5 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
DottaandPaperclip	d66acb7ac1	feat: automate Slack bot app setup and installation (#15413) ... ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Chat connectors give each agent a customer-owned bot and task-backed conversations. > - Manual Slack setup requires app creation and copying durable credentials. > - Operators need a shorter setup that an assisting agent can use safely. > - This pull request creates the app through Slack's Manifest API and installs it through OAuth. > - Durable registration state supports recovery without creating another app. > - A four-screen wizard, automatic avatar upload, and OAuth account linking reduce setup work. > - Connector settings and per-turn tool guidance support daily use after installation. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **Subsystem affected** Native Slack bot setup, company secret storage, chat connector management, and agent tool guidance. **Problem or motivation** New Slack bots require manual app creation and copying a signing secret and bot token. Interrupted setup can create duplicate apps. The setup and management screens contain unnecessary controls. Agents also need guidance for native questions, files, thread replies, and governed Slack actions. **Proposed solution** Use a temporary app-configuration access token to create a customer-owned app. Save durable secrets in the vault. Bind OAuth to the initiating actor, company, endpoint, registration revision, scopes, and configured origins. Preserve manual and existing-app recovery. Link the installing user's account, send a welcome DM, and advance from saved server evidence. Keep request-URL recovery instructions available if automatic connection detection waits. **Alternatives considered** The Slack CLI adds installation requirements. Socket Mode changes transport. A shared Paperclip-owned app changes app ownership. These alternatives are outside this change. **Roadmap alignment** This extends existing chat connectors and secrets capabilities. Related public work: #14037 and #13954 cover Slack MCP prerequisites and user OAuth. No duplicate bot-registration PR was found. ## What Changed - Share one reviewed manifest builder between automatic registration and manual setup. - Add replay-safe migration 0318 and company-bound registration state with vault references and uncertain-creation recovery. - Add registration, installation, callback, and resume APIs with short-lived, single-use OAuth state. - Save installation credentials before downstream checks and preserve bot identity constraints. - Reduce automatic setup to four screens. Keep advanced app details, manual recovery, and existing-app setup. - Upload the agent avatar with the Paperclip dark background. Link the OAuth installer's account and send setup DMs. - Show agent and connector-owner avatars. Simplify settings, access, and conversation screens. - Discover joined Slack channels and enable them by default. Start a task from a bare mention and admit same-thread follow-ups. - Refresh Slack tool guidance each turn. Add native-form, file, approval, and delivery regressions plus manual model probe definitions and sanitized acceptance records. - Update deployment/database docs, OpenAPI, redaction, removal cleanup, production Storybook stories, and provider browser tests. - Merge current master and move the registration migration after its latest migration without rewriting published commits. The completed Slack success view intentionally has a single centered **Done** action and no **Save & exit**, as explicitly requested by the product owner. `DESIGN.md` records this exception; unfinished setup steps retain the aligned wizard footer. ## Verification - Passed after the master merge: repository typecheck, full build, Storybook build, design-token gates, module-boundary gates, and migration generation. - Passed: all 352 focused Slack deterministic tests and all 14 affected provider browser tests. Browser tests use controlled provider fixtures and a separate throwaway instance. - Passed on current head `c5d01e0e2`: the complete GitHub test matrix (general server, chat, all workspaces, serialized server, and Runner), all eight browser shards, typecheck/release registry, build, canary dry run, security checks, and policy gates. There are 52 passing checks and no pending or failing checks. - Greptile completed on the exact current head with 5/5 and no actionable findings or open review threads. - Local repair verification passed 93 focused tests, including same-app reinstall after revocation and rejection of consent started before revocation, the AgentMail browser journey, and repository typecheck. Local build and Storybook build also passed. The redundant local full-suite rerun was stopped after the complete current-head CI matrix passed. - Real Slack setup and agent replies were exercised in the authorized isolated test drive during the setup iteration. - The ten additional model probes were attempted with legacy `codex_local`, `gpt-5.6-sol`: five passed, two failed, and three were partly verified. Native runtime is not qualified. See `server/src/services/connectors/slack/evals/2026-10-08-acceptance.md` for evidence and limits. - Passing model probes cover native forms, downloaded file bytes, bare mentions with thread replies, explicit posts/reactions, and saved approval denial. - The controlled uncertain-write probe found wrong delivery-check IDs. The canvas fallback attempt used an invented tool name. Search pagination/native search, a private-source denied-tool receipt, and distinct board/webhook origins remain unqualified. Reviewer path: enable Chat connectors, start Slack chat setup, select an agent, enter an app-configuration access token, and approve Slack installation. Send a message to the bot and confirm that setup advances to success. Inspect settings and allowed channels. See `doc/connections/SLACK-AUTOMATIC-SETUP.md` for deployment and recovery. ## Risks - Slack app creation has no provider idempotency guarantee. A timeout after dispatch stays uncertain until the operator checks Slack. - OAuth needs a stable public HTTPS board origin. Webhook ingress may use a separate configured HTTPS origin. Workspace policy can delay installation. - Migration 0318 can replay safely on instances that applied the earlier development migration. - OAuth installation now links the installer to the initiating Paperclip user. Identity checks and company access rules still apply. - Joined channels now enable bot responses by default. Linked-user authorization and per-action approval rules still apply. - Model behavior has the documented delivery-check and canvas fallback failures. A passing CI run does not establish that every model probe passed. - Removing the connection does not delete the customer's Slack app. No new first-party telemetry is added. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 family, with reasoning, repository tools, code execution, and browser verification. The runtime does not expose a more specific authoring model ID or context-window size. The live bot probes used OpenAI `gpt-5.6-sol` through `codex_local` in legacy mode. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>	2026-10-08 06:33:31 -05:00
Devin FoleyandPaperclip	892b0b3606	fix: scope quota reports to authorized subscription accounts (#14994) ... Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>	2026-10-06 18:20:37 -07:00
3 people	b847e8b6f6	perf(server): reduce issue detail request overhead (#10414) ... ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source control plane people use to coordinate AI-agent work > - Opening an issue fans out into several authenticated issue-detail reads, so repeated work on that path directly affects perceived latency > - Those reads repeated issue and authorization lookups, returned full private JSON even when unchanged, and performed non-critical bookkeeping writes on the request path > - Interaction reads also performed lifecycle writes even though `GET` must be read-only > - This pull request adds request-scoped reuse, private conditional responses, read-only interaction access, and bounded write debouncing without crossing actor, request, or company boundaries > - The result is less database, serialization, logging, and response-body work while preserving authorization and interaction lifecycle invariants ## Linked Issues or Issue Description This is the server-only latency phase. Related work is tracked separately in #10415 (aggregate view), #10416 (warm navigation, merged into the base), and #10463 (bundle split). This pull request intentionally excludes those scopes. **What happened?** Opening an issue detail view caused avoidable server costs: repeated issue and authorization reads within one request, full private JSON responses when a representation was unchanged, writes during interaction-list reads, production debug transport setup, and immediate bookkeeping writes for cloud tenant activity and board-key usage. **Expected behavior** All successful JSON `GET /api/issues/:id/*` responses should support strong private ETags and `304 Not Modified`. Repeated work may be reused only within the current request. `GET /interactions` must not modify stored interactions. Non-critical activity timestamps may be debounced without weakening authentication or stale instance-admin cleanup. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Start Paperclip in local development or self-hosted server mode. 2. Open one issue and request its detail subresources with the same authenticated actor. 3. Repeat a successful JSON request with its `ETag` in `If-None-Match`. 4. Observe `304 Not Modified`, no interaction writes from `GET /interactions`, and unchanged authorization boundaries. **Deployment mode / installation** - Local development or self-hosted server - Built from source - Core server behavior; not adapter-specific ## What Changed - Added strong ETags and `Cache-Control: private, must-revalidate` to successful JSON reads under `/api/issues/:id/*`, including standards-compliant `If-None-Match` handling. - Added request-scoped promise memoization for issue and authorization lookups; no authorization result survives the request. - Made `GET /interactions` read-only, moved supersession and terminal-state handling to mutation paths, and prevented plugin callers from accepting or rejecting interactions after an issue closes. - Removed the production debug-file logger transport while preserving development formatting. - Debounced cloud-tenant activity and board-key `lastUsedAt` persistence, while keeping stale instance-admin deletion unconditional and authentication checks per request. - Added focused tests for ETags, request isolation, authorization lifecycle behavior, interaction invariants, logger configuration, and retry-safe debounce behavior. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/private-json-etag.test.ts server/src/__tests__/issue-thread-interaction-routes.test.ts` — 2 files, 23 tests passed. - Focused Vitest run covering request memoization, authorization, interactions, plugin orchestration, logger, cloud tenant, board auth, and issue services — 9 files, 264 tests passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` — passed. - `git diff --check origin/master...HEAD` — passed. - Scope guardrails: 21 changed files under `server/src`; no lockfile, workflow, migration, UI, aggregate-view, or bundle-split changes. ## Risks - Strong ETags hash each successful serialized JSON response. This adds a small CPU cost but avoids transferring unchanged bodies. - Debounced bookkeeping timestamps can lag by the bounded debounce interval. They are non-critical usage metadata; authentication still runs per request, and stale instance-admin deletion remains unconditional. - Legacy pending interactions on terminal issues are projected as expired by reads and are finalized only by mutation paths. The stored record remains unchanged on `GET` by design. - No database schema or migration changes are included. > This is a focused performance correction and does not duplicate a planned core feature in `ROADMAP.md`. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex using `gpt-5.3-codex` for the initial implementation and `gpt-5.6-sol` for isolation, verification, and PR preparation, with reasoning, repository tool use, code execution, and GitHub CLI access. The runtimes did not expose authoritative context-window sizes. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> Co-authored-by: Dev Agent <dev@paperclip.ing>	2026-08-11 14:39:23 -04:00
DottaandPaperclip	dbebf30c89	Add low-trust review containment (#7530) ... ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is a control plane for AI-agent companies, so execution policy and trust boundaries are part of the product's safety contract. > - Low-trust review work needs narrower authority than normal same-company agents because hostile PRs, comments, attachments, and generated output can carry prompt-injection payloads. > - The current V1 shape gives trusted workers broad company context, which is useful for normal execution but too permissive for a reviewer assigned to hostile content. > - This branch adds a `low_trust_review` preset, source-trust tagging, route-level containment, and quarantine handling so low-trust output does not automatically flow into higher-trust wake context. > - The branch has been rebased onto current `origin/master`, and the low-trust migration was renumbered to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql` to avoid collisions with existing `0091` through `0096` migrations. > - Greptile feedback was addressed by tightening low-trust detection, preserving project-level trust policy checks, fixing issue-kind promotion lookup, removing duplicate post-lease isolation assertion, documenting fail-closed source-trust behavior, bounding ancestry checks, enforcing runtime issue context for CEOs, awaiting accepted-plan monitor authorization, and making low-trust issue source-trust tagging atomic. > - The benefit is a first production slice of deny-by-default review containment with regression coverage for the main control-plane pivot surfaces. Fixes #7531. ## What Changed - Added shared trust-policy types and validators, plus database/source-trust fields for issues, comments, documents, and work products. - Implemented server enforcement for low-trust issue scope, agent self-view redaction, secret/plugin/runtime denial paths, promotion checks, and quarantined continuation/wake context. - Added focused low-trust regression tests for resolver behavior, source trust, route authorization, heartbeat preflight ordering, runtime containment, and quarantine redaction. - Added board UI affordances for selecting/reviewing the low-trust preset and surfacing source-trust badges in relevant issue views. - Added `doc/LOW-TRUST-PRESETS.md`, updated `doc/SPEC-implementation.md`, and committed the low-trust review contract plan under `doc/plans/`. - Rebasing note: the original `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql` migration was renamed to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`; the SQL uses `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS` so users who already applied the old-numbered migration are not broken by the renumbered migration. ## Verification - Rebased branch onto current `origin/master` and force-pushed with lease to `origin/PAP-10211-low-trust-agent` at head `2719f31e3`. - Confirmed the PR diff does not include `pnpm-lock.yaml` or `.github/workflows` changes. - Resolved upstream UI/comment conflicts by preserving deleted-comment tombstone behavior and low-trust source-trust badges/metadata. - Renumbered the low-trust source-trust migration to `0097_low_trust_source_trust.sql`; the SQL uses `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS` so users who already applied an old-numbered copy are not broken. - `pnpm exec vitest run ui/src/lib/issue-chat-messages.test.ts server/src/__tests__/heartbeat-workspace-session.test.ts` - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/source-trust.test.ts server/src/__tests__/workspace-runtime-service-authz.test.ts ui/src/lib/trust-policy-ui.test.ts ui/src/components/TrustPresetSection.test.tsx` - `pnpm run typecheck:build-gaps` - `git diff --check` - GitHub checks pass on head `2719f31e3`: build, typecheck/release registry, general tests, serialized server suites, e2e, canary, verify, policy/review, Socket, and Snyk. - Greptile Review passes with Confidence Score 5/5 and zero unresolved Greptile review threads. - No design screenshots/images were added because the task explicitly says not to add them unless they are specifically part of the work. ## Risks - Medium risk: this touches shared trust-policy contracts, server authorization paths, heartbeat context generation, migration metadata, and UI preset controls. - Low-trust containment is intentionally deny-by-default; legitimate future review workflows may need explicit allowlisted exceptions. - Plugin/runtime/security surfaces are broad, so regression tests cover the current known routes but future integrations must route through the same containment layer. - The PR is ready for review; GitHub checks are green and Greptile is 5/5. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 coding agent, tool-enabled shell and GitHub CLI workflow. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] UI changes are covered by focused tests; no screenshots were added per task instruction not to add design images unless specifically required - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>	2026-06-05 16:48:02 -05:00
4 people	b9a80dcf22	feat: implement multi-user access and invite flows (#3784) ... ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the control plane for autonomous AI companies. > - V1 needs to stay local-first while also supporting shared, authenticated deployments. > - Human operators need real identities, company membership, invite flows, profile surfaces, and company-scoped access controls. > - Agents and operators also need the existing issue, inbox, workspace, approval, and plugin flows to keep working under those authenticated boundaries. > - This branch accumulated the multi-user implementation, follow-up QA fixes, workspace/runtime refinements, invite UX improvements, release-branch conflict resolution, and review hardening. > - This pull request consolidates that branch onto the current `master` branch as a single reviewable PR. > - The benefit is a complete multi-user implementation path with tests and docs carried forward without dropping existing branch work. ## What Changed - Added authenticated human-user access surfaces: auth/session routes, company user directory, profile settings, company access/member management, join requests, and invite management. - Added invite creation, invite landing, onboarding, logo/branding, invite grants, deduped join requests, and authenticated multi-user E2E coverage. - Tightened company-scoped and instance-admin authorization across board, plugin, adapter, access, issue, and workspace routes. - Added profile-image URL validation hardening, avatar preservation on name-only profile updates, and join-request uniqueness migration cleanup for pending human requests. - Added an atomic member role/status/grants update path so Company Access saves no longer leave partially updated permissions. - Improved issue chat, inbox, assignee identity rendering, sidebar/account/company navigation, workspace routing, and execution workspace reuse behavior for multi-user operation. - Added and updated server/UI tests covering auth, invites, membership, issue workspace inheritance, plugin authz, inbox/chat behavior, and multi-user flows. - Merged current `public-gh/master` into this branch, resolved all conflicts, and verified no `pnpm-lock.yaml` change is included in this PR diff. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/issues-service.test.ts ui/src/components/IssueChatThread.test.tsx ui/src/pages/Inbox.test.tsx` - `pnpm run preflight:workspace-links && pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/plugin-routes-authz.test.ts` - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/plugin-routes-authz.test.ts server/src/__tests__/workspace-runtime-service-authz.test.ts server/src/__tests__/access-validators.test.ts` - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/authz-company-access.test.ts server/src/__tests__/routines-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/sidebar-preferences-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/approval-routes-idempotency.test.ts server/src/__tests__/openclaw-invite-prompt-route.test.ts server/src/__tests__/agent-cross-tenant-authz-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/routines-e2e.test.ts` - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/auth-routes.test.ts ui/src/pages/CompanyAccess.test.tsx` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/shared typecheck && pnpm --filter @paperclipai/db typecheck && pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/shared typecheck && pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui typecheck` - `pnpm db:generate` - `npx playwright test --config tests/e2e/playwright.config.ts --list` - Confirmed branch has no uncommitted changes and is `0` commits behind `public-gh/master` before PR creation. - Confirmed no `pnpm-lock.yaml` change is staged or present in the PR diff. ## Risks - High review surface area: this PR contains the accumulated multi-user branch plus follow-up fixes, so reviewers should focus especially on company-boundary enforcement and authenticated-vs-local deployment behavior. - UI behavior changed across invites, inbox, issue chat, access settings, and sidebar navigation; no browser screenshots are included in this branch-consolidation PR. - Plugin install, upgrade, and lifecycle/config mutations now require instance-admin access, which is intentional but may change expectations for non-admin board users. - A join-request dedupe migration rejects duplicate pending human requests before creating unique indexes; deployments with unusual historical duplicates should review the migration behavior. - Company member role/status/grant saves now use a new combined endpoint; older separate endpoints remain for compatibility. - Full production build was not run locally in this heartbeat; CI should cover the full matrix. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex coding agent, GPT-5-based model, CLI/tool-use environment. Exact deployed model identifier and context window were not exposed by the runtime. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge Note on screenshots: this is a branch-consolidation PR for an already-developed multi-user branch, and no browser screenshots were captured during this heartbeat. --------- Co-authored-by: dotta <dotta@example.com> Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-04-17 09:44:19 -05:00