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Author	SHA1	Message	Date
DottaandPaperclip	71a20453e1	fix(workspaces): honor inherited remote workspace bindings (#18611) ... ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip manages AI agents and their work. > - Task creation can bind a child to its parent's execution workspace. > - Native sandbox runs reserve that workspace before the provider starts. > - Remote reservation rejected inherited isolated workspaces and operator branches because the original source task differed. > - This check stopped valid child tasks before their existing access and writer checks could run. > - This pull request uses the persisted binding and existing source-access checks to admit that continuation. > - The benefit is that authorized child tasks can continue saved work while the single-writer lock stays effective. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What happened?** A child inherited an active isolated remote workspace through normal task creation. Its next run failed during setup with `Workspace ownership changed.` No provider work started. The reservation guard treated the original `sourceIssueId` as exclusive ownership, although task creation had persisted a valid child binding. **Expected behavior** A bound child or follow-up can reserve the workspace after the prior writer saves. Current task/run access, source visibility, trust, company scope, closed-workspace state, and writer checks must still apply. The original source task remains provenance. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Create a task with an active saved remote isolated workspace or operator branch. 2. Create a child without an explicit workspace override. 3. Confirm that the child inherited the execution workspace ID. 4. Start its native sandbox run. The old reservation guard rejects it before provider execution. **Paperclip version or commit** Reproduced on source based on `06bc8db75c71142ed108e0f331394c5187015d6a`. The same guard is present at `1a6017d6460267ad89d7e1784e2b521c28d8e9ac`. Related: #17156 proposes separate workspaces for child tasks. This repair preserves the current inheritance contract and enforces the remote writer lock. #16911 addresses child bindings across repositories. ## What Changed - Remove the original-task equality restriction for active remote workspaces. Keep the existing persisted-binding and retained-source authorization path. Explicit task-root selection follows the existing V1 filesystem contract; task-assignment grants do not define filesystem permissions. - Keep closed workspace rejection and unfinished-writer checks. - Add database-backed regressions for inheritance, replay, competing children, an unbound task, private source data, company isolation, and closed records. - Extend real save/restore tests for inherited isolated workspaces and operator branches. Keep shared-workspace discovery coverage. - Update the development guide and workspace maps. ## Verification - Red: before the repair, the inherited isolated/operator cases fail with `Workspace ownership changed.` The shared case passes. The unfixed suite has five failures and four passes. - Green: 11 reservation cases pass with real PostgreSQL 18 in an isolated Docker container. - An earlier run of the four affected workspace/preparation/trust suites passed 191 tests. The review follow-up passes all 15 selected reservation/save/restore cases. Inherited cases remove the original files, use a distinct allocation and target, restore the saved file, append child work, and independently read that work from the child's new snapshot. Shared-source discovery stays covered. The filter excludes 42 other integration cases. - `pnpm -r typecheck`, `pnpm build`, `node scripts/check-maps.mjs`, and `git diff --check` pass. A direct server typecheck also passes after the final test edit. - `pnpm test:run` stopped in its first chat shard: 338 passed, one Discord receiver-lease setup failure, 1,478 outside the shard. The failing test passes in isolation on both the unchanged baseline and the fix. Its suite-order failure is not explained by that retry and remains recorded. The unchanged baseline also fails three other Discord publication cases in that chat shard, while its next chat shard passes. This does not reproduce or explain the original lease failure; both results remain recorded. CI is complete on `e697f6e1b8`: 54 successful check runs, one successful legacy status, three skipped checks, and one neutral check. No check is pending or failed. Greptile gives this commit 5/5 with no remaining findings. The security reviewer accepted the V1-contract explanation; both review threads are resolved. - Live sandbox acceptance remains unverified. The available test credentials could not resolve the required sandbox snapshot. The provider rejected creation before workspace execution, and a scoped follow-up found no allocation. No live model turn, deployment, or original-task recovery is claimed. - Local environment: macOS arm64, Node 26.4.0, pnpm 9.15.4. Native PostgreSQL startup hit the host semaphore limit; tests use disposable Docker databases. No shared database was reset. ## Risks - A bound child can now write after the prior writer releases the workspace. Incorrect binding or access checks could expose source data. Regressions cover unbound, private-source, and foreign-company rejection. - Concurrent children must not become two writers. A real transaction race grants exactly one reservation; saved-file tests keep the second writer blocked until save completes. - No schema or migration changes. This PR does not change task-creation inheritance, requested models, credentials, trust, approval gates, or recovery budgets. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex, based on GPT-6. The exact serving model ID and context window are not exposed in this session. Used reasoning, tool use, code execution, and browser diagnostics. No sub-agents were used. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass — the targeted workspace suites pass; the full local chat-suite failure and baseline comparison are documented above - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>	2026-11-02 09:36:05 -06:00
DottaandPaperclip	5e4cc01073	feat(workspaces): keep remote files off the webserver disk (#18403) ... Keep native sandbox workspace files independent of the webserver disk. Use encrypted saved versions and Postgres ownership so a replacement server can recover files and continue work. Enable the path by default for new eligible workspaces when durable storage is configured. Preserve explicit opt-outs and existing host workspaces. Include safe snapshot repair, Files access, import, migration and retention. Bound saved-Files resources, preserve imported Git recovery, reject unfinished Git operations, publish immutable concurrent captures, and verify permanent object-version deletion. Validated 471 targeted local controls, build/typechecks, all 40 CI partitions, fresh Greptile 5/5 and security review. The PR records original failed attempts and scoped retries. Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>	2026-10-31 14:54:01 -05:00