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Author	SHA1	Message	Date
DottaandPaperclip	83076d7e7c	feat: return completed handoffs to Agent Chat (#14408 ) Return completed Agent Chat handoffs through a durable outbox and scope each generated update to its supplied tasks. Add recovery, browser delivery, result access, and calibrated quality coverage. Validated with two consecutive ten-case Claude/Codex campaigns, all CI checks, and a 5/5 review. Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>	2026-09-29 10:25:52 -05:00
Jannes StubbemannandClaude Opus 4.7	7f2ed0ad90	security(server): close cross-tenant existence oracle (404 instead of 403) (#3967 ) ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies > - In a multi-tenant deployment, route handlers that take a resource id (`issue`, `goal`, `project`, `approval`, etc.) look the resource up by id and then call `assertCompanyAccess` on its `companyId` — 404 if it doesn't exist, 403 if it exists in another tenant > - The split status codes are a classic existence oracle: any authenticated user can enumerate ids across tenants by probing for the 403/404 boundary, mapping out which issues, labels, approvals, etc. exist in other customers' tenants even when they cannot read the contents > - The right fix is a single uniform 404 for both "not found" and "found but cross-tenant", which collapses the oracle but still preserves write-path checks (active membership, viewer-readonly) for authorized tenants > - This pull request adds a non-throwing `hasCompanyAccess(req, companyId)` helper plus a `getAccessibleResource` wrapper that ~130 handlers across 14 route files now use, folding the access check into the existence check while still running `assertCompanyAccess` for authorized tenants so viewer-readonly / inactive-membership rejections fire unchanged on write paths > - The benefit is closing a multi-tenant information leak without breaking write-path security or single-tenant local-first behavior ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs #709 — asks for company-scope regression coverage across approval/activity/access routes, because a subtle route refactor could leak cross-tenant data; this PR hardens exactly those surfaces (uniform 404 across 14 route files including `approvals`, `activity`, `secrets`) and updates cross-tenant expectations in test files. It does not add the full coverage matrix #709 asks for — hence Refs, not Closes. No existing issue covers the oracle itself — described in-PR: - Route handlers returned 404 for "not found" but 403 for "exists in another tenant", a classic existence oracle: any authenticated user could enumerate ids across tenants by probing the 403/404 boundary. - That maps out which issues, labels, approvals, etc. exist in other customers' tenants even when their contents are unreadable. - Fix: a uniform 404 for both cases, while keeping write-path checks (active membership, viewer-readonly) for authorized tenants. ## What Changed - `server/src/routes/authz.ts` — new `hasCompanyAccess(req, companyId): boolean` helper alongside the existing `assertCompanyAccess`. Docstring spells out the two-step pattern (404 gate, then `assertCompanyAccess` for write-path checks). The helper mirrors `assertCompanyAccess`'s company-scope semantics exactly — in particular, signed-in instance admins do not get blanket access to companies they are not a member of (the repo's `authz-company-access` tests pin that behavior for `assertCompanyAccess`; an earlier draft of the helper accidentally widened it for reads). - `getAccessibleResource(req, res, lookup, notFoundMessage)` — the safe thing is now the easy thing. One helper wraps the whole pattern (uniform 404 for missing/cross-tenant, then `assertCompanyAccess` for write-path membership checks) and ~130 handlers across 14 route files use it: ```ts const goal = await getAccessibleResource(req, res, svc.getById(id), "Goal not found"); if (!goal) return; ``` Files: `activity`, `agents`, `approvals`, `assets`, `costs`, `environments`, `execution-workspaces`, `file-resources`, `goals`, `issue-tree-control`, `issues`, `projects`, `routines`, `secrets`. Handlers with bespoke not-found behavior (the legacy `200 []` contract, audit-logged denials in `file-resources`, null-returning authz helpers) compose `hasCompanyAccess` directly using the documented two-step pattern: ```ts // step 1: close the oracle (uniform 404 for both not-found and cross-tenant) if (!existing \|\| !hasCompanyAccess(req, existing.companyId)) { res.status(404).json({ error: "Goal not found" }); return; } // step 2: enforce write-path membership checks for authorised tenants (no-op on GET) assertCompanyAccess(req, existing.companyId); ``` Routes where `companyId` comes from request input (`req.params.companyId`, `req.body.companyId`, e.g. in `companies.ts` and `plugins.ts`) deliberately retain plain `assertCompanyAccess` — there's no existence oracle to close because the companyId is an input, not a discovered value. - Full-sweep coverage — a scripted audit of every `assertCompanyAccess(req, <resource>.companyId)` call site in `server/src/routes/` found ~55 lookup-then-assert pairs the first pass missed; all are now gated. Notable ones: the `/secret-provider-configs/:id` CRUD routes, the agents instructions-bundle/config-revision/skills-sync routes (which check access via the `assertCanUpdateAgent` / `assertCanReadAgent` / `assertCanManageInstructionsPath` helpers), `POST /heartbeat-runs/:runId/watchdog-decisions`, `GET /issues/:id/cost-summary`, the environment + environment-lease GET routes, all six issue-tree-control routes, ~24 issue sub-resource routes (document annotations, interactions, approvals links, recovery actions, plan decompositions, lock/unlock), and the three workspace file-resource routes (these throw `notFound` instead of `forbidden` inside their audit-logging wrappers, so denied attempts are still activity-logged server-side while the client sees a uniform 404). - Helpers made self-defending — `assertCanUpdateAgent` / `assertCanReadAgent` / `assertCanManageInstructionsPath` (agents) and `assertCanManage{Project,Execution}WorkspaceRuntimeServices` throw `notFound` for cross-tenant resources before their `assertCompanyAccess` step, so a future caller that forgets the route-level gate still can't reopen the oracle. - Pattern enforcement — new `authz-existence-oracle-guard.test.ts` statically scans `server/src/routes/.ts` and fails CI on any `assertCompanyAccess(req, <resource>.companyId)` call that is not preceded by a `hasCompanyAccess` gate, with an explicit allowlist (plus staleness check) for the request-input cases. New routes that regress to the 403/404 split fail the suite with a message pointing at the documented pattern. - Tests* — cross-tenant expectations updated from 403→404 where routes are now gated; new `hasCompanyAccess` unit tests in `authz-company-access.test.ts` pin the instance-admin/local-implicit/agent/none semantics in lockstep with `assertCompanyAccess`; `write-path-membership.test.ts` (added in an earlier round) confirms viewer/inactive users are still rejected on writes. - One legacy-contract preserve — `GET /heartbeat-runs/:runId/issues` still returns `200 []` for both "doesn't exist" and "cross-tenant" so the legacy contract is preserved while the oracle stays closed. ## Verification - `pnpm run typecheck` — PASS. - `pnpm -F @paperclipai/server exec vitest run` — full server suite green locally apart from 4 pre-existing local-environment failures (`paperclip-skill-utils` ×2 and `workspace-runtime` ×1 are cwd/git-environment dependent — verified identical on a clean checkout of the base; `heartbeat-process-recovery` is the known macOS flake). - The new `authz-existence-oracle-guard` test sweeps `server/src/routes/.ts` and confirms no remaining `assertCompanyAccess(resource.companyId)` site without a `hasCompanyAccess` gate; the only allowlisted holdouts take `companyId` from request input. ## Risks - API contract narrowing.* Any client that specifically checked for `403` on cross-tenant access now sees `404`. This is a strict narrowing (one status instead of two for the same negative outcome) and matches what a client should expect for any id it can't access. - Write-path checks preserved. `assertCompanyAccess` still runs after the 404 gate on write routes, so viewer-readonly / inactive-membership rejections fire unchanged for legitimate users. - Instance-admin scope unchanged. `hasCompanyAccess` denies signed-in instance admins without an explicit membership, exactly like `assertCompanyAccess` (pinned by unit tests) — so the gate introduces no new read access for admins. - Single-tenant local-first deploys behave identically — the helper short-circuits to `true` for `local_implicit` sessions. - No new env vars, no deployment-mode switch. ## Model Used Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context), extended thinking mode; completeness sweep + instance-admin parity fix by Claude Fable 5 (1M context). ## Checklist - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] Thinking path traces from project context to this change - [x] Model used specified - [x] Checked ROADMAP.md — part of the multi-tenant hardening initiative - [x] Tests run locally and pass - [x] Added/updated cross-tenant 404 expectations across test files - [x] No UI changes - [x] Documented risks above - [x] Will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before merge Part of the multi-tenant hardening initiative — see also #5864 (per-company JWT keys) and #5865 (plugin tables `company_id`). --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-07-14 15:53:09 -07:00
Nicky LeachandPaperclip	31a0080e61	Fix wake diagnostics low-trust identifier redaction (#9133 ) ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open-source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - The task/issue lifecycle subsystem tracks when agents wake up, are suppressed, or are deferred, recording each wake request in `agent_wakeup_requests` and each defer/suppression event in `activity_log` > - When an agent appears stuck or doesn't resume after a dependency resolves, there is currently no read-only API surface to inspect its wake history — operators must query the database directly > - Making wake history queryable via a first-class endpoint lets operators, support, and monitoring tools diagnose "why didn't this agent wake up?" without database access > - This pull request adds `GET /api/issues/:id/diagnostics/wakes`, returning a bounded 14-day/50-row projection of wake requests and defer/suppression activity events, with a deterministic `diagnosis` field and a `likelyReason` inference — including a Case-B inference ("no wake enqueued because a visible blocker is not done") that reuses the blocker readiness data from the companion blocker diagnostics endpoint (see Refs #9114) > - The benefit is that platform operators can answer "why is this agent not waking up?" from a safe, read-only HTTP endpoint rather than needing direct database access, and CI/monitoring can assert expected wake behavior ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs #9114 (companion blocker diagnostics endpoint, already merged — this PR extends the same diagnostic surface to wake/activity history) ## What Changed - New route `GET /api/issues/:id/diagnostics/wakes` in `server/src/routes/issues.ts`: returns a bounded (14-day window, 50-row cap) projection of `agent_wakeup_requests` rows and wake-relevant `activity_log` rows (defer/suppression events) - Sanitized projection: raw `payload`, `details`, `error`, and `triggerDetail` fields are stripped; unknown free-form `source`, `reason`, and `status` values are projected to `"other"` to prevent schema bleed - Deterministic `diagnosis` and `likelyReason` fields: includes Case-B inference ("no wake enqueued — visible blocker not done") that calls the existing blocker-readiness helper from Slice 1 (#9114) so the wake surface can explain missing wakes caused by outstanding blockers - Auth: `assertCompanyAccess` + `assertIssueReadAllowed`; cross-company requests are denied; Case-B blocker inference filters by caller trust level so hidden (low-trust) blockers are mentioned but not identified - Types in `@paperclipai/shared`: `IssueWakeDiagnosticsResponse`, `WakeEvent`, `ActivityEvent` exported from the shared package - OpenAPI tag registration for the new route - Skill reference docs in `skills/paperclip/references/api-reference.md` documenting the endpoint contract - Test coverage (`server/src/__tests__/issue-wake-diagnostics-routes.test.ts`, embedded Postgres): happy path, empty/null diagnosis, Case-B inference, low-trust hidden blocker, cross-company denial, raw blob minimization, cap behaviour, combined blocker+wake test run ## Verification ```bash # Wake diagnostics tests only pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/issue-wake-diagnostics-routes.test.ts # Wake + blocker diagnostics together (integration) pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/issue-blocker-diagnostics-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/issue-wake-diagnostics-routes.test.ts # Type-check shared and server packages pnpm --filter @paperclipai/shared typecheck pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck # Whitespace / diff check git diff --check ``` All commands passed locally. ## Risks - No schema or migration changes — this is a read-only projection over existing tables; no DDL risk. - Bounded queries — 14-day window + 50-row cap limit per call; no unbounded scans. - Auth boundary — cross-company access is denied at `assertCompanyAccess`; Case-B inference uses the same per-node trust filtering as the blocker endpoint so low-trust blockers are acknowledged but not identified. - Low overall risk; the endpoint is additive and read-only. ## Model Used - Provider: Anthropic - Model: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (`claude-sonnet-4-6`) - Tool use: yes (file reads, edits, bash execution, Paperclip API calls) - Reasoning mode: standard (no extended thinking) ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [ ] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>	2026-07-07 04:45:23 +00:00

Author

SHA1

Message

Date

DottaandPaperclip

83076d7e7c

feat: return completed handoffs to Agent Chat (#14408 )

Return completed Agent Chat handoffs through a durable outbox and scope each generated update to its supplied tasks. Add recovery, browser delivery, result access, and calibrated quality coverage.

Validated with two consecutive ten-case Claude/Codex campaigns, all CI checks, and a 5/5 review.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>

2026-09-29 10:25:52 -05:00

Jannes StubbemannandClaude Opus 4.7

7f2ed0ad90

security(server): close cross-tenant existence oracle (404 instead of 403) (#3967 )

## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies
> - In a multi-tenant deployment, route handlers that take a resource id
(`issue`, `goal`, `project`, `approval`, etc.) look the resource up by
id and then call `assertCompanyAccess` on its `companyId` — 404 if it
doesn't exist, 403 if it exists in another tenant
> - The split status codes are a classic *existence oracle*: any
authenticated user can enumerate ids across tenants by probing for the
403/404 boundary, mapping out which issues, labels, approvals, etc.
exist in other customers' tenants even when they cannot read the
contents
> - The right fix is a single uniform 404 for both "not found" and
"found but cross-tenant", which collapses the oracle but still preserves
write-path checks (active membership, viewer-readonly) for *authorized*
tenants
> - This pull request adds a non-throwing `hasCompanyAccess(req,
companyId)` helper plus a `getAccessibleResource` wrapper that ~130
handlers across 14 route files now use, folding the access check into
the existence check while still running `assertCompanyAccess` for
authorized tenants so viewer-readonly / inactive-membership rejections
fire unchanged on write paths
> - The benefit is closing a multi-tenant information leak without
breaking write-path security or single-tenant local-first behavior

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #709 — asks for company-scope regression coverage across
approval/activity/access routes, because a subtle route refactor could
leak cross-tenant data; this PR hardens exactly those surfaces (uniform
404 across 14 route files including `approvals`, `activity`, `secrets`)
and updates cross-tenant expectations in test files. It does not add the
full coverage matrix #709 asks for — hence Refs, not Closes.

No existing issue covers the oracle itself — described in-PR:

- Route handlers returned 404 for "not found" but 403 for "exists in
another tenant", a classic *existence oracle*: any authenticated user
could enumerate ids across tenants by probing the 403/404 boundary.
- That maps out which issues, labels, approvals, etc. exist in other
customers' tenants even when their contents are unreadable.
- Fix: a uniform 404 for both cases, while keeping write-path checks
(active membership, viewer-readonly) for authorized tenants.

## What Changed

- **`server/src/routes/authz.ts`** — new `hasCompanyAccess(req,
companyId): boolean` helper alongside the existing
`assertCompanyAccess`. Docstring spells out the two-step pattern (404
gate, then `assertCompanyAccess` for write-path checks). The helper
mirrors `assertCompanyAccess`'s company-scope semantics exactly — in
particular, signed-in instance admins do **not** get blanket access to
companies they are not a member of (the repo's `authz-company-access`
tests pin that behavior for `assertCompanyAccess`; an earlier draft of
the helper accidentally widened it for reads).
- **`getAccessibleResource(req, res, lookup, notFoundMessage)`** — the
safe thing is now the easy thing. One helper wraps the whole pattern
(uniform 404 for missing/cross-tenant, then `assertCompanyAccess` for
write-path membership checks) and ~130 handlers across 14 route files
use it:
  ```ts
const goal = await getAccessibleResource(req, res, svc.getById(id),
"Goal not found");
  if (!goal) return;
  ```
Files: `activity`, `agents`, `approvals`, `assets`, `costs`,
`environments`, `execution-workspaces`, `file-resources`, `goals`,
`issue-tree-control`, `issues`, `projects`, `routines`, `secrets`.
Handlers with bespoke not-found behavior (the legacy `200 []` contract,
audit-logged denials in `file-resources`, null-returning authz helpers)
compose `hasCompanyAccess` directly using the documented two-step
pattern:
  ```ts
// step 1: close the oracle (uniform 404 for both not-found and
cross-tenant)
  if (!existing || !hasCompanyAccess(req, existing.companyId)) {
    res.status(404).json({ error: "Goal not found" });
    return;
  }
// step 2: enforce write-path membership checks for authorised tenants
(no-op on GET)
  assertCompanyAccess(req, existing.companyId);
  ```
Routes where `companyId` comes from *request input*
(`req.params.companyId`, `req.body.companyId`, e.g. in `companies.ts`
and `plugins.ts`) deliberately retain plain `assertCompanyAccess` —
there's no existence oracle to close because the companyId is an input,
not a discovered value.
- **Full-sweep coverage** — a scripted audit of every
`assertCompanyAccess(req, <resource>.companyId)` call site in
`server/src/routes/` found ~55 lookup-then-assert pairs the first pass
missed; all are now gated. Notable ones: the
`/secret-provider-configs/:id` CRUD routes, the agents
instructions-bundle/config-revision/skills-sync routes (which check
access via the `assertCanUpdateAgent` / `assertCanReadAgent` /
`assertCanManageInstructionsPath` helpers), `POST
/heartbeat-runs/:runId/watchdog-decisions`, `GET
/issues/:id/cost-summary`, the environment + environment-lease GET
routes, all six issue-tree-control routes, ~24 issue sub-resource routes
(document annotations, interactions, approvals links, recovery actions,
plan decompositions, lock/unlock), and the three workspace file-resource
routes (these throw `notFound` instead of `forbidden` inside their
audit-logging wrappers, so denied attempts are still activity-logged
server-side while the client sees a uniform 404).
- **Helpers made self-defending** — `assertCanUpdateAgent` /
`assertCanReadAgent` / `assertCanManageInstructionsPath` (agents) and
`assertCanManage{Project,Execution}WorkspaceRuntimeServices` throw
`notFound` for cross-tenant resources before their `assertCompanyAccess`
step, so a future caller that forgets the route-level gate still can't
reopen the oracle.
- **Pattern enforcement** — new `authz-existence-oracle-guard.test.ts`
statically scans `server/src/routes/*.ts` and fails CI on any
`assertCompanyAccess(req, <resource>.companyId)` call that is not
preceded by a `hasCompanyAccess` gate, with an explicit allowlist (plus
staleness check) for the request-input cases. New routes that regress to
the 403/404 split fail the suite with a message pointing at the
documented pattern.
- **Tests** — cross-tenant expectations updated from 403→404 where
routes are now gated; new `hasCompanyAccess` unit tests in
`authz-company-access.test.ts` pin the
instance-admin/local-implicit/agent/none semantics in lockstep with
`assertCompanyAccess`; `write-path-membership.test.ts` (added in an
earlier round) confirms viewer/inactive users are still rejected on
writes.
- **One legacy-contract preserve** — `GET /heartbeat-runs/:runId/issues`
still returns `200 []` for both "doesn't exist" and "cross-tenant" so
the legacy contract is preserved while the oracle stays closed.

## Verification

- `pnpm run typecheck` — PASS.
- `pnpm -F @paperclipai/server exec vitest run` — full server suite
green locally apart from 4 pre-existing local-environment failures
(`paperclip-skill-utils` ×2 and `workspace-runtime` ×1 are
cwd/git-environment dependent — verified identical on a clean checkout
of the base; `heartbeat-process-recovery` is the known macOS flake).
- The new `authz-existence-oracle-guard` test sweeps
`server/src/routes/*.ts` and confirms no remaining
`assertCompanyAccess(resource.companyId)` site without a
`hasCompanyAccess` gate; the only allowlisted holdouts take `companyId`
from request input.

## Risks

- **API contract narrowing.** Any client that specifically checked for
`403` on cross-tenant access now sees `404`. This is a strict narrowing
(one status instead of two for the same negative outcome) and matches
what a client should expect for any id it can't access.
- **Write-path checks preserved.** `assertCompanyAccess` still runs
after the 404 gate on write routes, so viewer-readonly /
inactive-membership rejections fire unchanged for legitimate users.
- **Instance-admin scope unchanged.** `hasCompanyAccess` denies
signed-in instance admins without an explicit membership, exactly like
`assertCompanyAccess` (pinned by unit tests) — so the gate introduces no
new read access for admins.
- **Single-tenant local-first deploys** behave identically — the helper
short-circuits to `true` for `local_implicit` sessions.
- No new env vars, no deployment-mode switch.

## Model Used

Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context), extended thinking mode; completeness sweep
+ instance-admin parity fix by Claude Fable 5 (1M context).

## Checklist

- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] Thinking path traces from project context to this change
- [x] Model used specified
- [x] Checked ROADMAP.md — part of the multi-tenant hardening initiative
- [x] Tests run locally and pass
- [x] Added/updated cross-tenant 404 expectations across test files
- [x] No UI changes
- [x] Documented risks above
- [x] Will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before merge

Part of the multi-tenant hardening initiative — see also #5864
(per-company JWT keys) and #5865 (plugin tables `company_id`).

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-07-14 15:53:09 -07:00

Nicky LeachandPaperclip

31a0080e61

Fix wake diagnostics low-trust identifier redaction (#9133 )

## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open-source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - The task/issue lifecycle subsystem tracks when agents wake up, are
suppressed, or are deferred, recording each wake request in
`agent_wakeup_requests` and each defer/suppression event in
`activity_log`
> - When an agent appears stuck or doesn't resume after a dependency
resolves, there is currently no read-only API surface to inspect its
wake history — operators must query the database directly
> - Making wake history queryable via a first-class endpoint lets
operators, support, and monitoring tools diagnose "why didn't this agent
wake up?" without database access
> - This pull request adds `GET /api/issues/:id/diagnostics/wakes`,
returning a bounded 14-day/50-row projection of wake requests and
defer/suppression activity events, with a deterministic `diagnosis`
field and a `likelyReason` inference — including a Case-B inference ("no
wake enqueued because a visible blocker is not done") that reuses the
blocker readiness data from the companion blocker diagnostics endpoint
(see Refs #9114)
> - The benefit is that platform operators can answer "why is this agent
not waking up?" from a safe, read-only HTTP endpoint rather than needing
direct database access, and CI/monitoring can assert expected wake
behavior

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #9114 (companion blocker diagnostics endpoint, already merged —
this PR extends the same diagnostic surface to wake/activity history)

## What Changed

- **New route** `GET /api/issues/:id/diagnostics/wakes` in
`server/src/routes/issues.ts`: returns a bounded (14-day window, 50-row
cap) projection of `agent_wakeup_requests` rows and wake-relevant
`activity_log` rows (defer/suppression events)
- **Sanitized projection**: raw `payload`, `details`, `error`, and
`triggerDetail` fields are stripped; unknown free-form `source`,
`reason`, and `status` values are projected to `"other"` to prevent
schema bleed
- **Deterministic `diagnosis` and `likelyReason` fields**: includes
Case-B inference ("no wake enqueued — visible blocker not done") that
calls the existing blocker-readiness helper from Slice 1 (#9114) so the
wake surface can explain missing wakes caused by outstanding blockers
- **Auth**: `assertCompanyAccess` + `assertIssueReadAllowed`;
cross-company requests are denied; Case-B blocker inference filters by
caller trust level so hidden (low-trust) blockers are mentioned but not
identified
- **Types in `@paperclipai/shared`**: `IssueWakeDiagnosticsResponse`,
`WakeEvent`, `ActivityEvent` exported from the shared package
- **OpenAPI tag registration** for the new route
- **Skill reference docs** in
`skills/paperclip/references/api-reference.md` documenting the endpoint
contract
- **Test coverage**
(`server/src/__tests__/issue-wake-diagnostics-routes.test.ts`, embedded
Postgres): happy path, empty/null diagnosis, Case-B inference, low-trust
hidden blocker, cross-company denial, raw blob minimization, cap
behaviour, combined blocker+wake test run

## Verification

```bash
# Wake diagnostics tests only
pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/issue-wake-diagnostics-routes.test.ts

# Wake + blocker diagnostics together (integration)
pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/issue-blocker-diagnostics-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/issue-wake-diagnostics-routes.test.ts

# Type-check shared and server packages
pnpm --filter @paperclipai/shared typecheck
pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck

# Whitespace / diff check
git diff --check
```

All commands passed locally.

## Risks

- **No schema or migration changes** — this is a read-only projection
over existing tables; no DDL risk.
- **Bounded queries** — 14-day window + 50-row cap limit per call; no
unbounded scans.
- **Auth boundary** — cross-company access is denied at
`assertCompanyAccess`; Case-B inference uses the same per-node trust
filtering as the blocker endpoint so low-trust blockers are acknowledged
but not identified.
- Low overall risk; the endpoint is additive and read-only.

## Model Used

- **Provider:** Anthropic
- **Model:** Claude Sonnet 4.6 (`claude-sonnet-4-6`)
- **Tool use:** yes (file reads, edits, bash execution, Paperclip API
calls)
- **Reasoning mode:** standard (no extended thinking)

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [ ] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

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Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>

2026-07-07 04:45:23 +00:00