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889947c238 |
feat: add experimental native chat connectors (#13038)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - People also ask agents for work in their existing chat tools. > - Each external conversation needs one task and a current authorized source. > - Retries, Stop, and provider failures must not duplicate work or expose private data. > - The first chat PR establishes the opt-in provider and data contracts. > - This PR adds experimental channel integration and its durable control plane. > - Users can request work from connected channels and inspect delivery in Paperclip. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs #13100 and #13092. This is the second of exactly two chat PRs. Foundation #13100 is merged and changed 143 files. Runner prerequisite #13092 is also merged. This PR changes 400 files against master, below the 500-file review limit. It contains no wireframe images or HTML galleries. ## What Changed - Add native Slack, GitHub, Microsoft Teams, Telegram, and Discord chat connections. Keep chat disabled unless the operator enables experimental chat connectors. Preserve the production GitHub tool connection and its normal setup path. - Bind each provider bot identity to one immutable Paperclip agent. Bind each admitted external conversation to one task. Paperclip owns tasks, runs, permissions, and audit records. - Add durable admission, per-conversation queues, questions, task controls, progress, final replies, images, files, and delivery receipts. Board comments remain internal unless explicitly sent to the channel. - Check current identity, provider reach, resource access, credentials, runtime generation, and exact source before provider effects. Keep private responses private. Never send raw reasoning, private logs, credentials, or tool arguments. - Hold uncertain sends for explicit audited resolution. Make Board Send-to-channel atomic and idempotent. Keep reconnect and setup credentials in Paperclip secret storage. - Preserve current native-runner authority across retries, lost acknowledgements, and recovery. Keep immutable input and completion contracts separate from newer user input. Receipt reconciliation cannot launch a provider. - Reconcile chat close/new ordering and provider-effect lock order. Audit resource access changes in the same transaction. Submit only the selected resource from each UI toggle so stale pages cannot undo unrelated access changes. - Drain Codex stdout before certifying process exit. Bound the drain with the existing shutdown grace. Preserve observed terminal authority without treating an undrained process as successful or reusable. - Incorporate master `018ca5da` with its ACP Stop, mobile task layout, runner packaging, and official lock changes. Preserve dedicated chat-answer continuations in both directions when ordinary queued comments are adopted after Stop. - Fence late adapter readiness behind an earlier Stop for the same run. Preserve verified cleanup for registered adapters. Handle single Stop, agent pause, duplicate Stops, and failure release without creating a false cancellation receipt. - Incorporate master's `6dd48cad4` wake-queue extraction. Preserve exact failed-chat retry authorization and lineage, retired question-source suppression, and the block on generic recovery that would discard the admitted source. Fresh deferred input retains its separate promotion path. - Incorporate master `2a05b5ed3` and its queue-admission extraction, simplified transaction ports, and separate runner CI job. Preserve exact durable receipts, actor separation, and dedicated-answer isolation through the new module. A failed receipt insert rolls back the accompanying deferred-wake merge. ## Verification Current head: `afe19299d06253cb628eb398e91d1200ea9f412a`, incorporating master `2a05b5ed3457ea33efd6895520447d1d97fe98d8`. The conflicts are resolved. This successor fixes two test-harness boundaries exposed by CI: per-case route-module preparation and actual durable-save completion before intentional runner termination. Production code and all existing test/turn deadlines are unchanged. [Exact-head Greptile review](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/13038#issuecomment-5587250594) is **5/5**, completed September 10 at 13:20:55 UTC, with no actionable findings or open review threads. [Fresh exact-head CI](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/34481724341) passes **all 24 jobs**, including Build and both required aggregates. Normal exact-head guarded merge was attempted and rejected by the remaining branch approval policy: CODEOWNER review is required and no human approval is present. Normal **squash auto-merge is enabled** as of September 10 at 13:36:26 UTC. Requested CODEOWNERS have been notified; no approval bypass or self-approval was used. Earlier-head results below remain historical evidence, not qualification of this successor. - Final exact-head Linux evidence: 995/995 chat integration cases; 36/36 agent-skills routes; 35/35 runner live-session cases, including real process kill/resume; 1948 runner Vitest cases with three existing benchmark/platform guards; 870/870 API-authority cases; and 104 browser cases with four existing optional skips. Rust, conformance/replay, full repository build, typecheck, canary, all server/workspace shards, and both required aggregates pass with normal CI concurrency. Earlier failed attempts remain recorded below. - Latest test-only qualification: 141/141 route/permissions/authentication cases pass in separate cold forks, with plain server types and independent review clear. The real-runner suite passes 35/35, with plain runner types and independent review clear. A controlled premature-save acknowledgement fails as expected; matching ownership/effect/process evidence, rejected saves, real turn outcome, test abort, and pre-kill liveness are covered. No local reproduction of the original CI scheduling failure is claimed. The preceding [CI run](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/34479680858) passes 21/24 jobs, including all 995 Linux chat cases and browser aggregate (104 passed, four existing optional skips); only Build, the skills serialized shard, and the required verification aggregate fail. Its exact-head Greptile review was 5/5. Both failed job logs are retained. - Final fixture qualification: all eight focused Discord cases and all 995 chat integration cases pass. The exact modal statement/PID is observed before taking the real connection lock; the test then proves its actual blocking relationship before mutation. Original SQL execution, provider behavior, negative assertions, and 1s/15s timeouts remain unchanged. Independent review is clear and test/production hashes remain frozen. The preceding [CI attempt](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/34477184777) passed 22 jobs, including Build/runner, typecheck, canary, all other test shards, and browser aggregate (104 passed, four existing optional skips); the two fixture failures and failed verification aggregate remain recorded, not relabeled as a pass. - Current queue-module composition: 308/308 recovery/batching/queue/Stop tests; 995/995 full chat integration; 89/89 module tests, including real PostgreSQL receipt-insert rollback; 24/24 workflow/module-boundary tests; plain server and UI types. All four actual local process/ACP browser paths pass in 1.4 minutes. Fresh databases, no skips or retries, stable reviewed source hashes. The initial boundary failure is retained; its no-op service wrapper was removed without changing recovery context or weakening the check. An exploratory standalone test-directory typecheck fails because its new upstream transformation config is not a standalone typechecking project; standard CI/build does not invoke it, and no configuration was weakened to suppress those diagnostics. - The preceding head `e02a63d462ce5d47433b0aeb632bb6fd20aab1ba` passed [all 24 CI jobs](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/34436462958) and exact-head Greptile review at 5/5. Required CODEOWNER review prevented its normal merge before master advanced again. - Final extracted-module composition: 307/307 recovery, batching, queue and Stop-control tests; 995/995 full chat integration; 49/49 module tests including eight PostgreSQL adapter cases; and 19/19 issue-update tests. Plain server types pass. All four actual local process/ACP browser paths pass in 1.3 minutes. Fresh databases, no skips or retries in these cohorts, frozen source hashes, and independent review clear. - The preceding head `3e4e1c1c` passes [all PR CI jobs](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/34415826820), including Build and required `ci / verify` and `ci / e2e`. Both the original Rust failure and the previously load-sensitive lineage fixture pass with unchanged Linux concurrency. Master advanced afterward and required this reconciliation. - Final master composition: 448/448 focused UI tests, 186/186 adapter tests, 24/24 queue/control tests, and 11/11 packaging tests. Plain UI, server, shared, and adapter types pass. Token gates and diff checks pass. Independent server and UI reviews are clear. - Stop-registration regression: both real-service cases fail against exact `a95` source and pass with the fix. The full corrected recovery/control suite passes 265/265. Duplicate-owner and failed-Stop controls also pass. Plain server types pass. The readiness barrier prevents provider startup without adding an acknowledgment to an already terminal run. - Final qualification strengthens terminal-field equality and repeats both affected cases successfully on a fresh database. All four actual local process/ACP browser paths pass again in 1.3 minutes, without skips or retries. The final screenshot shows Cancelled, a paused subtree, retained input, and no error toast. - Two new actual-service regressions fail before the merge fix. They prove that queued-comment adoption could consume a dedicated chat answer or add unrelated input to that answer. The fixed four-case cohort passes, including ordinary upstream continuation and adapter Stop controls. Full recovery passes 257/257. All four actual local process/ACP Stop browser flows pass in 1.4 minutes, without skips or retries, on a fresh database. - The unchanged runner artifact was qualified with 171/171 transport tests, 870/870 API-authority tests, conformance 1/1, and replay 11/11. Six controlled reader tests prove the exit/drain repair. Its local serial Rust workspace passed 546 top-level cases plus two invoked helpers; the later passing Linux CI supplies default-concurrency evidence. - Prior exact-source full chat integration passes 995/995. Settings regressions cover concurrent stale pages, 501 destinations, pending state, rejected updates, and explicit retry. These deterministic tests do not prove live provider behavior. - Retained failed attempts and their causes are in the [qualification log](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/blob/afe19299d06253cb628eb398e91d1200ea9f412a/doc/plans/chat-adapters/2026-09-08-chat-queue-and-webhook-repair.md). The first merge adapter run timed out while macOS slept for 290 seconds. Its unchanged repeat passed with a temporary sleep guard. No assertion, deadline, or CI gate was weakened. Review commands include `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/heartbeat-process-recovery.test.ts src/__tests__/issue-queued-comments-routes.test.ts` and `pnpm exec playwright test --config tests/e2e/playwright.config.ts tests/e2e/acp-stop-continuation.spec.ts`. Database suites require fresh disposable databases. See the [browser runbook](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/blob/afe19299d06253cb628eb398e91d1200ea9f412a/doc/plans/chat-adapters/2026-09-04-chat-adapters-browser-e2e-runbook.md) for provider setup and separate live acceptance steps. ## Risks - This remains experimental. Deterministic tests and bounded live evidence do not establish every provider feature, tenant, permission layout, or media shape. Teams work-tenant qualification is still open. - Failed and uncertain provider effects remain visible and can require operator action. A transport receipt does not prove recipient visibility. - Native controller and runner artifacts must remain compatible. Preserve lease ownership, terminal authority, source binding, and quarantine during future changes. - Access and audit rows commit together, but activity notifications remain best-effort. This is not a new durable event outbox. - The PR operation does not deploy a live server, replace its runner, or change provider permissions. Remaining live qualification is documented in the [temporary handoff](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/blob/afe19299d06253cb628eb398e91d1200ea9f412a/doc/plans/chat-adapters/2026-09-08-open-qualification-followups.md). ## Model Used OpenAI Codex assisted with implementation, tool execution, testing, and review. The work records `gpt-6-astra` assistance. The environment does not report a context-window size. No private reasoning traces are included. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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9dd6526b47 |
fix(security): harden privileged server boundaries (#12776)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - The server controls secrets, host files, outbound requests, and workspace commands > - A red-team review found cases where restricted callers could cross these trust boundaries > - These cases could expose credentials or let untrusted input reach privileged resources > - This pull request applies least-privilege checks at each affected server boundary > - The benefit is safer agent execution without changing the private-instance bootstrap contract ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What happened?** Several server paths used authorization, redaction, or content-delivery rules that were too broad. Restricted agent keys could obtain company-level operational data. Some adapter and instruction paths could reach server-owned network or file resources without the required owner approval. **Expected behavior** Paperclip must redact credential values, enforce restricted-key scopes, guard outbound network access, prevent same-origin script execution, and reserve host-level file and command controls for authorized operators. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Configure an authenticated development instance at the parent commit. 2. Exercise the affected APIs with a restricted agent key or a non-instance-admin company user. 3. Observe that the parent commit returns privileged data or accepts a privileged operation. 4. Repeat on this branch and observe a redacted response, a safe download, or an HTTP 403 response. **Paperclip version or commit** The findings reproduce from commit `39898ab22` and are fixed by this pull request. **Deployment mode** Authenticated self-hosted server and local development modes. **Installation method** Built from source with pnpm. ## What Changed - Redact generic secret `value` and `token` fields recursively in structured logs. - Classify exact and separator-suffixed `KEY` environment names as secrets in company exports. - Limit restricted self-identity responses and protect company run, log, and secret catalog APIs. - Route HTTP adapter requests through DNS-pinned SSRF protection with exact private-origin allowlisting. - Download HTML, SVG, and other script-capable assets with `nosniff` and a sandbox CSP. - Require instance-admin access for external instruction roots and exports that read them. - Block agent-authenticated host command persistence across supported workspace runtime shapes. - Apply the central runtime-management decision before workspace command controls. - Keep the documented first-user instance-admin claim contract unchanged. - Add regression tests and server-owner configuration documentation. ## Verification - `pnpm -r typecheck` passes. - The Node 24 remediation suite passes with 365 tests. It skips 25 environment-gated tests. - `pnpm build` passes under Node 24. - `git diff --check` passes. - The full local runner reaches known macOS-only general-server harness failures before the serialized route lane. The Linux PR matrix is the authoritative full-suite gate. ## Risks - Restricted agent keys now receive HTTP 403 responses from company-wide run, log, and secret catalog endpoints. - Script-capable assets now download instead of rendering inline. - External instruction roots now require instance-admin access. - Private HTTP adapter endpoints now require an exact origin in `PAPERCLIP_HTTP_ADAPTER_PRIVATE_ENDPOINT_ALLOWLIST`. - Public HTTP adapter endpoints remain enabled. Redirects and metadata or link-local targets remain blocked. - No database migration is required. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-5. The exact serving snapshot and context-window size are not exposed. The model used tool-enabled reasoning, repository access, code execution, and test execution. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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cabc9146d0 |
feat(apps): add secure remote MCP and PostHog setup (#12339)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Apps give those agents governed access to external tools. > - Remote MCP setup needs secure endpoint validation and durable credentials. > - PostHog needs both browser sign-in and personal API key setup paths. > - This pull request adds the shared remote MCP foundation and the PostHog definition. > - The benefit is a secure and reusable base for later app connection work. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs #11965 This is stack 1 of 11. It replaces the first reviewable part of #11965. ## What Changed - Add guarded remote MCP setup and credential handling. - Add PostHog OAuth and API key connection methods. - Add focused server, shared contract, and UI coverage. - Keep the migration replay-safe and idempotent. - Give the late-close security regression the same 10-second CI headroom as the adjacent real-timer handshake test. - Synchronize fake-timer handshake tests at the exact ensure-session boundary so real filesystem setup cannot race the fake deadline. - Drive PTY overflow coverage only after listener registration so scheduling cannot reorder the test fixture. ## Verification - pnpm exec vitest run packages/adapter-utils/src/acpx-engine/execute.test.ts server/src/__tests__/plugin-worker-manager.test.ts (220 passed; affected cases also passed five focused stress repetitions) - `pnpm exec vitest run packages/adapter-utils/src/acpx-engine/execute.test.ts -t "never leaks a sandbox-provided value from a late close rejection into logs or the result"` (1 passed) - `pnpm exec vitest run packages/adapter-utils/src/acpx-engine/execute.test.ts -t "never promotes a late ensureSession resolution|closes a late-resolving real handle exactly once"` (2 passed) - `pnpm -r typecheck` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/tool-access-service.test.ts` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/db check:migrations` - `pnpm build` ## Risks - Remote endpoint validation can reject configurations that previously passed without checks. - OAuth configuration errors can block setup until the operator corrects the provider settings. - The migration uses guarded statements so repeated execution is safe. - The test-only synchronization changes do not affect runtime behavior; they remove filesystem/fake-clock and listener-registration races observed under parallel CI load. > I checked `ROADMAP.md`. This stack continues the existing app connection work from #11965 and does not duplicate another planned item. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-5. The runtime model ID and context window were not exposed. The model used reasoning, tool use, and code execution. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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89ce36d7af |
