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| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 DottaandPaperclip
|
0ffc091473 |
feat(connections): add durable GitHub identities and webhooks (#12843)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - Agents need source control access for repository work > - A shared token cannot preserve the responsible person's identity or an agent's dedicated identity > - GitHub App tokens also need durable refresh, repository access checks, and webhook delivery > - Paperclip already has managed connections, encrypted grants, run secret leases, and merge-confirmation behavior > - This pull request extends those systems with GitHub identities instead of adding a parallel credential system > - The benefit is durable GitHub access with explicit identity, repository, runtime, and webhook boundaries ## Linked Issues or Issue Description No public GitHub issue describes this connection change. This description follows the feature request template. **Subsystem affected** Connected Apps, connection grants, secret resolution, native Git runtime setup, webhook processing, and the Apps UI. **Problem or motivation** Users need to connect GitHub once and let agents use the correct GitHub identity. A run should use a dedicated agent account when one exists. Otherwise, it should use the responsible person's account. The connection must survive token expiry, repository access changes, and temporary instance downtime. **Proposed solution** Add user-owned and agent-owned GitHub grants to the existing connection model. Resolve one identity for MCP, Git, `gh`, health checks, and webhook bindings. Store provider tokens in the existing encrypted secret system. Refresh expiring token pairs under the existing lease and compare-and-swap path. Register signed Cloud webhook bindings and process normalized pull request and installation events through a durable local inbox. **Alternatives considered** An organization-wide GitHub token would lose person and agent attribution. Environment variables alone would bypass the managed connection and grant model. A new GitHub-only credential store would duplicate the existing secret and access systems. GitHub App installation tokens and private-key custody remain outside this first version. **Roadmap alignment** This change implements the Connected Apps direction. It also extends the shipped MCP Tool Gateway, per-agent secret access, and action-attribution systems. It does not add a repository catalog. The open repository catalog work in [#11234](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/11234) is related and complementary. ## What Changed - Added agent-owned connection grants and a per-agent credential policy with company and subject constraints. - Added a managed GitHub App method while keeping the personal access token method as an advanced fallback. - Added durable access-token and refresh-token handling with proactive rotation and one automatic recovery after a provider `401`. - Added GitHub identity and installation summaries without storing repository-name lists. - Added signed Cloud webhook binding, event lease, acknowledgement, local idempotency, pull request merge processing, and installation access handling. - Added one identity resolver for MCP, native Git, `gh`, checkout, health checks, and webhook bindings. - Added a class-3 run projection for `GH_TOKEN`, `GITHUB_TOKEN`, a `github.com`-only credential helper, SSH-to-HTTPS rewrite, and GitHub noreply commit attribution. - Added personal and dedicated-agent setup choices plus identity, repository, continuity, and webhook status in the Apps UI. - Added schema migrations, tests, and connection documentation. ## Verification - The current head is fully green in GitHub CI, including build, typecheck, all serialized/general server shards, all browser shards, policy, canary dry run, review, and security checks. - Live staging proof completed with a non-expiring GitHub App user token, selected-repository installation, repository add/remove refresh, managed MCP, native `gh`, HTTPS clone/push/delete, GitHub noreply commit attribution, signed merged-PR webhook acceptance, durable Cloud-to-instance delivery, and installation-access event processing. Temporary branches and temporary repository access were removed afterward. - `pnpm check:token-gates` passed. - `pnpm -r typecheck` passed before and after the rebase onto `origin/master`. - `pnpm build` passed. - The focused connector suite passed 285 tests after the rebase. - The full stable suite passed 5,790 tests and failed 22 tests across 8 general server files. The failures reproduced as shared-runner environment issues. They included `/tmp` versus `/private/tmp`, closed database connections, and invalid high ephemeral ports. The focused connection tests pass in isolation. ## Risks - Migrations add agent grant subjects and a durable connection-event inbox. Migration numbering and safety checks pass. - A raw GitHub user token enters the agent process for Git and `gh`. Per-tool Ask-first controls cannot limit those shell operations. The UI warns users about this boundary. - GitHub App user tokens can be non-expiring. Paperclip performs a continuity check every 30 days, but provider revocation still requires a reconnect. - The webhook path accepts only signed and bounded payloads. It stores a minimal normalized record and no raw provider payload. - GitHub repository permissions remain authoritative. Removed access can make a cached repository count temporarily stale, but runtime access fails immediately. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, `gpt-5.6-sol`, extended reasoning, tool use, code execution, browser control, and multi-file repository editing. The context window size was not provided. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [ ] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
