apps entries.
- The published Git tree exactly matches the tested local resolution.
- Catalog and Apps UI suites: **295 tests pass** after the catalog count
fixes.
- Connection service suite: **387 tests pass** in the full run. Its only
failure was the old catalog count. That test passes on a focused rerun
after the fix. This gives **388 passing service tests** across the two
runs.
- Total focused coverage: **683 passing tests**. The first runs exposed
four fixed-count assertions that needed the combined totals.
- Shared package build and plugin SDK compile pass. Token gates and
whitespace checks pass.
- Generation with `--definitions-only` reproduces the Telem definition
and registry. The unrelated AgentMail and Linear drift remains excluded.
- Local UI typecheck ended with exit 137 at the container memory limit.
Full local typecheck, test, and build are not claimed. Earlier runs also
recorded missing Cargo and Node development headers.
- GitHub reports a clean merge state against master `228f0e280`.
- All 54 checks are complete: **52 passed and two Storybook checks
skipped**. No check failed or remains pending.
-
[CI](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/37545412406)
passes on this head. This includes typecheck, build, tests, browser
shards, Runner checks, and Canary Dry Run.
-
[Greptile](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/15379#issuecomment-6024519537)
is **5/5 on this head**. There are no review threads, open P2s,
recommendations, or follow-ups.
-
[Superagent](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/runs/112548142930)
passes.
- Final recovery checks confirm all seven original commits and current
master remain in history. Token gates and whitespace checks pass.
- The final recovery run makes no source change. It verifies the
published repair and retains the local check limits below.
-
[Commitperclip](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/37545407943)
passes with no failures. Its only informational note asks the merger to
keep the author trailer above.
- All seven original contribution commits remain in history. The diff
against master contains the same 14 Telem files. It adds no dependency,
lockfile, schema, or workflow change.
- The managed GitHub CLI capability was missing in this run. The
installed GitHub connection applied the base files, merged master, then
restored the tested combined catalog. No history was rewritten.

The previous head `2d32a0094` passed all remote gates and had Greptile
5/5. Those results do not verify this new head.

The original PR reports live setup, discovery, settings headers, gateway
calls, and context-header forwarding. This repair does not repeat those
account-bound checks. The permission record still marks maintainer live
qualification as outstanding.

## Risks

- Telem.AI receives the six context IDs by default. The saved header
policy controls forwarding. Search use is billed to the account that
owns the key.
- All agents on a connection share its search settings.
- The merge uses master's route-test setup unchanged. The
company-boundary assertions remain intact.
- No schema, dependency, or workflow change is included.
- Live provider evidence is attributed to the original contributor.
Maintainer live qualification remains outside this CI repair.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

- Original contribution: Anthropic Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`),
1M-token context, through Claude Code with shell, editing, and test
tools, as disclosed in #15302.
- CI repair and review: OpenAI `gpt-6-astra`, through Codex with
reasoning, shell, editing, and GitHub tools. The runtime does not expose
the context-window size.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Yifei Ai <aiwen324@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: devinfoley <139239+devinfoley@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-06 16:33:18 -07:00
Devin Foley 8cbd21b3e7 feat(apps): add Superagent connection (#15394)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Agents reach external services through the Apps catalog. Each
catalog entry is a reviewed `AppDefinition` that connects a provider's
hosted MCP server to Paperclip's shared vault, grants, policies,
gateway, and audit trail.
> - Superagent (`superagent.sh`) is a security platform. Its hosted MCP
server lets agents read and triage security findings, start red-team
reports, run Contributor Trust and dependency update jobs, and score web
pages, email, files, skills, MCP repositories, and packages before an
agent trusts them.
> - Superagent is not in the catalog. Operators must use the generic
"Connect your own MCP server" flow. That flow has no branding, no key
guidance, and no warning about billable or destructive tools.
> - The connector playbook supports this provider with existing
definition fields. The server accepts an organization API key as a
bearer header. It publishes no OAuth authorization-server metadata, so
browser sign-in is not possible.
> - This pull request adds the Superagent definition, its artwork, the
research and permission-review ledger rows, documentation, deterministic
tests, and one reviewed risk-classification rule.
> - The benefit is a branded, governed Superagent connection with clear
key guidance and a warning about tools that cost credits or delete data.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**Problem or motivation**

Teams that use Superagent for PR security, red teaming, and agent
guardrails want their Paperclip agents to read findings, return
structured reports, and score content before they use it. Superagent is
not in the Apps catalog. Operators must paste the MCP URL and an
`Authorization` header into the generic remote-MCP flow. That flow gives
no branding and no provider guidance. It also does not tell the operator
that the key reaches the whole organization, or that some tools consume
credits or permanently delete findings.

**Proposed solution**

Add a catalog-only Superagent connection that follows the connector
playbook. It has one method: a customer organization API key
(`sk_live_...`), sent as an `Authorization: Bearer` header to
`https://www.superagent.sh/mcp`. The field helper text explains that
Superagent keys are not scoped. The method warning tells operators to
set billable and destructive actions to Ask first before agents run
unattended. All discovered tools stay governed by the normal per-action
policies.

**Alternatives considered**

A browser sign-in method was not added. The server's protected-resource
metadata names `https://superagent.sh` as its authorization server, but
that origin publishes no `oauth-authorization-server` or
`openid-configuration` document, so Paperclip cannot discover OAuth
endpoints. A plugin was not needed because the connection needs no
custom UI, tables, workers, or webhooks. Relying on the generic risk
classifier was not enough. Several Superagent mutations
(`triage_finding`, `scan_*`, `restore_agent_builtin_rule`) use names
that it reads as reads, so a narrow reviewed Superagent rule was added
instead.

**Roadmap alignment**

This extends the existing self-serve remote-MCP connection catalog. It
does not overlap planned core work.

## What Changed

- Added the `superagent` row to
`packages/shared/src/self-serve-mcp-research.json` (API-key auth, risk
tier S4).
- Added the `superagent` provider to
`scripts/ingest-app-definitions.mjs` (category, key placement and
placeholder, console links, guidance, description). Regenerated
`packages/shared/src/app-definitions/superagent.json` and the generated
registry.
- Added the `superagent/mcp-api-key` permission review to
`doc/connections/tool-method-permission-reviews.json`, with
key-permission text and evidence links.
- Added Superagent's official mark
(`ui/public/brands/apps/superagent.png`, the 460×460 avatar of the
official `superagent-ai` GitHub organization) and the brand manifest
entry.
- Added gallery copy for the Superagent card.
- Added a reviewed Superagent rule to `classifyRisk` in
`server/src/services/tool-access.ts`. Only `list_*` and `get_*` tools,
and tools that Superagent marks read-only, are reads. `delete_*` and
`revoke_agent_client` are destructive. All other tools are writes, so
billable and rule-changing tools can be set to Ask first.
- Put the Ask-first advice in the API-key helper text, because the key
form shows helper text and not method warnings.
- Added `doc/connections/SUPERAGENT.md` (transport and auth, why there
is no OAuth, administrator setup, capabilities and policy, manifest,
brand provenance, validation hook). Linked it from the connections
README and the permission audit.
- Tests: definition shape, store visibility and artwork, URL
recognition, the bearer header on discovery with the key kept out of
connection config, read/write/destructive classification of fixture
tools, the Superagent risk rule (including `triage_finding` and
`restore_agent_builtin_rule`), the visible Ask-first advice and API-key
gating of the connect form, and the pinned catalog counts.

## Verification

- `pnpm exec vitest run packages/shared/src/app-definitions.test.ts
packages/shared/src/app-definitions-url.test.ts
ui/src/pages/apps/AppsConnect.test.tsx ui/src/pages/apps/Browse.test.tsx
ui/src/lib/app-brand-assets.test.ts
ui/src/pages/apps/AppLogo.brand-assets.test.tsx`: 317 passed.
- `pnpm exec vitest run
server/src/__tests__/tool-access-service.test.ts`: 385 passed.
- `node scripts/check-app-brand-assets.mjs` and `node --test
scripts/app-brand-validation.test.mjs`: passed.
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/shared typecheck`, `pnpm --filter
@paperclipai/server typecheck`, and `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui
typecheck`: clean.
- Manual: in a local instance, open Apps → Browse and confirm the
Superagent card and icon. Open `/apps/connect?source=superagent`.
Confirm the single API-key method, and confirm that Connect enables only
after a key is entered.
- Live metadata probe on 2026-10-06: an unauthenticated `initialize` on
`https://www.superagent.sh/mcp` returns 401 with
`resource_metadata="https://www.superagent.sh/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource"`.
That document returns 200. No authorization-server metadata exists at
the named issuer.

## Risks

- Low risk to existing providers. The change is additive catalog data
plus tests. The generated registry only gains one import. The new risk
rule runs only for Superagent connections.
- A Superagent key reaches its whole organization. Some tools consume
credits (`create_*_report`, `triage_finding`) or delete data permanently
(`delete_finding`). Every action starts Allowed under the current
product default. The key helper text tells operators to set these
actions to Ask first.
- The permission-review ledger records live proof as not run. No
Superagent account was used. The lifecycle checklist in
`doc/connections/SUPERAGENT.md` needs a documented pass before the entry
is fully qualified.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

- Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`, 1M context) in Claude Code, with
extended thinking and tool use (shell, file editing, web fetch, browser
checks).

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
2026-10-06 15:57:16 -07:00
ea8e686197 fix(tools): distinguish requested from granted OAuth scopes (#14059)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Apps use OAuth connection grants to let agents reach external
services.
> - Paperclip stored a requested scope as a granted scope when a
provider omitted `scope` from its token response.
> - A live MCP connection showed why that matters: the provider reported
scopes beyond the requested scope. Scope names alone do not establish
write capability.
> - This PR records whether a scope came from the provider or from
Paperclip's request, and flags asserted extra scopes.
> - The result is an honest scope record across authorization and
refresh, including for self-hosted and Cloud instances.

**Review order:** shared scope resolver and OAuth write paths in
`server/src/services/tool-access.ts` → optional schema/types/validator
fields → focused tests in
`server/src/__tests__/tool-access-service.test.ts`. This PR changes the
shared OAuth record. The Enterpret catalog definition is separate in
**#13906**.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

No public issue covers this bug. Related: **#13906** adds the official
read-only Enterpret connector with OAuth and organization tokens.

**What happened?**

The OAuth callback stored `normalizeOauthScopes(token.scope ??
requestedScopes)`. When the provider omitted `scope`, Paperclip recorded
the request as though it were a verified grant. In the live case:

```text
Paperclip requested     mcp:read
Provider token reply    no scope field
Paperclip recorded      ["mcp:read"]
Token introspection    openid email profile mcp:read mcp:write
```

The access token is opaque. A negative introspection control returned
`active: false` with no scope, confirming the wider scope belonged to
the live token. The grants API could therefore present requested scopes
as though the provider had asserted them. This observation did not
establish access to write tools.

**Expected behavior**

Store the provider's asserted scope when present. When absent, identify
the value as an inference from the request. Preserve that provenance
through refresh and report extra scopes only when the provider actually
asserts them.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Use an OAuth provider that omits `scope` from its token response.
2. Complete consent after requesting `mcp:read`.
3. Read the connection or grant: before this fix, the stored `scopes`
looked like an asserted read-only grant.
4. The focused fixture tests reproduce the callback and refresh record
without needing a live provider.

**Deployment mode**

The shared OAuth path affects self-hosted and Cloud. The live provider
evidence came from an isolated self-hosted runtime.

## What Changed

- Added `resolveGrantedOauthScopes`. It records `scopeSource: provider`
when the token response asserts scope, or `requested_fallback` when it
does not. `unrequestedScopes` contains only provider-asserted scopes
outside the request.
- Applied the resolver at initial authorization and refresh. A refresh
without `scope` retains a previous provider assertion and warning; a
fresh assertion can replace them.
- Stored the actual authorization request per grant as
`providerTenant.oauth.requestedScopes`. This keeps a multi-user
connection's refresh baseline tied to the right grant. Generic MCP OAuth
also records discovered scopes when it sends them; curated apps retain
their reviewed request.
- Carried provenance onto the connection and default organization grant.
The organization grant does not receive token expiry, so its existing
refresh/reconnect behavior remains intact.
- Added optional fields to database JSONB schema types, shared types,
and validation. Existing grants need no migration or backfill.

This PR **does not change authorization decisions**, reject tokens,
introspect providers, or show a new UI warning. If a provider hides an
over-grant by omitting `scope`, Paperclip still cannot discover it.
`unrequestedScopes: []` with `requested_fallback` means **unknown**, not
least privilege.

## Verification

**Current head:** `7fde922a8`. Reconciled with master `88ff98b83`; the
final diff is six OAuth implementation, contract, and test files.
Preserved master's generic `offline_access` consent and legacy callback
baseline, and verified requested versus provider-asserted scopes on each
grant. Removed four duplicated GitHub token-method fixture properties
after fresh review.

All 504 focused tests in seven suites pass on the final head. Local
workspace build, recursive typecheck, build-gap typecheck, module
boundaries, node-version, token gates, and runtime push-policy checks
pass. The full local Vitest run completed with 15,610 passing tests, 91
skipped, and six failures in heartbeat/workspace suites; all six
failures reproduced on unchanged master `88ff98b83` in an isolated
baseline worktree. These suites and their runtime code are unchanged by
this PR. Greptile is 5/5 on this exact head with no actionable findings.
All current-head GitHub checks are green: 53 successful check runs, two
intentional Storybook skips, and the successful Snyk status. The
initially failed adapter-access and signoff-heartbeat shards both passed
their single rerun. [CI
run](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/37521588330).

The regression coverage includes omitted and explicit scopes, asserted
extra scopes, refresh preservation, per-user request baselines, generic
MCP discovery, and organization grants. No live provider token is needed
to reproduce these recordkeeping cases.

## Risks

- Existing records keep their scope list but have no source marker.
Historical provenance cannot be recovered from them.
- A refresh that omits `scope` preserves the last known assertion. A
provider that silently narrows a grant will not update the record until
it asserts a new scope.
- A provider that omits `scope` leaves the actual scope unasserted. This
PR cannot discover scopes omitted from the response or establish
endpoint capabilities. Enterpret’s provider fixes are separate
follow-ups.
- Scope provenance is additive metadata. No policy path uses these new
fields to allow or deny an action.

## Model Used

Implementation and tests: Claude Opus 5 (`claude-opus-5`) through Claude
Code with extended thinking, tools, and code execution. PR text cleanup:
Codex GPT-6 (exact host model ID and context window were not exposed;
tool use).

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] Focused tests pass locally; full-suite baseline failures are
documented above
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All current-head CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 on the current head with no actionable follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

This shared scope-recording fix can be reviewed and merged independently
of the Enterpret connector.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-06 13:25:20 -07:00
88ff98b83d feat(apps): add read-only Enterpret MCP with OAuth and org tokens (#13906)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip agents need governed access to Enterpret's hosted MCP
tools for customer feedback.
> - The official Enterpret MCP is read-only. Enterpret Agent’s beta
write MCP is a separate service and is outside this PR.
> - This PR supports both organization auth tokens and personal browser
OAuth for the official MCP.
> - Enterpret committed to fixing OAuth scope behavior and reducing its
token-revocation cache window. The provider fixes will follow after
connector deployment and do not gate this release. Paperclip functional
validation remains required. New tools stay quarantined on refresh.
> - This PR combines the original connector and Vivek's token-path work
on current master, with live self-hosted QA recorded in the validation
guide.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

No public issue covers this connector. This PR incorporates the work
from #14737. The independent OAuth scope-provenance fix is #14059; it is
not required for the organization-token path. #13890 is a merged
connector precedent. #13692 provides the connector-authoring skill.

**Problem or motivation**

The generic MCP setup can reach Enterpret, but it has no reviewed
Enterpret entry, method-specific setup, artwork, or policy defaults. The
original connector branch had also fallen behind master.

**Proposed solution**

Publish the Enterpret catalog entry with an organization auth token as
the selectable method. Support browser OAuth through instance-local DCR
on the same read-only endpoint. Default `run_graph_query` to Ask first
and quarantine tools newly found on refresh.

## What Changed

- Added the Enterpret app definition, generated registry, official icon,
Browse card, setup copy, tests, and Storybook states.
- Combined #14737 and resolved the current-master conflicts, including
the connector permission audit.
- Preserved catalog quarantine on token reconnect and updated expiry
guidance to follow the token's dashboard expiry. The QA token displayed
three months, contradicting the former six-month copy.
- Enabled personal OAuth for the official read-only MCP. Removed the
write-capability inference and OAuth draft-only setup restriction. The
beta Agent endpoint is excluded.
- Preserved tool quarantine during token reconnect, with a regression
test for existing quarantined and newly discovered tools.
- Added OAuth scope and revocation-cache disclosures and an interactive
Storybook retry check.
- Merged master `d9f600043` into the existing PR branch without
rewriting history. Resolved four conflicts, regenerated the combined
registry, and retained the model-provider assertions with a catalog
count of 66.
- Recorded live QA and its limits in
[doc/connections/ENTERPRET.md](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/blob/950bacc52/doc/connections/ENTERPRET.md).

## Verification

Current head: `6c73d3084202ccbb25080e7a4e9c3467bc1341dd`. All 513
focused connector, discovery, OAuth, policy, shared-definition, and
UI-handoff tests passed across 11 suites. Full repository typecheck,
build, Storybook build, token gates, module boundaries, Node policy,
no-git-push policy, and typecheck-build-gaps passed. Release-registry
tests passed 129/129 with modern Bash. The four failures with macOS Bash
3.2 also reproduced on untouched master.

The full test suite passed in CI on this exact head, including every
general-test and serialized-server shard and all eight E2E shards. The
duplicate local `pnpm test:run` was stopped after these remote test
lanes passed; it did not complete locally. The combined registry was
regenerated. Regeneration also reproduces existing Linear and AgentMail
definition drift on untouched master; those unrelated changes were
excluded.

On an isolated self-hosted Paperclip instance, an organization token
connected and discovered eight actions. `get_organization_details`
returned the intended organization before and after reconnect. Catalog
refresh, invalid-token failure and valid-token recovery, activity
logging, local disable, and local removal were exercised. No feedback
quotes or graph query were requested. Paperclip revoked both QA
connection secrets and archived the QA connections.

The token-path agent access preview correctly showed an action Off, but
the board Test endpoint still invoked it as the board user. This shared
Test-path mismatch is documented; it is not evidence that a real agent
can bypass policy. An actual token-path agent-session denial, a real
agent process, expiry recovery, server/VPS, and Cloud remain unverified.

Enterpret's dashboard confirmed the QA token was revoked, but the same
token immediately reconnected and completed a safe read. Vivek explained
this as a 24-hour validity cache and committed to reducing the window.
The new maximum delay and deployment remain unverified. The earlier
OAuth check reported `mcp:write` and `email` for an `mcp:read` request.
This is a scope mismatch; it did not prove access to write tools. On
2026-10-01 the account holder relayed Vivek’s clarification that the
official MCP is read-only and the beta Agent write MCP is separate.

## Risks

The organization token can read the organization's customer feedback,
and provider-side revocation did not immediately stop access. Operators
should check each token's displayed expiry and remove Paperclip's local
connection when retiring access. The account holder confirmed the
provider fixes are fast follows after deployment. Release can proceed
with the current scope reporting and up-to-24-hour revocation delay
documented, once fresh OAuth authorization/refresh, real-agent
allow/deny, CI, and review pass. Retest the reduced revocation window
after Enterpret deploys it. Scope labels alone must not be used to claim
write access.

Greptile is 5/5 on head `6c73d3084` with no actionable findings. All
current-head CI checks pass, including the canary dry run. Live
agent-session denial and fresh OAuth refresh remain explicit deployment
QA items. The board Test panel does not prove agent authorization.
Provider scope-reporting and revocation-cache fixes are accepted fast
follows after deployment.

## Model Used

Original connector and validation record: Claude Opus 5 through Claude
Code. Integration, current-master reconciliation, and token-path QA:
OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 family (exact host variant not exposed), using
repository tools and an isolated runtime. Contributor commits retain
their authors.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either linked existing issues or described the issue in-PR
- [x] I have not referenced internal or instance-local Paperclip issues
or links
- [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal issue
ID
- [x] I have run relevant local tests and checks
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation
- [x] I have considered and documented the risks above
- [x] All current-head CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no actionable follow-ups

If squash-merging, preserve contributor credit in the squash message:

Co-Authored-By: Vivek Kaushal <kaushalvivek@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Vivek Kaushal <vivek@enterpret.com>
2026-10-06 14:35:51 -05:00
DottaandPaperclip e34abee670 feat(mcp): connect assistants to a team with user OAuth (#14846)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip gives teams durable tasks, agent execution, budgets, and
approvals.
> - People also use assistants in Codex, Claude, and other MCP clients.
> - Those assistants need a scoped connection that preserves the
person’s permissions and attribution.
> - Delegating a task must not turn the assistant into the assigned
agent.
> - This PR adds opt-in user OAuth, ten first-party tools, browser
consent, and workflow packages.
> - Paid product evals verify the resulting tasks, documents,
attribution, retries, and access boundaries.
> - The team keeps working after the assistant conversation ends.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**Problem or motivation**

A person cannot connect an external assistant to an existing team
through browser consent and safely delegate durable work as themselves.

**Proposed solution**

Expose an opt-in `/mcp/paperclip` endpoint with individually described
first-party operations. Bind every connection to a person, client,
company, resource, and scopes. Reuse domain authorization and
scheduling. Package shared team-review, delegation, and follow-up
workflows for OpenAI/Codex and Claude.

**Alternatives considered**

Related PRs #9393 and #12549 cover earlier remote MCP and board-operator
approaches. This change uses user OAuth and a bounded public catalog. It
does not expose a generic executor, operator administration, static
shared board credentials, or external agent execution. Registry listing
work in #9851 is a separate distribution step.

**Roadmap alignment**

This maintainer-requested implementation extends the governed MCP
gateway, activity attribution, durable work products, and hosted
deployment direction in `ROADMAP.md`. It implements the first release of
the saved design plan; external agent participation and granted
third-party tools remain later releases.

## What Changed

- Add MCP 2.0 discovery and task status/comment/document Events on the
same authenticated endpoint. Persist subscriptions and delivery
receipts, verify HTTPS callbacks, sign Standard Webhooks, encrypt
callback material, recheck permissions/Cloud membership, and bound
retries/expiry. Older MCP clients keep their existing tools.
- Add discovery, dynamic client registration, S256 PKCE, resource
validation, rotating refresh tokens, revocation, and company consent.
Store credentials as hashes and recheck membership at execution.
- Add tools for connection identity, agents/projects, task
search/read/create, human comments, documents/deliverables, and
pending-approval links. Preserve current domain permissions and
scheduling.
- Add durable mutation receipts across reconnects. Matching retries
replay results; uncertain outcomes keep the same request ID and require
inspection.
- Add consent and connection-management pages, OAuth log redaction,
shared plugin workflows, and separate OpenAI/Codex and Claude package
outputs.
- Add eight paid Product E2E cases across three models, independent
durable-state grading, usage evidence, cleanup, and report integration.
Add task-document guidance and regenerate the runner capability
inventories.
- Add migrations 0301 and 0302, the dated implementation plan, result
notes, and direct-client setup instructions in `doc/public-mcp.md`.

## Verification

- Merge integration `e180b1948`: resolved conflicts with current master,
preserved both eval registries, regenerated capability catalogs, and
regenerated migrations as 0301/0302 while keeping the original
replay-safe SQL byte-identical. Local migration safety/snapshot tests
(26), MCP/OAuth tests (38), redaction/OpenAPI tests (71), and eval
catalog/grading tests (198) pass. Token and capability gates pass. Full
recursive typecheck passed. Fresh Greptile review is 5/5 with no
unresolved findings. CI is green on this exact head (55 successes, two
intentional skips, one neutral result): one unchanged Cursor sandbox
test timed out at 10 seconds, then passed locally in 856 ms. A single
retry of that failed shard and the aggregate workflow passed. Merge
remains blocked on the repository code-owner approval rule.

Earlier checks passed at `6aa0962d4fb715f2190bb7bb22efacab2e58495d`: 55
successes, two intentional skips and one neutral result. [The earlier CI
run](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/36901592350)
includes all test shards, browser tests, typecheck, build and canary dry
run. Greptile was 5/5 on that commit with no unresolved review threads.
GitHub still requires code-owner review under the repository merge
rules; passing checks do not bypass that approval. Paid source
fingerprints remain separate below and in the dated result note.

- Paid Events qualification passes **3/3**: GPT-5.4 Mini, Claude Haiku
4.5 and Claude Sonnet 4.6. Each uses a real public HTTPS callback,
signature verification and report retrieval in a fresh conversation. A
final Mini regression passes after the quota/status fixes. All evidence
validates. Bounded tunnel startup retries occur before provider calls
and remain visible; failed earlier attempts retain their original
grades.
- The earlier complete seven-case matrix passes **21/21**, with a
separate **3/3** delegation regression. Two preceding matrices also
passed 21/21 each. A complete 24-cell matrix including Events has not
been run. [The dated
results](doc/plans/2026-10-01-public-mcp-paid-eval-results.md) retain
exact source fingerprints, failures, model IDs and partial costs.
- Node 24: repository-wide `pnpm -r typecheck` and `pnpm build` pass
after merging master. Server typecheck passes after the final
quota/status changes. Eval typecheck and all 892 eval-support tests
pass.
- All 33 real MCP/OAuth tests pass. The preceding combined MCP,
redaction, private-address and DNS-rebinding run passed 129 tests; two
later MCP regressions cover quota reuse and unchanged-status
suppression. All 28 adjacent issue-tree/stale-lock route tests pass. CI
then found a null checkout result in the existing concurrent-workspace
path; logging now uses optional status access. All 12 closed-workspace
tests and all 33 MCP tests pass after that correction. The exact-start
event calibration exposed a timestamp gap; scanning now includes the
subscription start, with all 33 MCP tests and server typecheck passing.
These two narrow corrections follow the paid regression.
- A real Core → Cloud → Core authority round trip passes OAuth, MCP 2.0
subscription/delivery, current membership loss, unsubscribe, legacy SDK
tools, refresh and revocation. Its callback transport is a fixture with
independent HMAC verification. The paid Events campaigns separately
prove public HTTPS delivery.
- Earlier component qualification passed UI 7,117 tests, CLI 502, shared
832, skills catalog 20, database 160 and OpenAPI 10. Token gates, module
boundaries, migration order and plugin regeneration passed. CI covers
general/serialized suites, eight browser shards, runner checks,
typecheck, build and canary dry run.
- **Local full-suite limitation:** the earlier monolithic run was not
clean. It encountered overlapping schema rebuilding, Mac database
shared-memory limits and isolated CLI/fixture failures. Targeted reruns
passed. The existing >32 MiB Git filename stress test still hit its
300-second Mac timeout. The additional serialized sweep stopped after 62
passing suites once CI passed. Original failures and partial logs
remain; this PR does not claim a wholly green local monolithic run.
- Local Codex CLI and Claude Code OAuth login and MCP SDK
interoperability were verified. Public-store installation, actual
ChatGPT Work Cloud Events UI, staging HTTPS client behavior and hosted
newcomer provisioning remain release gates.

Enablement is moving to **Settings → Experimental → Assistant
connections (MCP)** in the stacked follow-up
[#14933](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/14933). Merge
both for the intended setup experience. This foundation branch alone
still uses `PAPERCLIP_PUBLIC_MCP_ENABLED=true`. After deployment, set
`PAPERCLIP_PUBLIC_URL` to the authenticated instance's HTTPS origin, and
connect to `/mcp/paperclip`. Select a team and allow writes in browser
consent. Configure an available agent and budget, then delegate and
retrieve results later. For Events, rescan the deployed plugin catalog
in ChatGPT Work Cloud; the host supplies its webhook credentials when
the user asks to watch a task. See [the setup
runbook](doc/public-mcp.md).

## Risks

- Events are at-least-once and may arrive out of order. No replay cursor
is advertised. Clients must refresh finite subscriptions, read current
state and avoid comment feedback loops. Callback material uses the
instance secrets master key; hosted subscriptions require the updated
Cloud broker and are bounded to five minutes/the access proof expiry.
- ChatGPT Work Cloud/dot event UI, plugin rescan and a hosted staging
subscription remain deployment gates. Local signed-webhook and paid
model evidence does not claim those surfaces have been exercised.
- Disabled by default. Merging adds schema and opt-in code; it does not
deploy a public endpoint, publish a store listing, create a team, or
start paid agents.
- Migrations 0301 and 0302 are additive and idempotent. Their SQL is
unchanged from the earlier preview numbers, so hash-aware upgrade
reconciliation preserves prior staging applications. Normal instance
upgrades must apply it before enabling MCP.
- Task creation and comments can schedule paid agent work. Consent and
tool descriptions disclose that effect. Revocation blocks future calls
but does not undo delegated work.
- Public deployments need edge rate limits and credential-safe logging.
Internal dispatch is restricted to the closed catalog and carries a
request-local verified actor.
- Hosted onboarding requires the companion Cloud broker, encryption-key
configuration, and tenant rollout. Self-hosted direct connections can
use this PR alone.
- Store acceptance and agent-mode participation are not claimed.
Checked-in plugin endpoints are development defaults; rebuild packages
for a real deployment before installation.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-6 in Codex, with reasoning, tool use, and code execution. A
more specific serving version and context-window size were not exposed
by the session. Paid eval models: `gpt-5.4-mini-2026-03-17`,
`claude-haiku-4-5-20251001`, and `claude-sonnet-4-6`.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass (targeted/component checks;
full local-run limitations are recorded above)
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-06 11:48:53 -05:00
DottaandPaperclip 4857799a88 feat(connections): deliver saved instructions to authorized agent turns (#15216)
Persist optional connection instructions and deliver authorized snapshots to agent execution prompts. Keep provider templates with each app definition, preserve edits and opt-outs, and replace sessions when guidance or access changes.

Use shared production settings across setup and Permissions, with source visibility in agent Instructions. Add the initial memory-provider defaults and managed Honcho workspace configuration. Include migration 0298 and regression coverage for generic providers, runtime delivery, authorization, and catalog regeneration.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-05 18:16:00 -05:00
DottaandPaperclip b43073d11f feat(connections): sync and group accounts managed by aggregators (#15254)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Connections give agents governed access to external tools.
> - Aggregator gateways can expose accounts that users already connected
upstream.
> - The Apps catalog did not show those accounts or their current
provider status.
> - Separate cards and setup tasks also made account ownership unclear.
> - This pull request discovers upstream accounts and groups them under
one app card.
> - Users can find connected apps while each provider keeps control of
its accounts.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**Subsystem affected**

Connections across the database, shared contracts, server, and board UI.

**Problem or motivation**

Users cannot see which apps are connected through a saved aggregator
gateway. Native and upstream accounts need one app card. Discovery must
preserve company, user, gateway, and credential boundaries.

**Proposed solution**

Sync account metadata from Composio, Arcade, and supported Executor
gateways. Keep upstream account management in each provider. Use source
chips and search to browse the catalog. Preserve native setup and the
gateway's existing access policy.

**Alternatives considered**

Creating a local executable connection for each upstream account would
duplicate authorization state. Using an agent task for routine Composio
setup would add an unnecessary step. The board now calls the saved
gateway directly for that setup.

**Roadmap alignment**

This extends the shipped Connected Apps and MCP Tool Gateway features in
ROADMAP.md. The duplicate search found no open PR for managed account
discovery.

Related work: Refs #13755, Refs #13941, Refs #14725, Refs #13855. Open
PR #12906 covers adjacent toolkit routing work.

## What Changed

- Add provider-neutral discovery, sync, and refresh APIs. Preserve the
Composio API paths.
- Cache observations by company, saved gateway, viewing user, and
credential version. Retain stale observations after failed or incomplete
scans.
- Add optional Arcade account sync credentials in the vault. Discover
Executor accounts through its supported inventory interface.
- Group native and upstream accounts in one app card. Imported account
menus open their provider. Gateway menus own refresh and sync setup.
- Add Paperclip, Composio, Arcade, Installed, and All chips. Show 50
catalog entries per page. Keep connected accounts above discovery. Keep
explicit provider searches scoped.
- Simplify Composio app setup and refresh its connected app list on the
gateway Permissions page.
- Add a compact agent access card and task creation defaults for
connection setup. Preserve explicit blocks and approval policies.
- Add two replay-safe migrations, service and UI tests, Storybook
journeys, and acceptance stories.

## Verification

- Passed the repository typecheck, full build, token gates, and
migration ordering check.
- Passed the focused provider adapter, connection interaction, and
catalog tests after rebasing onto master.
- Passed all nine database sync and migration replay tests using a
disposable database on the test-drive PostgreSQL cluster. Removed that
database after the run.
- Verified Arcade cursor pagination against its official Go SDK and
passed all eight adapter tests, including short and incomplete pages.
- Passed all 45 interaction tests after making the exact requested tools
and their Allowed/Ask first permissions visible before granting access.
Verified the compact card in Storybook.
- Passed the complete UI suite on the final code: 683 files and 7,432
tests, including the corrected Composio destination assertions. Passed
130 focused tests for the UUID, management-link, and health-status
corrections.
- Passed 22 Composio setup/sync tests, 23 connection-intent service
tests, and the connection migration test in separate disposable
databases. Database startup alone was substituted; the suites exercised
their real SQL and services.
- Passed all 10 OpenAPI route checks and the full-stack
connection-intent browser test, including scoped consent, agent
continuation, and task completion.
- The local full runner encountered embedded PostgreSQL startup failures
on this loaded macOS host. The earlier in-flight run also held the
pre-fix Arcade transform; a fresh run of the final provider suite
passes. The final-head CI is queued during GitHub’s active Actions
incident: https://www.githubstatus.com/. The previous run also lost
several runners simultaneously; its real catalog assertion failures are
fixed and the fresh complete UI suite passes.
- Tested the real test-drive server in the embedded browser with a live
Composio gateway. Detected Airtable and Circleback. Verified refresh
progress, account rows, source chips, search scope, and 50-entry
pagination.
- Arcade and Executor coverage uses provider fixtures. Live credentials
were unavailable.
- Storybook builds successfully and includes grouped native/provider
accounts, stale and unavailable discovery, optional Arcade setup, and
mobile states. The acceptance document records the simulated and live
coverage separately.

- Greptile reviewed final commit
`217b024c27b5933e773ce9419c4e92b1032042c6` at 5/5. All six review
threads are resolved, security scans pass, and the PR has no merge
conflicts. The outstanding remote checks are `ci / Select trusted
runner` and `review`, queued by GitHub. They need to complete before
merge.

## Risks

- Provider response changes can break inventory discovery. Failed scans
retain observations and show stale status.
- Composio scans only the supported catalog and can take time. Large
inventories run in the background with progress and a bounded lease.
- Arcade requires a project API key and user ID when the gateway cannot
supply them. This key is used only for discovery.
- Executor discovery depends on the server's exposed inventory tools.
Unsupported servers report unavailable discovery.
- Cached account rows do not grant access or create executable
connections. Gateway policies still govern tool use. Account deletion
and per-app authorization remain upstream.
- The migrations add tables and one nullable column. Replay preserves
existing rows and company-scoped foreign keys.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, based on GPT-6. The session does not expose a more
specific serving model ID or context limit. Used reasoning, repository
tools, code execution, and browser verification.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [ ] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-05 14:57:04 -05:00
DottaandPaperclip 839cac1343 fix: request supported offline access for generic MCP OAuth (#14950)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Agents use external MCP tools through the governed gateway.
> - Remote MCP connections can use OAuth access tokens that expire.
> - Some providers issue refresh tokens only after an offline-access
request and consent.
> - Resource scopes hid that identity-provider capability in the generic
connection flow.
> - This pull request requests supported offline access and tests expiry
through a local MCP server.
> - The benefit is continued tool access without another sign-in when
the provider permits refresh.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Related PR: #13447 addresses the same OAuth symptom together with
managed Codex configuration. This PR focuses on generic MCP OAuth. It
also covers consent, explicit scope overrides, legacy reconnects, exact
scope persistence, and real HTTP expiry tests.

**What happened?**

A generic MCP resource can advertise only its tool scopes. Its OAuth
server can separately advertise `offline_access`. Paperclip selected the
resource scopes and omitted the offline-access request. A provider could
then issue an access token without a refresh token. Tool access stopped
after the access token expired.

**Expected behavior**

Paperclip adds advertised offline access to the selected tool scopes
when the OAuth server does not exclude refresh tokens. It requests
consent and stores the scopes sent in the authorization request.
Existing connections can discover this capability when the user
reconnects. Providers without this capability keep their existing scope
behavior.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Run `node scripts/mcp-fixtures/servers/oauth-refresh-fixture.mjs`
from the repository root.
2. Add its MCP URL as a generic connection on a local Paperclip
instance.
3. Approve the test consent page and call `read_status`.
4. Let the two-minute access token expire and call the tool again.
5. Before this fix, the connection needs another sign-in. With this fix,
the call refreshes the token and succeeds.

**Paperclip version or commit**

The integration regression reproduced the missing-refresh-token failure
on the parent of this PR's fix. The same test passes with the fix.

**Deployment mode**

Local development. Automated tests use a loopback HTTP MCP/OAuth server
and a disposable PostgreSQL database.

## What Changed

- Track offline-access capability separately from MCP tool scopes.
- Add supported offline access and consent for generic connections.
- Preserve the actual requested scopes through callback completion and
reconnect.
- Discover the capability for older connections with cached OAuth
endpoints.
- Add a reusable MCP/OAuth fixture with PKCE, token expiry, resource
binding, and refresh-token rotation.
- Test shared and personal gateway calls through two refresh rotations.
Cover scope selection, unsupported refresh, and legacy reconnects.
- Document the behavior and local test commands.

## Verification

- The two real HTTP expiry tests failed before the fix with
`oauth_refresh_missing` after the first token expired.
- Tests passed on the current head: 76 generic MCP regressions, all 365
tool-access service tests, and 4 fixture controls.
- Full workspace `pnpm -r typecheck` and `pnpm build` passed. Server
TypeScript checks also passed after the review fixes.
- All remote checks passed on
`d22909bb34e9d54478c0002077c498ffe105932d`. Greptile gave 5/5 with both
previous findings resolved. The complete local `pnpm test:run` is still
running.
- Run `node --test
scripts/mcp-fixtures/servers/oauth-refresh-fixture.test.mjs` for the
standalone provider controls.
- Run `pnpm exec vitest run
server/src/__tests__/generic-mcp-connection.test.ts` for the Paperclip
integration tests.

## Risks

- Users can see a consent prompt when a generic provider supports
offline access.
- The provider can still decline to issue a refresh token. Access works
until expiry, then the user must reconnect.
- A provider that advertises offline access but rejects the scope
produces an OAuth error. This PR does not add an automatic retry without
that scope.
- Existing grants without refresh tokens need another sign-in. The fix
does not change them in place.
- Curated Apps keep their reviewed scope and authorization-parameter
allowlists. No database migration is required.
- This simulation verifies the suspected failure. The reported internal
MCP server has not been tested.

## Model Used

- OpenAI Codex, based on GPT-6, with reasoning, tool use, and code
execution. The runtime did not expose a more specific model ID or
context-window size.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-02 14:13:59 -05:00
DottaandPaperclip 4ac374103f fix(connections): repair Asana MCP and add shared-app sign-in (#14756)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Connections let agents use provider tools through the permission
gateway.
> - Asana provides an official remote MCP server, but its v2 server
requires a registered MCP OAuth app.
> - Setup can discover retired v1 endpoints and send a callback that
differs from the displayed URL.
> - This pull request repairs custom app setup and adds sign-in through
Paperclip's shared app.
> - Users can choose their own app without enrolling with Paperclip
Cloud.
> - Agents can use Asana tools after the user connects their account and
sets action permissions.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Related: #14739 supplies the personal credential repair used by resumed
Asana setup. No duplicate Asana authentication PR was found.

**What happened?**

Asana setup failed even with a user-created app. Root discovery metadata
still points at v1. MCP v2 uses the Asana OAuth issuer and requires an
MCP app with a client secret. Local setup also displayed a localhost
callback while an Origin header could make authorization use a numeric
loopback callback.

**Expected behavior**

Sign in with Paperclip's app when its broker profile is available. Keep
custom MCP app setup available without Cloud enrollment. Use the correct
issuer, callback, client credentials, and resource throughout setup.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Open Asana in the connection catalog.
2. Supply an Asana MCP app's client ID and secret.
3. Start OAuth on a local instance opened with a numeric loopback
address, or resume a draft that cached v1 metadata.
4. Observe the wrong discovery endpoint or callback mismatch.

**Paperclip version or commit**

Reproduced from b54b2dc35c. Rebased onto
master at `0829d94af` after the single-screen setup change in #14811.

**Deployment mode**

Local development from source. The managed path also supports enrolled
self-hosted instances.

## What Changed

- Add the `asana.mcp` managed profile and the default Sign in with Asana
method.
- Use Asana's reviewed v2 protected-resource metadata before cached
endpoints.
- Require a custom MCP app's client secret and retain saved credentials
during setup or reconnect. Repair only the known Asana v1
issuer/resource binding, retaining company and callback checks.
- Expose a boolean for the acting user's saved client secret. The form
offers secret reuse only when that user has an active grant with the
required reference.
- Let users select their own app from the enrollment and
shared-app-unavailable screens, or from Advanced on the single-screen
setup page.
- Canonicalize HTTP loopback callbacks even when the request includes an
Origin header.
- Extend signed broker claims and provider URL validation for Asana.
Require refresh credentials on managed authorization.
- Document setup, distribution, and shared-app rollout requirements.
- Resolve permission-profile name collisions when finishing another
account. The live staging test found this after renaming the first Asana
connection; OAuth succeeded but profile finalization failed.

## Verification

- Final live staging proof used app commit
`c6053157c4e42ac017727117b754ae77fa5c45fa` and the real Cloud broker at
`767b63835170f664542afd0df99a76615e204b62`. In the embedded browser,
default shared sign-in required no client credentials, returned through
the central Cloud callback to the tenant, and discovered 39 actions. Get
me succeeded through the gateway as the selected QA agent (2.1 seconds).
The custom-app connection also returned a real result on this final
build (0.9 seconds).
- Retried the shared draft that failed during the first staging test. It
completed after the profile-name fix, retained the selected agent, and
kept the existing custom connection intact. Two database regressions
reproduced the collision before the fix and passed afterward. The
updated transaction rollback test also passes.
- Shared reconnect returned to the same staging connection with 39
actions. Earlier staging checks verified the custom-app fallback when
the shared profile was unavailable, saved-secret reuse on reconnect, and
Off blocking the action test. Allowed was restored after that check.
- Local live-provider checks also repaired a saved Asana v1
issuer/resource binding without reentering the secret and verified that
numeric-loopback setup uses the displayed localhost callback. Expiring
the local managed access-token timestamp triggered a real Asana refresh
and a successful Get me call. These early local broker tests used
enrollment/authentication and storage fixtures; the final staging proof
used deployed Cloud identity and persistent storage.
- The new production app is registered and configured, but production
sign-in has not been deployed or verified. Live provider revocation was
not run because the existing staging test app is shared with other
connections.

- After rebasing onto the single-screen setup flow, full `pnpm -r
typecheck`, `pnpm build`, and `pnpm check:token-gates` pass. Focused
verification passes 365 service and 36 broker-client tests. Broader
checks pass all 833 shared-package tests and all 530 connector-page
tests. The shared suite uses `TMPDIR=/private/tmp` to avoid macOS
temporary-directory symlinks in its canonical-path tests. The UI tests
verify the shared-app default and switching to a custom app with its
required client secret.
- Embedded-browser smoke on the current rebased build verified the
shared sign-in default, Advanced → custom app (client ID and secret
required), and switching back to Paperclip. Both existing Asana
connections remained connected after restart. No new provider
authorization was performed during this smoke.
- The full local `pnpm test:run` was interrupted when the execution
session restarted. Before interruption, it reported one runtime-slot
restart test failure. That test passed on an isolated retry after
clearing two unused PostgreSQL shared-memory segments. The full local
suite did not complete; CI must pass on the current head before merge.
- All 52 CI and security checks pass on
`9318fd4e9b616cdc3de12f40cdb9bd32d865af4c` (CI run `36882064080`),
including all eight browser shards, nine serialized-server shards,
build, typecheck, and canary dry run. Two optional Storybook checks were
skipped. Greptile review 4 reports 5/5 on this exact commit, with all
review threads resolved. Its updated summary identifies the current SHA;
this comment-triggered review did not publish a separate GitHub check
run.
- Provider revocation is unit-tested in the companion broker. Live
provider revocation was not run because the existing test app is shared
with other connections.

## Risks

- The shared Paperclip Asana MCP app has been registered with its
production callback and Any workspace distribution. Its secret is
provisioned in the production secret store, and the runtime client ID
and secret reference are configured. The production profile is enabled
in the saved deployment configuration. The companion broker has merged
and passed staging deployment; production sign-in still requires a
production deployment and live verification. Custom setup remains
available.
- Asana MCP uses the provider's fixed `default` grant. Paperclip action
policies limit agent tool use; they do not narrow provider consent.
- The callback correction affects HTTP loopback OAuth flows. Public
HTTPS callbacks retain their existing behavior.
- Reviewed discovery URLs now override stale cached endpoints. Tests
cover the Asana v1-to-v2 repair.
- No schema migration. Connection removal retains the existing
local-only revocation behavior.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex, with code execution, browser testing, and
GitHub tooling. The exact model variant and context window are not
exposed in this session.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-01 10:24:44 -05:00
467125fafb feat(connections): one-screen connector setup with stated defaults (#14811)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - Agents use Connections (the Apps catalog) to act in services like
Notion, GitHub, Google Workspace and Railway
> - Each connector asked the user to answer setup questions before it
went to the provider. Most of the questions already had the correct
answer selected
> - ROADMAP.md lists "simpler setup" for Apps and Connections as ongoing
work. This change continues that work
> - This pull request removes the questions that Paperclip can answer
itself. It states the defaults in one line and moves the choices behind
"Change" and onto the Permissions tab
> - The benefit is that most connectors take one click in Paperclip and
then the provider's own consent screen

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

No public issue exists. This is the description, from the enhancement
template.

**What existing behavior does this improve?**
The setup flow for tool connectors in the Apps catalog.

**Subsystem affected**
Apps and Connections: `ui/src/features/connections`,
`ui/src/pages/apps`, the `packages/shared` app definitions, and the
OAuth routes in `server/src/routes/tool-access.ts`.

**Current behavior**
Every connector opened with an Access step. The step asked who can use
the connection and which agents get it, and both answers were already
selected. 18 connectors also asked "How do you want to connect?" when
Paperclip could rank the methods. The Google apps and Postman also asked
"What should Paperclip be able to do?" before sign-in. The four gateway
connectors (Zapier, Arcade, Composio, Executor) used a separate two-step
wizard. Asana was pinned to a customer-owned OAuth app, so the user had
to register an app in Asana's developer console. The "Set all" control
on the Permissions tab changed only one action. After the user approved
access, Railway's consent page showed "you can close this window" and
did not return to Paperclip.

**Proposed behavior**
One screen per connector, with one primary button. The screen states the
defaults in one sentence, for example "Connects for everyone in your
organization, available to all agents". A "Change" link opens one
Advanced panel. When the provider's metadata allows dynamic client
registration, Paperclip registers a client itself. Connecting lands on
the Permissions tab. On that tab, "Set all" changes every action in the
group.

**Reason and benefit**
The user makes fewer decisions before the connection exists. Most
choices are easier to make after the connection, on the Permissions tab,
where a change has an immediate effect.

**Breaking changes**
None. No schema or API change. Existing connections keep their settings.

## What Changed

- **No Access step.** `ConnectionSetupFlow` no longer has the Access
step. The flow shows the resolved default above the primary button and
on the completion screen. The access controls moved into one Advanced
panel. The panel opens automatically only when a setting in it is
required.
- **A default method for every app.** The flow always picks the ranked
default method. Alternate methods are in the Advanced panel. The Google
and Postman capability choice is not asked before sign-in. The
write-capable method is the default.
- **Gateway connectors.** `RemoteMcpProductionSetup` (Zapier, Arcade,
Composio, Executor) no longer has its own Access step. Its commit path
and the main commit path use one helper, `askFirstCatalogEntryIdsFor`,
for server-suggested defaults.
- **Dynamic registration from live metadata.**
`canRegisterOAuthClientDynamically` now allows registration when the
provider advertises a registration endpoint, even if the catalog entry
lists only customer-owned clients. The Asana and Linear definitions and
catalog text match live probes. Asana issues clients for loopback
callbacks only, so a hosted deployment still needs an Asana app.
- **Connection setup states.** New
`packages/shared/src/connection-setup-state.ts` sorts each method into
`instant`, `authorize`, `paste` or `register`. The gallery card verb
("Connect" or "Add key") comes from this resolver and the instance's
ownership availability.
- **Generic MCP.** The generic path no longer asks "Does it need a key?"
first. A credential challenge from the server shows the key field.
- **Permissions tab.** Each action row shows its risk level. Each group
has a "Set all" control. The control sends one change for the whole
group. Before, each row's save started from the same render, so the
saves overwrote each other. The Zapier/Arcade/Composio/Executor setup
screen had the same defect.
- **OAuth callback interstitial.** A cross-site browser navigation to
`/api/tools/oauth/callback` gets a small same-origin "Finishing your
connection…" page. That page repeats the request, and the repeat does
the code exchange. Railway's consent page replaces itself after about
two seconds, and the code exchange plus tool discovery takes longer than
that. The interstitial uses only a meta refresh, because the OAuth code
is single-use. Requests without `Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site` take the
old path.
- **Linear registers through its MCP server.** Linear pins the console
endpoints at `linear.app`. Pinned endpoints now replace discovery only
when the method cannot register, or when the connection has an
operator-entered client. So a Linear connection now finds the
registration endpoint at `mcp.linear.app`.
- **Own-OAuth-app recovery stays on the one-click screen.** When the
method also accepts a customer-owned client, the client fields are in
the Advanced panel. The panel opens after a failed sign-in. "Try again"
resumes the draft with the operator's client.
- **E2E specs** follow the one-screen flow. The Access-step clicks are
removed, the specs open **Change** before they pick agents, and they
expect GitHub's **Add key** verb.
- **Default permissions do not change.** New connections still allow
every action. The user can set actions to Ask first or Off on the
Permissions tab.

## Verification

- `cd ui && npx vitest run src/pages/apps src/features/connections
--no-file-parallelism`
- `cd packages/shared && npx vitest run src/app-definitions.test.ts
src/connection-setup-state.test.ts`
- `cd server && npx vitest run src/__tests__/tool-access-service.test.ts
src/__tests__/remote-mcp-connectors.test.ts`
- `pnpm check:token-gates`
- New tests:
- `PermissionsPanel.group.test.tsx` checks that "Set all" sends one
change for the whole group. It fails on the old code.
  - `action-permissions.test.ts` checks the group update.
  - `connection-setup-state.test.ts` checks the four setup states.
- A server test checks that a cross-site callback gets the interstitial
and does not use the OAuth state, and that the same-origin repeat
completes the connection.
- Manual check on a hosted staging deployment. GitHub, Google Drive,
Composio, Notion, PostHog and Railway each connected from one screen and
returned to the Permissions tab. On Railway, "Set all" changed all 65
write actions, and the change remained after a reload.
- Visual changes: snapshot baselines are intentionally not updated. See
the `doc/design/DECISION-SHEET.md` entry "Per-change snapshot
verification demoted to dormant (Jul 13 2026)".

## Risks

- **Fewer confirmation clicks.** Organization-wide access is the
default, and the user does not confirm it on a separate step. This was
already the preselected answer. The flow shows the default before the
user clicks and again after the connection.
- **Google write scope.** Google apps now request the write-capable
scope by default. A narrower scope needs a new sign-in.
- **Dynamic registration from live metadata.** A provider can advertise
registration and then reject a redirect URI. Asana rejects hosted
callbacks, for example. In that case registration fails, and the
customer-owned client path remains available for recovery.
- **Callback interstitial.** The OAuth callback adds one same-origin
step for cross-site browser navigations. Browsers without `Sec-Fetch-*`
headers use the old direct path.
- Chat and bot connectors (Discord, Telegram, Microsoft Teams, iMessage)
do not change.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

- Claude Opus 5.5 (Anthropic), model ID `claude-opus-5-5`, used through
Claude Code with tool use (shell, file editing, browser automation) and
extended thinking. It wrote the code, the tests and this description. A
human product owner directed the work and tested it by hand.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: scotttong <squadbot000@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-30 23:13:47 -07:00
DottaandPaperclip ad55d0a281 fix(connections): repair personal credentials and request write access (#14739)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Agents use Apps through a gateway that checks identity, company
access, and action policies.
> - Personal pasted credentials can point to company secrets. Setup can
show success while the gateway rejects every call.
> - Several OAuth methods also omit the scopes needed for their
supported write actions.
> - This pull request gives setup, health checks, and invocation the
same credential rules. Owners repair existing connections by
reconnecting.
> - New connections request reviewed permissions for their supported
actions. Read-only choices remain available under Advanced.
> - Agents can use the connections people give them, while existing
consent, identity boundaries, and action restrictions remain enforced.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #14009 and #14008. This addresses the personal-credential defect.
The separate GitHub organization-identity selection defect is outside
this change.

Related work: #13942 fixed part of new personal-key setup. #14200
independently fixes legacy personal reconnect and protects managed-agent
profile credentials during removal. This PR covers that ownership
invariant across key and secret-URL setup, reconnect, health, discovery,
and invocation, and keeps owner reconnect as the repair path. #14059
tracks requested versus provider-asserted OAuth scopes; it remains
separate work. I searched open PRs and issues for Zapier, Airtable
scopes, connector writes, and personal credential failures.

**What happened?**

A Zapier secret URL saved through personal setup can become a company
secret referenced by a user grant. Health checks bypass the gateway's
ownership check, so the connection appears healthy but calls fail with
`grant_credential_invalid`. Custom-header paths can also receive a
duplicate `credentials.` prefix. Omitted OAuth scopes make write access
depend on provider defaults.

**Expected behavior**

Personal invocation credentials belong to the selected user. Setup,
health, and actual calls enforce the same rule. New connections request
documented permissions for supported read and write actions. Existing
tokens gain no permissions without provider consent.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Connect Zapier or a generic secret URL with the personal identity.
2. Allow an agent to use the connection and complete setup.
3. Invoke a tool through a run-scoped gateway. The legacy layout fails
ownership validation despite successful setup.

**Paperclip version or commit**

The implementation started from
`44736c9c7c67b7b646ead9d51721db10f5b83835` and was rebased onto master
at `94e8dec56`.

**Deployment mode**

Built from source. Regression tests use isolated PostgreSQL fixtures and
controlled MCP transports.

## What Changed

- Share credential writing, ownership validation, and canonical paths
across initial setup, resume, reconnect, rotation, health, discovery,
and gateway calls. Keep OAuth client-registration secrets separate from
invocation credentials.
- Existing personal connections with company-scoped credentials require
owner reconnect with a fresh key or secret URL. Reconnect creates a
correctly owned value and updates the existing grant and declarations.
There is no automatic ownership backfill or new startup hook.
- Preserve PostgreSQL timestamp precision when reconnect checks whether
a grant changed. Previously, converting the timestamp to a JavaScript
Date could reject reconnect with a false concurrent-change error.
- Protect credentials used by other grants, connections, bindings,
managed-agent profiles, routine triggers, or secret proposals from
connection removal.
- Review all 117 tool methods, including 84 OAuth methods. Record
explicit scopes or documented provider-default exceptions with official
evidence. Add Airtable's seven scopes, Hugging Face repository/job
scopes, and other documented MCP permissions.
- Prefer available write-capable methods. Put explicit read-only choices
under Advanced. Explain pasted-key permissions and offer reconnect for
missing OAuth consent. Preserve existing grants, policies, Google
availability gates, and curated scope allowlists.
- Reconnect generic secret URLs and custom headers using their stored
credential fields. Refresh the catalog after setup, correct reconnect
feedback and error guidance, and let Cancel exit invalid setup while
Save & exit retains draft-saving behavior.
- Apply ownership checks to the new GitHub repository/skill connection
picker. Align the permission audit with the Google scope reductions
merged on master.
- Add run-scoped gateway, ownership, owner-reconnect, OAuth URL,
insufficient-scope, UI, and catalog-wide regression coverage. Update the
connector playbook and permission audit.

## Verification

Latest commit `97bc0b86e0eae0ec892e4ac44beff1a66164b20e` passes all
CI/status gates (55 completed check runs, no failures or pending checks)
and has a completed Greptile review at **5/5 with no outstanding
findings**. GitHub reports the PR as mergeable/CLEAN.

- **Embedded browser:** used the actual server and built UI from this
worktree, a fresh isolated database, and local HTTP MCP fixtures.
Completed personal bearer-key, secret-URL, and custom-header setup;
reproduced the legacy ownership failure; reconnected through the owner’s
form; and completed writes afterward. Read-back was verified for
bearer-key and secret-URL connections. Public organization-wide setup
appeared immediately in Browse without reload. Zapier URL
validation/Cancel and Google’s enrollment gate were also exercised.
- **Persistence and invocation:** verified user ownership, canonical
`credentials.authorization` / `remote.url` / `headers.X-Api-Key`
declarations, and unchanged connection/grant identity. The old company
secrets retain their ownership. Separate HTTP calls through an actual
run-scoped gateway session completed a write and read-back.
- **Backend coverage:** the final gateway suite passes all 82 cases,
including catalog Zapier and generic inline reconnect. It checks
company/user isolation, canonical declarations, same-endpoint URL
validation, fresh credentials, retained restrictions, and real gateway
read/write execution using fixture transport. A timestamp with
PostgreSQL microseconds covers the former false reconnect conflict.
- **Local checks:** 368 catalog, gateway, repository, and UI tests
passed before the final extra Zapier case; 49 GitHub skill access tests
also passed. All three Apps browser regressions pass, including
reconnect through the actual form and catalog visibility without reload.
Full `pnpm -r typecheck`, `pnpm build`, server typecheck after the final
patch, and token gates passed. Full tool-access service runs hit varying
15-second Google fixture timeouts; both affected cases and the updated
reconnect assertion pass in isolation (3 tests). The complete test
matrix passes in CI on this head.
- **Verification limits:** no live provider account was available for
Zapier/Airtable/OAuth consent or account-bound write proof. Public
metadata and local fixtures do not establish provider consent. The
original development database clone failed on a pre-existing missing
`tool_connections_transport_check` constraint; browser acceptance used a
fresh isolated database created by the normal CLI onboarding flow.

## Risks

- Existing broken personal connections stay unusable until their owner
reconnects. Health, discovery, and invocation return an actionable
ownership error; startup does not rewrite credential ownership.
- Scope changes affect new authorization requests. Providers may still
require resource selection, account roles, paid plans, or app
verification. Existing consent and action restrictions remain unchanged.
- Shared credentials are retained rather than reassigned or revoked.
Provider-default exceptions and unavailable live checks are documented
in `doc/connections/CONNECTOR-PERMISSION-AUDIT.md`.
- No new endpoint, database table, lockfile change, or CI workflow
change is included.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, based on GPT-6, with reasoning, code editing, shell
execution, web research, and browser tools. The exact deployment model
ID and context window were not exposed in this session.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-09-30 14:32:34 -05:00
DottaandPaperclip d432dc7fa3 Add GitHub-synced skill sources (#14713)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Company skills supply instructions and files to those agents.
> - GitHub imports already exist, but users cannot manage repositories
as skill sources.
> - Repository refresh also needs caller-authorized access and complete
local packages.
> - This pull request adds Sources inside Skills and reuses GitHub
connections from Apps.
> - Installed snapshots let agents use skills without fetching GitHub
during a run.
> - Manual refresh preserves skill identity and leaves failed imports on
their last good version.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**Subsystem affected**

Cross-cutting: skills UI, server, database, shared contracts, and
runtime materialization.

**Problem or motivation**

Users keep skills in GitHub repositories. They need a clear way to
select, import, and refresh those skills. Existing imports do not expose
repository management or consistently preserve supporting files.

**Proposed solution**

Add company-scoped skill sources. Browse repositories from all
accessible GitHub connections, or paste a public repository or branch
URL. Select whole skill packages, inspect included files and reference
warnings, and install complete, immutable snapshots. Refresh each source
manually.

**Alternatives considered**

Project repository settings hide the workflow from Skills. A second
GitHub connector would duplicate credentials and grants. Upstream
editing and PR creation are separate work.

**Roadmap alignment**

This implements the Skills Manager direction in ROADMAP.md. The
maintainer requested this scope and reviewed the component and full-app
journey stories before implementation.

Related reports: Refs #10285, Refs #10949, Refs #13464. Related work:
#14356, #13656, #9268.

## What Changed

- Add source and entry records, an idempotent migration, company-scoped
APIs, and legacy GitHub import adoption.
- Reuse current caller grants and credential refresh. Combine and
deduplicate repository inventories across accessible connections. Pasted
public URLs also prefer the active user’s authorized connections. Tokens
stay in the Git child environment, never argv or disk.
- Fetch a shallow Git snapshot at one immutable commit. Scan the full
local tree, including hidden and nested folders. Read Git objects
without checkout or archive transformations and enforce nested package
boundaries.
- Bound Git downloads to 128 MiB and three minutes. Cancel active
process groups and remove incomplete downloads. Preserve cancellation
and deadlines while progress drains; close stalled HTTP progress streams
after 30 seconds. Reuse caller-scoped temporary snapshots for
preview/import after reauthorization.
- Index repository package boundaries once and cap expanded work at
1,000 packages, 10,000 files, and 100 MiB, including repeated copies of
shared blobs. Bound path depth and the shared path index. Discovery
keeps audited manifests without retaining all package bodies.
- Resolve moving branches before fetching so unchanged discovery reuses
caller-scoped snapshots. Limit active scans, scan frequency, and new
downloads per caller and company; quotas apply before metadata reads and
across connections, and cached scans do not consume the download quota.
- Store complete versions with script content, binary bytes, and
executable modes. Preserve these through copies, runtime caches, and
runner packaging.
- Stage downloads before publication. Use source leases, revision
checks, and transactional activity records. Keep installed versions
after failures, upstream deletion, deselection, and disconnect.
- Add the approved import flow, Sources page, selection tree,
provenance, read-only Studio behavior, and saved return from GitHub
setup.
- Add package manifests, commit-pinned file previews, and separate
runtime requirements and reference warnings. Supporting files are
included together; nested skills remain independently selectable.
Preview requests reauthorize the caller and re-audit package content.
- Show installed skills as compact links beneath each source. Repository
titles open GitHub. Keep Refresh, Select skills, and Disconnect source
in a three-dot menu. Source rows omit the branch, imported count, and
refresh timestamp; action alignment and repository titles work at narrow
widths.
- Stream discovery metadata over an opt-in NDJSON response. Show
measured Git download progress and real package/file counts, animate
newly checked skills, support cancellation, and require a complete scan
before selection. Keep the existing JSON API.
- Retain component stories and add a separate full-app journey story
group. Include fixed progress states and interactive scan,
large-repository, interruption, and saving stories.
- Update Skills documentation and product contracts. Suppress private
GitHub skill references in telemetry. Privacy review requested for the
telemetry changes.

## Verification

- Local repository typecheck, full build, token gates, and Storybook
build passed during this work. Focused transport, authorization,
scanner, persistence, route, and UI tests pass. The final UI refinement
passes all eight focused UI tests, UI typecheck/build, and token gates.
The scanner resource and repeated-discovery fixes pass 132 focused
scanner, transport, authorization, source-service, route, and rate-limit
tests, plus server typecheck/build. Full-suite verification comes from
CI; the older full local Vitest run was stopped after unrelated chat
failures and a font-test failure, all of which passed in fresh focused
runs. At commit `1098d5996`, all 54 active checks pass; two optional
Storybook jobs are skipped. CI covers repository typecheck, build, the
full test suites, browser shards, and the canary dry run. Greptile is
5/5 with no open findings; the security scan also passes.
- Adversarial scanner tests verify repeated-blob byte accounting with
and without declared sizes, package/file/path caps, one-time repository
indexing, metadata-only discovery audits, and nested package boundaries.
Additional tests cover branch movement, snapshot reuse, caller/company
quotas, isolation across connections, active-lease cleanup, quota
recovery, and rejection before any metadata API call.
- Real Git tests verify hidden paths, exact binary bytes, executable
modes, export-ignore preservation, symlink/submodule reporting, pinned
commits, caller-scoped cache reuse, cancellation, cleanup, and
credential isolation. Regression tests hold both download slots with
permanently blocked progress callbacks, verify timeout/cancellation
cleanup and retry, and exercise HTTP backpressure cancellation. Access
tests cover automatic public-URL connection selection and revoked
grants. Database tests verify company and grant audiences.
- Live isolated browser test: the public `anthropics/skills` scan now
completes and discovers all 20 skills without connecting an account.
Imported canvas-design with all 83 files, opened it from Sources, and
verified the installed binary-font preview/download control. Package
previews also expose the complete file inventory before import.
Cancelled an active Git download and retried successfully to all 20
discovered skills; the browser displayed measured download progress. The
current audits reject four other packages; eligible selections remain
importable.
- Browser checks verify the simplified source rows at desktop and narrow
widths, keyboard navigation into the actions menu, Refresh from the
menu, selection, and fixture disconnect with installed skills retained.
Storybook includes a menu-open checkpoint and a 320px layout.
- Storybook includes receiving/preparing download checkpoints and a
timed full-app import journey, plus cancellation, retry,
large-repository, and saving states. Streaming tests cover split UTF-8
frames, incomplete streams, late responses, cross-company requests, HTTP
errors, and JSON compatibility.
- Earlier live acceptance on this PR imported `stitch-skill` with
`DESIGN.md`, assigned it to an agent, disconnected its source, and ran a
successful Studio test that read both installed files. An editable copy
changed independently. Both Skills variants, mobile selection, and
return from GitHub setup were exercised.
- Private access, revoked credentials, OAuth success return,
binary/script preservation, concurrent refresh, transaction rollback,
version pins, and legacy adoption have automated coverage. A real
private-repository OAuth grant was not created during this test.

## Risks

- The migration groups recognizable legacy imports without provider
calls. Their first successful refresh completes the local package
snapshot.
- Reference checks are advisory. They cover Markdown links and explicit
relative resource paths, not arbitrary runtime dependency graphs.
Preview text is capped at 64 KiB; imported bytes remain complete.
- Git must be installed on the server. Shallow fetches still download
the branch snapshot, including files outside selected packages.
Downloads have size/time/concurrency limits. Temporary caches are
bounded and caller-scoped. GitHub API quota still applies to repository
metadata and the connection picker; content no longer uses per-file API
requests. Failed scans retain installed content.
- Sources depend on the current caller's GitHub access. A saved
connection does not grant access to another person's token.
- GitHub script support and immediate manual refresh are explicit
maintainer-approved requirements. The operator trusts the selected
repository and accepts upstream script and executable-mode changes on
refresh. Static audits are not a sandbox or a guarantee of safe code;
agents may later invoke installed helpers under their runtime
permissions. Import and refresh do not execute scripts, hooks, package
installation, or builds. Raw URL and skills.sh imports keep their prior
script restrictions.
- Source originals remain read-only. Refresh affects subsequent unpinned
runs; explicit pins and active runs retain their versions.
- The telemetry change removes source-managed GitHub identifiers from
skill-reference events. It introduces no event or field. Please review
the privacy boundary.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, based on GPT-6, with reasoning, code execution, and
browser tools. The exact serving model ID and context-window size are
not exposed in this session.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-09-30 13:32:58 -05:00
DottaandPaperclip d72389bee2 feat: add Browser Use Cloud connector and live task browsers (#14627)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - The Apps gateway gives agents governed access to external tools.
> - Browser Use Cloud can run browser work, but a tool result alone does
not let a person watch or take over.
> - A task needs a durable browser session, a visible viewer, and
recorded costs.
> - This pull request adds a Browser Use Cloud v4 connection and
interactive browser tabs on tasks.
> - People can follow the work, interact with the page, and retain the
browser after the agent finishes.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**Problem or motivation**

Agents need governed access to Browser Use Cloud. People need to see and
interact with the same browser from the task. A browser must remain
available after a run finishes and appear at the correct point in the
task feed.

**Proposed solution**

Add a native REST connection for the v4 API. Bind each session to its
company, task, agent, and credential grant. Open its interactive viewer
in the task side panel. Record provider costs as financial events. Use
`browser-use-cloud` as the app and connector key. Keep its skill with
the connector and deliver it only with authorized connection tools.

**Alternatives considered**

A v3 MCP connection would expose tools without the v4 lifecycle
integration. An external viewer link would leave the task. A fixed
viewer size would prevent pages from responding to changes in the task
pane.

**Roadmap alignment**

This extends the governed Apps gateway and Connected Apps roadmap. It
uses the existing task, grant, secret, approval, and financial records.
The work was requested by the maintainer. A search found no duplicate
Browser Use connector PR or issue.

## What Changed

- Add the Browser Use Cloud app, brand asset, API-key connection, and
profile settings under the `browser-use-cloud` key.
- Bundle the `browser-use-cloud` skill with the connector. Keep it out
of global `skills/` discovery. Deliver it only with authorized task/run
connection tools. Remove retired connector skill keys from runtime
overlays and preserve unrelated browser skills.
- Expose seven v4 tools through the governed gateway and deliver them to
native and CLI agents.
- Persist sessions, browsers, runs, event and recovery cursors, shutdown
leases, and cumulative cost accounting. Recover uncertain paid starts
without replaying them.
- Enforce task ownership, credential grants, approvals, revoked access,
and budget limits.
- Add interactive task browser tabs and compact chronological feed
entries. Retain the viewer across tab switches and keep visible idle
browsers open.
- Add debounced automatic viewport fitting, standard size presets, and a
viewer ownership lease.
- Add lifecycle, authorization, accounting, viewport, UI, and Storybook
coverage.
- Add an idempotent database migration after the current master
migration. Preserve deployed migration hashes. Migrate pre-release Cloud
connection and financial keys without replacing grants, credentials, or
browser history.
- Document provider behavior, live acceptance results, and the lack of
documented passkey forwarding.

## Verification

- Full workspace typecheck and production build pass on the updated
branch.
- Token gates, brand asset validation, module boundaries, and migration
ordering pass.
- Cloud tests verify global skill exclusion, authorized task/run
delivery, unassigned agents, disabled connections, revocation, adapter
isolation, and secret exclusion. The existing AgentMail connector
assignment test also passes.
- Migration replay runs twice against existing browser work and
financial records. It preserves the records and avoids duplicate costs.
- The focused provider, app catalog, OpenAPI, connection gateway, and
migration regression suites pass. Recovery coverage includes lost
replies, process crashes, provider rejection, and browser arrival
acknowledgement.
- All 54 checks pass on `2974b5f03641ad0cea3c941d8c02579316fa8c92`,
including the full test matrix, browser E2E shards, build, typecheck,
security, and release canary. Two optional Storybook jobs are skipped.
- Greptile is 5/5 on the same commit, with zero unresolved review
threads. The corrected review uses the actual master-to-head diff.
- The local `pnpm test:run` started and was stopped after the full CI
matrix passed. It did not complete locally; the full-suite result above
comes from CI.
- Earlier live acceptance used an isolated company with a capped
provider credential. The agent opened paperclip.ing, the embedded viewer
accepted navigation, and the same browser stayed available after
completion and tab switches.
- The local Storybook build passes. Stories cover the panel, footer,
feed entries, settings, lifecycle failures, and viewport modes with an
offline viewer fixture.

## Risks

- Browser Use charges for hosted work. Provider caps and local budget
checks reduce exposure; reported costs can arrive after work completes.
- Viewer and CDP URLs grant access to the browser. The server validates
and restricts them. They are excluded from agent results and durable
event data.
- Runtime resizing of v4 agent browsers uses a provider option confirmed
by live testing but absent from its published agent schema. Resizing
during a click may invalidate coordinates. Fixed presets remain
available.
- Viewport ownership is process-local and resets on restart. The
lifecycle and accounting records remain in the database.
- The original intermittent embedded-viewer stall has not been fully
diagnosed. A bounded reconnect and active-session recovery cover the
observed failure paths.
- Live tests did not cover every revocation, approval, rate-limit, or
restart case. Deterministic integration tests cover those paths. Passkey
forwarding is not claimed.
- Unknown create outcomes keep the credential available for cleanup.
Run-list absence cannot prove a paid POST was rejected, so recovery
stays pending until it can identify provider work.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-6. Used reasoning, repository search, code execution,
browser interaction, and test tools. The exact serving model ID and
context-window size were not exposed in this session.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-09-30 07:13:16 -05:00
DottaandPaperclip 8781f06a87 feat(connections): enable MCP aggregators by default (#13964)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip helps people manage AI agents for work.
> - Connections let those agents use external services with explicit
access rules.
> - Zapier, Arcade, Composio Connect, and Executor already have setup
and runtime support.
> - Their experimental switch still blocks discovery and setup by
default.
> - This pull request removes those gates and the Settings toggle.
> - Users can connect these providers without enabling an experiment.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #13755. Refs #13941.

**What existing behavior does this improve?**
Apps browsing, inline setup, and agent connection search for the four
MCP aggregators.

**Current behavior**
An instance must enable the MCP aggregators experiment before users or
agents can start setup.

**Proposed behavior**
All four providers are available by default on local and managed
instances. Old stored and managed values still parse but cannot disable
them.

## What Changed

- Remove the aggregator gates from Apps, inline setup, server setup, and
agent search.
- Remove the Settings toggle and its UI hook.
- Retain the old setting key only for upgrade compatibility. Normalize
it to true and ignore managed overrides, as Apps already does.
- Replace opt-in fixtures with default-on coverage. Test old false
values, all four setup flows, provider choice, and the removed toggle.
- Update current connector guidance and remove the opt-in from the
runner acceptance fixture.

## Verification

- 306 focused tests passed across eight files: shared remote MCP
contracts; server remote MCP lifecycle, aggregator fallback, settings
normalization, and managed overlay; UI Apps browsing, setup, and
experimental settings.
- Server and UI TypeScript checks passed.
- UI token gates and `git diff --check` passed.
- The full local suite was not run, per the maintainer's instruction.
All 54 CI checks passed; two checks were skipped. One unrelated
workspace-preview readiness timeout passed on one failed-shard retry.
- The setup fixtures use simulated MCP responses. This change does not
claim new live provider acceptance.

## Risks

- Existing instances now show all four providers, even if the old flag
was false. This is intentional.
- External provider choice, credentials, company isolation, agent
grants, and tool policies still apply. Showing a connector does not
authorize an external account.
- No data migration is required. The compatibility key keeps old managed
configuration documents valid.
- Historical Zapier live acceptance remains incomplete in the existing
evidence report. The maintainer explicitly requested the default-on
rollout for all four existing providers; the report records that scoped
exception.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-6 (`gpt-6-astra`) through Codex, with reasoning, repository
tools, and test execution. The context window size is not exposed in
this session.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-09-24 17:31:32 -05:00
DottaandPaperclip 18dac1e1ef feat(connections): add experimental memory providers and remote MCP access (#13942)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip manages AI agents and their work.
> - Connections give agents governed access to external tools.
> - Agents need durable memory across tasks and execution environments.
> - Mem0, Zep, Supermemory, Cognee, and Honcho provide hosted memory
tools.
> - This pull request adds their setup flows behind an experimental
toggle.
> - It also delivers assigned MCP tools through the native remote Codex
runner.
> - Operators can connect a provider once and use the same governed
tools locally or in Daytona.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**Problem or motivation**

The Apps catalog lacks a complete set of memory providers. Remote native
Codex agents also need access to assigned managed MCP tools without
receiving provider credentials.

**Proposed solution**

Add five memory connectors behind the disabled-by-default Experimental
memory connectors setting. Use the existing connection setup and
permissions UI. Default their tools to Allowed. Preserve company
boundaries, operator permission changes, provider scopes, and audit
attribution.

**Alternatives considered**

Direct provider credentials in each sandbox would duplicate setup and
bypass the managed gateway. The remote runner instead uses its existing
protocol channel to call the gateway on the server.

**Roadmap alignment**

This maintainer-requested experiment supports the Memory / Knowledge and
Connected Apps roadmap areas. It adds provider connections without
introducing a separate memory UI. Related connector authoring
documentation is tracked in #13692; no duplicate memory-provider
implementation was found.

## What Changed

- Add provider definitions, official branding, and the experimental
setting for all five providers.
- Use OAuth for Zep and Supermemory, API credentials for Mem0 and
Honcho, and a bundled Cloud API bridge for Cognee with no runtime
downloads or subprocesses.
- Default memory tools to Allowed and classify destructive actions
explicitly.
- Fix personal remote credential resolution and propagate provider tool
errors.
- Relay assigned managed MCP tools to remote native Codex through the
runner protocol. Recheck current authority for each call and rotate
stale tool contracts.
- Add 21 Storybook states and complete OAuth walkthrough fixtures.
- Document provider research, sanitized tool inventory, and live local
and Daytona proof.

## Verification

- Passed workspace typecheck: `pnpm -r typecheck`.
- Passed production build: `pnpm build`.
- Full local `pnpm test:run`: 13,273 passed, with failures from
process/readiness timeouts under parallel load. Reran all 16 affected
suites with one worker: 456 passed, leaving two macOS `/var` versus
`/private/var` path assertions. Both passed with `TMPDIR=/private/tmp`.
No test failures remain unverified. Latest-head remote CI passes all 54
checks (two optional Storybook jobs skipped). Greptile is 5/5 with no
unresolved findings.
- Latest Cognee gateway regression: 71 passed, including public
deployment without a runtime host and immediate recovery after a
provider error. Bundled bridge tests: 25 passed.
- Browser setup and real agent tasks exercised all five providers. Mem0,
Cognee, Zep, and Honcho have successful store/retrieve proof.
- Supermemory now has scoped read/write consent. Local storage and real
Daytona write, document read, and semantic recall passed; indexing
completion was verified before claiming success.
- All five providers were exercised through a real Daytona sandbox and
its native runner MCP relay. Provider credentials remained on the
server. The final bundled Cognee bridge also passed a fresh Daytona
store/recall run. All disposable sandboxes were removed and verified
absent after testing.
- Storybook is rebuilt and contains the experimental toggle, catalog,
setup, permissions, and error states. The Zep and Supermemory access
steps advance correctly.

## Risks

- Provider OAuth scopes and plan limits remain independent of Paperclip
tool permissions. An Allowed tool can still be rejected by the provider.
- Providers can queue memory indexing; save acceptance does not prove
that semantic recall is ready.
- Remote tool contracts must stay synchronized with current connection
authority. Regression tests cover revocation and stale contracts.
- This change has no database migration. Existing connections remain
usable when the experimental catalog toggle is disabled.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 Astra (`gpt-6-astra`), with reasoning, repository
edits, code execution, and browser automation. The exact context window
size is not exposed in this session. Live acceptance agents used
`gpt-5.6-sol`.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-09-24 15:54:38 -05:00
Michael Nguyen 30182c704c feat(telemetry): propose connector telemetry events behind proposal markers (#13582)
Adds connection.created / connection.updated / connection.invoked as proposed-telemetry wrappers (unregistered; the TelemetryClient cannot queue or send them) plus the server-side emitter wiring and tests. No telemetry is transmitted by this change. Proposal: #13578. Coordinated release plan and review package: PAP-24 (Step A.1).
2026-09-23 22:32:40 +00:00
DottaandPaperclip 24429024e7 feat: add Fireflies connector and summary-ready routines (#13890)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Apps gives agents governed access to external tools through stored
credentials.
> - Routines start work when an external service sends an event.
> - Fireflies provides meeting transcripts and summaries through an
official hosted MCP server.
> - This PR adds that connection and accepts signed meeting events
through the shared app webhook flow.
> - Agents can review completed meetings with the same permissions and
audit records as other work.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**Problem or motivation**

Operators need agents to read Fireflies meetings and start follow-up
work when a summary is ready. The Apps catalog lacks Fireflies. The
shared app webhook flow needs to accept its signed deliveries.

**Proposed solution**

Use the official Fireflies MCP endpoint with OAuth or a vaulted bearer
API key. Extend the existing Another app or script flow with signed
webhook support. Verify the raw-body signature and pass the JSON payload
as external data. Select Meeting Summarized in Fireflies. Deduplicate
identical signed deliveries, including setup deliveries.

**Alternatives considered**

A separate REST connector would duplicate the governed MCP path.
Polling, legacy V1 payloads, and automatic provider-side webhook
registration are outside this change.

**Roadmap alignment**

This extends the existing MCP Tool Gateway & Apps and Scheduled Routines
surfaces. It adds a provider to those systems. It does not introduce a
second integration framework.

**Additional context**

A GitHub search found no existing Fireflies issues or PRs. Provider
references and verification limits are in
`doc/connections/FIREFLIES.md`.

## What Changed

- Add the official Fireflies catalog definition, generated registry,
provider evidence, and branded artwork.
- Reuse Access → Connect, dynamic discovery, Permissions, vault storage,
policy, and audit behavior.
- Classify Fireflies sharing, movement, and access revocation as writes.
- Preserve Off and Ask first restrictions during OAuth reauthorization
and API-key replacement. New actions retain normal defaults.
- Add `app_webhook` authentication to the shared Another app or script
flow. Accept bearer tokens or raw-body HMAC-SHA256. Preserve earlier
`fireflies_hmac` triggers and revision snapshots for compatibility.
Existing text columns need no migration.
- Verify `X-Hub-Signature` or `X-Hub-Signature-256` against the exact
request body. Preserve generic event payloads and deduplicate identical
signed requests.
- Keep the routine wizard generic. Show one webhook URL and secret in
Another app or script. Keep all new app webhook event names
provider-neutral. Keep provider setup instructions in the connector
documentation.
- Pass generic webhook JSON to the task in an explicit external-data
block, capped at 16,384 characters. Keep strict meeting validation for
existing legacy Fireflies triggers.

## Verification

- Feature implementation commit `0882dc8a1`: all 54 CI checks passed;
two conditional Storybook checks skipped. This includes full tests,
typecheck, build, browser E2E, canary dry run, and security checks.
Greptile rated this commit 5/5; all review threads are resolved.
- Full local `pnpm -r typecheck`, `pnpm build`, and token gates passed
on the final code. Targeted connector, gateway, webhook, revision, and
UI suites passed during implementation. After the provider-neutral
follow-up, all 84 app-webhook and routine-service tests passed; the
final payload-to-task assertion also passed in the 72-test routine suite
and a clean-config rerun.
- The long local `pnpm test:run` invocation started before the final
edits and was stopped after the final-commit CI suites passed. It
reported one generic webhook test failure while those files were
changing; that test and the entire routine suite passed on the final
source, including a clean-config reproduction. The interrupted local run
is not counted as a full-suite pass.
- In the embedded browser, completed official OAuth consent and
discovered 20 live actions. Real meeting listing, transcript retrieval,
and summary/action-item retrieval succeeded as the selected agent.
Turning a live read Off blocked its test; catalog refresh preserved the
restriction.
- Embedded-browser Another app or script setup, back/save/resume, narrow
layout, and a signed synthetic Fireflies delivery succeeded. The UI
reported authentication passed without creating a task. Fixtures cover
signature tampering, malformed requests, ordinary app event names,
duplicate/setup deliveries, rotation, revisions, pause/archive, and
company isolation.
- Existing MCP browser suite: 8 passed and 2 provider-dependent cases
skipped. Branding checks passed; connector artwork and webhook setup
were checked at desktop/mobile widths and in light/dark modes.
- An unauthenticated POST to a correctly formatted public webhook URL
reached the staging tenant verifier through the existing Cloud gateway.
- A real Fireflies webhook delivery remains unverified. A staging
callback is available for the operator walkthrough. Live API-key
authorization, credential expiry, and a new meeting's summary completion
were not tested against the provider. Fixtures cover these protocol and
lifecycle paths where applicable.

- Storybook follow-up `c54174faa`: 27 production-component stories cover
every UI change, with a source-to-story map in the connector
documentation. Static Storybook build, UI typecheck, token gates, and
Playwright checks for all stories and the mobile footer pass. All PR
checks passed for this Storybook follow-up; Greptile reviewed
`c54174faa` at 5/5.

## Risks

- Fireflies may change its hosted MCP tools or OAuth behavior. Tool
discovery stays dynamic. Experimental search/fetch tools are not
required.
- Public webhook setup requires HTTPS and a separate signing secret.
Fireflies normally emits events for meetings owned by the configuring
account.
- Reauthorization touches shared MCP permission code. Regression tests
cover existing restrictions, new actions, connection removal, and other
gateway callers.
- Webhook receipt grants no tool access. The routine agent still needs
an authorized Fireflies connection.

- New generic triggers rely on provider event subscriptions. Without a
sender-supplied idempotency key, changed request bytes count as a new
event. Existing legacy Fireflies triggers retain summary-only filtering
and per-meeting deduplication.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, model `gpt-6-astra`. Used reasoning, repository editing,
code execution, and embedded-browser testing. The runtime did not expose
a context-window size.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-09-23 17:11:16 -05:00
DottaandPaperclip a10702a878 feat(slack): add governed tools for Slack-origin tasks (#13828)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Chat connectors let people start and continue agent tasks from other
services.
> - A Slack conversation needs access to its surrounding discussion and
Slack collaboration tools.
> - The agent must use the linked requester's access and keep private
material within its permitted audience.
> - This pull request adds Slack tools through the existing connector
contribution and approval framework.
> - People can ask an invited bot to read a discussion, create follow-up
tasks, and collaborate in Slack.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**Subsystem affected**

Chat connectors, connector runtime, tool gateway, and connection
Settings/Access.

**Problem or motivation**

Slack-origin tasks can receive messages but cannot inspect the rest of a
channel or act through the originating bot. People must paste context or
configure a separate integration.

**Proposed solution**

Supply typed Slack tools and a bundled skill only to the originating
task and assigned agent. Resolve the linked requester on the server.
Check bot and requester access before reads and writes. Use existing
durable actions and approvals. Retrieved messages remain source
material.

**Alternatives considered**

Slack's user-OAuth MCP server does not replace the customer-created chat
bot. An unrestricted Web API proxy would not provide suitable permission
or publication boundaries.

**Roadmap alignment**

This extends the existing MCP Tool Gateway & Apps work with a provider
contribution. It does not add a task dispatcher or a separate Slack task
lifecycle. Related: #11144 covers generic per-user MCP grant execution;
this change binds Slack bot operations to chat-origin tasks.

## What Changed

- Add 39 typed Slack tools, a method/scope matrix, a bundled skill, and
shared native/HTTP execution.
- Bind tools to company, endpoint, task, run, assigned agent, and
admitted linked requester. Check membership and revocation on each call
and before queued writes.
- Add paginated reads, bounded history search, source links, messages,
file uploads, reactions, pins, bookmarks, topics, canvases, lists, and
approved channel operations.
- Restrict private-source publication, including automatic replies and
uploaded deliverables. Keep other people's bot DMs inaccessible.
- Reuse action receipts, idempotency, approvals, and reconciliation.
Suppress an identical explicit-send/final-reply duplicate. Return
governed results through their verified originating conversation.
- Add endpoint-bound personal search OAuth storage and lifecycle. Keep
native real-time search disabled until a runtime meets Slack's
transient-result requirements. Current runtimes use bounded history
search.
- Show capabilities, scope upgrades, and personal search authorization
in Settings/Access and Storybook. Document provider and runtime limits.

## Verification

- Current head `0eb21cba4`: CI checks pass and Greptile is 5/5 with no
unresolved findings. One unchanged rapid-callback timing test passed on
a single CI retry.
- Approval presentation regressions cover board-comment precedence and
exact Slack publication; the expanded database assertion passed in CI.
The local PostgreSQL startup probe later became unavailable, so that
final assertion was verified in CI. Slack setup and failed-run retry
browser tests also passed locally.

- Full workspace typecheck and build passed. Server typecheck/build
passed again after the approval routing fix.
- Broad local suites passed in separate groups: server 12,958 tests, UI
6,555, shared 770, skills catalog 20, and other workspace packages
2,652. CLI and serialized server checks passed after environment/timeout
retries. These are composite results, not one uninterrupted green
full-suite invocation.
- PostgreSQL authority regression covers admitted identity,
cross-company/task/agent rejection, recovery, retained-session
revocation, OAuth refresh/disconnect races, approval execution, exact
publication lineage, retries, uncertain sends, and duplicate
suppression.
- Gateway/response regressions cover separate-origin approval batches
and durable continuation. Focused provider, access, search, native
runtime, route, and AgentMail regressions pass.
- Storybook capability, missing-scope, OAuth configuration,
authorization, and disconnect states were inspected in the browser.
- Live staging: read a channel decision and full thread, create exactly
two assigned backlog tasks, add a reaction, paginate discovery to
exhaustion, and return bounded search matches with source links and
coverage.
- Live staging: create/edit/read a canvas and list, inspect the canvas
in Slack, post/edit one message, and create a channel only after
approval. New channels remain disabled for responses.
- Live staging: read a response-disabled channel from the requester's
DM; writes to that channel were denied. The test setting was restored.
- Final live retest passed: explicit file upload and exact content
read-back; approved deletion of only the disposable bot message;
continuation confirmation returned to the original Slack thread without
repeating the action.
- Optional OAuth, private multi-user boundaries, native RTS, and CLI
provider execution are not fully live-qualified. The staging agent
initially supplied malformed tool arguments; valid arguments succeeded,
and the tool/skill descriptions now emphasize UUID write keys.

## Risks

- Existing Slack apps must add scopes and reinstall for new
capabilities. Provider plans and document permissions can still restrict
operations.
- Instances need an independent `PAPERCLIP_TOOL_ACTION_SIGNING_SECRET`
for governed tool actions. The staging instance was configured with
explicit operator approval; fleet provisioning is a separate gap.
- Native RTS is not exposed on current transcript-retaining runtimes.
Bounded history scans are deliberately reported as incomplete. Inline
file reads support text/canvas content up to 256 KiB; other types return
metadata.
- Private document edits fail closed when the full audience cannot be
verified. Uncertain effects other than posts/uploads require inspection
instead of blind retries.
- Shared approval-delivery code now separates outcomes by source run to
preserve origin boundaries. No database migration is required.
- A separate completion-validator gap remains when the agent cites a
prior run's registered artifact during finalization. It asked for
registration again even though Slack delivery was confirmed. This change
does not add a connector-specific task-completion policy.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex, with repository tools, code execution, and
browser testing. The exact deployed model identifier and context-window
size were not exposed in the session.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-09-22 15:29:07 -05:00
DottaandPaperclip a959e47508 fix(apps): reduce Google Chat scopes and block unread filters (#13820)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Apps give agents controlled access to external services.
> - Google Chat uses OAuth profiles and reviewed MCP tools.
> - Those profiles request membership and read-state access that the
supported feature set does not need.
> - Removing read-state access also requires us to block unread search
filters, including on existing connections.
> - This pull request reduces both OAuth methods and enforces the
reduced search contract before dispatch.
> - Users retain conversation lookup, message history, ordinary search,
and approved message sending.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**

Both Google Chat profiles request membership and read-state scopes. The
supported tool set does not include membership listing or read-state
updates. Message search still advertises an unread filter. Related work:
Refs #12619.

**Expected behavior**

Managed and customer-owned OAuth request only the scopes needed for
supported features. Unsupported unread filters fail clearly before any
provider call. Existing cached catalogs and broader grants must not
bypass that policy.

**Steps to reproduce**

Start Google Chat OAuth from either connection method and inspect the
requested scopes. Inspect the message-search tool schema, then submit a
search with `searchParameters.isUnread` set to true or false.

**Paperclip version or commit**

The scope change is based on master at `110d176fc`.

**Deployment mode**

Managed Cloud and self-hosted instances with Google Chat Apps enabled.

## What Changed

- Remove `chat.memberships.readonly` and `chat.users.readstate.readonly`
from shared profiles and all four Chat connection methods.
- Hide unsupported read-state fields and instructions in agent and board
Test tool schemas.
- Reject explicit unread filters, including false, null, snake-case
fields, and encoded filter objects, before provider dispatch.
- Recheck previously approved calls and support existing profile-bound
and URL-only Chat connections.
- Add scope, signed broker request, OAuth URL, allowlist, schema, and
dispatch regression tests.
- Document coordinated app/broker rollout, existing-grant reconnects,
and the remaining deployment checks.

## Verification

- All seven focused OAuth and Chat gateway test files pass: 498 tests on
the rebased branch.
- `pnpm -r typecheck` and `pnpm build` pass, using pinned pnpm 9.15.4.
- The complete sharded CI test matrix passes, including general server,
Chat, workspace, serialized server, Runner, and all eight browser e2e
shards. The duplicate unsharded local `pnpm test:run` was stopped after
CI passed; it did not complete locally.
- `git diff --check` passes.
- `node scripts/ingest-app-definitions.mjs` succeeds and leaves the
branch unchanged. Google Workspace JSON is the durable reviewed input
used by the generator.
- All current-head CI checks pass at
`7ee755371714dc036fff1c7da844776fee3f2ec1`, including typecheck, build,
and canary dry run. Greptile is 5/5 with zero unresolved threads. The
generator concern was withdrawn after review of the source and
regeneration evidence.
- No production deployment or live Google consent test was performed.
After coordinated deployment, verify reduced consent scopes, normal
search/history, message sending, and rejection of unread filters.

## Risks

- Coordinate deployment with the companion Cloud broker scope change.
Mixed versions can reject exact-scope requests.
- Existing tokens are not narrowed or revoked. Grants with old scopes
need new consent. Do not revoke a shared Google client to migrate one
profile.
- Explicit unread filters now return an error instead of being sent to
Google. Ordinary search and the approved send tool remain available.
- No database, UI, lockfile, or workflow changes.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, a GPT-5-based coding agent, with tool use and code
execution. The exact runtime model ID and context window were not
exposed in this session.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-09-22 15:12:30 -05:00
Devin FoleyandPaperclip c496acb570 Return client errors for known OAuth reconnect states (#13794)
Map missing OAuth refresh credentials and terminal reauthorization to HTTP 422. Preserve reconnect instructions and reporting of unexpected provider failures.

All 363 focused tests and server typecheck pass. Required CI and review checks passed; Greptile 5/5 with no unresolved comments.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-09-21 20:50:01 -07:00
Devin FoleyandPaperclip a7d3b17a97 Explain disabled Slack MCP app access during discovery
Recognize Slack's exact disabled-app response and return actionable setup
instructions from catalog and health routes. Bound response parsing and keep
unknown upstream errors reportable without exposing provider settings links.

Verified 361 focused tests, server typecheck, and authenticated discovery.
The three route regressions fail before this change and pass afterward.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-09-21 20:25:06 -07:00
Devin FoleyandPaperclip 878734a061 fix(tools): treat OAuth sign-in challenges as client errors (#13786)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Connected apps can require OAuth sign-in before they list their
tools.
> - Remote discovery recognizes this condition as `oauth_challenge`.
> - Discovery and catalog refresh currently return it as HTTP 502.
> - The server error handler reports that response as a crash.
> - This pull request returns HTTP 422 for the explicit sign-in
challenge.
> - The operator keeps the sign-in instructions, while unexpected
upstream failures remain reportable.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**

Connecting a remote MCP app that answers with a recognized OAuth
challenge returns HTTP 502. Reading an empty catalog or explicitly
refreshing it does the same. The server error handler then sends the
expected sign-in condition to error monitoring.

**Expected behavior**

A known sign-in requirement returns HTTP 422 with the existing
`oauth_challenge` code, message, and setup/reconnect links. An
unexplained upstream HTTP 400 or an unavailable upstream service still
returns 502 and reaches error monitoring.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Configure a remote MCP app that returns HTTP 401 with a Bearer
challenge.
2. Connect the app, read its empty catalog, or request a catalog
refresh.
3. Observe HTTP 502 and a server error report before this change.

**Paperclip version or commit**

Reproduced on `6de50ba594b15efaa3eae6ed869cd39b3a436456`.

**Deployment mode**

Server with remote MCP connections. The regression coverage uses local
PostgreSQL and mocked upstream HTTP responses.

Related: #9750 addresses MCP initialization and session recovery. It
does not change the classification of this recognized sign-in condition.
Targeted searches found no duplicate classification PR.

## What Changed

- Return 422 for `oauth_challenge` from discovery and from catalog
health-error normalization.
- Preserve the existing structured error and remediation links.
- Test automatic empty-catalog reads and explicit refreshes. Verify that
OAuth challenges produce no Sentry capture and that upstream 400/503
failures still do.
- Update the direct-connect and blocked-redirect expectations and
document the monitoring behavior.

## Verification

- Before the fix, three sign-in route regressions fail with 502 instead
of 422; all four upstream-error controls pass.
- After the fix, all 339 tool-access and error-handler tests pass,
including authorization and redirect protections.
- These suites ran against disposable Homebrew PostgreSQL 16.14 through
the existing test-constructor seam. The temporary setup and config
remain outside the repository. CI uses the ordinary embedded PostgreSQL
setup.
- Direct server `tsc --noEmit` passes.
- Full build and recursive typecheck were attempted; the Runner Rust
step cannot run because `cargo` is absent on this machine.
- Full `pnpm test:run`: 8,211 passed, 14 failed, 4,759 skipped. The 36
failed files match the existing embedded PostgreSQL startup/cleanup and
macOS runtime-cache `EACCES` limitations. The changed database-backed
service suite passed separately with local PostgreSQL.
- Greptile: 5/5 with no unresolved comments. Seven CI workers received a
simultaneous shutdown signal; the failed jobs are being retried through
the normal workflow. Other completed checks passed.

## Risks

Low risk. Clients now receive 422 instead of 502 for the explicit
`oauth_challenge` condition. The code, message, and remediation links
remain available. No permissions, credential handling, OAuth discovery
rules, retry policy, or schema change. Other upstream failures retain
their existing behavior.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-6 via Codex, with reasoning, repository inspection, code
editing, and test execution. The session does not expose an exact model
snapshot or context-window size.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass (339 service and
error-handler tests; full workspace limitations are documented above)
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-09-22 00:34:45 +00:00
DottaandPaperclip 8813a50105 feat: run GitHub review bots through Paperclip agents (#13717)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip manages agent work as tasks and runs.
> - GitHub chat brings repository conversations into those tasks.
> - A review bot needs the assigned agent, its authority, and governed
provider tools.
> - The existing channel connection did not supply that review workflow
or a complete setup journey.
> - This pull request adds GitHub App setup, account access, event
prompts, task-bound review tools, and exact-commit checks.
> - Operators can inspect each review through the same task, run, and
activity systems.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**Subsystem affected**

GitHub chat, governed connection tools, task execution, shared/database
contracts, and connector setup UI.

**Problem or motivation**

Operators need a GitHub review bot that runs their assigned Paperclip
agent. Mentions and PR events must preserve task ownership and requester
authority. Provider publication must use the bot App identity and
enforce the configured permissions.

**Proposed solution**

Extend the existing GitHub chat connector with resumable App onboarding,
linked-member and sponsored-guest access, editable event prompts, and
governed review operations. Validate structured assessments on the
server and compute a stable Paperclip Review check for the exact head
commit.

**Alternatives considered**

A separate review scheduler would duplicate Paperclip execution and
permissions. Reusing personal GitHub credentials would change the bot
identity and credential boundary.

**Roadmap alignment**

This extends the existing Connected Apps and governed-tool
infrastructure. The project owner requested and approved this design.
Related PR #8645 imports external Codex review feedback; this change
runs an assigned Paperclip agent and publishes its results through the
existing chat connector.

## What Changed

- Include the current Paperclip instance origin in the copied setup
prompt. Storybook uses its configured Paperclip origin; callback
parameters and URL credentials are excluded.

- Add a Claude/Codex copy button in the real setup and Storybook opening
step. Its detailed prompt asks four setup questions and guides
embedded-browser setup, verification, and optional required checks.
Clipboard failure exposes selectable instructions.
- Add a tutorial that explains why App installation, review scheduling,
and required checks are separate choices.

- Add manifest registration, an existing-App path, separate installation
and repository selection, repository refresh, and explicit account
confirmation.
- Add low-trust agent guidance, effective capability verification,
member selection, and explicit restricted guests with a sponsor.
- Add configurable PR events, prompts, repository overrides, rating
thresholds, and separate formal-review permissions.
- Give the assigned agent governed App tools to read PRs, comment, begin
an assessment, submit findings, and optionally submit a formal review.
- Bind review history, root PR events, and inline replies to ordinary
tasks. Deduplicate deliveries/findings and reject stale publication.
- Link check Details to the underlying task on the current trusted
hostname, or to Reviews before task creation.
- Add schema migration 0283, API contracts, production UI, and 49
interactive Storybook states.
- Repair local lease recovery. Keep the Cloud Dockerfile identical to
master; no provider-pack layer or runtime-default environment variable
is added.
- Retry only rolled-back wake-admission transactions after transient
endpoint-lock contention. A deterministic held-lock regression proves
one accepted wake.

## Verification

- Current head: `7ba761fe007bb798400d3e62346fa964f607f0f8`, rebased on
master `d9b3a5653e41f2ee5a1345b97c86a238f7a5c8e9`. Dockerfile has zero
diff against master. Final workspace typecheck and build passed. The new
PostgreSQL migration regression passed and preserves existing relation
and constraint identities after replay.
- Greptile reviewed this exact head at 5/5. There are zero unresolved
review threads and no merge conflicts.
- All current-head checks are green: 54 passed and two conditional
Storybook jobs skipped. This includes complete server/workspace test
suites, build, typechecks, policy checks, Runner suites, browser suites,
and security status. One timing-sensitive callback-ordering test passed
in isolation and its CI shard passed one retry. The duplicate local
full-suite run was stopped after CI completed; it is not counted as a
local full-suite pass.
- Before the final Slack rebase and migration renumbering, 186 focused
GitHub tests, 14 native bootstrap cases, token gates, and Storybook
build passed. The final rebase retained the new Slack communication
guidance.
- The embedded-browser setup test copied the full detailed prompt,
including the configured Paperclip instance URL. Desktop and narrow
layouts were checked. Component tests cover successful copying and
clipboard failure with selectable text and retry.
- Live local and hosted GitHub acceptance evidence refers to application
revision `cb703ac959876a07ebf3d7a295847f9f351eb6fc`. Real agent tasks
exercised issue mentions, automatic PR reviews, inline findings,
repeated mentions, task continuation, and failing-to-passing checks
after a push. The Storybook agent generated, built, and browser-rendered
pages; missing acceptance text failed, matching text passed, and broken
JSX produced an incomplete result.
- Live cases also covered independently disabled push events, prompt
injection, duplicate signed deliveries, rapid pushes, stale-result
rejection, finding deduplication, and restart recovery. Formal reviews
were denied while disabled and published only after explicit enablement.
Check Details links pointed to the underlying task on the trusted
hostname.
- Those hosted native Claude runs used the provider-pack layer now
removed from this PR. They do not prove native Claude works on the
standard Cloud image. A replacement hosted native Codex run is not yet
verified: the disposable QA tenant has only an Anthropic AI connection.
No new staging or production deployment was made for the packaging
removal.
- Required-check merge enforcement could not be tested because the
private disposable repository's GitHub plan rejected the rules
configuration. Published success/failure/incomplete check states were
verified directly.

## Risks

- Latest master allocated migration 0282 to Slack. The GitHub migration
is regenerated as 0283 with replay-safe table/index/constraint creation;
a PostgreSQL regression verifies existing relations and constraints are
preserved. Existing preview tenants remain subject to the fleet
migration-history compatibility preflight; no bypass is introduced.

- Migration 0283 adds company-scoped configuration, registration,
review, and publication records. Existing connections retain their
behavior until reviews/tools are enabled.
- Signed webhooks and expiring registration state remain required.
Hosted installations also need the companion narrow Cloud gateway
exemptions.
- Agent assessments can be incomplete or wrong. The server enforces
coverage/result structure, current-head publication, rating policy, and
separate formal-review permission; it does not replace code-review
judgment.
- No Cloud image packaging changes are included. Remote native
ACPX/Claude and OpenCode retain their existing operator-supplied
provider-pack prerequisite. Native Codex and Codex with managed MCP
tools do not require that pack. Earlier staging deployment evidence
refers to its stated revision, not this packaging-removal head.
Production rollout and merging remain outside this change.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex, with repository, code execution, API, and
embedded-browser tools. The exact serving model ID and context-window
size were not exposed by the environment.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-09-21 14:41:19 -05:00
DottaandPaperclip b82661b561 refactor(connections): retire the legacy Composio broker (#13758)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip manages agents and their access to external tools.
> - Connectors expose these tools through a governed MCP gateway.
> - PR #13755 added a direct Composio MCP connection behind the
experimental MCP aggregators flag.
> - The old project API-key broker still created toolkit child
connections and showed a separate Services tab.
> - Keeping both paths leaves obsolete setup and session code in the
product.
> - This change removes the broker and preserves direct MCP setup,
credentials, permissions, and execution.
> - Saved legacy records fail closed and remain available for explicit
removal.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Related: #13755. This retirement supersedes the legacy-path fixes
proposed in #12630, #12632, #12634, and #12906. It does not close those
PRs.

**What existing behavior does this improve?**

Composio connector setup, management, and runtime dispatch.

**Current behavior**

Composio offers both direct MCP and a project API-key broker. The broker
mints sessions and creates one child connection per toolkit.

**Proposed behavior**

Offer only direct MCP. Remove the toolkit Services UI, REST routes, API
client, and session broker. Block saved legacy parent and child records
from discovery, execution, health checks, reconnect, and OAuth. Preserve
their records and credentials until the operator removes each
connection.

**Reason and benefit**

The direct MCP connector becomes the single supported Composio workflow.
Provider accounts remain managed in Composio.

## What Changed

- Remove the API-key catalog method and its generated-source definition.
- Delete Composio broker clients, session creation, account
synchronization, child lifecycle, and toolkit routes.
- Remove the Services tab, service rows, child provenance, and
cascade-removal controls. Keep Vercel provenance intact.
- Retain a shared retirement guard for stored legacy records. Show
Retired status and replacement/removal guidance in the connection list
and details; hide obsolete runtime controls.
- Preserve the experimental MCP aggregators flag and direct MCP
infrastructure.
- Replace broker fixtures with retirement tests and extend direct
Composio catalog/reconnect coverage.

## Verification

- Focused shared, server, and UI tests passed with one worker. Server
retirement tests use a name filter; no full local test suite was run, as
requested.
- Server and UI TypeScript checks passed.
- Token gates and UI build passed.
- Real browser: opened the saved Composio connection, refreshed all 11
tools, and ran the provider's read-only GitHub account-list operation
through the standard Test dialog as an agent. The provider returned
success using the existing OAuth credentials.
- See `doc/connections/COMPOSIO-BROKER-RETIREMENT.md` for scope and live
evidence.
- Storybook build passed. A fresh real agent used
`COMPOSIO_SEARCH_TOOLS` and `COMPOSIO_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL` to return the
actual Paperclip DeepWiki hierarchy: one success, zero errors. Gateway
audit records confirm both calls succeeded.
- Browser retirement check: a credential-free legacy fixture showed the
guidance, opened the direct MCP replacement flow, and was removed
through the standard confirmation.
- Focused regressions for the experimental settings copy and exact
OpenAPI route coverage passed. All latest-head CI checks passed (54
successful, two intentionally skipped); Greptile scored 5/5 with no
unresolved review threads. The PR has no merge conflicts.

## Risks

This intentionally breaks the old Composio project API-key and
child-connection workflow. Existing legacy records cannot run, even if
their stored status is active. Operators must create a new direct MCP
connection and choose access rules; credentials and grants are not
migrated. Remove each old record separately to delete its credentials.
No schema migration or data deletion runs automatically. Direct MCP
connections keep their existing grants and secrets.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-6 via Codex, with reasoning, code execution, and browser
tools. The exact runtime variant and context-window size are not exposed
in this session.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-09-21 13:57:35 -05:00
DottaandPaperclip e8c8ba3c19 feat(apps): add experimental MCP aggregator connectors (#13755)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Its tool gateway applies company access rules and approval controls
to connected apps.
> - MCP aggregators expose many apps through one provider endpoint.
> - Each aggregator needs its own credential, catalog, grants, and
lifecycle in Paperclip.
> - This pull request adds independent Zapier, Arcade, Composio Connect,
and Executor setup with a common Access → Connect layout.
> - A default-off MCP aggregators flag lets operators opt in while we
complete provider acceptance tests.
> - Agents use the normal Paperclip permissions, Test screen, and
gateway after setup.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**Subsystem affected**

Apps, connection setup, shared contracts, and the remote MCP gateway.

**Problem or motivation**

Aggregator endpoints need clear provider setup and correct MCP sessions.
Generic setup does not explain each provider's authentication or broad
execution tools. Provider approval must preserve the original execution
instead of replaying a write.

**Proposed solution**

Add four separate connectors behind Settings → Experimental → MCP
aggregators. Start with human and agent access, then connect the
endpoint and read its tools. Enable tools by default. Use the existing
Permissions and Test screens after setup. Keep legacy Composio API-key
and child connections intact.

**Alternatives considered**

A shared connection for all providers would mix credentials and access
rules. Separate provider-specific permission and test screens would
duplicate existing controls. Vercel Connect is outside this change.

**Roadmap alignment**

Extends the existing MCP Tool Gateway & Apps capability and the
Connected Apps roadmap area. This work was requested and reviewed by the
maintainer.

Related work: #11894, #12630, #12632, #12634, and #12906 concern the
legacy Composio broker. #13102 also covers remote MCP pagination. This
change preserves the broker path and adds initialized sessions, response
matching, and provider resume handling alongside pagination.

## What Changed

- Add branded setup and interactive Storybooks for Zapier, Arcade,
Composio Connect, and Executor. Use the existing access controls and
normal action tests. Do not request a connection name or action choices
during setup.
- Add the default-off `enableMcpAggregators` flag to settings, managed
feature metadata, the catalog, and setup guards. Hidden connections keep
running. Legacy Composio connections remain unchanged.
- Reuse the vault, grants, policy, and catalog models. Support OAuth
discovery, bearer tokens, custom headers, and credential-bearing URLs.
Add no database tables or migrations.
- Initialize and retain Streamable HTTP sessions by connection and
effective credentials. Read paginated catalogs and match streaming
responses to request IDs.
- Classify unfamiliar aggregator tools as writes despite upstream
read-only hints; only exact reviewed read capabilities enter the
read-only allowlist. Legacy Composio child behavior is preserved.
- Preserve provider authorization links and execution IDs. Support
Executor approve/resume, decline, and cancel without automatic replay of
uncertain writes.
- Preserve Off and Ask first choices during refresh and reconnect. Allow
new tools and retire removed tools. Keep agent access updates atomic and
preserve an empty agent selection.
- Document connector UX rules, provider branding sources, and live
acceptance results.
- Stabilize the existing Sentry release fixture after its repeated CI
failure by reusing one module mock; production Sentry behavior is
unchanged.

## Verification

- Final head `d11781970`: [CI
run](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/35633534900)
passed, including broad typecheck, test shards, build, and E2E. All 54
checks pass; 2 optional checks are skipped. Greptile is 5/5, Security
Scan passes, and all review threads are resolved.

- Passed 27 focused connector Vitest checks and 18 connector-only
Storybook browser checks before the flag change. All 85 stories rendered
at desktop and narrow widths.
- Passed 5 connector lifecycle/server checks and 7 selected flag checks
after adding the flag. The latter cover settings, managed defaults,
cached catalog visibility, and all four setup routes.
- Review fixes passed 13 risk/handoff/lifecycle checks, dedicated
session-expiration and transport regressions, 13 selected
connector/gateway CI cases, and 10 selected setup/reconnect UI cases. A
real Composio connection-list call also succeeded through the refreshed
UI on `9ab115f71`.
- UI and server TypeScript checks passed. UI build, Storybook build,
token gates, and diff whitespace checks passed during implementation.
- Real browser and real Paperclip agent tests passed for Arcade,
Composio, and Executor. Tested action permissions, denied agent access,
reconnect, disconnect, and isolation. Tested Arcade catalog
additions/removal and Executor provider approve/resume, decline, and
cancel.
- Zapier live acceptance is incomplete. Its dedicated provider server is
configured, but its credential-copy dialog returned an empty clipboard
through browser automation. No live Zapier action is claimed.
- The three isolated Sentry release cases pass after the CI fixture fix.
- Local verification is deliberately narrow at the maintainer's request.
The full local suite, recursive typecheck, and repository-wide build
were not run. CI provides the broader checks.

## Risks

- Shared MCP transport changes affect other remote MCP servers. Protocol
fixtures cover initialized sessions, streaming response matching,
pagination, and isolation.
- Broad execution tools remain broad permissions. The provider governs
actions inside those tools.
- Provider handoff links are retained briefly in memory. After a server
restart, a one-time link may require reopening the provider dashboard.
Paperclip does not replay the original call.
- Zapier remains unproven live. Custom-header imports and self-hosted
endpoints have fixture coverage rather than a separate live account for
every variant.
- Turning the experimental flag off hides setup; it does not revoke
existing credentials or stop existing connections.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex, with reasoning, repository tools, shell
execution, and browser automation. The exact runtime model ID and
context-window size are not exposed in this session. A separate
Anthropic-backed Paperclip agent performed live gateway acceptance
tasks.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-09-21 12:53:11 -05:00
Devin FoleyandPaperclip 165b10bd98 fix: enable GitHub Actions MCP toolset (#13553)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - The GitHub connector lets agents use repository tools through MCP.
> - GitHub excludes Actions from its default MCP toolsets.
> - Approval of Actions permissions therefore does not make workflow
tools appear in Paperclip.
> - This pull request adds Actions to the requested toolsets for
discovery and execution.
> - Users can refresh existing connections and use workflow tools under
the existing access rules.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**

GitHub Actions tools remain absent after the GitHub App receives Actions
read/write access and the user refreshes actions in Paperclip. Paperclip
does not request the Actions MCP toolset.

**Expected behavior**

Authorized GitHub connections expose workflow tools, including
`actions_run_trigger` with `method: "run_workflow"`, so agents can
dispatch an existing release workflow.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Connect GitHub to Paperclip with access to a repository that has a
dispatchable workflow.
2. Grant the GitHub App Actions read/write permission and approve the
installation update.
3. Refresh the connection's actions in Paperclip.
4. Observe that the workflow tools are absent.

**Paperclip version or commit**

Base commit: `fae698031`.

**Deployment mode**

Hosted instance with a managed GitHub connection. The same missing
header affects PAT connections.

No matching public issue or pull request was found in the duplicate
search.

## What Changed

- Send `X-MCP-Toolsets: default,actions` through the shared GitHub MCP
header helper. This covers discovery, refresh, and execution for
existing and new managed or PAT connections, including legacy rows
identified through `transportConfig`.
- Test catalog refresh, tool risk classification, and workflow dispatch
through a mock MCP server.
- Document tool names, workflow arguments, required GitHub permissions,
and the refresh step.

## Verification

- Passed both affected test suites: `pnpm exec vitest run
server/src/__tests__/tool-access-service.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/tool-gateway.test.ts` (391 tests).
- Passed `pnpm check:token-gates` and `git diff --check`.
- Live provider check: the default catalog returned 45 tools.
`default,actions` returned 49 tools, with no tools removed. The four
added tools were `actions_get`, `actions_list`, `actions_run_trigger`,
and `get_job_logs`.
- Live `actions_get` / `get_workflow` call succeeded. No workflow was
dispatched during live verification.
- Passed `pnpm -r typecheck` and `pnpm build` with the existing Rust
toolchain added to PATH.
- Rechecked server typecheck and build after the legacy-connection fix;
both passed.
- The full local test run has reported three skills-cache failures in
`company-skills-service.test.ts`. All three reproduce on the untouched
base commit (`fae698031`) on this macOS host: runtime-cache directory
renames fail with `EACCES`. The full run remains in progress.
- Greptile: 5/5 on `7d391e3c7`, with no unresolved review threads.
- After deployment, use **Refresh actions** on an existing GitHub
connection and verify the workflow tools appear.

## Risks

- Refreshed GitHub catalogs expose more tools. Existing access,
approval, and quarantine rules still apply. `actions_run_trigger` keeps
GitHub's destructive classification because it also supports
cancellation and log deletion.
- GitHub still enforces token and installation permissions. Dispatch
requires Actions write permission and a workflow with
`workflow_dispatch`.
- No database migration or saved connection edit is required.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex, with code execution and tool use. The exact
serving model ID and context window are not exposed in this session.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-09-16 17:10:34 -07:00
Devin FoleyandPaperclip 6fe8e30625 feat(apps): add Railway connection and governed deployment tools (#13415)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Apps gives agents governed access to external resources.
> - Operators need to inspect Railway services, read logs, deploy code,
and run container commands.
> - Railway offers hosted MCP with OAuth, but broad remote actions hide
their internal operations.
> - This PR adds a branded connection and fixed direct operations
through the existing gateway.
> - Separate SSH keys enable container commands under the same grants
and policies.
> - Operators can require approval for an action and inspect the
resulting audit record.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**Subsystem affected**

Apps catalog, connection setup, gateway execution, and connection
documentation.

**Problem or motivation**

Agents need Railway access through Paperclip. Operators need to grant
and revoke that access, inspect available actions, and govern deployment
and container operations without giving agents provider credentials.

**Proposed solution**

Reuse hosted MCP OAuth, vault storage, catalog discovery, grants, and
the gateway. Probe the actual credential before enabling fixed GraphQL
operations. Use a dedicated grant-owned SSH key for bounded container
commands.

**Alternatives considered**

A catalog entry alone cannot execute the missing operations. The hosted
general agent has opaque internal effects. An unrestricted CLI runtime
can bypass action policy and inherit ambient credentials.

**Roadmap alignment**

This extends the existing MCP Tool Gateway & Apps path and the Connected
Apps direction in ROADMAP.md. It does not add a plugin or parallel
connection service.

Related PRs #311, #939, and #7861 concern hosting Paperclip on Railway.
They do not add this outbound Apps connection. The separate shared
agent-picker fix is #13414 and is not included here.

## What Changed

- Add the generated Railway catalog entry, official marks, provenance,
and OAuth setup guidance.
- Add fixed service/deployment status, bounded logs, and
redeploy/restart/rollback tools. Block source deployment until the
provider can atomically bind the approved repository and commit.
- Verify API access with an explicit workspace before exposing direct
tools.
- Add grant-owned SSH key setup and a bounded runner with host
verification, target checks, isolated state, and cleanup.
- Block the opaque hosted railway-agent and accept-deploy actions.
Preserve normal Allowed defaults and Ask-first policies for other
actions.
- Quarantine new or changed Railway schemas after initial discovery,
including reconnect.
- Add provider, lifecycle, gateway, SSH, UI, and browser fixtures.
Document setup, limitations, and the release checklist.

## Verification

- Security follow-up: removed the unsafe source-deployment mutation.
Direct calls and old active catalog entries are denied before any
upstream request, including normalized aliases. Refresh marks retired
entries disabled. All 386 focused Railway, catalog and gateway tests
passed, and server TypeScript checking passed. Full [GitHub
CI](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/35139421144)
passed on d86530ab9, including typecheck, build, all tests, runner
checks, and browser tests. Superagent passed and confirmed the P2 fix.
Greptile reviewed the same commit at 5/5 with no findings.

- CI follow-up: fixed the missing Railway SSH operation in the OpenAPI
document, including its request schema, operator-only authentication,
and error responses. The failure reproduced locally before the fix; all
403 selected API, Railway, catalog, and artwork tests passed after it.
Synced current master and resolved the catalog/artwork conflicts.

- After rebase: 440 focused provider, lifecycle, gateway, catalog, and
container-panel tests passed. AppDetail and AppsConnect passed another
196 tests.
- Full typecheck, build, token gates, and the gallery browser check
passed after rebase.
- During implementation, full build and the gallery browser check
passed. Shared generic-MCP fixtures covered OAuth callback/state/issuer
binding and failure paths.
- Local live consent and tools/list succeeded. There were 44 active
hosted actions and two blocked actions. A workspace-bound API probe and
direct project/service/environment reads succeeded. The inspected
project had no deployed services. No provider mutation ran.
- Full GitHub CI passed on commit 303340f19, including all
server/workspace test groups, typecheck, build, runtime verification,
release dry run, and browser tests. The original local full-run attempt
was incomplete; the complete automated suite is now verified in CI.

Manual review: connect Railway, review the actual actions, install for
an agent, and run a resource read through the gateway. Choose Ask first
before testing a deployment mutation. Configure a dedicated key only
when container access is needed.

**Release qualification is still open.** Live agent gateway reads/logs,
rejected and approved deployment calls, refresh/revoke, public HTTPS
consent, and SSH enrollment/commands/cleanup need an authorized
disposable service. The passing API diagnostic does not replace those
tests. See doc/connections/RAILWAY.md and RAILWAY-REVIEW.md.

## Risks

Overall risk is medium. New runtime behavior is gated to Railway
connections, but the PR changes shared catalog, credential lifecycle,
and gateway code. A regression in those paths can affect other Apps
connections. The highest-impact operations are Railway deployments and
container commands.

- Provider consent can authorize an entire workspace. Catalog labels are
not local resource allowlists. Direct tools check target membership, and
provider permissions still apply.
- Shell commands have broad internal authority. Action policy cannot
approve each internal shell step. Timeouts close the local connection
but cannot guarantee remote child-process termination.
- Log and command output may contain application secrets that pattern
redaction cannot recognize.
- Source deployment is unavailable until the provider supports atomic
repository/commit binding. Existing deployments can still be redeployed,
restarted or rolled back.
- No database migration is required. Rollback can remove promotion and
direct dispatch while preserving connection data and the generic MCP
path.
- Live Railway qualification must still pass before release acceptance.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, based on GPT-6, with code execution and browser testing.
An independent read-only security agent reviewed the local
implementation. The exact serving model ID and context window were not
exposed in this session.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-09-16 13:54:44 -07:00
DottaandPaperclip 9adeabb590 fix(connections): unblock personal MCP auth discovery (#13497)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Connections let people give agents access to external tools.
> - A personal connection needs the current user's authorization.
> - A new MCP URL must be probed before Paperclip can discover its
sign-in method.
> - Requiring a personal grant before that probe prevents sign-in from
starting.
> - This pull request permits the initial probe for a creator-owned
draft with no credentials.
> - People can complete personal setup while later requests retain
authorization checks.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**

Connecting an unknown MCP URL with "Just me" failed with HTTP 502 and
"This connection needs the current user's authorization". Paperclip
checked for a personal grant before contacting the provider. The health
wrapper also changed the expected authorization error into a server
error.

**Expected behavior**

Discover OAuth and start browser sign-in. Create a personal grant after
consent. For a public endpoint, discover its tools and create the empty
personal grant after a successful probe. Keep missing authorization on
later health checks as HTTP 422.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Add an unknown remote MCP URL with no saved credentials.
2. Select "Just me".
3. Check the link. Before this fix, the request fails before sign-in or
tool discovery.

**Paperclip version or commit**

The three original regressions fail against `6cfe4acff` with the service
fix removed and pass with it restored.

**Deployment mode**

The defect was reported in production and reproduced in local server
tests with isolated PostgreSQL.

Related work: Refs #11831. Refs #11144. Searches found no duplicate fix.

## What Changed

- Allow an initial credential-free probe only for the creating user's
personal draft with unknown authentication and no supplied credentials.
- Leave OAuth grant creation to the callback. Create an empty personal
grant only after a public probe succeeds.
- Preserve the personal grant for URLs that already contain a
credential.
- Make empty personal grant creation conflict-safe without overwriting a
concurrent grant or duplicating its creation audit.
- Commit the empty grant and audit atomically. Retain the established
public draft identity after a later catalog failure, so a failed retry
cannot remove a successful retry's grant.
- Run the following catalog/default-profile step in its own transaction,
so failures discard partial catalog, profile, binding, and audit changes
without deleting the established identity.
- Verify archived personal connections retain their owner: another user
is rejected before probing, while the original owner can resume setup.
- Preserve `user_authorization_required` and HTTP 422 in health
failures.
- Cover the connect and OAuth callback routes, real loopback HTTP,
credential-bearing URLs, and later health checks.
- Document personal setup and the test fixtures.

## Verification

- Red/green: the original three tests failed with the exact reported
error before the fix and passed after it.
- The credential-bearing personal URL regression also failed before its
guard was added.
- Focused suite: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/generic-mcp-connection.test.ts
src/__tests__/tool-access-service.test.ts` passed all 385 tests across
the two suites. An earlier run had a socket hang-up in an existing
agent-permissions test; the unchanged suite passed on rerun.
- The concurrent rollback regression failed before its fix because the
successful retry's grant was deleted. It now verifies the grant and
draft survive and a later normal health check succeeds.
- Database fault injection during profile-entry insertion reproduced
partial catalog writes before the transaction fix. The regression now
verifies unchanged catalog rows, no partial profile/bindings, a retained
grant, and successful retry.
- CI's first serialized-server shard 3 attempt failed an existing
peer-agent mutation test (the real run-context guard ran despite the
test's mock). The test passed in isolation and all 108 tests in that
suite passed unchanged locally. The single failed-shard rerun passed
without code changes.
- Final-commit CI: all 32 applicable checks passed on
`639f037987352cab6084c4ebfa5dbf7b0aed6046`, including all 385 affected
tests, the full test matrix, browser suite, build, typecheck, release
checks, and security checks. The two Storybook-only checks were not
applicable and skipped. Greptile is 5/5 with all review threads
resolved. [Successful CI
run](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/35027478353).
- `pnpm -r typecheck` passed.
- `pnpm smoke:mcp-fixtures -- --require-paperclip` passed.
- `pnpm build` passed.
- Full local `pnpm test:run` was attempted: its general-server group
finished with 12,372 passed, 4 failed, and 70 skipped tests. The run
started before review edits; its two MCP failures used the old cached
service (including an insert without the new conflict clause). All 385
focused tests pass on the final code. The other failures were existing
workspace-cleanup and runtime-port tests; their unchanged suites passed
on rerun (66 passed, and 25 passed/3 skipped). The local command stopped
before later groups. The final-commit CI matrix is the full-suite merge
gate; this local run is not claimed as green.

## Risks

- The initial probe must not become a general authorization bypass. It
is restricted to the creating user's draft. Normal health checks retain
authorization enforcement.
- Public endpoints get a personal grant with no secrets only after they
answer successfully. Credential-bearing URLs keep their existing grant.
- The concurrent-probe regression seeds the catalog and default profile
to isolate grant creation. Existing first-time catalog/profile creation
races are outside this change; this does not claim to make the entire
setup flow concurrency-safe.
- No database migration or UI change is required. OAuth tests use a
simulated provider; the public endpoint test uses real loopback HTTP.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-6-based assistant for regression tests and PR
preparation; a GPT-5-based Codex assistant assisted with the initial
implementation. Exact runtime model IDs and context-window sizes are not
exposed in this session. Both used reasoning, repository tools, and code
execution.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-09-15 17:11:59 -05:00