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1477d1ecea |
test: remove the no-op sequential describe modifier (#15286)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Paperclip runs the server and runner test suites with Vitest. > - Vitest 5 removes the deprecated `describe.sequential` property, so the pending Vitest 5 upgrade fails the type-check and test jobs. > - `describe.sequential` only changes behaviour inside a `describe.concurrent` suite, or when `sequence.concurrent` is on. > - This repository has neither, so the modifier changed nothing at run time. > - The benefit is that the Vitest 5 upgrade can land, and the test files lose a modifier that did no work. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs: #12969 ## What Changed - Replace every `describe.sequential` use with a plain `describe` call. - Drop the `{ concurrent: false }` suite option from the two runner test files. - Add a comment to `server/vitest.config.ts` that records why these suites must run one test at a time. - Leave the package manifests and the lockfile unchanged. ## Why the modifier did nothing The Vitest documentation states that `describe.sequential` is useful to run tests in sequence inside a `describe.concurrent` suite, or with the `--sequence.concurrent` option. `sequence.concurrent` defaults to `false`. This repository satisfies neither condition: - No test file uses `describe.concurrent`, `it.concurrent`, or `test.concurrent`. - `server/vitest.config.ts` sets `sequence.concurrent: false`, with `maxWorkers: 1`, `maxConcurrency: 1`, and `isolate: true`. - `packages/paperclip-runner/vitest.config.ts` sets no `sequence` block, so the `false` default applies. `packages/db` and `cli` already run the same embedded-Postgres suites with a plain `describe`, and those jobs are green. The server package was the only outlier. The modifier did carry one real piece of knowledge: these suites need their tests to run one at a time. The new comment in `server/vitest.config.ts` records that reason next to the setting that enforces it. ## Verification - `git grep` for `describe.sequential` returns nothing outside `node_modules`. - The author ran the changed server test files under the installed Vitest 4, and the results match the results without this change. - Two very large embedded-Postgres test files exceeded the author's local memory limit, so the CI test jobs cover those two. - The two changed runner test files have pre-existing local failures caused by a missing Rust toolchain and a missing global `pnpm` binary. The failures are identical with and without this change. - The author type-checked the changed files and found no new error. - CI must pass the typecheck, build, server test, and runner verify jobs. ## Risks - Low risk. Suite execution stays serial, because the Vitest config enforces it. - The change adds no dependency and changes no package manifest or lockfile. - A future change that turns `sequence.concurrent` on would break these suites. The new config comment warns against it. ## Model Used - Claude Sonnet 5 — code edits and local verification. - OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 — the earlier revision of this branch. ## Test plan - [x] Every CI check reaches a terminal green state. A pending or queued check is not a pass. - [x] The `Typecheck + Release Registry` job passes. This change must not introduce a type error. - [x] The `Build` job passes. - [x] The server test jobs and the runner verify jobs pass. - [x] Greptile re-reviews this commit set and posts a passing verdict. The dependabot waiver does not apply to this pull request. - [x] `mergeable` reads `MERGEABLE` as a terminal value. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have linked the related public issue with `Refs: #12969` - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge Co-Authored-By: Priya Raman <priya.raman@paperclip.ing> --------- Co-authored-by: Priya Raman <priya.raman@paperclip.ing> Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: nickyleach <331803+nickyleach@users.noreply.github.com> |
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606e74d11f |
cloud_tenant: company-scoped tenants, never instance-admin (#7525)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies, and a single server instance can host many companies. > - The auth middleware (`server/src/middleware/auth.ts`) supports a `cloud_tenant` mode where a trusted hosting proxy injects per-request identity headers, designed originally for one-deployment-per-tenant setups. > - In that original setup, granting every cloud tenant the `instance_admin` role was harmless; on a **shared, multi-tenant pool** it means any paying tenant is admin of the whole instance and can reach every other tenant's data. > - A tenant only needs to own its own company — which it already gets via the company membership the same code path upserts — so instance-level admin is never appropriate for `cloud_tenant` actors. > - This PR removes the `instance_admin` grant from the cloud-tenant path and pins `isInstanceAdmin: false` on the resolved actor. > - Greptile review then surfaced a follow-up gap: deployments that ran the pre-hardening build still have stale `instance_admin` rows in `instance_user_roles`, which other lookups (BetterAuth session path, board API keys, and the authorization service's own DB re-check) would still honor. > - The follow-up commit closes that gap by purging stale rows at the cloud-tenant auth boundary and by teaching the authorization service that `cloud_tenant` actors are never instance admins. > - The benefit is that shared-pool hosting becomes structurally safe: tenants are company-scoped owners, never instance admins — including on deployments upgrading from the older behavior. ## Linked Issues - Refs #966 — managed SaaS multi-tenant hosting is the deployment shape this hardening protects. - Refs #5015 — same problem space: instance-admin-scoped credentials are too broad for multi-company instances; tenants need company-scoped access. Neither issue is fully closed by this PR; it removes the instance-admin grant from the `cloud_tenant` trusted-header path specifically. ## What Changed - `server/src/middleware/auth.ts` - Removed the `instanceUserRoles` insert that granted every cloud tenant `instance_admin`; `resolveCloudTenantActor` now returns `isInstanceAdmin: false` (was `true`). - `resolveCloudTenantActor` now **deletes** any stale `instance_admin` row for the authenticated tenant user on every trusted-header request, so grants left behind by pre-hardening deployments are purged at the source (closes the Greptile P2: stale rows could otherwise re-elevate the user via the BetterAuth session path, board API keys, or the authorization service). - The function is `export`ed so it can be unit-tested directly. - `server/src/services/authorization.ts` - `authorizationService` previously re-checked `instanceUserRoles` from the DB regardless of the actor flag, which would have elevated even hardened `cloud_tenant` actors while a stale row lingered. Actors with `source === "cloud_tenant"` are now never elevated to instance admin; other board actors keep the existing lookup. - `server/src/services/authorization.ts` + `server/src/middleware/auth.ts` (follow-up commit `dc57a71c7`) - CI on the merge ref surfaced that elevation removal alone strands real cloud tenant users: board actors only ever reached `issue:read` / `issue:mutate` through instance-admin elevation (`permissionForAction` maps both to no grant key). `decide()` now grants `cloud_tenant` actors with an **active membership in the resource company** the same read surface as a same-company agent (`agent:read`, `company_scope:read`, `issue:read`, `project:read`) plus `issue:mutate` for non-viewer members — cross-company access stays denied (new `allow_company_member` reason). - `resolveCloudTenantActor` seeds the standard role-default permission grants (`ensureHumanRoleDefaultGrants`) so granted actions (e.g. `tasks:assign`, `agents:create` for owners) work without elevation. - Master-side route tests that stubbed cloud tenant actors with `isInstanceAdmin: true` now seed a real membership and assert under the hardened contract (`issue-identifier-routes`, `multilingual-issues-routes`, `issue-comment-redaction`). - Tests - `server/src/middleware/cloud-tenant-actor.test.ts` (new): cloud tenant is never instance-admin, is scoped to exactly the one company from its stack, still upserts user/company/membership, purges stale `instance_admin` rows, returns null without the server token, and maps non-owner stack roles without elevating. - `server/src/__tests__/auth-session-route.test.ts`: end-to-end middleware regression — a user with a stale `instance_admin` row stops being elevated via the session path once they authenticate through the cloud-tenant path (with a control assertion showing the pre-purge elevation). - `server/src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts` (embedded Postgres): a `cloud_tenant` actor with a stale `instance_admin` row in the real DB cannot cross company boundaries, while a `session` actor with the same row still resolves `allow_instance_admin`. ## Verification Run from the repo root after `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile`: ```bash cd server npx vitest run src/middleware/cloud-tenant-actor.test.ts src/__tests__/auth-session-route.test.ts # 9 tests passed npx vitest run src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts # 16 tests passed (embedded Postgres) pnpm typecheck # clean ``` Also ran the broader auth-related suites locally (`auth-routes`, `authz-company-access`, `better-auth`, `adapter-routes-authz`, `express5-auth-wildcard`): 8 files, 58 tests, all passing. ## Risks - **This touches authentication and authorization paths directly.** Mistakes here are security bugs in both directions; review accordingly. - **Behavioral change for existing `cloud_tenant` deployments:** tenants that previously (incorrectly) had instance-admin lose it — including the ability to see/manage other companies on the instance. This is the intended hardening, but any single-tenant deployment that relied on the cloud-tenant identity for instance administration must provision a separate admin identity. - **The purge is destructive by design:** if an operator's instance-admin identity is *also* provisioned through the cloud-tenant headers (same user id), its `instance_admin` row will be deleted on the next trusted-header request. Operators should hold admin through a non-cloud-tenant identity. - **Residual gap (documented, not fixed here):** a deployment that ran the old cloud_tenant build and then *disabled* cloud-tenant mode keeps stale rows until the affected user re-authenticates through the cloud path. A data migration was considered and deliberately avoided: there is no reliable SQL predicate for "cloud-tenant-provisioned user" (no source column), so a migration risks deleting legitimate admins. - No schema or migration changes; no UI changes. ## Model Used - Claude Fable 5 (claude-fable-5, 1M context), extended thinking + tool use, via Claude Code — this revision; original PR authored in an earlier Claude Code session. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above (none duplicate this; related issues Refs #966 / #5015 are linked in the issue section) - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots (no UI changes) - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes (no existing docs reference `cloud_tenant` mode) - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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4c47eb46c3 |
[codex] Add multilingual issue preservation coverage (#6069)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for autonomous companies. > - Agents and board operators coordinate through company-scoped issues, comments, documents, and heartbeat wake payloads. > - Chinese, Japanese, and Hindi text needs to survive the full issue lifecycle without normalization or prompt serialization damage. > - The riskiest paths are board issue creation, server issue/comment/document round-tripping, and scoped wake prompt rendering. > - This pull request adds focused regression coverage across those surfaces. > - The benefit is higher confidence that multilingual operators and agents can create, search, comment on, complete, and wake on issues using non-Latin text. ## What Changed - Added adapter-utils wake payload and prompt rendering coverage for Chinese, Japanese, and Hindi issue/comment text. - Added UI New Issue dialog coverage proving multilingual title and description text is submitted unchanged. - Added server route coverage that round-trips multilingual issue text through create, search, comments, documents, completion comments, and heartbeat context. - Addressed Greptile feedback by using a typed storage mock and splitting the server route integration path into smaller ordered assertions. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run packages/adapter-utils/src/server-utils.test.ts ui/src/components/NewIssueDialog.test.tsx server/src/__tests__/multilingual-issues-routes.test.ts` - Result: 3 test files passed, 51 tests passed. ## Risks - Low risk: this PR adds regression coverage only and does not change runtime behavior. - The new server test uses embedded Postgres support and skips on unsupported hosts using the existing helper pattern. - No migrations are included. - No `pnpm-lock.yaml` changes are included. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected - check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 based coding agent, with shell, git, Vitest, and GitHub connector/CLI tool use. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge |