Commit Graph
5 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
DottaandPaperclip 12f70d0d4c Keep Slack form custody and receipt transfer durable (#19825)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip manages work for AI-agent companies.
> - Chat connections deliver provider messages and user answers.
> - Slack requires a response within its original three-second deadline.
> - Forms and their delivery receipts must survive retries and tenant
restarts.
> - This change uses the existing connector queue and durable form
owners.
> - Current authorization, exact receipt checks and normal ACK rules
stay in force.
> - The tenant can settle useful work while keeping the connection
enabled.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #19019 and #19348. Companion Cloud PR:
paperclipai/paperclip-cloud#1250.

## What Changed

- Preserve form grants, sessions, encrypted evidence, terminal receipts
and company-authorized Retry.
- Check initial form enrollment before the provider send. Keep a typed
preparation wait only while an exact current enrollment obligation
exists.
- Refund the attempt only when the claimed attempt and credential lease
still match and provider invocation has not started. Possible or
accepted sends retain uncertain-delivery custody. An ordinary error with
the same text still uses the normal five-attempt limit.
- Notify the existing publication worker when normal enrollment commits.
Reconstruct pending work from durable state after a lost reply or owner
restart.
- Page settled history before proving idle safety. Keep unfinished,
malformed and foreign receipts visible beyond the first 1,000 rows.
- Keep Slack callback, answer, receipt and ACK rules in their provider
owners. Support body-bound Cloud idle capabilities when a complete
catalog exceeds the header budget.
- Add focused regression coverage, an enabled quiet/reactivation recipe
and explicit fixture port checks.
- Keep SDK evidence tests tied to a normally built reviewed reference,
with a separate strict refusal for actual unreviewed CI outputs.

## Verification

App head: `6284d6881b5dc38a9ee149bcbde35e69a67dd8ca`, including actual
master `dff8bed007e01c32f3826144b893ec80603d1335`. Companion Cloud head:
`f83b38187dc7e6b2e219fe865dc16d268cc66fdb`, including actual Cloud
master `b1dcc3421a91efffee631a61536cf48f357c22fc`. Cloud #1250 is merged
at `1d07d81f23d4627ab7b6dcf49176b4128a2f8f9b` after exact-head passing
checks and complete Greptile 5/5. Current exact-head CI typecheck,
build, tests and aggregate verification are green; the complete edited
Greptile review is 5/5 and all 13 review threads and nested comment
pages are resolved.

- Both latest enrollment findings were reproduced against the preceding
product. The pure readiness control returned no wait for the first
enrollment. The real-PostgreSQL control observed a provider call while
that enrollment was still staged.
- The repaired source passes three whole files: 21 readiness controls,
80 real-PostgreSQL milestone controls and 37 tenant-actor middleware
controls. All 138 pass with zero excluded or TODO cases. The SQL case
reconstructs the worker through seven waits, preserves the attempt
budget, recovers a controlled lost enrollment reply, and commits one
provider-port call and one exact grant. Replaying the selected attempt
does not duplicate them. Authorization, SDK and enrollment-response
ports are controlled in that SQL case.
- The same files cover ordinary five-attempt exhaustion, accepted and
possible sends, stale ownership, malformed bindings, attention states
and current actor restrictions. One synthetic mismatched-binding
parameter uses generation 2 against current generation 1; it is not
evidence for an older-generation control.
- The normal server-package typecheck passes at the measured source. It
runs the normal Runner TypeScript, protocol, SDK and declaration
prerequisites and all seven main App programs. The separate declaration
configuration is also recorded. A worker union-narrowing error was
found, fixed with an explicit callable/null branch, and verified by that
normal compiler. No cast or test relaxation was used.
- The normal merge of current master preserves all 78 owned paths and
15,783 unrelated master entries and modes. The three measured test files
and their changed feature paths are unchanged. New upstream DB code adds
only the normal nonunique concurrent native-session index and its
migration classification. Shared and adapter-utils changes alter
unrelated prompt or denial wording. The 138-case proof carries for those
unchanged behaviors; it is not reported as a rerun after the merge. The
normal Shared/SDK ensure, DB build, adapter-utils build and complete
server-package check also pass at the current merged head. Their fresh
inventory contains 8,143 outputs; canonical SQL and journal copies
match. This build did not apply the new index migration.
- Earlier real-PostgreSQL retained-history coverage reproduced the
missing proof with 1,005 settled rows. Its repair retains the existing
two-second/64-query inspection budget, current endpoint bound and exact
owner snapshot. The 46 source-bound controls cover unfinished and
invalid tails, exact cross-page action references, Retry, rollback and
lost receipt responses.
- Earlier enabled quiet/reactivation coverage produced ordinary useful
work, kept configuration enabled, accepted fresh signed work plus a
duplicate, and produced exactly one second useful reply. Its two
App-worker windows lasted at least 30 seconds with zero measured PG
writes, connection or outbound activity after settlement. That evidence
stays tied to its measured revision. A missing worker EXIT marker limits
that earlier proof; parent evidence does not replace it.
- Earlier three-second callback, terminal ACK, current-question race and
complete body-size controls remain source-bound. The
500-owner/1,000-binding body measured 313,875 bytes with a 618-byte JWT;
signature tampering failed closed.
- Final managed-provider acceptance now passes all five fresh Node
boots: A/A, A/AB, B/A rejection, B/AB recovery, B/B final. Two
independently configured, challenged, verified, linked and enrolled
Slack identities exercise ACK and retirement debt separately. Normal
provider factory/materialization delivers the configuration through a
controlled external stack-provider boundary. The registered opening
returns HTTP 200 in 21 ms within the original 3-second deadline. Two
answers persist, normal ACK is accepted, exact retirement and lost
acceptance/GC replies recover, and the original canonical snapshot
remains unchanged without duplicate provider sends or submissions.
- The separate complete committed-preflight case passes. A committed
`update_attempted` response is lost before SDK entry; normal
service-owner reconstruction after the original lease/deadline recovers
the same useful update and one answer without a second trigger. This
reconstructs service owners within one App process; the separate five
fresh Node boots cover process restart and managed signing-key rotation.
- Assertion-time PG socket reports balance 15 opens/15 closes across the
five boots and 5/5 in preflight, peak 2 and zero live sockets or
unexpected attempts. Worker terminal EXIT markers were missing and are
not replaced by parent EXIT markers. These are domain/recovery and
assertion-time connection proofs, not a new whole-worker terminal quiet
measurement. All known owners/groups closed; independent SQL audits were
empty; only successful fixture databases were removed. Earlier failed
fixture databases/logs remain retained. No product guard, deadline or
assertion was weakened. Exact runtime source and normal outputs are
unchanged by the three test files in the current follow-up, so these
source-bound proofs carry without repeating those journeys.
- The preceding App CI ran 11,312 support cases: 11,289 passed, three
SDK-evidence cases failed, and 20 external cases skipped. Normal CI
dependency setup resolved six stale Slack patch-hash references and
produced an unreviewed lock. The public SDK proof correctly refused that
lock; the tests incorrectly assumed the CI output was a reviewed
reference. The three-file test repair keeps the protected lock policy,
source/compiler/parser/Zod pins, scanner and redaction rules unchanged.
It builds an owned reviewed reference using the existing normal
Shared/SDK producers for the positive seal test, while a separate
negative requires actual unreviewed-build privacy refusal and no
retained SDK bytes. It does not relabel the CI build as certified or
admit a new lock hash.
- All four whole SDK support files pass locally: public type 30,
evidence 16, public-input synchronizer 8 and lock preparation 10,
totaling 64 with zero excluded/TODO cases in 28.73 seconds. The genuine
fresh reference build/positive seal and separate invalidated-reference
privacy refusal passed within their original 120-second bounds. Original
installed dependencies, SDK outputs/cache and runtime source stayed
unchanged; normal global setup produced only its own Runner JavaScript
outputs. PostgreSQL was denied throughout, all four worker markers were
observed, and the owned process group/private test root closed. The
local canonical-lock negative mutates only its own reference; fresh
remote CI also passes the actual resolved-CI-lock branch: all 16
evidence and 30 public-type tests pass, including the genuine
reviewed-reference positive and the strict actual-unreviewed-build
refusal. The upstream synchronizer file runs its current 10 cases in CI.
- The first complete CI attempt on this head also exposed two separate
30-second timeouts: one real reporter-artifact test and the
`agent-test-environment` module-loading hook. Full original logs remain
preserved. Their exact test, sanitizer and evidence source blobs are
unchanged from the preceding head; inspection found no deterministic
setup cause. After the original run finished, one retry of only the
failed jobs passed on the same synthetic merge
`168851e210671ebe97e7a778e8cf891807e80502`: Runner support reports
11,304 passes and 20 external skips; serialized shard 6 reports all 395
passes, including all 67 route bodies. No source, timeout or assertion
changed. This proves recovery; the original causes remain unexplained.
- The final pre-merge tree audit uses actual master
`17136a6c25ef6cb7c816a29140a4c48c2c75fb31` (refreshed after the earlier
`85dec046` audit). The expected normal squash preserves all 81 owned
paths and 15,816 unrelated master entries and modes. Only OpenAPI has
edits from both sides, and its complete content composition preserves
the new project route and token help alongside this PR's API entries.
The shared inbound selection changes preserve the same candidate set;
new concurrent indexes, Native/workspace behavior and shutdown changes
remain upstream behavior. The scoped form proof uses process agents and
does not qualify the new Native/sandbox branches. The latest
question-schema change still accepts the explicit version-1 payload
exercised here. The last master delta also changes managed AI/Native
credential refresh and writeback; those branches are outside the
measured process-agent form paths. Existing 8,143 local outputs remain
tied to their measured revision; no new whole-tree output equality or
deployed suspension is claimed.
- Reproduce the public path with
`doc/testing/slack-cloud-qualification.md`, the companion Cloud
checkout, Node 24/22 and fresh owned fixture databases. Aggregate local
`pnpm -r typecheck`, `pnpm test:run` and `pnpm build` were not rerun as
one command set. Current exact-head required CI and the complete
Greptile 5/5 review now pass; the full edited summaries and all
paginated threads were read.

Local worker quiet does not prove deployed host or Neon suspension.
Photon and Discord remain separate work; this PR completes the described
Slack slice.

## Risks

Use compatible App and Cloud readers before transferring custody.
Signatures prove authenticity; current authorization and exact ownership
still control execution. Preserve old targets, secrets and terminal
facts until their normal owners release them. Keep the managed seal
identity stable while custody remains. The required Slack adapter patch
remains pinned. Upstream's concurrent index uses the normal top-level
migration path.

## Model Used

OpenAI `gpt-6.1-sol` implemented and tested the changes. A GPT-6-based
Codex managing agent reviewed and integrated them. The host does not
expose the managing agent's exact model ID or context-window sizes. The
agents used code execution and test tools.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used, its version and tool capabilities
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have linked public related issues or PRs
- [x] I have not referenced internal or instance-local Paperclip issues
or links
- [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal
Paperclip ticket id
- [x] I have run the local tests listed above and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation
- [x] I have considered and documented risks
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green for the current head
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open findings for the current head
- [x] I will address all reviewer comments before requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-11-10 12:17:50 -06:00
DottaandPaperclip 9966f31bee fix(chat): keep permission failures scoped to the rejected operation (#16847)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - External channels deliver agent replies through a durable
publication queue.
> - A provider can reject one operation while other operations remain
allowed.
> - The shared error classifier treated generic 403 and permission
errors as failures of the whole connection.
> - Failure handlers then changed the user's enabled setting and removed
all assigned channel tools.
> - This pull request limits permission failures to the rejected
operation and preserves connection intent during authentication
failures.
> - Unrelated work can continue, while confirmed authentication failures
still stop endpoint traffic.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #16137. Follows #16138, which distinguishes local authorization
errors from provider errors. This change also narrows provider
permission failures. Related #16806 handles a separate task-continuation
tool-binding defect.

A provider 403 or missing-scope response currently disables a connection
that may still support other operations. The expected behavior is a
visible operation failure with unrelated work preserved. Confirmed
authentication failures must stop sends without changing the user's
enabled setting.

## What Changed

- Classify generic 403, adapter permission errors, and Slack
missing-scope/no-permission responses as failed operations.
- Preserve rate-limit retries, known destination quarantine, and
confirmed authentication failures.
- Preserve connection status and enabled intent when publication,
provider-reply, or form-open authentication fails. The endpoint still
enters attention and its runtime stops.
- Add GitHub regressions for retained discovery and successful later
publication after 403, and no further sends after 401.
- Mark authentication health failed and fence persistent receiver
startup, background reconciliation, and receiver callbacks. Keep signed
GitHub lifecycle events available during an authentication stop. Verify
Discord reconciliation and Photon restart preserve the stop, while
transient Discord disconnects still recover.
- Update provider, publication, and modal regression expectations and
the execution contract and verification maps.

## Verification

- Red: five new classifier cases returned endpoint attention before the
repair. The signed-installation-removal regression also reproduced a
blocked lifecycle event after a 401 before narrowing the receiver guard.
- Green: all 35 classifier tests pass.
- Green: 19 PostgreSQL-backed cases pass through the production channel
services, including GitHub discovery/publication, Slack provider replies
and question modals, Telegram credential/destination failures, rate
limiting, and Discord/Photon authentication-stop persistence.
- Map structural checks and `git diff --check` pass.
- `pnpm -r typecheck` and `pnpm build` pass. All CI gates are green on
`7e379bcd98aa8363e42efe7f8a4b2589b7111ae6`; Greptile is 5/5 on that
exact commit with no unresolved findings.
- The monolithic local `pnpm test:run` was started, then stopped after
its revision passed the full CI matrix and was superseded by the
authentication-stop repair. Final full-suite verification passed in CI
shards; all 19 final local provider regressions pass.
- The tests run from this source checkout on macOS arm64 with isolated
PostgreSQL and controlled provider failures. They do not prove live
GitHub recovery or deployment. No live connection settings were changed.

## Risks

- Permission failures now leave unrelated work available. The rejected
operation remains failed and is not automatically replayed. Provider
authorization still applies to every request.
- Keeping a connection enabled must not bypass an authentication stop.
GitHub verifies blocked tool discovery and later sends; Discord and
Photon verify background reconciliation and restart cannot clear the
stop. Failed connection health is an execution gate while the endpoint
requires attention.
- Explicit disable, disconnect, signed installation revocation, and
existing destination-specific denial handling remain unchanged. No
migration or API schema change is required.
- Previously disabled connections are not automatically re-enabled
because an upgrade cannot safely infer the user's intent.

## Model Used

- OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 family. The runtime does not expose the exact
deployment model ID or context-window size. Used reasoning, shell tools,
repository edits, and test execution.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-10-19 09:54:22 -05:00
Naeem Akhtar 0ed760ce9a fix(server): keep local authorization failures from disabling chat endpoints (#16138)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - Chat endpoints publish agent replies to providers such as GitHub,
and a durable outbox classifies each send failure
> - A GitHub review run that fails posts a "review failed" reply. When
the run has no request binding, Paperclip throws its own `forbidden()`
before any GitHub request
> - The classifier reads that local 403 as a provider credential
failure. The endpoint goes to `attention`, its tool connection is
disabled, and new `pull_request` webhooks are dropped
> - One failed review can stop all reviews on that endpoint until an
operator reconnects it
> - This pull request classifies Paperclip's own 401/403 `HttpError`
without a provider status as a failure of that publication only
> - The benefit is that only real provider credential failures lock an
endpoint

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Fixes: #16137

## What Changed

- `server/src/services/chat-publication-errors.ts`: an `HttpError`
(Paperclip's own class) with status 401 or 403 and no numeric
`details.providerStatus` returns `{ kind: "failed" }`. The check runs
before the credential branch.
- Provider errors do not change. Adapter
`AuthenticationError`/`PermissionError`, Octokit errors (named
`HttpError`, but not this class) and Paperclip-wrapped provider
rejections that carry `providerStatus` still return
`endpoint_attention`.
- `server/src/services/chat-publication-errors.test.ts`: a new test
covers a local `forbidden()`, a local `unauthorized()` and a wrapped
provider 403.

## Verification

- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server vitest run
src/services/chat-publication-errors.test.ts`
- I ran the classifier source with type stripping on Node 22: local
`forbidden("GitHub failure has no request binding")` → `failed`; local
`unauthorized()` → `failed`; `new HttpError(403, …, { providerStatus:
403 })` → `endpoint_attention`; an Octokit-shaped 403 →
`endpoint_attention`.
- I applied the same change to the built `dist` of a self-hosted install
and called its classifier with the same four errors. The results were
the same.

## Risks

- Low risk. The change applies only to Paperclip's own `HttpError` with
status 401/403 and no provider status. Such an error now fails one
publication and does not disable the endpoint. Code that throws a local
401/403 to report a provider credential problem must attach
`providerStatus`. I found no such caller in `server/src/services`.

## Model Used

- Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`, Anthropic), in Claude Code with
tool use (shell, file edits, test runs). It helped to find the cause,
write the change and the test, and run the checks.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [ ] I have run tests locally and they pass (classifier checked with
type stripping; the full vitest suite runs in CI)
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
2026-10-19 08:57:18 -05:00
DottaandPaperclip 4d317274ce feat(channels): add experimental iMessage Photon (#13299)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Channels connect external conversations to company tasks and agent
execution.
> - Slack, Discord, and AgentMail already provide durable delivery and
access controls.
> - People also need to reach an agent from Apple Messages and send
photos.
> - Photon provides shared Pro DMs, dedicated numbers, and authenticated
event recovery.
> - This pull request connects Photon to the existing channel services.
> - People can message an agent while Paperclip retains task ownership
and approval authority.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**Subsystem affected**

Cross-cutting: channel services, shared contracts, database constraints,
Apps, and agent Channels UI.

**Problem or motivation**

Paperclip has no iMessage channel. A person cannot use Apple Messages to
start a task, send a photo, or answer an agent's pending question.

**Proposed solution**

Add experimental **iMessage Photon** with Pro-compatible shared DMs or a
dedicated Photon Cloud number per agent channel. Reuse channel
admission, identity links, task generations, publication, and
interaction continuation. Keep groups disabled for shared allocation.
Dedicated lines support groups that an operator explicitly enables.
Require a fresh linked message and a published agent response before
setup completes.

**Alternatives considered**

Shared allocation has no owned phone number, so it reserves one project
and allows DMs only. Dedicated allocation reserves one stable number.
Local Mac access needs a separate deployment model. The upstream Photon
Chat SDK adapter does not persist the poll mappings and send receipts
required here. This change uses the lower-level SDK without adding
another agent runtime.

**Roadmap alignment**

This extends Connected Apps and agent communication through the existing
channel subsystem. It does not add a parallel tool connection or agent
loop. GitHub searches for Photon and iMessage found no matching provider
implementation.

**Additional context**

This ships behind the existing experimental channel gate. Dedicated-line
release qualification remains incomplete. Real Photon Pro DMs passed
task/reply, native poll, text answers, confirmation rejection, media,
restart, pause, reconnect, revocation, and removal tests. An
operator-supplied iPhone camera HEIC also passed the full round trip.
Dedicated groups remain unqualified. See [the verification
record](doc/connections/IMESSAGE-PHOTON-VERIFICATION.md) and [the
implementation plan](doc/plans/2026-09-11-imessage-photon.md).

## What Changed

- Add the provider catalog entry, shared setup contracts, and a forward
migration. A global partial index reserves the dedicated number or
shared project until its endpoint is archived.
- Add Cloud project inspection, vaulted project credentials,
selected-line token renewal, and a leased receiver. Persist checkpoint
updates under the receiver lease. Shared project replay accepts sparse
increasing sequences only after a complete recovery barrier.
- Connect DMs and enabled groups to existing task generations, sender
authorization, ordered delivery, and publication services. Keep each
iMessage conversation on its task after completion; only explicit `/new`
or `/close` releases the binding. Publish committed inbound comments
live and label their human bubbles “Sent from iMessage” in both
task-chat renderers.
- Persist immutable text/file send identities, upload receipts, poll
IDs, option IDs, per-person drafts, and canonical interaction
continuation proofs.
- Add source-bound file recovery, bounded HEIC/HEIF conversion, JPEG
previews, and related Live Photo companion video retention.
- Add the three-step setup flow and channel management surfaces with
official branding. Preserve the experimental gate and existing
pause/disconnect behavior.
- Add interactive production-component Storybooks for setup, access,
recovery, and ongoing conversations. Add provider, integration, catalog,
and browser regression coverage. Document setup, recovery, supported
boundaries, and qualification gaps.

## Verification

- Live Photon Pro, SDK 2.1.0: linked iPhone messages create a task and
receive native Codex replies in Apple Messages. Unlinked senders cannot
start work.
- Three real follow-ups each reopened the same completed task. Incoming
bubbles appeared on its open page without reload and showed “Sent from
iMessage.” The third follow-up ran after restarting the server on
`4d7222110`; the agent correctly repeated its previous reply from before
the restart.
- Native polls after restart, sequential text drafts, required-field
correction, explicit submission, approval rejection with a required
reason, and native continuation passed against Photon.
- PNG, text documents, synthetic HEIC, and a real iPhone camera HEIC
passed in both directions. The camera photo produced a 3024×4032 JPEG
preview. The native agent described it and returned the received HEIC
byte-for-byte.
- Pause/resume, reconnect, identity revocation, removal, `/status`,
`/new`, `/close`, and stale answers after close passed live. Messages
suppressed by pause did not become work on resume. Removal stopped
intake and removed credential bindings.
- All 304 focused tests passed on `4d7222110`. These cover Photon
unit/integration behavior, both task-chat renderers, live comment
hydration, completed-task continuity after restart, enabled groups,
duplicate delivery, and explicit reset/close. The selected Teams
completion-boundary regression also passed. Full workspace
typecheck/build and token gates passed for the conversation fix; the
final UI changes passed their affected typecheck/build and tests.
- All 26 new Photon Storybook Playwright cases passed in light and dark
themes, including the complete shared-DM setup journey and 390px mobile
follow-ups. UI typecheck and the Storybook build passed. These stories
use simulated Photon responses and do not replace the live evidence
above.
- The full chat-adapters browser suite previously passed all 39 cases.
Migration checks passed, and migration 0275 applied to the isolated live
instance with the earlier Photon migration already applied.
- The local full Vitest run was previously interrupted by the host's
embedded-Postgres shared-memory limit; it is not a full-suite pass. All
30 applicable CI checks passed on preceding head `7a5419cac`, with two
skipped checks and Greptile 5/5. Head `24f8e1aae` adds an explicit
required-story discovery guard to the 26 passing Storybook cases.
Greptile rates this final head 5/5 with no unresolved review threads.
All 30 applicable CI checks passed, with two optional checks skipped.
- A repeated live send key suppressed the duplicate but returned gRPC 6
/ SDK `internalError` without an original receipt. Paperclip keeps
unknown delivery unresolved. This provider behavior is covered by a
regression test.
- See [the verification
record](doc/connections/IMESSAGE-PHOTON-VERIFICATION.md) for package
versions, redacted live evidence, deterministic coverage, and remaining
qualification gaps.

## Risks

- Dedicated group qualification remains unrun; groups are disabled for
the approved Pro scope. Real iPhone camera HEIC passed transport,
preview generation, agent inspection, and return. Keep the channel
experimental; the dedicated-line release matrix remains incomplete.
- Shared recovery and attachment aliases were verified against the live
gateway. Duplicate writes currently return an error without the original
receipt; unresolved sends require operator resolution. The
implementation fails visibly on invalid replay ordering, a reset cursor,
or changed identity.
- The HEIF converter passed on macOS arm64 and in Linux CI. Windows HEIF
binaries have not been executed in this work. Linux musl has no packaged
converter. Unsupported conversion retains the original and reports the
missing preview.
- The migration adds a global reservation across companies for Photon
numbers and shared projects. Paused and revoked endpoints keep that
reservation until removal.
- Integration touches shared channel services. Existing provider browser
coverage passes; broad repository verification is recorded above.
- `pnpm-lock.yaml` is intentionally excluded under repository policy.
The repository bot owns lockfile updates. The additional Superagent
supply-chain scan is neutral/inconclusive because these new dependencies
are not yet in the committed lockfile. Its security scan passed; all
required CI checks pass.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 family, with reasoning, repository inspection, code
execution, browser testing, and tool use. The exact served model
identifier and context-window size are not exposed in this session. No
sub-agents were used.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
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Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-09-12 15:23:50 -05:00
DottaandPaperclip 6abeb67334 feat: add opt-in chat provider and data foundation (#13100)
Add dormant provider contracts, qualified patched adapters, tenant-scoped persistence and lifecycle ownership without activating chat routes. Preserve the experimental integration as dependent PR #13038.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-09-09 13:49:12 -05:00