4 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
DottaandPaperclip	417db14e7d	fix: show credential access errors in task chat (#15741) ... ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Agents use AI connections to run tasks for a responsible user. > - A connection can deny access when its owner has not shared it with that user. > - The task conversation hides this cause behind a collapsed failure marker. > - People need to see which connection blocked the agent and how to fix it. > - This pull request shows an expanded access error in the task conversation. > - The error names the agent and connection, and links to the agent's AI settings. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What happened?** A task could fail because its responsible user could not use the agent's AI connection. The user saw a temporary error toast and a collapsed task failure. The task did not clearly explain the access problem. **Expected behavior** The task should show a visible error that names the agent, the connection, and the person who lacks access. For example: "Codie is configured to use Dotta's API Key, but you don't have access to that credential." It should offer a link to change the AI connection. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Configure an agent with a personal AI connection. 2. Start a task for a user who cannot use that connection. 3. Open the task after the run fails. 4. Check that the access error stays visible and links to AI settings. Refs #15714. That change classifies expected connection-sharing denials. This change makes the same failure clear in task chat. ## What Changed - Keep the connection display name in private error metadata when a sharing check denies access. - Store a private grant reference for the name visibility check. Use one rule for task summaries and full run responses. Show the name to the affected user and the connection sharing audience. Other task readers see a generic label. Strip grant IDs from public run responses. - Show an expanded error card for native and legacy task runs. Use "you" only when the viewer is the responsible user. - Link to AI settings and the failed run. Preserve names on resumed native runs. Hide the old error after a newer successful attempt. - Add full task-page Storybook examples, focused tests, and design guidance. ## Verification - Passed 249 focused tests for task chat, error text, private error metadata, and the real database run summary. These include resumed native runs and viewer access rules. - Passed all UI token gates on the rebased branch. - Checked the production task page in Storybook. Verified the viewer's error, another user's error, mobile layout, and a newer successful attempt. - Passed `pnpm -r typecheck` and `pnpm build` in a clean checkout with Node 24 and the pinned pnpm version. Passed the final server typecheck after the response filter changes. - Passed the real database route regression for the connection owner, affected user, and another task reader. Passed the registered secret redaction tests. - The local route checks needed `--testTimeout 60000` for cold imports. A broader local route run hit cold-import timeouts and an old fixture assertion that is now fixed. The duplicate local `pnpm test:run` aggregate was stopped to free resources. The full suite passed in CI with the normal timeouts. - Passed the full [final-commit CI workflow](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/37996148342), including all server, UI, runner, browser, typecheck, build, and canary packaging gates. All 54 executed checks passed; two Storybook jobs were skipped. Greptile reviewed the final commit at 5/5 with no remaining findings, and every review thread is resolved. - Review the Storybook group `Task / Credential access` for the notice and full task-page examples. ## Risks - Only the allowed connection display name enters the compact run summary. Credential secrets, grant IDs, and arbitrary error details do not enter it. - Existing runs can lack the connection name. They show a clear fallback message. - The notice uses the existing task-run relevance rules. A newer attempt or a completed task hides the old failure. - No schema migration or API permission change is required. ## Model Used OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex, with tool execution and browser verification. The exact serving variant and context-window size are not exposed in this session. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>	2026-10-09 17:06:54 -05:00
DottaandPaperclip	a05b828bcd	Reduce run polling and workspace inspection amplification (#13174) ... ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip manages agent work and shows run progress to operators. > - Run lists, live events, transcripts, and workspace details must remain responsive as usage grows. > - Run-list redaction rereads the full context for every run. Hidden tabs can still trigger requests through live events and manual timers. > - Workspace detail reads repeat Git inspection even when concurrent callers request the same state. > - This pull request batches registry reads, pauses hidden-tab refreshes, and caches Git inspection for display. > - Cleanup keeps fresh Git checks, and redaction keeps company and run boundaries. ## Linked Issues **What happened?** Run-list responses perform one extra database read per run and parse full context JSON to obtain small secret registries. Hidden tabs continue transcript reads and event-triggered refetches. Workspace detail requests repeat Git scans. **Expected behavior** A run list reads registries once. Hidden tabs stop recurring run reads and reconcile when visible. Concurrent workspace detail reads share a short-lived Git result. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Open run lists and task transcripts in several tabs while agents run. 2. Hide some tabs and observe transcript and event-triggered requests. 3. Request a 200-run list and count redaction database queries. 4. Request the same workspace detail concurrently and count Git inspections. Related: #5255 adjusts polling cadence. This change addresses hidden-tab lifecycle, batched registry reads, and workspace inspection reuse. No duplicate with this scope was found. ## What Changed - Batch heartbeat and live-run redaction into one company-scoped registry query. Select only registry JSON for run and issue redaction. - Resolve duplicate secret values once per request. Preserve each run's registry and remove registry material from responses. - Suspend company event sockets and transcript reads while hidden. Refresh active queries and resume transcript offsets on return. - Prevent queued event invalidations and developer health polling from fetching in hidden tabs. Gate legacy run-log readers in both UI variants. - Exclude legacy plugin placeholder connections from remote health probes. Select only due connection IDs in SQL before the sweep limit. Preserve existing plugin records. - Cache concurrent Git display inspections for five seconds, with at most 256 entries. Leave close-readiness and cleanup checks uncached. - Add regression coverage and document the performance behavior. - Stabilize the existing Rust descendant-lineage fixture: allow a bounded 30 seconds for 300 durable notifications under concurrent test load, retaining every correctness assertion and adding timeout diagnostics. ## Verification - Regression coverage verifies one registry query for 200 runs, per-run isolation, request-local secret resolution, decryption failures, Git cache expiry/bounds, hidden-tab pause, and visibility recovery. - Real PostgreSQL redaction/run-route suites passed all 57 tests; workspace-service coverage passed. The health-sweep regression verifies plugin placeholders and chat connections remain untouched and do not consume the sweep limit. - Both legacy transcript viewers retain history and resume their byte offset after visibility changes. The related visibility/progress/chunk suites passed all 29 tests. Other focused UI suites and token gates passed. - Full `pnpm -r typecheck` and `pnpm build` passed. Affected-package typechecks/builds passed after review fixes. The concurrent Rust provider suite passed 84 tests (two ignored), and Rust formatting passed. - Full local `pnpm test:run` stopped after the general-server group: 10,538 passed, 65 skipped, four failed. Fresh chat-delivery and health-sweep reruns passed; building the debug runner fixture cleared the native-event test. One unchanged native-session recovery assertion still fails locally with a semantic-digest error instead of the expected settled-session message. The full local command is therefore not green. CI runs the later groups separately and skips the two native-session tests requiring a prebuilt runner binary (confirmed in its 37-test native-session suite). - All CI gates pass on final head `ee610e737`: typechecking, general and serialized tests, browser tests, runner verification, build, and canary dry run. One server shard passed on its single retry after exposure fixtures encountered port 42001 where they assumed 42000; that suite also passed locally (25 passed, three platform-specific skips). - Greptile reviewed the final head at 5/5 with no actionable findings. ## Risks - Workspace delivery display can lag local Git changes by five seconds. Destructive operations still inspect current state. - Hidden tabs do not receive company live-event notifications until visible. Active queries refresh on return. - This change preserves legacy plugin records and does not repair instance-specific workspace rows. There is no database migration. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 family, with reasoning, repository tools, code execution, and browser inspection. The exact model identifier and context-window size are not exposed in this session. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass (targeted regressions; full-suite limitation documented above) - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>	2026-09-11 08:34:24 -05:00
3 people	656ecfa585	fix(server): keep Date fields intact through secret redaction; harden chat notice timestamps (#10984) ... ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - The task chat thread renders issue comments, system notices, and run transcripts > - The server routes comment payloads through the run-secret redaction walker before it sends them > - The walker rebuilds each object with `Object.entries`, and this collapses `Date` instances to `{}` > - The chat renderer then calls `.toISOString()` on an invalid date and throws, and the thread falls back to the error banner > - This pull request keeps `Date` instances intact in redacted responses and makes the renderer safe against bad timestamps > - The benefit is that task threads with system notices render correctly again ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What happened** Task threads that contain a system notice showed the banner "Chat renderer hit an internal state error." in place of the conversation. This occurred on many tasks. **Expected behavior** The thread renders all comments and system notices with correct timestamps. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Open a task that has at least one system notice comment (for example a "Workspace ready" notice). 2. `GET /api/issues/{id}/comments` returns `createdAt: {}` for every comment because the secret-redaction walker collapses `Date` objects. 3. The system-notice row calls `new Date({}).toISOString()`. This throws `RangeError: Invalid time value` and trips the thread error boundary. **Version / deployment** Regression from #9934 (`e43f187ca`). It applies to all deployments that include that commit. ## What Changed - `server/src/services/run-secret-redaction.ts`: `redactRegisteredSecretValues` now returns `Date` instances as-is. Dates hold no redactable text, and the `Object.entries` rebuild turned them into `{}`. - `ui/src/components/IssueChatThread.tsx`: the system-notice row formats its timestamp with a new `toValidIsoString` helper. A value that does not parse as a date now degrades to "no timestamp" instead of a render crash. - Regression tests at three layers: - Walker unit tests: `Date` values survive with and without registered secret values. - Route test: `GET /issues/:id/comments` serializes `createdAt` / `updatedAt` as ISO strings. - Render test: a system notice with a malformed `createdAt` renders without the error boundary. ## Verification - `npx vitest run --root server src/__tests__/run-secret-redaction.test.ts` — 5 passed. - `npx vitest run --root server src/__tests__/issue-comment-redaction.test.ts` — 4 passed (embedded Postgres route test). - `cd ui && npx vitest run src/components/IssueChatThread.test.tsx src/components/IssueChatThreadSystemNotice.test.tsx src/lib/issue-chat-messages.test.ts` — 121 passed. - Each new test was run against the unfixed code and failed there, which confirms it guards the regression. - A local sweep rendered 47 real issue threads through `IssueChatThread`: 7 tripped the boundary before the fix, 0 after. ## Risks - Low risk. The server change only preserves `Date` objects that the walker destroyed before. String redaction behavior does not change, and the registry-key stripping does not change. - The UI change only affects the timestamp of system-notice rows and omits it when the value is invalid. ## Model Used - Claude Fable 5 (`claude-fable-5`), Anthropic. Agentic coding session with tool use (file edits, shell, Vitest). No extended-context or special reasoning mode. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>	2026-08-06 10:29:07 -05:00
3 people	e43f187cad	feat(secrets): add human-approved secret proposals (#9934) ... ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the control plane people use to manage AI-agent companies. > - Agents can encounter credentials during work. > - Directly creating live secrets or bindings would bypass human governance. > - Proposal records must remain inert and separate from live secret resolution until an authorized human approves them. > - Approval must reuse the existing secret-create and protected agent-config write paths. > - This pull request adds the propose, review, approve, and reject lifecycle. > - The benefit is that agents can safely hand credentials into Paperclip without exposing plaintext or gaining authority to activate them. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Follow-on to #9921, which established run-bound agent secret access. **Problem / motivation:** Agents can receive credentials during work. There is no governed way for them to propose a credential or binding without exposing plaintext in work artifacts or immediately creating live access. **Proposed solution:** Store agent-authored proposals outside live secret tables. Encrypt each proposed value and register exact-value redaction when Paperclip receives it. Require an authorized human to approve or reject each proposal. Approval executes through the normal write paths as the human approver. Binding proposals can target only the proposer or its downward reporting chain under the restrictive V1 policy. **Alternatives considered:** We rejected live secrets with a `proposed` status. That design would put untrusted rows in resolver, list, and sync paths. It would also allow uniqueness squatting. We rejected direct agent binding writes because a binding is an agent-config write and must keep the existing human permission gate. **Roadmap alignment:** This change extends the run-bound agent secret-access foundation in #9921 with a governed proposal workflow. ## Security Verdict Q0 SecEng verdict: **PASS-with-required-changes**. The review accepted the separate proposal-table design and required the implementation to: - fail closed unless both encryption and exact-value run redaction registration succeed; - scrub ciphertext idempotently on reject, withdraw, and expiry, with audit-visible state; - treat agent justification as hostile input and foreground action, target, provenance, and approver permissions; - snapshot and re-check the target agent plus reports-to chain at approval to prevent org-chart laundering; - make cascade approval atomic and fail closed if either secret creation or binding authorization fails; - deny low-trust, `skill_test`, `task_bridge`, and non-run-bound sources consistently; and - execute approval through the normal human secret/config write paths, including protected-change gates. Those requirements are implemented and covered by focused service, route, and UI tests. Residual V1 risk remains the accepted 14-day encrypted retention window. Proposal-time redaction also cannot clean a value that leaked before the propose call. ## What Changed - Added `company_secret_proposals`, migration `0207`, shared proposal contracts, and a state-machine service for create, approve, reject, withdraw, cascade, expiry, and ciphertext scrubbing. - Added run-bound agent proposal routes and board review routes. The routes derive provenance from authentication and enforce source restrictions, company isolation, chain-of-command checks, approval-as-approver, wake-on-resolution, and dual audit trails. - Added durable per-run exact-value redaction registration so proposal values remain redacted on later read surfaces. - Added the Secrets **Proposals** tab and agent configuration **Proposed access** rows. The UI shows fingerprint and length only. It also frames agent justification as untrusted input, runs permission preflight, supports approve and reject actions, and confirms cascades. - Updated OpenAPI, agent skill guidance, API reference documentation, and focused server and UI regression coverage. - Rebased the branch onto current `master` and renumbered the proposal migration after `0206`. ## QA Acceptance Results Q5 QA verdict: **PASS — 9/9 acceptance criteria met**, with one Minor non-blocking follow-up. - **AC1:** proposed values never echo, never appear in live lists/resolvers, and expose only fingerprint + length to board reviewers. - **AC2:** restrictive `self_and_reports` matrix passes: self/downward allowed; upward/lateral denied. - **AC3:** secret approval uses the normal create path, honors rename overrides, records proposer/approver provenance, and scrubs ciphertext. - **AC4:** approved bindings materialize and resolve through the target agent's runtime list/fetch routes. - **AC5:** pending-secret bindings require cascade; cascade succeeds atomically and permission failures leave nothing applied. - **AC6:** reject, withdraw, dependent rejection, and expiry paths scrub ciphertext and preserve reasons/audit state. - **AC7:** token/source and approver denial matrix passes through live checks plus focused route tests. - **AC8:** proposal lifecycle events and reused `secret.created`/config-write events form the required dual audit trail; origin-issue notification and wake are queued. - **AC9:** both review surfaces render and execute correctly; UI approval materializes the binding. QA also confirmed zero plaintext occurrences for all exercised proposal values in server logs. The single finding is that the company-level `bindingTargetPolicy` toggle is not wired yet. V1 is hardcoded to the restrictive `self_and_reports` policy. The matrix is correct and the follow-up is tracked separately, so QA classified it as non-blocking. ## Verification - Focused server proposal and redaction suite: 83 tests pass. - Focused proposal review UI suite: 54 tests pass. - Embedded-Postgres migration reapply test: 1 test passes with the documented 30-second timeout. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/db typecheck` passes, including migration numbering and safety checks. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/shared typecheck` passes. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui typecheck` passes. - `pnpm check:token-gates` passes with all gates clean. - Q5 exercised the complete propose, review, approve, bind, and runtime-resolve flow over real HTTP, JWT, and database paths. It verified 9/9 acceptance criteria. ## Risks - Proposal ciphertext is retained encrypted for up to 14 days while pending. Terminal-state and expiry scrub paths reduce but do not remove server-compromise risk during that window. - The V1 target policy is restrictive but not yet company-configurable. A separate follow-up owns that change. - A new migration can require another renumber if another migration lands before maintainers merge this pull request. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex coding agent. The exact runtime model ID and context-window size are not exposed. The agent used reasoning, repository editing, terminal execution, Paperclip API, and GitHub CLI capabilities. Q3 UI work also records Claude Opus 4.8 assistance in its commit trailers. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal or instance-local Paperclip issues or links - [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-05 21:49:40 -05:00