||
|
Devin Foley
|
2c90cf0f2c |
fix(server): serialize managed-checkout materialization and stop misattributing clone failures (#10723)
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - Repo-only project workspaces are materialized by a server-side
managed `git clone` into a per-project directory (#10720 added
credentials for private repos)
> - Two issues on the same project routinely wake seconds apart, and
both runs race the same clone target
> - The loser fails with "destination path already exists", and its
failure cleanup removes the directory out from under the winner's
in-progress clone — both runs then fail every round
> - This pull request serializes materialization per target directory
and makes the clone land atomically via a temp sibling + rename, so the
shared target is never partial and never removed
> - The benefit is that concurrent runs on the same project converge:
one clone happens, everyone adopts it, and unrelated failures no longer
blame the GitHub credential
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
**What happened?**
With isolated workspaces enabled on a project whose only workspace is
repo-only, unblocking two issues at once produced lockstep mutual
destruction (observed live, two consecutive rounds): both runs called
the managed-checkout materialization concurrently; one clone created the
target directory, the other's `git clone` failed with `fatal:
destination path '…' already exists and is not an empty directory`, and
that run's failure cleanup deleted the directory while the first clone
was still writing into it (`fatal: could not set 'core…'`). Both runs
failed `workspace_validation_failed`; their staggered retries could race
again. The failure message also wrongly claimed the GitHub credential
"was rejected or lacks access" — the collision had nothing to do with
auth.
**Expected behavior**
Concurrent materializations of the same project checkout share one
clone; a completed checkout is never removed by a failing sibling; the
credential is only blamed for auth-shaped failures.
**Steps to reproduce**
1. Project with a repo-only workspace (private repo, isolated workspaces
on).
2. Move two issues on that project to `todo` at the same time so both
runs start within seconds.
3. Both runs fail workspace validation with "destination path already
exists" / "could not set 'core…'" instead of one clone succeeding.
**Paperclip version or commit**
`master` (
|
||
|
Devin Foley
|
e0c2448267 |
feat(server): authenticate server-side git clone and fetch with a company-secret GitHub token (#10720)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - Repo-only project workspaces are materialized by a server-side `git clone`, and isolated `git_worktree` runs refresh their base ref with server-side `git fetch` > - Both operations run outside the agent process with no credentials, so private GitHub repositories can never be cloned or refreshed — agent-scoped credential env bindings do not reach them > - The company secret store already has a well-known GitHub token convention (`GITHUB_TOKEN` / `GH_TOKEN` / `PAPERCLIP_GITHUB_TOKEN`, consumed by the external-object provider for API reads), but nothing server-side consults it for git > - This pull request resolves that token per run and authenticates the managed clone and every base-ref refresh with it through an ephemeral credential helper > - The benefit is that isolated workspaces work on private repositories with one company secret, while public repositories and self-hosted ambient git configuration keep working unchanged ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **Subsystem affected** Server workspace materialization (`server/src/services/heartbeat.ts`) and execution-workspace realization (`server/src/services/workspace-runtime.ts`). **Problem or motivation** A project workspace configured with only a private GitHub `repoUrl` cannot be used for isolated `git_worktree` runs: the managed `git clone` runs with a sanitized, credential-less environment, and plain git cannot consume a bare token env variable without a credential helper. There is no way to give the server a git credential — storing a `GH_TOKEN` company secret has no effect on server-side git, and a credential-less private clone hangs on a terminal prompt until the ten-minute clone timeout. Base-ref refreshes (`git fetch`) during worktree realization have the same gap. **Proposed solution** A `git-credentials` module resolves a token per run — company secret by well-known name (`GITHUB_TOKEN`, `GH_TOKEN`, `PAPERCLIP_GITHUB_TOKEN`), then `GITHUB_TOKEN`/`GH_TOKEN` in the server process environment for self-hosted deployments, then none — and builds a git invocation that authenticates via an inline credential helper. The token travels in an env variable; it never appears in argv, URLs, or on disk. Only `https://github.com` remotes are authenticated; everything else keeps ambient behavior. The provider is a single factory seam so a future brokered credential source can replace it without touching call sites. **Alternatives considered** - A GitHub OAuth "connect your account" flow: heavier product surface, needs app registration and callback custody; out of scope for a server credential and better served by a dedicated connector later. The provider seam keeps that path open. - `gh auth setup-git`: writes helper configuration to disk and requires a global token env; rejected in favor of per-invocation config with no persistent state. - Embedding the token in the clone URL: leaks into argv, error messages, and `.git/config`; rejected. ## What Changed - New `server/src/services/git-credentials.ts`: `createGitRemoteAuthProvider` (memoized per run, one secret resolution and one audit event), `buildGitAuthInvocation` (helper-reset + inline helper, `x-access-token` username, `GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0`), `isGitHubHttpsRemoteUrl` host gating (rejects ssh/GHES/http/other hosts/userinfo URLs), `describeGitAuthFailure`, and the canonical `scrubGitCredentialText`. Secret resolutions pass a `system` consumer access context so they are recorded as secret access events. - `ensureManagedProjectWorkspace` (now exported) accepts an optional auth provider; the clone env spreads the token after `sanitizeRuntimeServiceBaseEnv` (which strips `PAPERCLIP_*`), always sets `GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0`, distinguishes "credential rejected" from "no credential configured — add a GITHUB_TOKEN or GH_TOKEN company secret" in the error, and removes the partially created directory on clone failure so a timeout-killed clone cannot be adopted as a broken checkout by the next run. - `refreshRemoteTrackingBaseRef` (now exported) captures the remote URL it already looked up, asks the provider for an invocation, and attributes failed authenticated fetches to the credential in a scrubbed warning. The optional provider threads through `detectDefaultBranch`, `resolveAuthoritativeBaseRef`, `inspectExecutionWorkspaceBaseDrift`, `realizeExecutionWorkspace`, and `ensurePersistedExecutionWorkspaceAvailable`; heartbeat builds one provider per run for both the anchor-resolution clone path and workspace realization/restore. - `github-external-object-provider.ts` imports the shared secret-name list; `isGitHubDotCom` is exported from `github-fetch.ts`. - Docs: "Private repositories and repo-only project workspaces" section in the execution-workspaces guide, cross-linked from the secrets deploy doc. ## Verification - `cd server && npx vitest run src/__tests__/git-credentials.test.ts` — resolution chain order and precedence, env fallback, memoization, audited access context, host-gating matrix, invocation shape (token absent from argv), scrubber, failure descriptions, and a real-git `git credential fill` round trip that proves the helper executes and answers with the env-carried token (no network). - `cd server && npx vitest run src/__tests__/heartbeat-managed-clone-credentials.test.ts` — clones behave byte-identically with no provider or a null-returning provider (local repos, no network), authenticated-failure errors name the credential, non-auth failures do not mention credentials, partial clone directories are removed, pre-existing non-git directories keep the "Using it as-is" path, and the sanitizer spread order keeps the token env alive. - `cd server && npx vitest run src/__tests__/workspace-runtime.test.ts` — new `refreshRemoteTrackingBaseRef` cases: provider offered the remote URL and null keeps behavior identical; failed authenticated fetch warning names the credential; unauthenticated failure warning stays credential-free. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` is clean. - Manual (optional, networked): store a `GH_TOKEN` company secret, configure a repo-only project workspace pointing at a private GitHub repository, run an isolated-workspace issue — the managed clone succeeds and the worktree run proceeds. ## Risks - Every new parameter is optional; with no provider the git invocations are byte-identical to before. Public repos and ambient credential helpers keep working whenever no token resolves. - Precedence change when a token exists: a stored company secret now wins over ambient helpers for `https://github.com` remotes (the helper list is reset for that invocation). The rejected-credential error names the secret so an operator can fix or remove it. - `GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0` on the managed clone is the one always-on change: a credential-less private clone now fails fast with a clear message instead of hanging until the ten-minute timeout (it could only ever "succeed" interactively on a TTY dev server). - The token is scoped to the git process env for one invocation; it is never written to agent env, run context, disk, or logs, and error text is scrubbed of URL userinfo. - No migrations, no image changes (git ships in the image). ## Model Used Claude Fable 5 (`claude-fable-5`, extended thinking, agentic tool use via Claude Code CLI). ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge |