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DottaandClaude Opus 5.5 23ce68a8dc feat(connections): end Google access when a Paperclip-managed Google connection is removed (#22065)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - Connectors let agents use Google Workspace through a Google sign-in
that Paperclip Cloud manages for the user
> - When a user removes a Paperclip-managed Google connection, Paperclip
deletes the tokens locally, but the grant stays live at Google
> - Google's OAuth review expects that a disconnect ends the app's
access, and users expect it too
> - Google's revoke ends the user's whole grant to the shared client, so
only the Paperclip Cloud broker can decide when it is safe to revoke
> - This pull request asks the broker to revoke each removed grant,
keeps local removal unconditional, and tells the user the outcome in
plain language
> - The benefit is that removal ends Google access when no other
Paperclip connection needs it, and the user knows what to do when it did
not

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**Subsystem affected**
Connectors: Paperclip-managed Google Workspace and the legacy
per-service Google connections (server removal, shared contracts,
connection UI).

**Problem or motivation**
Removing a Paperclip-managed Google connection or grant was local only.
The refresh token was deleted in Paperclip, but Google still listed
Paperclip as having access to the account. The docs said so ("Removal is
local for managed grants").

**Proposed solution**
On removal, send each removed grant's refresh token to the broker's
signed `POST /v1/connector/revoke`. The broker revokes at Google only
when no other live binding could share the grant. Paperclip records the
broker's outcome code and shows one of three plain messages. Local
removal never waits on, or fails because of, that call.

**Alternatives considered**
Call Google's revoke endpoint from the app. This ends the user's whole
grant to the shared client and can break their other Google connections,
so the broker owns the decision.

**Additional context**
Older brokers answer 409 `REVOCATION_NOT_AVAILABLE`. The app treats
that, a timeout, and a network error as "could not end access at Google"
and still removes the connection.

## What Changed

- `paperclip-cloud-connector.ts`: `revoke()` takes an optional
`timeoutMs`, returns the broker's `outcome` from an allowlist, and keeps
`REVOCATION_NOT_AVAILABLE` as an allowed rejection reason.
- New `tool-access/connections/google-access-removal.ts`. For a managed
Google connection, `prepare()` reads each removed grant's refresh token
and returns a `send()` step. `send()` calls the broker for each distinct
token, one after another, under one 5-second deadline. Every result and
every error (including a Paperclip Cloud client that cannot be created)
becomes an outcome code. It never rejects and never logs a token. An
unexpected error is logged with the error name only and reported as
`unexpected_error`.
- Order for removing a whole connection: read the tokens, run the whole
local teardown (grants, installs, app profile, gateway tokens, runtime
slots, catalog, OAuth state, archive the connection), call the broker,
delete the sent refresh-token secrets whatever the outcome, then delete
the remaining secrets. A failure anywhere in the teardown makes no
broker call. Order for removing one grant: read the token, commit the
revocation, call the broker, delete the grant's refresh-token secret.
`send()` owns the call and the deletion through an injected
secret-removal function.
- Owed revocations: a revoked managed Google grant whose refresh-token
secret still exists (and that nothing live uses) is sent by every later
removal, then the secret is deleted. This covers a process stop after
the teardown and before the call, with no new column. Once the secret is
deleted, nothing is sent again.
- Shared tokens: the shared (organization) sign-in writes the same
secret refs to the organization grant and the connection. So revoking an
organization grant alone neither calls the broker nor deletes the
secret, because the connection still uses that token; removing the
connection does both. The same rule applies to any refresh token still
used by another live grant or connection.
- Audit history: once the broker call settles, a
`connection.google_access_removal` audit event records `reasonCode` =
result and `providerAccess` (plus `grantId` for a single grant). If that
write fails, the removal still succeeds and the failure is logged.
- Revoke signs with the subject that consented to the grant
(`providerTenant.externalId`, saved by the managed callback from the
claim). Grants saved without it fall back to the refresh rule. Refresh
is unchanged; see Risks.
- `removal.ts` and `grants.ts`: `providerAccess: { provider, result,
outcomes }` goes to the responses and to the `tool_connection.archived`
and `tool_connection.grant_revoked` activity entries. The tool access
audit field `providerRevocation` keeps its Vercel meaning only.
- `packages/shared`: `ManagedGoogleAccessRemoval`,
`ManagedGoogleRevocationOutcome`, `ConnectionGrantRevocationResult`.
- UI: one helper, `connectionRemovalToast`, builds the removal toast
(base sentence plus the Google notice, tone and action) for Connectors,
Connections and the app page. No codes are shown.
- API: `docs/api/tool-connections.md` documents both DELETE responses
and `providerAccess`. The OpenAPI registration describes the optional
field and its four results.
- Docs: `GOOGLE-WORKSPACE.md` (order, owed revocations, decision table),
`GMAIL.md`, the Google connector memory note, and the help page on
deleting connection data.

Decision table, judged over the distinct tokens sent in this removal:

| Outcomes | `result` | User message |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Every token `revoked` | `ended` | "Paperclip's access to this Google
account was also ended at Google." |
| Any failure-type code: `provider_revocation_failed`,
`binding_not_known` (the broker had no record, so Google was not
called), `provider_revocation_disabled`, `revocation_in_progress`,
`revocation_not_available`, `broker_unavailable`, `broker_error`,
`credential_unavailable`, `unexpected_error` | `not_ended` | "Paperclip
removed the connection but couldn't end its access at Google. You can
remove Paperclip from your Google account's third-party connections." +
"Open Google account connections" |
| Only `other_connections_remain` | `other_connections_remain` | "Other
Paperclip connections still use this Google account, so Google keeps
Paperclip's access until you remove those too." |
| At least one `revoked`, the rest `other_connections_remain` |
`ended_unconfirmed` | "Paperclip's access was ended at Google. If more
than one Google account was connected here, check your Google account's
third-party connections to be sure." + "Open Google account connections"
|

Grants record no Google account identity: the managed callback saves
`externalId` (the Paperclip subject), `name` (the provider name), and
OAuth timing and scopes, and none of the 14 scopes returns an account
identifier. So the last row is always `ended_unconfirmed`. This includes
two tokens of one user and several agent grants on one Google account.

## Verification

- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/google-managed-connection-removal.test.ts
src/services/tool-access
src/services/paperclip-cloud-connector-revoke.test.ts
src/services/paperclip-cloud-connector.test.ts
src/__tests__/tool-connection-removal.test.ts
src/__tests__/tool-access-service.test.ts
src/__tests__/openapi-routes.test.ts` (714 passed)
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui exec vitest run
src/features/connections/googleAccessRemoval.test.ts src/pages/apps`
(passed)
- Server test typecheck (`node server/scripts/typecheck-layers.mjs`)
passes.
- Red then green: the server tests failed on `master` sources (21), then
each review round's new tests failed on the previous head and pass now.
They cover: the order on both paths, local failure before the grant
commit making no call and the retry sending, cleanup failure after the
call making no second call, a process stop between commit and call being
sent on retry with the secret deleted after, a Paperclip Cloud client
that cannot be created, the consenting subject for an organization
grant, sequential sends under one deadline, each row of the decision
table (per-agent and same-user cases give `ended_unconfirmed`, a mixed
failure gives `not_ended`), the unexpected-error log without a token, no
token in any log call, the delete-stored-data option, and a toast test
per surface.
- Added time, measured locally with a stubbed broker that answers at
once: median 22.1 ms against 20.3 ms without the broker step (12 runs
each), about 2 ms. With a real broker, one round trip per removed token,
capped at 5 seconds in total.
- `pnpm verify` exits 2 (a global CI input changed), so required CI
supplies the broad coverage.
- Not verified against a live broker or a real Google account.

## Risks

- A removal of a managed Google connection or grant can take up to 5
seconds longer when the broker is slow.
- Refresh subject is not changed in this PR. In the broker
(`recordProviderGrant`), a ledger row's subject is fixed when the row is
first written, and a refresh under another subject leaves that row
untouched. So moving refresh to a new subject could stop updating the
row's last-seen time. After 200 days the row would then count as not
live, and a later removal elsewhere could revoke at Google while this
connection still works. That risk cannot be ruled out from code for rows
written before this release, so both refresh paths keep their old rules.
The two refresh paths already use different subject orders today: the
gateway prefers `connectorSubjectAgentId` and then
`connectorSubjectUserId`, while background refresh prefers the grant's
own subject. That is pre-existing, and this PR leaves it unchanged.
Revoke uses the consenting subject, which matches the claim-time ledger
row. When the row was first written by a refresh under a different
subject, the broker answers `binding_not_known` and the user gets the
warning.
- Repeated removals can send an already-removed token again; the broker
returns its recorded outcome and changes nothing at Google.
- Against an older broker, users see the "could not end access at
Google" message, which is accurate.

## Model Used

- Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`) in Claude Code, with tool use and
code execution.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-17 15:52:20 -06:00
DottaandClaude Opus 5.5 d1b5cfe038 feat(connections): let users delete data read through a connection (#22010)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - Agents call connected apps, such as Google Workspace, through
Paperclip's tool gateway
> - Paperclip saves part of each tool result, approval previews, app
views and the full run transcripts that contain tool output
> - No user action deleted this data. Removing the connection left it in
place
> - Google's restricted-scope review requires that users can delete the
data an app obtained, and that the privacy policy says how
> - This pull request adds "Delete data read through this connection"
for any connection, on the connection's page and as an option when you
remove it
> - The benefit is that the picker text ("They stay there until you
delete them") is now true, and the privacy policy can link to a help
page

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**Subsystem affected**

Connections (tool gateway audit tables, run logs, run events) and the
Connectors UI.

**Problem or motivation**

Paperclip stores content from a connection's tool calls in several
places and gives users no way to delete it:

- `tool_invocations.arguments_summary/result_summary` and
`tool_call_events.arguments_summary/request_summary/result_summary` keep
the first ~4,000 characters of each redacted value
(`summarizeToolValue`, `tool-access-policy.ts` `redactArguments`). No
retention limit.
- `tool_action_requests` keeps `canonical_arguments_summary`,
`preview_markdown` and `signed_arguments`. The linked approval card
(`issue_thread_interactions`) keeps copies in `payload.detailsMarkdown`,
`payload.toolAction.previewMarkdown`,
`payload.toolAction.argumentsSummaryJson` and
`result.toolAction.resultSummary`.
- `tool_mcp_app_views` keeps `tool_input` and `tool_result` for MCP app
views.
- Run transcripts hold full tool output: the run log (`local_file` with
an optional S3 mirror, or `s3_segments`/`s3_archive` object journals),
`heartbeat_run_events.message/payload`, and
`heartbeat_runs.stdout_excerpt/stderr_excerpt`. Neither run-log store
had a delete path.
- Connection removal (`removal.ts`) archives the connection and revokes
credentials. It deletes no content.

**Proposed solution**

A durable, resumable, company-scoped deletion request per connection.
See "Design" below.

**Alternatives considered**

- Delete synchronously in the request. Rejected: an interrupted request
leaves partial state that needs a person to retry it.
- Delete only the run events that mention the connection. Rejected: tool
output also reaches the model's later messages, so the safe unit is the
whole run transcript.
- Delete the audit rows. Rejected: counts, outcomes and hashes feed the
activity history and usage counts.

## Design

**Rule.** The job never drops a reference to content it has not
confirmed deleted. It is marked complete, and writes the
`tool_connection.content_deleted` activity entry, only after every step
succeeded. A step that cannot confirm its work throws. The request then
stays pending, the UI says "Paperclip keeps trying until it finishes",
and the worker retries it.

**Store inventory.** Every place that stores tool arguments, results or
previews. I found them from `summarizeToolValue`, `redactArguments`,
`writeAudit`, and every column or JSON field named like summary,
preview, arguments, result, toolInput or toolResult.

| Store | Content | Cleared by this PR | Proof |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `tool_invocations.arguments_summary`, `result_summary`, `progress` |
Redacted request/result preview, provider progress | Yes: `summary`
becomes `""` with `contentDeletedAt`; `progress` null; size and sha256
kept | content-deletion test 1 |
| `tool_call_events.arguments_summary`, `request_summary`,
`result_summary` | Same previews | Yes, same | test 1 |
| `tool_access_audit_events.details.argumentsSummary` (`writeAudit`) |
Argument preview | Yes, same; decision, ids, size, hash kept | test 1 |
| `tool_action_requests.canonical_arguments_summary`,
`preview_markdown`, `signed_arguments` | Approval preview and arguments
| Yes, for settled requests | test 1, card retry test |
| Approval card in `issue_thread_interactions`:
`payload.detailsMarkdown`, `payload.toolAction.previewMarkdown`,
`payload.toolAction.argumentsSummaryJson`,
`result.toolAction.resultSummary` | Approval preview, arguments,
executed result | Yes. Cards are found from every settled request of a
batch, in the same transaction | test 1, card retry test |
| `heartbeat_runs.context_snapshot` and `agent_wakeup_requests.payload`
(`toolAction(s)[].resultSummary`,
`paperclipAgentMessage.untrustedToolResults[].resultSummary`) | Approved
action result delivered to the agent | Yes, for settled runs and settled
wakes | test 1 |
| `tool_mcp_app_views.tool_input`, `tool_result`, `model_context` | App
view input, result, shared context | Yes: rows deleted | test 1 |
| Run log: object journal, archive journal, original `local_file` log
and its legacy S3 mirror | Full transcript | Yes, every copy, for each
settled run that called the connection or received an approved result |
run-log-store tests, test 1 |
| `heartbeat_run_events.message`, `payload` | Transcript events | Yes,
except structural events (lifecycle, terminal, presentation, usage,
compaction, session/turn start, `native.*`) | test 1 |
| `heartbeat_runs.stdout_excerpt`, `stderr_excerpt`, and every string
`summary`, `result`, `message`, `text`, `output`, `content` or `body` at
any depth of `result_json` (including `nativeResult`, `acceptedResult`,
`semanticResult` and their `continuation`) | Output excerpts and final
answer | Yes; schema and control fields kept | test 1, canary |
| `approvals.payload` (formal board approval) | Tool name, risk and
hashes only | Not needed: no content | — |
| `tool_mcp_tasks` | Request hash and sealed provider task id; no result
| Not needed: no content | — |
| `tool_mcp_elicitations.questions` and their question cards | Questions
the provider asked a person | No. These are provider prompts, not tool
results, and the answered question stays in the task. Follow-up if
wanted | — |
| `tool_mcp_skills`, `tool_mcp_skill_files`, `tool_catalog_entries` |
Skills and tool descriptions the provider publishes | No. These are
provider definitions, not data read through tool calls | — |
| Transcripts of later runs that read an app view's `model_context` |
Shared app context | No. Nothing records which runs read it. The help
page says so. Follow-up | — |
| `issue_comments.body`, issue documents (including continuation
summaries), files, chat messages | Task content written by agents or
Paperclip | No, by design. The user removes it by editing or deleting it
or the task. The confirmation says in bold that anything agents wrote
into tasks is not removed, and so does the help page. The canary
excludes `issue_comments.body` by name for this reason | canary asserts
it is kept |
| Raw provider traces | Full provider traffic | No. Admin opt-in,
encrypted, expire within 24 hours | — |
| Feedback exports already sent | Run logs the user chose to share | No.
Already outside Paperclip | — |
| Content of runs of a deleted task or company | Same stores | No.
Follow-up | — |

**Durable request (schema change).** I added one table,
`tool_connection_content_deletions`, and migration `0490`. I followed
`doc/DATABASE.md`: edited the schema, exported it from
`packages/db/src/schema/index.ts`, ran `pnpm db:generate`, and ran the
migration drift and compatibility tests. The classifier marks it
`online_compatible` (a new table and its indexes only). No existing
table can hold a durable per-connection request with a cutoff time,
cursor, counts and retry state. Without it, an interrupted deletion
could resume only when a person pressed the button again.

**Resume after restart.** The worker uses the shared
`registerDeadlineWork` lifecycle on a new
`tool-connection-content-deletion` queue. The request insert signals the
queue in the same transaction. At server start the worker runs once,
`next()` finds any pending row, and processing continues from the saved
phase and cursor. Nobody presses anything. `next()` returns a deadline
only while a pending row exists, so an idle instance sends no recurring
query. A failure records `attempts` and `last_error` and retries after
30 seconds.

**One run selection.** `runsWithStoredContentSql` selects the runs whose
transcripts are deleted: runs that made a tool call or tool-call event
through the connection, and runs whose context lists one of the
connection's approved action requests, limited to runs that still hold a
log, an excerpt, result text or a content event. The dialog count, its
in-progress warning and the job's `runs` phase all use this one
function.

**Phases.** `invocations`, `events`, `auditEvents`, `appViews`,
`deliveredResults` (50 action requests per page; matching runs and wakes
are locked with `FOR UPDATE` before their documents are rewritten),
`runs` (the shared selection, 50 run ids per page, then one run at a
time), `done`.

**Canary test.** `tool-connection-content-deletion-canary.test.ts` puts
a unique marker in a tool call's arguments and result, an approved
action with a preview, a result delivered to a later run and its wake, a
native run that quotes the marker in its answer and events, a run log
migrated from a local file with an S3 mirror to an object journal, an
MCP App view and the audit tables. It checks that the marker is first
present in the database, the object store, the legacy mirror and the log
files. After the deletion it scans every `text`, `varchar`, `json` and
`jsonb` column of every table found through `information_schema` (no
hand-written table list), every object in both stores and every file
under the log directory. Any hit fails with the table and column or the
key. It runs three times: a complete deletion, a deletion interrupted
twice by storage failures and resumed, and two deletions for different
connections on one task at the same time. The only exclusion is
`issue_comments.body`, named with its reason.

**Batching and time budget.** Tool rows are read in pages of 200 with
keyset pagination on the existing `(company_id, created_at)` indexes,
bounded by the request time. Each page's writes and the saved progress
commit in one transaction. Counts are therefore exact, and a crash
repeats at most one page, idempotently. Runs advance one at a time from
the shared selection. Each 1,000-event page is its own step. Log removal
is its own step and runs before its progress transaction, so object
storage calls never run inside a database transaction. The 10-second
budget is checked after every step. Nothing changes on the agent boot or
tool-call path.

**In-flight work.** A run counts as settled only when its status is
terminal, `finished_at` is set, cost accounting is done, and no native
finalization is open. Calls, approvals, events, app views, delivered
results and transcripts tied to other runs or wakes are skipped and
counted. The confirmation says "N runs are still working and will be
skipped. Delete again after they finish."

**Permissions.** Board users with configure access (connection manager
or creator) can delete, like `DELETE /tool-connections/:id`. Agents,
viewers and other companies are refused. The activity entries
`tool_connection.content_deletion_requested` and
`tool_connection.content_deleted` hold counts only.

**UI reads.** The dialog loads counts once when it opens. While a
deletion runs, it polls `GET
/tool-connections/:id/stored-content/deletion`, a single indexed row
read, every 2 seconds. Polling stops when the job completes or the
dialog closes. The Delete button is not gated on counts.

## What Changed

- `packages/db`: new `tool_connection_content_deletions` table and
migration `0490` (online compatible: new table and its indexes only).
- `packages/shared`: `ToolConnectionStoredContent`,
`ToolConnectionContentDeletion` and counts types; optional
`contentDeletedAt` on `ToolRedactedValueSummary`.
- `server`: `RunLogStore.remove`, which deletes every copy of a run's
log (`composeRunLogStore`); `content-deletion.ts` service; deadline
worker wired into startup and pre-drain; `GET
/tool-connections/:id/stored-content`, `POST` and `GET
/tool-connections/:id/stored-content/deletion`, and `DELETE
/tool-connections/:id?deleteStoredContent=true`; OpenAPI entries.
- `ui`: "Delete data" row on the connection's Permissions tab with a
confirmation that shows counts, skipped runs, and "This cannot be
undone"; "Also delete data read through this connection" checkbox in the
Connectors removal dialog.
- Docs: user help
`docs/guides/board-operator/deleting-connection-data.md` (for the
privacy policy link) and an API note in
`doc/connections/CONNECTOR-PLAYBOOK.md`.
- `tests/runner-e2e/source-sdk-public-inputs.json` refreshed for the
shared type change.

`server/src/routes/tool-access.ts` (3,010 lines) and
`ui/src/pages/apps/Browse.tsx` (1,722 lines) grow by about 40 and 20
lines. The routes reuse that file's connection access checks; the dialog
reuses the existing removal confirmation. The new logic lives in its own
files.

## Verification

- `server/src/__tests__/tool-connection-content-deletion.test.ts`
(embedded PostgreSQL): content is gone from every "Yes" store in the
inventory; rows, hashes and sizes stay; another connection and another
company are untouched; a running run is skipped and is deleted after it
settles; a storage failure leaves the request pending with `retrying`,
and the next pass completes it; an approval-card update that fails once
is cleared on the retry; an unrecognised log backend keeps the pointer,
keeps the job pending and writes no completion entry; a zero time budget
yields after every step and still finishes; a repeat request returns the
pending one; agents and outsiders are refused; removal with
`deleteStoredContent=true` queues the deletion.
- `run-log-store.test.ts` and `object-run-log-store.test.ts`: `remove`
deletes local and mirrored logs and object journals, removes a migrated
run's original local file and mirror with its journal, refuses an object
log when object storage is not configured, and is idempotent.
- `ui/.../StoredContentDeletion.test.tsx`: confirmation text, counts,
skipped-run warning, and the request.
- Red: these tests fail on `master` because `remove`, the service and
the routes do not exist. Green on this branch.
- Ran: the tests above, `openapi-routes`,
`server-startup-feedback-export`, `tool-connection-removal`,
`packages/db` migration drift and compatibility tests, all
`ui/src/pages/apps` tests (950), `pnpm check:token-gates`, server and UI
`tsc --noEmit`. `pnpm verify` exits 2 (global CI input changed), so
required CI supplies broad coverage.

## Risks

- Deleting is permanent by design. The confirmation says so.
- A `local_file` log written on another replica's local disk stays on
that pod's disk until the pod is replaced; its S3 mirror is deleted. New
logs on S3-configured instances use object journals, which are deleted.
- On versioned buckets, earlier object versions remain until the
bucket's lifecycle policy removes them (the existing journal delete path
does not remove versions).
- Not in this PR (follow-ups): the "No" rows of the inventory (except
agent-written task content, which is out of scope by design), mainly the
same deletion when a task or a company is deleted, and later runs that
read an app view's shared context.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

- Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`), Anthropic, via Claude Code with
tool use and code execution.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-17 08:55:35 -06:00
8818402e7a feat(inbox): route requests to people and record personal outcomes (#20959)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip helps people manage AI agents and their work.
> - The inbox collects requests that need a human decision.
> - Teams need to know who owns each request and who may act on it.
> - A shared close operation must differ from hiding a card for one
person.
> - This pull request adds personal routing and durable outcomes to the
existing attention service.
> - People can claim or transfer work and inspect what another person
did for them.
> - Domain permissions still decide who may resolve each request.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**Subsystem affected**

Server, shared contracts, and database. This is the routing foundation
for a stacked inbox UI change.

**Problem or motivation**

A company-wide attention feed does not give teams a clear personal
queue. Archive, withdrawal, transfer, and decisions by another person
need distinct scopes and records.

**Proposed solution**

Resolve a request audience from its addressee, task participants, and
configured owners. Provide personal, unassigned, company, all-assignee,
and archived views. Add claim, transfer, personal archive and snooze,
shared withdrawal, receipts, and personal history.

**Alternatives considered**

A single shared inbox leaves ownership and personal hiding ambiguous.
The service keeps one canonical request and projects its audience
instead of copying requests for each person.

**Roadmap alignment**

This extends the existing Multiple Human Users and Agent Reviews and
Approvals capabilities in ROADMAP.md.

**Additional context**

Refs #19363 and #19520 for the current inbox navigation and confirmation
replacement rules. Refs #20268 for related actionable-request work. That
PR filters actionability; this stack adds audience routing and personal
outcomes.

This is part 1 of a two-PR stack. The inbox UI PR #20961 targets this
branch.

## What Changed

- Add nullable company and project decision owners and a company budget
owner.
- Add audience views and personal badge counts to the canonical
attention projections.
- Add claim, transfer, withdrawal, personal archive, snooze, and restore
operations with permission checks and activity records. Lock addressed
transfers to the current addressee or routing administrators, and
validate the recipient against canonical resolution policies.
- Add receipts and scoped history for work handled by another person.
- Keep closed-task requests and replaced confirmations out of current
cards.
- Add an idempotent migration and a concurrent receipt-history index.
- Update typed fixtures so the existing UI remains compatible with the
new contracts.

## Verification

- Server layered typechecking passes, including all three test-tree
partitions.
- Seven routing and interaction-resolution suites pass all 249 tests
against a dedicated external PostgreSQL test database on `4caecc21d8`.
Six new regressions failed before the repair; they cover takeover
followed by approval, legitimate delegation, excluded creators/review
requesters, and unauthorized claims.
- Prior focused verification covers private approval history and
receipts, transfer visibility, audience escalation, withdrawal
governance, hidden-card counts, per-recipient confirmation replacement,
and SDK source contracts.
- A synthetic three-person company passed 37 routing and lifecycle
acceptance checks. The UI stack adds browser acceptance for the shared
controls.
- The complete [GitHub Actions CI
matrix](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/43134997331)
passes on `4caecc21d891677323a7335f23b1a015cce24c13` (Linux/Node 24:
typecheck, build, general and serialized tests, Runner support, browser
shards, and aggregate gates). Greptile is 5/5 on that exact head with no
open findings. The fresh security scan passes after explicitly
rechecking the addressee-transfer repair.
- `pnpm verify` reports exit 2 because a CI-global script changed; full
CI supplies that broader coverage. Embedded PostgreSQL could not start
on this Mac because shared-memory slots were exhausted, so local
database checks use a separate external test database. Linux CI covers
the embedded setup.

## Risks

- Personal badge counts change to the viewer's assigned requests.
Accessible feed totals and task membership keep their existing scope.
- The migration adds nullable owner fields and a dismissal fingerprint.
Its index runs outside a transaction. The migration is classified and
rerunnable.
- Routing changes the addressee used by resolution authorization. The
current addressee or a routing administrator must authorize an addressed
transfer; the recipient must satisfy writer access, canonical resolver
exclusions, and task review policy under row locks.
- The shared validator export barrel crosses 1,000 lines because it
exports the new attention schemas. Schema implementation stays in the
dedicated attention validator module.

## Model Used

OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex. Used repository tools, code execution, and
browser checks. This session does not expose a more specific runtime
model ID or its context-window size.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue
template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links
- [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal
Paperclip ticket id
- [x] I have run focused tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
(OpenAPI contracts and docs/api/attention.md)
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Scott Tong <scott@scottsmbpm5max.lan>
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-11-11 17:49:39 -08:00
DottaandClaude Opus 5.5 353945c86d fix(tool-gateway): let agents create gateway tokens without receiving the value (#20613)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - Tool gateways let external MCP clients use a company's tools with a
gateway client token
> - Since delegated connection management (#17737), an agent can create
and revoke gateway client tokens for its responsible person
> - #20581 stopped agents from getting the one-time token value, but it
did this by making token creation person-only
> - The product decision is that agents keep their delegated authority
to create and revoke tokens
> - This pull request restores agent token creation, but the agent never
receives the token value: the person reveals the value once on the
gateway's Tokens page
> - The benefit is that an agent can do the rotation work for the
person, and the secret still never enters chat, run events, logs or tool
output

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs #17737
Refs #20581

**What happened**
After #20581, `POST /api/tool-gateway/gateways/{gatewayId}/tokens`
returns 403 `gateway_token_requires_person` to every agent caller.
Agents lost the delegated authority to create gateway client tokens that
#17737 gave them. Before #20581, an agent that created a token received
the plaintext value in its tool result and could repeat it in chat.

**Expected behavior**
An agent with delegated connection management can create and revoke
gateway client tokens. The agent never receives a token value. The
responsible person gets the value once, on the gateway's Tokens page.
Person callers keep today's behavior.

**Steps to reproduce**
1. Give an agent delegated connection management for a responsible
person with `tools:admin`.
2. As the agent, call `POST
/api/tool-gateway/gateways/{gatewayId}/tokens` (for example through
`call_api`).
3. See 403 `gateway_token_requires_person`.

## What Changed

- Agent create: `POST /api/tool-gateway/gateways/:gatewayId/tokens` from
an agent with delegated authority returns 201 with token metadata only
(`id`, `tokenPrefix`, `expiresAt`, `pendingReveal: true`), plus
`tokensPath`, a `reveal_credential` `requiredUserAction` for the
responsible person, and a `nextStep` instruction. The saved row has no
usable value: its stored hash is of a value that is generated and then
discarded. Gateway authentication also rejects `pendingReveal` rows.
- Person reveal: new person-only `POST
/api/tool-gateway/gateway-tokens/:tokenId/reveal`. It generates the
value, stores its hash, clears `pendingReveal` and returns the value
once. A conditional update makes a second or concurrent reveal return
409. Only the token's responsible person can reveal it (403
`gateway_token_reveal_requires_responsible_person`). Agent callers get
403 `gateway_token_requires_person`. A token revoked before reveal
cannot be revealed.
- Why a reveal that generates the value: no stored plaintext existed to
reveal, and storing one (even encrypted) for later display adds a secret
at rest. Generating the value at reveal time keeps the existing one-time
display and stores only a hash.
- Schema: `tool_mcp_gateway_tokens.pending_reveal boolean not null
default false` (migration `0460_gateway_token_pending_reveal`). Shared
`ToolMcpGatewayToken.pendingReveal`, and `ConnectionRequiredUserAction`
gets `reveal_credential` / `gateway_token`.
- UI: the Tokens page shows a "Waiting for you to reveal" section for
pending tokens with a "Reveal token" button. The value appears in the
existing "New token — copy now" one-time block. Pending tokens show the
status "Not revealed".
- Agent gateway create: the 201 for agent callers also includes
`gatewayPath`, `tokensPath` and a `nextStep` that tells the agent to
link the saved gateway.
- The agent create-token `nextStep` and the catalog say not to revoke
the old token in the same turn: its client keeps working on it until the
person installs the new value.
- The reveal update and its `tool_gateway.token_revealed` activity entry
commit in one transaction. The Tokens page offers Reveal only for tokens
that act for the signed-in person.
- API reference: new `docs/api/tool-gateway-tokens.md` (create, reveal,
revoke) in the docs nav.
- Revoke stays allowed for agents with delegated authority (unchanged
route).
- API catalog: create-gateway, create-token, reveal and revoke
descriptions now say who acts, that agents never receive values, the
page paths, and that the old token is revoked only after the client
works with the new one.
- Agent access map: create-token policy note and a new reveal entry.
- Evals `gateways-profiles.create-gateway` and
`gateways-profiles.rotate-token`:
- Remove the keyword grader (`human|operator|admin|manage`) and the
handoff text checks. Grade saved state, rendered links and secret
absence. A plain reply or a question card is accepted.
- Remove the setup probes that called the create routes as the agent.
Under delegated authority, those probes created a real gateway
("Forbidden agent gateway"), which failed create-gateway before the
agent ran.
- create-gateway: exactly one gateway for the intended profile and
company, created by the agent (or by the person after a handoff); the
person opens it from a rendered link; attribution matches the creator;
any agent-created token is still pending reveal; no token value in chat,
cards or run events.
- rotate-token: after the agent's turn, both setup tokens still work and
any replacement the agent created is pending the person's reveal; the
person follows the rendered Tokens page link and reveals (or issues) the
value in a private browser; the new value works before the old token is
revoked; the unrelated client keeps access; no token value appears
anywhere, including a regex scan for any full `pcgw_<id>.<secret>`
value.
- The changed scenario context and outcomes are recorded in
`chat-full-catalog-testops-manifest.json` `changedFields` and pinned in
the manifest test. The inventory digest, descriptors (`oracleVersion`
v2, `sourceFiles`) and SDK public input pins are updated. The unused
`external-gateway-handoff.ts` module is removed.
- Fixture realism: the create-gateway profile now allows a real read
tool (an empty profile made the agent ask which apps to add instead of
finishing), and the rotation tokens get a neutral owner note instead of
"Disposable rotation fixture" (the agent read that note as an eval
hint).
- Shared private-browser helpers (`external-private-browser.ts`,
`external-private-browser-worker.ts`) get one optional `pendingTokenId`
input and one `revealedPending` receipt field.

## Verification

- Red: on `master` route code, the new integration tests `lets agents
create and revoke gateway client tokens without ever receiving a token
value` and `reveals an agent-created gateway token value only to its
responsible person` fail (403 `gateway_token_requires_person`).
- Green: `cd server && npx vitest run
src/__tests__/connection-management.integration.test.ts -t gateway` (25
passed). The test checks that the agent `call_api` result has no `token`
field and no token-shaped value, that the agent cannot reveal, that the
person reveals once (second reveal 409) and the value authenticates,
that agent revoke works and stops the value, that a token revoked before
reveal never gets a value, and that person create still returns the
value.
- `npx vitest run src/__tests__/tool-gateway.test.ts
src/__tests__/openapi-routes.test.ts
src/services/native-runtime/runner-api.test.ts` (2247 passed).
- `cd ui && npx vitest run
src/pages/apps/gateways/panels/TokensPanel.test.tsx
src/pages/apps/gateways/gateway-helpers.test.ts` (16 passed); `pnpm
check:token-gates` clean.
- Eval graders and catalog: `pnpm exec vitest run --config
tests/runner-e2e/vitest.config.ts` on the gateway oracle tests,
`external.test.ts`, catalog consistency/contract, TestOps
export/retained, phase/clock callers and SDK input/type tests (all
pass); `node --test` on the TestOps manifest, adapter, contract,
streaming and reconcile tests (all pass); `node
tests/runner-e2e/source-sdk-public-inputs.mjs <HEAD> --check`
(unchanged).
- `node scripts/check-maps.mjs` passes. `tsc --noEmit` for `server`,
`ui` and `tests/runner-e2e`: no errors in changed files.
- Paid end-to-end run of both eval cases, run
[42872921890](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/42872921890)
on 39f38a7f6c (before the last three commits): both FAILED, for
agent-behavior reasons the later commits address. Not rerun yet.
- rotate-token: the agent created the replacement (pending reveal, no
value), then revoked the old token in the same turn, despite the create
response saying to wait. Its reasoning cited the eval-looking fixture
note. The grader rejected the premature revocation. The reply linked the
Tokens page correctly.
- create-gateway: the agent created the gateway and one pending token,
then asked a question card about which apps to add to the empty profile,
with no link to the gateway. The grader rejected the missing link.
- Token values: a scan of all evidence files of both cells found no full
`pcgw_<id>.<secret>` value and no `pcgw_<uuid>` form. Agent `call_api`
payloads in run events are redacted; the integration test proves the
agent tool result has no value.

## Risks

- Behavior change for agents: token create returns metadata and a Tokens
page path, not a value. Agents that expect `token` in the response must
send the person to the Tokens page.
- Migration adds one boolean column with a default. Existing tokens get
`false` and keep working.
- A pending token that is never revealed stays as an unusable row until
someone revokes it. It cannot authenticate.

## Model Used

- Anthropic Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`), tool use and code
execution in Claude Code.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-10 15:13:34 -06:00
DottaandPaperclip b8f8b904fa feat(routines): preserve automation ancestry through webhooks (#18772)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Routines let external services start agent tasks through a normal
webhook.
> - A repair routine must recognize failures from work that it created.
> - The receiver added in #18714 put Sentry payload parsing and repair
policy in core routine intake.
> - This pull request replaces that receiver with verified creation
provenance on normal routine calls.
> - Sentry can filter the resulting tags before it sends a normal
routine webhook.
> - The benefit is reusable provenance and loop prevention without a
provider-specific route.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**Problem or motivation**

A Sentry repair alert can start another repair when its own work fails.
The dedicated receiver in #18714 solved this through a Sentry-specific
payload contract. Ordinary routine webhooks also need a trusted way to
retain the automation that created their tasks.

**Proposed solution**

Use the existing public `/fire` route and its current authentication. An
optional source run credential proves a live Paperclip caller. Store the
caller separately from webhook JSON. Follow recorded task creation links
and export bounded ancestry tags on run-failure events. Let Sentry alert
filters exclude repair-origin work.

**Alternatives considered**

Keep the dedicated Sentry receiver, accept sender-supplied origin IDs,
or filter only the immediate routine. The first couples core intake to
one provider. The second accepts unverified claims. The third misses
child tasks, standalone follow-ups, and calls through another routine.

**Roadmap alignment**

This improves the shipped Scheduled Routines and Activity log
capabilities. It does not add a new scheduler or incident system.
Related work: #18714 is the implementation replaced here; #9727 adds
source-task navigation and UI attribution; #10206 proposes exception-led
routine dispatch. This PR uses existing task creation records and does
not implement either of those broader proposals.

## What Changed

- Remove the Sentry-only route, parser, authentication exception, and
payload-specific tests and documentation from #18714.
- Add optional `X-Paperclip-Source-Run-Token` support to normal routine
webhooks. Validate the standard run JWT, company, instance, agent, live
run, and cancellation state. Authenticated routine API calls also retain
their validated caller.
- Add nullable `routine_runs.created_by_run_id`. Keep the reference
after source-run deletion so missing history becomes unknown. Separate
callers during coalescing, including legacy open tasks.
- Follow company-scoped routine receipts, creator runs, task parents,
and legacy creation activity. Mark missing, foreign, cyclic, private, or
excessive ancestry for safe alert filtering.
- Add event-local `automation_origin_status`, `automation_routine_ids`,
and `task_shareable` tags through the existing Sentry SDK hook. Cap
ancestry at 32 reads and share a 750 ms deadline across metadata and
ancestry lookup. Keep the SDK one-second wait and eight-lookup
concurrency bound. Redact the source credential from HTTP logs and
Sentry request headers.
- Preserve unexpected database failures as server errors without
rejection bookkeeping in an aborted transaction. Document 409, 415, and
422 responses for the normal webhook.
- Keep `routineScopedRunId` as generic opt-in
`X-Paperclip-Idempotency-Scope: routine` support. Default trigger
receipts and timestamped HMAC replay protection retain their current
scope.
- Add [the Sentry repair
tutorial](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/blob/codex/routine-creation-provenance/docs/guides/board-operator/sentry-run-failure-repairs.md),
API documentation, OpenAPI headers, and capability-map updates.

## Verification

At commit `0f4a0051528edd1367a921a76a8050c3fd087872`:

- `pnpm -r typecheck` and `pnpm build` passed for the full workspace.
Migration numbering and safety checks passed.
- The focused service, route, Sentry, redaction, and OpenAPI suites
passed 228 tests in five files. The database Sentry resolver and OpenAPI
invocation passed 33 tests in two files. These are separate invocations
with some overlap.
- The full routine HTTP suite passed all 15 tests. The authenticated API
case failed before the caller-wiring fix and passed after it. The
fixture loads the real route-owned services. No test deadline was
raised.
- The real `@sentry/node@10.71.0` suite passed all 12 tests. It uses an
in-memory transport and sends no events to Sentry. It covers terminal
failures, saved-message interruptions, event isolation, and source-token
redaction.
- Regression tests also cover forged, expired, foreign, and cancelled
caller credentials; payload spoofing; inherited routine ancestry; legacy
coalescing; deleted history; private work; cycles; query and time
limits; database error causes; and routine-wide receipts. The new error
and budget cases failed before their fixes.
- `node scripts/check-maps.mjs` and `git diff --check` passed. The map
check covers 35 areas and 192 capabilities.
- The full local Vitest command was stopped for a required master merge
after four chat shards passed 1,278 tests. No full local pass is
claimed. An earlier combined HTTP run hit an existing malformed-ID
timeout whose original cause is not established; the final full HTTP
suite passes. An extra local run of the unchanged heartbeat scheduling
file passed 12 of 13 tests and failed a readiness-status assertion. Its
logs also reported a missing fixture user membership. The same 13-test
file now passes in current-head CI.
- All GitHub Actions checks pass on this commit. Three jobs initially
lost their self-hosted runners. One server shard initially failed while
deleting a company in an unchanged heartbeat test because of a
`company_skills` foreign key. One retry passed all affected jobs without
code changes. That server shard passed all 499 tests, and all eight
browser shards passed.
- Fresh Greptile review is 5/5 on this commit. All six review threads
are resolved. The separate Paperclip Review check remains queued. Its
bot reports that work is paused. A maintainer must resume the assigned
review work to complete that check. No full green check state is claimed
while this external gate is pending.
- Live Sentry configuration and deployment are outside this PR's
acceptance evidence. The tutorial describes setup, a controlled failure,
and a repair-origin exclusion check for operators to run after
deployment.

## Risks

- Normal app webhooks retain the sender's full JSON in company-readable
routine history and the execution task. Alert filters and task
visibility are not content scrubbers. Operators must scrub sensitive
event data in Sentry before forwarding it and keep connection tests in
setup mode.
- Existing users of `/sentry-run-failures` must move to `/fire` and add
the documented Sentry filters before enabling repair intake. The old
route is removed. Stored tasks and receipts remain.
- The additive migration uses `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS`. It does not
rewrite historical tasks or infer missing provenance.
- Unknown or unshareable ancestry is excluded by the tutorial's alert
rule. Missing history, an enrichment timeout, or more than five routine
IDs can therefore suppress a repair webhook while retaining the Sentry
error.
- An external webhook without a verified source credential starts a new
receiving-routine origin. Its JSON cannot establish upstream Paperclip
ancestry. Sentry must not store a Paperclip run credential.
- Routine-wide receipt reuse needs a stable sender key. A static Sentry
custom header is not a per-event key. The tutorial keeps delivery
deduplication separate from loop prevention.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 model family, with reasoning, repository access,
code editing, and test execution. The session does not expose the exact
model variant or context window size.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-11-03 09:33:17 -06:00
5acf56658b feat(onboarding): first task opens as a chat with a chief of staff (#13068)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - Onboarding ends by handing a new user to their first agent on a
seeded first task
> - Today the wizard asks for a mission up front, the UI composes what
the agent is told, and the agent starts running before the user says
anything
> - New users get a cold, ticket-shaped start, and nobody can edit the
agent's brief or persona without a code change
> - This pull request makes the first task a short chat: a four-step
wizard, a chief-of-staff persona, a greeting plus a two-option opening
card, server-owned markdown texts, and no run until the user answers
> - It also gives question cards one consistent action row (Cancel /
Skip / Next), makes agent hires idempotent within a run, and turns the
Paperclip Runner flag on by default for self-hosted instances
> - The benefit is a first run the user steers, with texts a board
operator can edit as markdown

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

No public GitHub issue exists for this change. The feature request
fields follow.

Related PRs and issues:

- Refs #11043 — an earlier draft of the first-task onboarding
experience. This PR supersedes it.
- Refs #11280 — a report about the onboarding first-task route test.
This PR extends that test file.

### Subsystem affected

Onboarding wizard, the seeded first task and its texts, task-chat
question cards, agent hiring, and the instance experimental settings.

### Problem or motivation

The onboarding wizard collects a mission through two extra steps and a
questionnaire. The UI then composes the first agent's instructions and
the first task description from those answers. The first task wakes the
agent at once, so the agent runs and posts before the user types a word.
Board operators cannot change the greeting, the brief, or the persona
without editing TypeScript. Question cards in chat behave differently
per adapter, and a single-select pick submits on click. A misread hire
response could create a duplicate agent that the creating agent cannot
remove.

### Proposed solution

Reduce the wizard to four steps and stop the UI from authoring agent
texts. Move the greeting, the brief, the chief-of-staff persona, and the
opening question into markdown and JSON files that the server loads at
runtime. Seed the persona onto the first agent through an explicit hire
marker. Do not wake the first task until the user answers the opening
card or types. Give every question card the same Cancel / Skip / Next
actions. Add an experimental toggle that switches the single-task
proposal between one confirmation card and a plan document with a
checkbox card. Make agent hires idempotent within a run.

### Alternatives considered

- Keep the mission questionnaire and feed it into the brief. Rejected:
the agent asks better questions in chat, and the wizard gets shorter.
- Keep the first task open-ended with a plain composer. Rejected: a
two-option card gives the user a clear first move.
- Derive the plan-document behaviour from the user's intent only.
Rejected in favour of an explicit experimental toggle so operators can
choose.
- Key the "pick does not submit" behaviour off the presence of a submit
label. Rejected: several adapters set a submit label on single-select
cards, and their cards would change behaviour.

### Roadmap alignment

`ROADMAP.md` lists no planned core work on onboarding or the first task.
This change refines the existing flow and does not duplicate planned
work.

## What Changed

- Wizard: four steps (Name your organization, Create your first agent,
Connect a model, Review). The front door and both mission steps are
removed with their state and saved-progress keys. The UI no longer
composes the first agent's instructions or the first task description.
- Server-owned texts: the greeting, the brief with two proposal
variants, the chief-of-staff persona, the opening question, and a README
live in `server/src/onboarding-assets/first-task/` and load at runtime.
The create route stores the assembled brief and ignores any client
description.
- Persona seed: an `onboardingFirstAgent` marker on the hire lets the
server seed the chief-of-staff persona over the first agent's entry
file. Board-authored hires only. The persona tells the agent the hire
response shape and to list agents before it acts on an unclear result.
- No auto-run: the first task does not queue an assignment wake. The
stranded-assignment reconciler leaves it idle until a user comment or an
answered card exists.
- Opening card: the server seeds an `ask_user_questions` card right
after the greeting with two options: "Interview me and propose a plan
and an agent team to execute it." and "I have a task in mind" with free
text. Answering wakes the agent.
- Experimental toggle `enableFirstTaskPlanProposal` (default off): the
single-task proposal is one confirmation card, or a plan document plus a
checkbox card when on.
- Question cards: every `ask_user_questions` card renders Cancel, Skip,
and Next (the submit label on the last question). Skip hides on required
questions. Picking an option no longer advances or submits by itself.
- Wizard guards: the dashboard's agentless offer ignores a cached empty
agent list while a refetch is in flight. The hire step adopts an agent
that already carries the typed name instead of hiring "Name 2".
- Agent hires are idempotent within a run: a retry of the identical
request under the same run id returns the existing agent with `200` and
`idempotent: true`. The fingerprint covers the whole validated request,
so a corrected payload is a new hire. Lookup, create, and activity
record run under one lock per company and run, so overlapping retries
cannot both create.
- The Paperclip Runner experimental flag defaults to on for self-hosted
instances. Cloud keeps its declared default: a managed instance whose
tenant row and managed overlay omit the flag resolves it to off.
- Question cards: a send that finds an earlier required answer missing
returns to that question with a message instead of failing silently.
- The two onboarding e2e specs follow the new wizard: the front door and
growth intake shots are gone, and the planning-mode spec dismisses the
opening card before it reads the composer.
- Docs: `docs/board-operator/editing-first-task-texts.md` explains how
to edit the texts and the toggle.

## Verification

Commands, run from the repo root:

```
pnpm -r --filter './packages/*' --filter '!@paperclipai/paperclip-runner' build
pnpm --filter ./packages/shared typecheck
pnpm --filter ./ui typecheck
pnpm --filter ./server exec tsc --noEmit
pnpm check:token-gates
pnpm --filter ./ui exec vitest run OnboardingWizard onboarding QuestionForm InteractionCard ProtocolCard TaskChatComposer Dashboard feature
PAPERCLIP_IN_WORKTREE=false pnpm --filter ./server exec vitest run onboarding-first-task heartbeat-process-recovery agent-hire-idempotency instance-settings agent-skills-routes issue-onboarding onboarding-greeting --testTimeout=90000
```

Results on this branch:

- Typecheck is clean for shared, ui, and server.
- Token gates: 4 of 4 clean.
- UI: 344 tests pass across 23 files.
- Server: all suites pass. The first test in `agent-skills-routes` has
its own 10 s cap and needs about 15 s on my laptop for the app cold
start. It passes with a longer cap. This PR does not change that cap.

Manual steps on a dev instance:

1. Open `/onboarding`. Confirm four steps: Name your organization,
Create your first agent, Connect a model, Review.
2. Finish the wizard. Confirm the first task shows the chief-of-staff
greeting and the opening card with two options. Confirm no run starts.
3. Pick "Interview me…". Confirm no run starts. Press Continue. Confirm
a run starts and an interview card of 3–4 questions arrives.
4. On a fresh organization, pick "I have a task in mind", type a task,
and press Continue. Confirm a proposal arrives as one confirmation card.
5. Turn on Settings → Experimental → "First task: propose with a plan
document" and repeat step 4. Confirm a plan document and a checkbox card
arrive.
6. Visit the dashboard after the hire. Confirm the wizard does not
reopen and one agent exists.
7. Open any question card. Confirm Cancel returns the plain composer
with the card still pending, Skip advances an optional question, and
Next moves to the next question.

Design reference with flow diagrams, chat mock-ups, and live captures:
https://pages.paperclip.ing/first-task-flow/proposed/

## Risks

- `pnpm dev` now builds the runner daemon because the Paperclip Runner
flag is on by default. Developers without a Rust toolchain must set
`PAPERCLIP_RUNNER_BINARY` or turn the flag off. Self-hosted instances
that never set the flag now let qualified agents use the runner.
- The wizard drops the mission steps and their saved-progress keys. A
user who is mid-wizard on an older build restarts at step 1 after an
upgrade. Existing organizations are not touched.
- The first task no longer runs on its own. A user who neither answers
the card nor types sees no agent activity. This is intended.
- The persona seed applies only to hires that carry the marker from the
wizard. API hires are unchanged.
- Hire idempotency is scoped to one run id and to the exact request.
Retries across runs, or with a changed payload, still create a second
agent. The lock is per server process, which matches how an instance
serves its API.
- Single-select question cards no longer submit on pick. Users of
adapters that relied on that behaviour now press Next.
- No database migrations.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

- Claude (Anthropic) through Claude Code. `claude-fable-5-1` with
extended thinking, tool use, and code execution wrote most commits.
`claude-opus-4-8` wrote the toggle, texts, wizard, and idempotency
commits, as the `Co-Authored-By` trailers show.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-08 20:19:14 -07:00
7e40ed8c43 feat(status-cards): add experimental status card update view (#10101)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source control plane people use to manage
AI-agent companies.
> - Operators need a board-level way to monitor a changing slice of
company work without repeatedly rebuilding filters or reading raw task
threads.
> - Existing summaries are useful snapshots, but they do not provide a
dedicated query-backed card with refresh policy, change tracking, update
history, and per-update cost visibility.
> - The capability needs to be safe to evaluate before it becomes part
of the default product surface.
> - This pull request adds end-to-end experimental Status Cards, from
schema and query compilation through update orchestration and operator
UI.
> - The entire feature is gated behind the `enableStatusCards`
experimental toggle, including its route and sidebar entry.
> - The benefit is a governed, inspectable way to keep focused
operational rollups current while preserving explicit controls over
refresh frequency and spend.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

### Subsystem affected

Cross-cutting (`packages/db`, `packages/shared`, `server/`, `ui/`, and
bundled skills/docs).

### Problem or motivation

Operators cannot currently define a reusable natural-language view of
company work, compile it into an inspectable query, and keep its summary
current as matching issues change. Rebuilding filters and rereading task
threads makes board-level monitoring repetitive and hides the
relationship between source changes, refresh cost, and the resulting
summary.

### Proposed solution

Add experimental Status Cards that compile operator intent into a query,
summarize matched work, record each update, expose
manual/interval/reactive refresh policies and costs, and preserve the
last good result across stale, updating, paused, and error states. The
capability is off by default and fully gated behind `enableStatusCards`,
including its route and navigation entry.

### Alternatives considered

- Extend existing one-off summaries: rejected because status cards
require persistent query provenance, refresh policy, update history, and
card-specific cost controls.
- Add a dashboard-only filter widget: rejected because it would not
provide governed background refresh, an update ledger, or an inspectable
compile pipeline.
- Ship the surface by default: rejected in favor of an experimental
toggle while behavior and operator value are evaluated.

### Roadmap alignment

This advances Paperclip’s board-level execution visibility and
output-first product goals. `ROADMAP.md` was checked and no duplicate
status-card initiative was found.

### Additional context

No related open PR was found in the public GitHub search for status
cards. The PR-only design wireframes were removed from the repository
after review; the published prototype remains external to the production
source tree.
## What Changed

- Added company-scoped status-card schema, CRUD APIs, compile
provenance, update ledger, shared contracts, validators, and OpenAPI
coverage.
- Added the text-to-query compile pipeline, bundled `status-card-query`
agent skill, query versioning, and authorized write-back flow.
- Added the experimental board, create flow, lifecycle tiles,
detail/settings/debug drawers, archived view, routing, navigation, and
instance setting.
- Added a change-gated update engine with manual, interval, and reactive
refresh policies, trigger selection, active hours, and daily token caps.
- Added per-update token/cost recording, today and lifetime rollups, and
policy-derived cost previews.
- Added operator documentation and agent-authoring hardening for compile
and update behavior.
- Added PR-prep integration coverage for settings/startup wiring and
replaced raw UI values with design-system tokens.
- Removed the PR-only `design/pap-15023-status-cards` wireframe
artifacts so the repository contains only production feature assets.

## Verification

- `pnpm -r typecheck` — passes on the PR head; includes `ui` `tsc -b`
passing. The UI compile gate was also independently recorded as passing
at `6d7f3cf96b` on July 23, 2026.
- `pnpm build` — passes.
- `pnpm check:token-gates` — passes with all three gates clean.
- `pnpm test:run` — 2,880 tests passed and 1 skipped; the sole failure
was an unrelated 10-second `afterAll` database-cleanup timeout in
`execution-workspaces-service.test.ts`.
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/execution-workspaces-service.test.ts` — passes on
immediate focused rerun (25/25).
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/instance-settings-service.test.ts
src/__tests__/server-startup-feedback-export.test.ts` — passes (31/31).
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui exec vitest run
src/pages/StatusCards/StatusCardSettingsForm.test.tsx
src/pages/StatusCards/StatusCardTile.test.tsx
src/pages/StatusCards/format.test.ts src/lib/status-card-state.test.ts`
— passes (26/26).
- Recorded pre-PR QA: compile-pipeline e2e PASS; full lifecycle and cost
QA PASS; security re-review PASS after write-back hardening; UX
approved.
- `pnpm exec vitest run packages/db/src/status-card-migrations.test.ts`
— passes; reapplies migrations `0185`–`0189` against an already-migrated
embedded Postgres database.
- `pnpm --filter /db check:migrations` — passes migration numbering and
safety checks.
- `pnpm --filter /db typecheck` — passes.
- Merged current `origin/master` on July 24, 2026 with no conflicts;
migrations `0185`–`0189` remain unclaimed on master.

## Risks

- The feature introduces five database migrations and a new background
update path; all new DDL is repeat-safe after partial application,
migration numbering/safety checks pass, and update execution is
company-scoped and change-gated.
- Natural-language compilation can produce invalid or overly broad
queries; compile provenance, query validation, debug visibility, and
version history make failures inspectable and recoverable.
- Reactive or interval refresh could increase spend; active hours, max
refresh frequency, daily token caps, per-update cost records, and
budget-paused states bound and expose that risk.
- The branch name contains an internal execution identifier because it
is a fixed handoff branch; it was intentionally not renamed or rebased
per the release handoff instructions.
- Overall rollout risk is limited because the route, navigation,
services, and UI are disabled by default behind `enableStatusCards`.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

- OpenAI Codex using GPT-5.5 with reasoning, repository tool use, shell
execution, GitHub CLI, and test/build execution. The runtime did not
expose a context-window size.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change; the fixed execution-workspace
identifier is documented as an authorized handoff exception
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass, with the one cleanup
timeout passing on focused rerun
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-07-24 12:26:43 -05:00
Devin FoleyandPaperclip fce3b439af fix: warn operators that experimental features may break (#8382)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the control plane operators use to manage AI-agent
companies.
> - Board operators rely on the settings UI and CLI docs to understand
which product surfaces are stable to depend on.
> - Experimental features already existed in the product, but the
operator-facing contract around them was too soft and too fragmented.
> - That created a risk that users would enable experiments without
being told clearly that they can break, change, or disappear.
> - The docs and the in-product settings page both needed the same
explicit warning language so the contract is visible at the moment of
decision.
> - This pull request adds that warning to the board-operator guide, CLI
references, and the experimental settings page.
> - The benefit is clearer operator expectations without changing the
underlying feature flags or rollout behavior.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

No public GitHub issue exists for this docs/polish gap.

Problem description:
- Board operators could enable experimental features without a clear
operator-facing statement that those features are opt-in and come
without compatibility guarantees.
- The docs site, repo CLI reference, and in-product experimental
settings page did not present one consistent warning contract.
- This PR closes that gap by documenting the risk explicitly where
operators discover and enable those settings.

Related public search:
- Searched public issues/PRs for related work with `gh search issues
--repo paperclipai/paperclip 'experimental features warning'` and `gh
search prs --repo paperclipai/paperclip 'experimental features
warning'`.
- Reviewed open PR #6165 during that search and found it unrelated; it
changes experimental auth/routing flags rather than documenting
experimental-feature risk.

## What Changed

- Added a new board-operator guide at
`docs/guides/board-operator/experimental-features.md` that defines the
Paperclip contract for experimental features.
- Registered that guide in `docs/docs.json` so it appears in the public
docs navigation.
- Added matching caveat language next to `instance
settings:experimental` in `docs/cli/control-plane-commands.md`.
- Added the same caveat to `doc/CLI.md` so the repo CLI reference does
not drift from the published docs.
- Added a single page-level warning banner to
`ui/src/pages/InstanceExperimentalSettings.tsx` stating that
experimental features are opt-in, carry no compatibility guarantees, and
may change, break, or be removed.
- Added a targeted UI test in
`ui/src/pages/InstanceExperimentalSettings.test.tsx` that asserts
exactly one page-level warning renders with the new risk language.

## Verification

- `jq empty docs/docs.json`
- `git diff --check`
- `cd ui && pnpm vitest run
src/pages/InstanceExperimentalSettings.test.tsx`
- Manual review of the warning contract across:
  - `docs/guides/board-operator/experimental-features.md`
  - `docs/cli/control-plane-commands.md`
  - `doc/CLI.md`
  - `ui/src/pages/InstanceExperimentalSettings.tsx`

UI note:
- This is a copy-level warning addition rather than a layout rework. I
did not attach before/after screenshots in this PR body.

## Risks

- Low risk: this changes operator-facing documentation and warning copy,
not feature-flag behavior.
- The main failure mode is wording drift across docs and UI in future
edits, which is why this PR adds the same contract to all relevant
operator-facing surfaces.

> I checked `ROADMAP.md` before opening this PR. This is docs/UI polish
around an existing experimental surface, not overlapping roadmap-level
core feature work.

## Model Used

- OpenAI Codex Local using `gpt-5.4` with high reasoning and tool use
for coordination, review, docs changes, and PR preparation.
- Anthropic Claude Local using `claude-opus-4-8` with high reasoning and
tool use for the in-product warning and targeted UI test.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after
screenshots
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-06-20 10:14:58 -07:00
a71c4b6782 [codex] feat(watchdog): add task watchdog control plane (#8339)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - The task lifecycle and recovery subsystems decide when agent work is
still productive, stalled, or ready for review.
> - Existing recovery paths can observe stopped or incomplete work, but
there was no first-class per-task watchdog model with scoped review
permissions.
> - Watchdog follow-ups also need strict boundaries so
recovery/status-only runs cannot mutate approvals or perform deliverable
work.
> - This pull request adds the task watchdog data model, API/service
layer, scheduler/review flow, adapter wake context, UI configuration
surfaces, and docs.
> - The branch has been rebased onto current `paperclipai/paperclip`
`master`; the watchdog migration is now ordered after master's latest
migrations as `0104_issue_watchdogs`.
> - The benefit is a more explicit task-review loop that preserves
Paperclip's single-assignee and governance invariants while making
stalled work easier to route.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

No linked GitHub issue. Paperclip task:
[PAP-11275](/PAP/issues/PAP-11275).

## Problem or motivation

Task recovery needs a first-class watchdog path that can inspect stopped
work and create scoped follow-ups without bypassing normal task
ownership. Board/UI users need a way to configure watchdogs on tasks and
see watchdog-related live work. Recovery/status-only runs must remain
limited to status reporting and must not create approvals, link
approvals, or submit approval comments.

## Proposed solution

Add a task-watchdog data model, scheduler/classifier, scoped mutation
guard, adapter wake context, API/UI configuration surfaces, and
documentation so watchdog agents can review stopped task subtrees under
explicit boundaries.

## Alternatives considered

Reuse the existing recovery-action flow only. That would keep
stopped-work detection implicit, make per-task watchdog assignment
harder to expose in the UI, and would not provide a durable
scoped-review issue for stalled task trees.

## Roadmap alignment

This is Paperclip control-plane lifecycle infrastructure for task
execution and recovery. I checked `ROADMAP.md`; this PR does not
duplicate an existing planned core item.

## What Changed

- Added issue watchdog schema, migration, shared contracts, validators,
CRUD API, and service support.
- Added task watchdog scheduler/classifier behavior, scoped mutation
enforcement, adapter wake context, and default watchdog mandate
guidance.
- Added UI surfaces for configuring watchdogs on new/existing tasks,
viewing watchdog activity, and exposing the experimental setting.
- Added docs for the user-facing task watchdog workflow and
implementation semantics.
- Gated new-task watchdog setup behind `enableTaskWatchdogs` and blocked
cheap status-only recovery runs from approval mutations.
- Rebased onto current `master` and renumbered the idempotent watchdog
migration from the branch-local `0102_issue_watchdogs` slot to
`0104_issue_watchdogs`.
- Addressed Greptile feedback by loading watchdog classifier input with
a recursive subtree query and centralizing the watchdog origin-kind
constant.
- Added and updated focused server/UI tests for watchdog routes,
scheduler/classifier behavior, scope boundaries, live task visibility,
settings, and new issue dialog behavior.

## Verification

- `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/task-watchdogs-scheduler.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/task-watchdogs-classifier.test.ts`
- `pnpm vitest run
server/src/__tests__/approval-routes-idempotency.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/issue-agent-mutation-ownership-routes.test.ts`
- `pnpm vitest run ui/src/components/NewIssueDialog.test.tsx`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck`
- `git diff --check`
- Verified the PR diff does not include `pnpm-lock.yaml` or
`.github/workflows`.

## Risks

- Medium risk: this introduces a new task lifecycle surface touching DB
schema, server routes/services, adapter wake context, and UI task
configuration.
- Watchdog scheduling behavior depends on the new experimental setting
and runtime context checks behaving consistently across local and
production agents.
- The watchdog migration is idempotent (`IF NOT EXISTS` /
duplicate-object guards) so users who tried the previous branch-local
migration number should not get duplicate-object failures.
- CI and the second Greptile pass are pending after the latest
review-fix push.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-5-class coding agent in the Paperclip workspace. Exact
runtime model id and context window were not exposed to the agent; tool
use and local command execution were enabled.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after
screenshots — N/A per Paperclip task instruction: do not add
screenshots/images to this PR unless they are specifically part of the
work.
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-19 15:38:52 -05:00
b9a80dcf22 feat: implement multi-user access and invite flows (#3784)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the control plane for autonomous AI companies.
> - V1 needs to stay local-first while also supporting shared,
authenticated deployments.
> - Human operators need real identities, company membership, invite
flows, profile surfaces, and company-scoped access controls.
> - Agents and operators also need the existing issue, inbox, workspace,
approval, and plugin flows to keep working under those authenticated
boundaries.
> - This branch accumulated the multi-user implementation, follow-up QA
fixes, workspace/runtime refinements, invite UX improvements,
release-branch conflict resolution, and review hardening.
> - This pull request consolidates that branch onto the current `master`
branch as a single reviewable PR.
> - The benefit is a complete multi-user implementation path with tests
and docs carried forward without dropping existing branch work.

## What Changed

- Added authenticated human-user access surfaces: auth/session routes,
company user directory, profile settings, company access/member
management, join requests, and invite management.
- Added invite creation, invite landing, onboarding, logo/branding,
invite grants, deduped join requests, and authenticated multi-user E2E
coverage.
- Tightened company-scoped and instance-admin authorization across
board, plugin, adapter, access, issue, and workspace routes.
- Added profile-image URL validation hardening, avatar preservation on
name-only profile updates, and join-request uniqueness migration cleanup
for pending human requests.
- Added an atomic member role/status/grants update path so Company
Access saves no longer leave partially updated permissions.
- Improved issue chat, inbox, assignee identity rendering,
sidebar/account/company navigation, workspace routing, and execution
workspace reuse behavior for multi-user operation.
- Added and updated server/UI tests covering auth, invites, membership,
issue workspace inheritance, plugin authz, inbox/chat behavior, and
multi-user flows.
- Merged current `public-gh/master` into this branch, resolved all
conflicts, and verified no `pnpm-lock.yaml` change is included in this
PR diff.

## Verification

- `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/issues-service.test.ts
ui/src/components/IssueChatThread.test.tsx ui/src/pages/Inbox.test.tsx`
- `pnpm run preflight:workspace-links && pnpm exec vitest run
server/src/__tests__/plugin-routes-authz.test.ts`
- `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/plugin-routes-authz.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/workspace-runtime-service-authz.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/access-validators.test.ts`
- `pnpm exec vitest run
server/src/__tests__/authz-company-access.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/routines-routes.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/sidebar-preferences-routes.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/approval-routes-idempotency.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/openclaw-invite-prompt-route.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/agent-cross-tenant-authz-routes.test.ts
server/src/__tests__/routines-e2e.test.ts`
- `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/auth-routes.test.ts
ui/src/pages/CompanyAccess.test.tsx`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/shared typecheck && pnpm --filter
@paperclipai/db typecheck && pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server
typecheck`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/shared typecheck && pnpm --filter
@paperclipai/server typecheck`
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui typecheck`
- `pnpm db:generate`
- `npx playwright test --config tests/e2e/playwright.config.ts --list`
- Confirmed branch has no uncommitted changes and is `0` commits behind
`public-gh/master` before PR creation.
- Confirmed no `pnpm-lock.yaml` change is staged or present in the PR
diff.

## Risks

- High review surface area: this PR contains the accumulated multi-user
branch plus follow-up fixes, so reviewers should focus especially on
company-boundary enforcement and authenticated-vs-local deployment
behavior.
- UI behavior changed across invites, inbox, issue chat, access
settings, and sidebar navigation; no browser screenshots are included in
this branch-consolidation PR.
- Plugin install, upgrade, and lifecycle/config mutations now require
instance-admin access, which is intentional but may change expectations
for non-admin board users.
- A join-request dedupe migration rejects duplicate pending human
requests before creating unique indexes; deployments with unusual
historical duplicates should review the migration behavior.
- Company member role/status/grant saves now use a new combined
endpoint; older separate endpoints remain for compatibility.
- Full production build was not run locally in this heartbeat; CI should
cover the full matrix.

## Model Used

- OpenAI Codex coding agent, GPT-5-based model, CLI/tool-use
environment. Exact deployed model identifier and context window were not
exposed by the runtime.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after
screenshots
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

Note on screenshots: this is a branch-consolidation PR for an
already-developed multi-user branch, and no browser screenshots were
captured during this heartbeat.

---------

Co-authored-by: dotta <dotta@example.com>
Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-17 09:44:19 -05:00
HenkDz 14d59da316 feat(adapters): external adapter plugin system with dynamic UI parser
- Plugin loader: install/reload/remove/reinstall external adapters
  from npm packages or local directories
- Plugin store persisted at ~/.paperclip/adapter-plugins.json
- Self-healing UI parser resolution with version caching
- UI: Adapter Manager page, dynamic loader, display registry
  with humanized names for unknown adapter types
- Dev watch: exclude adapter-plugins dir from tsx watcher
  to prevent mid-request server restarts during reinstall
- All consumer fallbacks use getAdapterLabel() for consistent display
- AdapterTypeDropdown uses controlled open state for proper close behavior
- Remove hermes-local from built-in UI (externalized to plugin)
- Add docs for external adapters and UI parser contract
2026-04-03 21:11:20 +01:00
dottaandPaperclip b3d61a7561 Clarify manual workspace runtime behavior
Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-03-29 10:55:45 -05:00
Devin FoleyandPaperclip a5d47166e2 docs: add board-operator delegation guide (#1889)
* docs: add board-operator delegation guide

Create docs/guides/board-operator/delegation.md explaining the full
CEO-led delegation lifecycle from the board operator's perspective.
Covers what the board needs to do, what the CEO automates, common
delegation patterns (flat, 3-level, hire-on-demand), and a
troubleshooting section that directly answers the #1 new-user
confusion point: "Do I have to tell the CEO to delegate?"

Also adds a Delegation section to core-concepts.md and wires the
new guide into docs.json navigation after Managing Tasks.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>

* docs: add AGENTS.md troubleshooting note to delegation guide

Add a row to the troubleshooting table telling board operators to
verify the CEO's AGENTS.md instructions file contains delegation
directives. Without these instructions, the CEO won't delegate.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>

* docs: fix stale concept count and frontmatter summary

Update "five key concepts" to "six" and add "delegation" to the
frontmatter summary field, addressing Greptile review comments.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-03-26 23:01:58 -07:00
56a39fea3d Add importing & exporting company guide
Documents the `paperclipai company export` and `paperclipai company import`
CLI commands, covering package format, all options, target modes, collision
strategies, GitHub sources, interactive selection, and API endpoints.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-23 16:57:38 -05:00
Dotta e9ffde610b docs: add tailscale private access guide 2026-03-05 14:21:47 -06:00
DottaandClaude Opus 4.6 09d2ef1a37 fix: restore docs deleted in v0.2.3 release, add Paperclip branding
- Restored docs/ directory that was accidentally deleted by `git add -A`
  in the v0.2.3 release script
- Replaced generic "P" favicon with actual paperclip icon using brand
  primary color (#2563EB)
- Added light/dark logo SVGs for Mintlify navbar (paperclip icon + wordmark)
- Updated docs.json with logo configuration for dark/light mode
- Fixed release.sh to stage only release-related files instead of `git add -A`
  to prevent sweeping unrelated changes into release commits

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-03 15:49:43 -06:00
Dotta 28bf5e9e9b chore: release v0.2.3 2026-03-03 15:39:13 -06:00
Dotta cabd16bc70 docs: sync docs and skills updates from backup branch 2026-03-02 16:44:10 -06:00
ForgottenandClaude Opus 4.6 02dc46e782 docs: add external documentation site content
Add structured documentation covering quickstart, architecture, core
concepts, API reference, adapter guides, CLI commands, deployment
options, and operator/developer guides.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-26 16:33:55 -06:00