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Author SHA1 Message Date
DottaandPaperclip 0829d94af2 fix(auth): derive low-trust human direction from existing execution records (#14775)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Low-trust review contains work that may include hostile input.
> - Its default intake boundary currently blocks direct human chat and
tasks outside that boundary.
> - Human direction should authorize the assigned work while preserving
containment.
> - Existing conversations and execution requests already identify
direct human instructions.
> - This pull request derives exact-task authority from those records
and the current assignee.
> - The agent can perform that work without gaining access to unrelated
tasks or privileged tools.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**

A low-trust agent with a project boundary rejects its owner's direct
Agent Chat before provider execution. Human-assigned tasks outside that
project fail the same check.

**Expected behavior**

An authorized human can talk to the agent or assign it a task. The exact
task runs with its existing sandbox, credential, and tool restrictions.

**Steps to reproduce**

1. Enable Agent Chat and isolated workspaces. Configure a sandbox agent
with low-trust review scoped to an intake project.
2. Send the agent a direct board chat message, or assign it a
projectless task.
3. Observe `low_trust_boundary_mismatch` before execution.

Related: #14766 adds private task directories for repo-free low-trust
execution. It is now merged into master and included in the branch base,
so CI and staging verify the combined behavior.

## What Changed

- Derive owner-chat access from existing conversation identity.
- Derive exact-task access from the existing human requester and
server-owned request origin, including coalesced requests. Plugin and
external sender attribution do not authorize work.
- Follow existing `retryOfRunId` database links for automatic
continuations, checking company, agent, and task throughout; cancelled
ancestors cannot grant authority.
- Require a live run and current assignment. Preserve sandbox,
credential, privileged-tool, responsible-user, and quarantined-output
checks.
- Retain board backlog assignments in existing request records without
starting execution. Reassignment cancels old human requests in the
common service transaction, including plugin writes; late settlement
cannot revive them.
- Add real database and HTTP coverage for request provenance, retry
ancestry, cancelled runs, concurrent reassignment, spoofing, and
containment. Document the rule.
- Preserve legacy board assignment requests through their existing
source, reason, and human requester.
- Use the existing wrapped-error helper for concurrent chat-question
idempotency; a deterministic race test reproduces the CI failure before
the fix and passes after it.
- No new schema, migrations, or user-identity fields. Existing requester
columns hold attribution.

## Verification

- Passed the focused database, policy-retention, HTTP, and reassignment
tests locally. The HTTP test creates a task through the real board route
and checks the resulting persisted wakeup before exercising agent reads,
comments, mutations, and review handoff.
- Database tests hold a reassignment transaction open to verify coherent
authorization before and after commit, with a two-connection pool. They
cover retries, coalesced requests, cancelled ancestry, invalid
cross-company/agent/task links, cycles, and forged attribution.
- Full local `pnpm -r typecheck` and `pnpm build` passed on the final
commit (`d107c26df`). [Latest-head
CI](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/36815589542)
passed: 54 successful checks, two expected skips, including all eight
browser-test shards. Greptile is 5/5 on this exact commit with no
unresolved threads. Local tests were targeted; the full test suite ran
through CI’s test matrix.
- The revised HTTP suite passed all 13 tests; database authorization
tests passed all 11, including legacy compatibility and late watchdog
settlement; the backlog route contract passed all 3 tests. Another 102
tests covering durable chat admission, wake queues, and Cursor execution
passed.
- All 90 interaction-service tests passed with both create calls
deliberately held until their optimistic reads complete, forcing
duplicate-key recovery. That forced race failed before switching to the
shared wrapped-error helper.
- Previous staging proof covered owner chat and projectless task
persistence. The simplified revision has not been redeployed; that
earlier proof is not claimed for the new implementation.

## Risks

- This is an authorization change: only the live run's exact task
qualifies, and normal responsible-user restrictions still apply.
- Existing request and retry records are authoritative. Merely naming a
responsible/originating user or an external connector sender does not
qualify.
- Reassignment invalidates existing human request records
transactionally. A cancelled run or request cannot regain authority when
the task is assigned back.
- Ordinary task exceptions require server-owned origin or the legacy
board assignment source/reason/actor combination. Existing owner chats
use conversation identity.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-6 in Codex, with reasoning, repository tools, code execution,
and browser testing. The runtime does not expose a more specific model
ID or context-window size.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-01 09:45:18 -05:00
DottaandPaperclip dbebf30c89 Add low-trust review containment (#7530)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is a control plane for AI-agent companies, so execution
policy and trust boundaries are part of the product's safety contract.
> - Low-trust review work needs narrower authority than normal
same-company agents because hostile PRs, comments, attachments, and
generated output can carry prompt-injection payloads.
> - The current V1 shape gives trusted workers broad company context,
which is useful for normal execution but too permissive for a reviewer
assigned to hostile content.
> - This branch adds a `low_trust_review` preset, source-trust tagging,
route-level containment, and quarantine handling so low-trust output
does not automatically flow into higher-trust wake context.
> - The branch has been rebased onto current `origin/master`, and the
low-trust migration was renumbered to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`
to avoid collisions with existing `0091` through `0096` migrations.
> - Greptile feedback was addressed by tightening low-trust detection,
preserving project-level trust policy checks, fixing issue-kind
promotion lookup, removing duplicate post-lease isolation assertion,
documenting fail-closed source-trust behavior, bounding ancestry checks,
enforcing runtime issue context for CEOs, awaiting accepted-plan monitor
authorization, and making low-trust issue source-trust tagging atomic.
> - The benefit is a first production slice of deny-by-default review
containment with regression coverage for the main control-plane pivot
surfaces.

Fixes #7531.

## What Changed

- Added shared trust-policy types and validators, plus
database/source-trust fields for issues, comments, documents, and work
products.
- Implemented server enforcement for low-trust issue scope, agent
self-view redaction, secret/plugin/runtime denial paths, promotion
checks, and quarantined continuation/wake context.
- Added focused low-trust regression tests for resolver behavior, source
trust, route authorization, heartbeat preflight ordering, runtime
containment, and quarantine redaction.
- Added board UI affordances for selecting/reviewing the low-trust
preset and surfacing source-trust badges in relevant issue views.
- Added `doc/LOW-TRUST-PRESETS.md`, updated
`doc/SPEC-implementation.md`, and committed the low-trust review
contract plan under `doc/plans/`.
- Rebasing note: the original `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`
migration was renamed to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`; the SQL uses
`ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS` so users who already applied the old-numbered
migration are not broken by the renumbered migration.

## Verification

- Rebased branch onto current `origin/master` and force-pushed with
lease to `origin/PAP-10211-low-trust-agent` at head `2719f31e3`.
- Confirmed the PR diff does not include `pnpm-lock.yaml` or
`.github/workflows` changes.
- Resolved upstream UI/comment conflicts by preserving deleted-comment
tombstone behavior and low-trust source-trust badges/metadata.
- Renumbered the low-trust source-trust migration to
`0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`; the SQL uses `ADD COLUMN IF NOT
EXISTS` so users who already applied an old-numbered copy are not
broken.
- `pnpm exec vitest run ui/src/lib/issue-chat-messages.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/heartbeat-workspace-session.test.ts`
- `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/source-trust.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/workspace-runtime-service-authz.test.ts
ui/src/lib/trust-policy-ui.test.ts
ui/src/components/TrustPresetSection.test.tsx`
- `pnpm run typecheck:build-gaps`
- `git diff --check`
- GitHub checks pass on head `2719f31e3`: build, typecheck/release
registry, general tests, serialized server suites, e2e, canary, verify,
policy/review, Socket, and Snyk.
- Greptile Review passes with Confidence Score 5/5 and zero unresolved
Greptile review threads.
- No design screenshots/images were added because the task explicitly
says not to add them unless they are specifically part of the work.

## Risks

- Medium risk: this touches shared trust-policy contracts, server
authorization paths, heartbeat context generation, migration metadata,
and UI preset controls.
- Low-trust containment is intentionally deny-by-default; legitimate
future review workflows may need explicit allowlisted exceptions.
- Plugin/runtime/security surfaces are broad, so regression tests cover
the current known routes but future integrations must route through the
same containment layer.
- The PR is ready for review; GitHub checks are green and Greptile is
5/5.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

- OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 coding agent, tool-enabled shell and GitHub CLI
workflow.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] UI changes are covered by focused tests; no screenshots were added
per task instruction not to add design images unless specifically
required
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-06-05 16:48:02 -05:00