feat(skills): open-by-default company skill policy and core UX (#9564)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip uses company skills to make agent capabilities reusable across an organization. > - Skill operations currently mix capability availability with permission checks, which creates avoidable setup friction and inconsistent denial handling. > - The policy contract needs to remain open by default while allowing company-scoped restrictions for governed deployments. > - Core owns the canonical policy actions, persistence, evaluation, API behavior, safe import boundaries, and generic denial/read-only UI. > - Enterprise policy-editor implementation belongs in the separate `paperclip-ee` repository and is intentionally excluded from this PR. ### Problem or motivation Company skill operations can encounter permission dead ends even when no explicit restriction has been configured, and import-source classification can drift between policy evaluation and execution. ### Proposed solution Define eight canonical skill policy actions, default all actions to allowed, persist company-scoped restrictions, expose policy evaluation APIs, normalize import sources at the boundary, and update Skill Studio to present actionable restriction states without embedding Enterprise Edition implementation in the core repository. ### Alternatives considered Keeping capability checks distributed across routes and UI surfaces was rejected because it duplicates policy logic and makes denial behavior inconsistent. Shipping the Enterprise policy editor in this repository was rejected because `paperclip-ee` is a separate repository and must receive its own PR. ### Roadmap alignment Extends the completed **Skills Manager** roadmap area by adding coherent governance and removing workflow dead ends. ### Additional context The core API contract remains suitable for a separate Enterprise Edition editor, but this PR contains no `paperclip-ee` package or EE-specific UI integration code. ## What Changed - Added the company skill policy contract to product and implementation documentation, including the open-by-default rule, eight canonical actions, decision shape, and core/EE ownership boundary. - Added the company-scoped policy schema, migration `0170`, shared validators, policy service, REST routes, OpenAPI coverage, and focused server tests. - Hardened import policy enforcement by normalizing import sources and keeping source classification consistent between policy evaluation and execution. - Updated core Skill Studio behavior to remove generic permission dead ends and show actionable policy/platform denial states only when an operation is actually denied. - Removed the `plugin-paperclip-ee` package, Docker wiring, EE discovery/deep-link helpers, and EE-specific UI tests/stories from this PR so that implementation can be submitted separately to the EE repository. - Preserved open-by-default behavior when no explicit company restriction exists. ## Verification - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui exec vitest run src/components/skill-studio/SkillPolicySurfaces.test.tsx src/lib/skill-policy-denial.test.ts` — 20/20 passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui exec tsc --noEmit` — passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/worktree-config.test.ts` — 12/12 passed. - `pnpm check:token-gates` — passed with all gates clean. - `git diff --check` — passed. - `git diff --name-only origin/master | rg 'paperclip-ee|ee-skill-policy'` — no matches. ## Risks - Migration `0170` introduces company policy persistence; rollout depends on the migration applying before policy routes are exercised. - Open-by-default is an intentional behavioral policy: deployments expecting implicit denials must configure explicit restrictions. - Import normalization is security-sensitive and should retain focused review. - The separate EE editor must stay contract-compatible with the core policy API as policy actions evolve. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex CLI, runtime model identifier and context-window size not exposed by this execution environment; reasoning, repository tool use, shell execution, and code review capabilities enabled. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details available to this runtime) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked or described the result above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run focused tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green on the latest head - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Evyatar Bluzer <bluzername@users.noreply.github.com> |
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bb7978327e |
fix(logger): redact passwords and tokens from HTTP error log lines (#8013)
Resubmits #5820 by @echokos. The original PR's head fork could not accept maintainer edits (organization-owned fork without cross-org maintainer-edit access), so we've resubmitted the commits here with original authorship preserved. Thanks to @echokos for the contribution. --- ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies; the server is an Express app with structured HTTP logging via pino-http. > - The middleware in `server/src/middleware/logger.ts` defines a `customProps` hook that attaches request context (`req.body` / `req.params` / `req.query`) to every 4xx/5xx log entry so operators can diagnose failed requests. > - That hook copies the body verbatim. Better Auth's `POST /api/auth/sign-in/email` carries an `{ email, password }` body — on a wrong-password attempt the request lands in the 4xx branch and the plaintext password is written to `~/.paperclip/logs/server.log`. > - Two existing issues raise this (#3072 plaintext-password leak, #4759 similar concerns) and neither has a fix. > - Same exposure surface applies to sign-up, reset-password, API key creation, and any endpoint that accepts a credential in the body and can return 4xx. > - This pull request introduces a small `redactSensitive` walker that returns a shallow copy of the input with values for known credential-shaped keys replaced with `[REDACTED]`, and applies it at every body/params/query log site in `customProps`. > - The benefit is that operators can keep diagnostic logging on without their disk silently accumulating user passwords and bearer tokens. ## What Changed - `server/src/middleware/redact-sensitive.ts` (new): depth-capped, case-insensitive walker. Sensitive keys covered: `password`, `currentPassword`, `newPassword`, `passwordConfirmation`, `passwordConfirm`, `confirmPassword` (+ snake_case variants), `secret`, `client_secret`, `access_token`, `refresh_token`, `id_token`, `auth_token`, `session_token`, `api_key`, `authorization`, `private_key`. Bare `token` deliberately not in the list — pagination cursors and CSRF tokens are not credentials (per Greptile review). - `server/src/middleware/logger.ts`: wraps the six log sites in `customProps` (3 ctx-path + 3 fallback-path) with `redactSensitive`. - `server/src/__tests__/redact-sensitive.test.ts` (new): covers plaintext password, case-insensitive matching, multiple credential keys, nested objects/arrays, bare `token` left untouched, primitives untouched, cycle safety. - Depth-cap returns `undefined` (field absent from log line) rather than a sentinel string, per Greptile review. ## Verification - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server test redact-sensitive` should run the new test file green. - Manual: tail `~/.paperclip/logs/server.log`, hit `POST /api/auth/sign-in/email` with a deliberately wrong password, confirm the logged `reqBody.password` reads `[REDACTED]` (not the plaintext) and the surrounding fields still appear for diagnosis. ## Risks Low. The walker only rewrites values at the log-emit boundary — the actual `req.body` object handed to downstream handlers is unchanged because `redactSensitive` returns a new object. Standard log fields (email, route path, status code) remain visible. The sensitive-key list is conservative enough that the only risk is over-redacting a non-credential field that happens to share a name with a known credential; the bare `token` carve-out in this revision addresses the most obvious such case. ## Model Used - Claude Opus 4.7 (`claude-opus-4-7`), Anthropic, extended thinking mode, working through Claude Code CLI. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [ ] I have run tests locally and they pass (no `node_modules` in my disposable PR-prep checkout; CI vitest will exercise) - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots (N/A — server-only) - [ ] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes (no doc surface affected) - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge Closes #3072. Refs #4759. --- ## Original Context `customProps` in the HTTP logger copies `req.body` / `req.params` / `req.query` verbatim into 4xx/5xx log entries. Better Auth's wrong-password flow therefore writes: ``` {"reqBody":{"email":"…","password":"founding6gomez6croaking"},"msg":"POST /api/auth/sign-in/email 401"} ``` …to disk. This PR rewrites credential-shaped values to `[REDACTED]` at that boundary. --- ## Cross-references and status (maintainer) Closes #5820 Closes #3095 Closes #4760 Closes #4886 --------- Co-authored-by: Aurora <aurora@majorimpact.com> Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |