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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 DottaandPaperclip
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8f822bfcf7 |
fix(cloud): persist configuration and load release-image packages (#18335)
Land the approved Cloud configuration and release-image package stack.
Includes the separately reviewed adapter settings (#18335), external adapters (#18333), bundled plugins (#18336), startup configuration (#18339), and migration/package checks (#18341).
Includes the final image-owned loader and linked-dependency inventory corrections.
Verified stack head:
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1477d1ecea |
test: remove the no-op sequential describe modifier (#15286)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Paperclip runs the server and runner test suites with Vitest. > - Vitest 5 removes the deprecated `describe.sequential` property, so the pending Vitest 5 upgrade fails the type-check and test jobs. > - `describe.sequential` only changes behaviour inside a `describe.concurrent` suite, or when `sequence.concurrent` is on. > - This repository has neither, so the modifier changed nothing at run time. > - The benefit is that the Vitest 5 upgrade can land, and the test files lose a modifier that did no work. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs: #12969 ## What Changed - Replace every `describe.sequential` use with a plain `describe` call. - Drop the `{ concurrent: false }` suite option from the two runner test files. - Add a comment to `server/vitest.config.ts` that records why these suites must run one test at a time. - Leave the package manifests and the lockfile unchanged. ## Why the modifier did nothing The Vitest documentation states that `describe.sequential` is useful to run tests in sequence inside a `describe.concurrent` suite, or with the `--sequence.concurrent` option. `sequence.concurrent` defaults to `false`. This repository satisfies neither condition: - No test file uses `describe.concurrent`, `it.concurrent`, or `test.concurrent`. - `server/vitest.config.ts` sets `sequence.concurrent: false`, with `maxWorkers: 1`, `maxConcurrency: 1`, and `isolate: true`. - `packages/paperclip-runner/vitest.config.ts` sets no `sequence` block, so the `false` default applies. `packages/db` and `cli` already run the same embedded-Postgres suites with a plain `describe`, and those jobs are green. The server package was the only outlier. The modifier did carry one real piece of knowledge: these suites need their tests to run one at a time. The new comment in `server/vitest.config.ts` records that reason next to the setting that enforces it. ## Verification - `git grep` for `describe.sequential` returns nothing outside `node_modules`. - The author ran the changed server test files under the installed Vitest 4, and the results match the results without this change. - Two very large embedded-Postgres test files exceeded the author's local memory limit, so the CI test jobs cover those two. - The two changed runner test files have pre-existing local failures caused by a missing Rust toolchain and a missing global `pnpm` binary. The failures are identical with and without this change. - The author type-checked the changed files and found no new error. - CI must pass the typecheck, build, server test, and runner verify jobs. ## Risks - Low risk. Suite execution stays serial, because the Vitest config enforces it. - The change adds no dependency and changes no package manifest or lockfile. - A future change that turns `sequence.concurrent` on would break these suites. The new config comment warns against it. ## Model Used - Claude Sonnet 5 — code edits and local verification. - OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 — the earlier revision of this branch. ## Test plan - [x] Every CI check reaches a terminal green state. A pending or queued check is not a pass. - [x] The `Typecheck + Release Registry` job passes. This change must not introduce a type error. - [x] The `Build` job passes. - [x] The server test jobs and the runner verify jobs pass. - [x] Greptile re-reviews this commit set and posts a passing verdict. The dependabot waiver does not apply to this pull request. - [x] `mergeable` reads `MERGEABLE` as a terminal value. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have linked the related public issue with `Refs: #12969` - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge Co-Authored-By: Priya Raman <priya.raman@paperclip.ing> --------- Co-authored-by: Priya Raman <priya.raman@paperclip.ing> Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: nickyleach <331803+nickyleach@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Dotta
|
0f94521017 |
fix(runner): restore local session and task integrity (#12721)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the control plane for agents that perform work. > - Paperclip Runner connects durable provider sessions to individual task runs through PRP. > - Provider continuity and per-run authority are different lifetimes. > - The existing implementation mixed those lifetimes and lost event metadata between provider frames, runnerd, persistence, API sanitization, and the task thread. > - That caused failed continuation, missing progress and Plans, duplicate replies, hidden failures, and unsafe recovery. > - This repair gives every heartbeat fresh authority, preserves qualified provider-session continuity, and restores one lossless presentation path without changing direct adapters. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What happened?** A second native heartbeat could reuse tickets, leases, command receipts, sequence state, and run identity from the first heartbeat. Provider phase and item identity could be lost before the UI read them. Redaction could corrupt protocol discriminators while still missing malformed credential tails. The task thread could fold progress into the final response, hide failures, or show more than one final answer. Native Codex also exposed approval modes that do not yet have a durable approval bridge. **Expected behavior** Each heartbeat uses a new PRP authority epoch. Codex and OpenCode preserve exact qualified provider sessions; ACPX emits an explicit continuity event when its qualified process-replacement policy is used. Every accepted provider event is presented, classified as internal, or surfaced as unsupported. The task page shows chronological progress, reasoning summaries, activity, Plans, interactions, terminal failures, and exactly one final reply. Direct adapters retain their existing path. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Enable the unified experimental Paperclip Runner setting. 2. Create a local native Codex, OpenCode, ACPX Claude, or ACPX Codex agent. 3. Run response, Plan, structured-question/resume, restart, cancellation, and failure scenarios. 4. Reload the task while active, waiting, failed, and settled. 5. On the old implementation, observe stale run authority, missing classifications, incomplete output, or duplicated/folded replies. **Paperclip version or commit** The repair is based directly on `master` at `87d05e194b643810d16d20612115acd01d735d43`. **Deployment mode** Local development with the embedded database. Related work: Refs #12616, #12646, #12666, #12685, and #12700. ## What Changed - Rotates PRP control-plane, outbox, ticket, lease, command, receipt, and sequence authority for each heartbeat while carrying forward only a validated provider-session identity. - Reads `control-plane-state.json`, validates both durable schemas and lifecycle values, resumes coherent current runs, archives qualified settled authority, and quarantines malformed or mismatched scoped state without moving ambiguous live legacy state. - Preserves Codex provider phase and stable item identities so commentary remains progress and only `final_answer` becomes final. - Adds raw OpenCode HTTP/SSE boundary coverage and canonical reasoning lifecycle mapping. - Makes ACPX normalization lossless for visible reasoning, tool lifecycle metadata, stable bounded identities, Plan revisions, structured requests, failures, and qualified process replacement. Only the compatible terminal assistant message is promoted as final. - Applies schema-aware redaction before generic JWT-shaped detection and scans every diagnostic string leaf. Malformed raw/escaped quoted credential tails are redacted in both server and durable Rust state. - Restores snapshot-style chronological task presentation, expandable tool activity, inline Plan cards, visible waiting/resume/cancel/failure states, and exactly one final answer. - Makes `never` the only qualified native Codex permission mode and rejects unsupported persisted native modes with remediation. OpenCode and ACPX policies remain intact. - Keeps the unified experimental Runner setting as the only enablement flag. Onboarding and direct Codex, Claude, and OpenCode stay on their legacy execution/finalization paths. - Adds cross-language goldens, authority/recovery/fault coverage, exact response/count assertions, and native plus legacy acceptance scenarios. ## Verification - Pull-request GitHub Actions run Rust formatting/tests, TypeScript checks, server/UI tests, builds, protocol drift checks, browser E2E, and security scans. - A separate workflow-only validation ref is pinned directly on this PR head and runs the 35-cell paid local matrix: three core scenarios plus structured-question resume and restart/resume for native Codex, native OpenCode, ACPX Claude, ACPX Codex, and direct Codex/Claude/OpenCode. Run: https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/33682434315 - Acceptance requires exact single visible replies, monotonic sequences, matching envelope discriminators, one semantic terminal, one run terminal, no unresolved interaction, no duplicate mutation, no secret leakage, provider continuity, and zero native rows for direct adapters. - Per maintainer direction, tests are running in GitHub Actions rather than on the slower local host. Only formatters and static diff checks were run locally. ## Risks - Recovery from old or partial filesystem state is sensitive. The repair fails closed, preserves active or unverifiable authority, and quarantines only state whose scoped ownership is safe to move. - Provider event formats can change. Closed validators and boundary goldens turn new or malformed events into visible diagnostics instead of silent drops. - Shared task presentation could affect direct adapters. Runtime-fact gating plus the direct-adapter matrix protect the existing path. - Managed and remote providers are not qualified here. Shared code continues to compile and fail safely, but live qualification is deferred. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex based on GPT-5. The exact deployed snapshot and context-window size are not exposed to this task. It used agentic reasoning, repository inspection, code editing, Git, parallel subagents, and GitHub Actions. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id - [ ] I have run tests locally and they pass (intentionally deferred to GitHub Actions) - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented risks above - [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [ ] The paid local-provider matrix is green - [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge |
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|
Dotta
|
51ad751e0b |
feat(runner): integrate Codex native execution (#12616)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source control plane for teams of AI agents. > - Agent runs currently use direct adapters and their established finalization paths. > - The new runner package needs one production integration before it can execute a real provider through the server. > - That integration must not change direct adapters or expose unsupported providers. > - The rollout must also preserve native runs that were already recorded when the feature flag changes. > - This pull request adds a default-off, Codex-only native execution path and its authority boundary. > - The benefit is a recoverable production vertical slice with explicit compatibility guards. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **Subsystem affected** Cross-cutting server orchestration and adapter selection. **Problem or motivation** The runner package exists, but the server cannot yet start and recover a governed Codex run through it. A careless integration could also route existing direct adapters into the native runtime or lose cancellation and finalization state. **Proposed solution** Add a hidden `paperclip_runner` adapter for Codex. Keep it behind the default-off instance flag. Bind native execution, resume, cancellation, semantic tool authority, and finalization to the recorded company, issue, run, and coordinator identities. Leave every direct adapter on its existing path. **Alternatives considered** A multi-provider launch was rejected because only Codex has the complete production bridge in this series. Replacing direct adapter execution was rejected because the runner remains experimental. **Roadmap alignment** This work supports governed tool access, action attribution, and self-healing runs. It keeps the integration narrow and default-off. ## What Changed - Add the Codex-only native session executor and persisted resumption path. - Add run-scoped semantic tool projection, authorization, receipts, and idempotency. - Add audited native cancellation with durable issue and coordinator binding. - Add result fencing so a recorded result cannot reacquire the provider and run twice. - Reject fresh runner starts when the rollout flag is off while preserving recorded native recovery. - Keep direct adapters outside native status, cancellation, record creation, and finalization. - Add focused conformance, recovery, cancellation, status, portability, and compatibility coverage. ## Verification - GitHub Actions is the authoritative test environment for this large stack. - The PR policy and lightweight stack checks run while this is a middle PR. - The full required suite runs when this PR becomes the lowest unmerged or top PR. - Greptile will review this exact delta after the branch is pushed. ## Risks - The main risk is routing a legacy adapter into native execution. Runtime selection and heartbeat tests cover that boundary. - The next risk is stale or cross-company cancellation. Durable binding checks and transactional audit persistence cover it. - The adapter remains hidden and default-off. Only Codex is admitted. - There are no database migration, lockfile, or GitHub workflow changes in this PR. ## Stack 1. [Runner package, SDK, and developer tools](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/12608) 2. This PR: Codex production server integration 3. [Provider-neutral task-thread UI](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/12617) ## Model Used OpenAI Codex with GPT-5, extended reasoning, repository tools, and parallel review agents. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [ ] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge |
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|
Devin Foley
|
db4defdfbf |
feat: operator-configurable settings visibility via PAPERCLIP_HIDDEN_SETTINGS (#11823)
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work
> - The instance settings surface (Access, Plugins, Adapters, General,
Experimental) assumes the person at the keyboard operates the whole
instance
> - Operators who host Paperclip for others — a managed cloud or an
internal shared server — expose settings pages and toggles that do not
apply to their deployment, and the related mutation APIs stay open
> - A hosted tenant can open Plugins or Adapters, try an action, and hit
a confusing failure, because only a few hardcoded platform floors exist
> - This pull request adds a generic, operator-configured visibility
mechanism: one env var hides declared settings surfaces in the UI and
floors their mutation routes with a stable 403 code
> - The benefit is a clean hosted-tenant settings surface for any
operator, with zero behavior change for normal self-hosted instances
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
**Subsystem affected**
Instance settings (server routes and UI), the shared settings registry
in `packages/shared`, and the `/api/health` bootstrap payload.
**Problem or motivation**
An operator who hosts Paperclip for other people cannot hide settings
surfaces that the platform manages. Tenants see Access, Plugins, and
Adapters pages, backup retention, and host-level experimental toggles
that do nothing useful for them. The mutation APIs behind these surfaces
also stay open, so a tenant admin can attempt actions the platform must
control. ROADMAP.md names a cleaner shared deployment story as a goal
("Teams should be able to run the same product in hosted or semi-hosted
environments without changing the mental model").
**Proposed solution**
Add a declarative registry of hideable settings surfaces and one env
var, `PAPERCLIP_HIDDEN_SETTINGS`. The server parses the list at boot,
reports it on `/api/health`, and rejects value-changing writes to hidden
surfaces with a stable `settings_operator_managed` 403 code. The UI
reads the list from the health payload and removes the hidden pages,
sections, and toggles from navigation, routes, and page content. Unknown
keys warn and are ignored, so one list can roll across a fleet with
mixed app versions. With the variable unset, behavior is byte-identical
to today.
**Alternatives considered**
- Hardcode the hidden set for cloud instances in this repo: rejected,
because each hosting operator needs a different policy, and policy does
not belong in shared code.
- Deliver the hidden set through the managed-config document: rejected,
because that channel is cloud-specific and fail-closed on unknown
fields; a plain env var works for any operator, including self-hosted
shared servers.
- Lock the controls with a badge instead of hiding them: rejected for
these surfaces, because they are meaningless to tenants, not merely
platform-controlled; the existing managed-overlay lock stays the right
tool for controlled flags.
**Roadmap alignment**
Supports the "shared deployment story" item in ROADMAP.md: hosted and
semi-hosted deployments keep the same product with a settings surface
that matches what the tenant can actually do.
## What Changed
- New `packages/shared/src/settings-visibility.ts`: registry of hideable
surfaces (every instance settings page — profile, environments, access,
heartbeats, experimental, plugins, adapters; every Instance → General
section; every experimental flag as `instance.experimental.<key>`), the
`PAPERCLIP_HIDDEN_SETTINGS` parser, and the `settings_operator_managed`
error code. The General page stays visible as the settings root and
redirect target.
- New `server/src/services/settings-visibility.ts`: parse-once accessor;
unknown keys log one warning and are ignored.
- `/api/health` reports `hiddenSettings` on every response shape; the
field is omitted when nothing is hidden.
- Server floors on hidden surfaces, with same-value echo tolerance (the
`executionMode` precedent): field-backed general sections and
experimental keys reject value-changing PATCHes, and hiding the whole
Experimental page floors every toggle; plugin lifecycle and config
writes, adapter management writes, and the Access admin routes (reads
included) return 403 `settings_operator_managed`. Reads the app itself
needs (plugin `ui-contributions`, adapter metadata, plugin job trigger)
stay open. Pages without instance-scoped mutation routes are hidden in
the UI only.
- UI: new `useHiddenSettings` hook and `HiddenSettingsPageGate` route
gate (hidden pages redirect to the settings root); the settings sidebar
and tab bar drop hidden entries; remembered settings paths remap to the
default page; `InstanceGeneralSettings` skips hidden sections; every
`ExperimentalToggleCard` now carries its flag key and renders nothing
when hidden.
- Removed the dead `InstanceSidebar` component (referenced only by its
own test).
- Docs: `docs/deploy/environment-variables.md` documents the variable
and the key registry.
## Verification
- `pnpm vitest run` over the new and extended suites: shared registry
and parser, representative floor tests per route class (changed-value
403, same-value echo 200, unset env 200, page-level Experimental
hiding), the health field, the route gate, nav filtering, and
section/card hiding with one hidden example per surface kind — 168 tests
pass.
- Full root `pnpm typecheck` passes.
- Manual: booted a server with the variable set. `/api/health` lists the
keys; an unknown key logs one warning and the server boots; hidden pages
redirect; hidden sections and cards do not render; hidden-field PATCH
returns 403 with `details.code = "settings_operator_managed"`; a
same-value echo returns 200. Unset the variable: the full settings
surface returns and responses are byte-identical to master.
## Risks
- Low risk for self-hosted instances: with the variable unset, the
hidden set is empty, the health field is omitted, and no floor
activates.
- Flooring plugin config writes assumes hosted deployments configure
plugins through the platform. If a future bundled plugin needs
tenant-entered config, the floor needs a narrow carve-out.
- Hidden-key floors tolerate same-value echoes, so API clients that
round-trip full GET responses keep working.
- Hiding a toggle does not change its value; operators pair hiding with
the desired default where the value matters.
## Model Used
Claude Fable 5 (Anthropic, `claude-fable-5`) with extended thinking and
agentic tool use, driven through the Claude Code CLI (file edits, test
execution, and live-server verification loops).
## Checklist
- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
|
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Devin FoleyandPaperclip
|
c274f10abc |
feat(server): computed owner instance-admin elevation for cloud-managed instances, behind platform floors (#10343)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - Cloud-managed instances authenticate tenant users through a trusted-header path (`resolveCloudTenantActor`) that deliberately never grants `instance_admin`, so every tenant user is company-scoped > - On a dedicated (single-owner) managed instance that leaves the paying owner unable to administer their own instance: instance settings, the environments admin surface, and the custom sandbox image flow are all instance-admin gated (the environments UI can't even show the provider/image of the platform sandbox because the restricted read view blanks `config` entirely) > - Re-granting the old blanket `instance_user_roles` row would repeat the mistake the shared-pool hardening fixed: DB rows go stale, resurrect via restores, and elevate through every auth path > - This pull request elevates only the stack `owner`, computed per request at the trusted-header boundary behind a new managed-tier feature flag, and ships that elevation together with code floors on the platform-owned surfaces an instance admin must not control on a managed instance > - The benefit is that dedicated-stack owners can administer their own instance while platform credentials, execution policy, backups, and runtime code-install stay platform-owned, and self-hosted behavior is unchanged ## Linked Issues or Issue Description No public GitHub issue exists for this change; the underlying issue is described here following the feature-request template. ### Problem or motivation - On cloud-managed instances, tenant users resolved from trusted headers are always company-scoped. For dedicated instances with a single paying owner, the owner cannot reach any instance-admin surface of their own instance (instance settings, environments administration, custom image setup), and the restricted environment read view hides even structural fields like the sandbox provider and image. - The previous hardening intentionally removed blanket elevation (and purges stale `instance_user_roles` rows on every trusted-header authentication). That protection must not regress for shared multi-tenant pools. ### Proposed solution - Owner-only, computed, flag-gated elevation plus code floors on platform-owned surfaces, in one PR so the elevation can never ship without the floors. ### Alternatives considered - Re-inserting an `instance_user_roles` row for owners (the pre-hardening model): rejected — DB rows go stale, survive restores, and elevate through every auth path; #7525 removed exactly this. - Widening only the environments read view without any elevation: rejected — it fixes one screen but still leaves a dedicated-instance owner unable to administer instance settings or custom images. - Elevating additional stack roles (`member`/`admin`/`support`): rejected — only the owner has an ownership claim over the whole instance; other roles stay company-scoped. ### Roadmap alignment - Extends the shipped "Cloud deployments" roadmap work (multi-tenant isolation, company-scoped cloud tenants, managed-instance bootstrap) without overlapping planned core items, and leaves self-hosted behavior unchanged. ## What Changed - **New feature key** `enableOwnerInstanceAdmin` (`packages/shared`): boolean flag in `instanceExperimentalSettingsSchema`, catalog tier `managed`, `cloudDefault: true`, `selfHostedDefault: false`. Inert on self-hosted instances — the elevation path only exists behind the cloud tenant trust token. - **Computed elevation** (`server/src/middleware/auth.ts`): `resolveCloudTenantActor` now returns `isInstanceAdmin: true` only when the trusted-header stack role is `owner` **and** the flag is enabled. The flag is resolved through the instance-settings service so the managed-config overlay applies (the control plane can disable elevation fleet-wide without touching tenant databases; a DB row edit or restore cannot resurrect it). Resolution fails closed on settings read errors. The `instance_user_roles` never-insert and the per-request stale-row purge are byte-identical. `member`/`admin`/`support` stack roles stay company-scoped. - **Authorization guard split** (`server/src/services/authorization.ts`): the blanket-allow now trusts the actor's *computed* `isInstanceAdmin` flag (only the attested resolver can set it for `cloud_tenant` actors) while keeping the `instance_user_roles` DB lookup excluded for `cloud_tenant` — a stale or hand-inserted role row still elevates nothing. - **Floor F1 — platform environment credentials** (`server/src/routes/environments.ts`): on cloud-managed instances, platform-provisioned environment rows (`managedByPaperclip` marker, plus the legacy managed-Kubernetes marker) use a single floored view for every reader on all environment routes (list, get, create, update, delete responses): `envVars` are never echoed and credential-shaped `config` keys (reusing the managed-config `SECRET_LIKE_CONFIG_KEY_PATTERN`) are dropped — for **all** actors including instance admins — while structural config (provider, image, template, region, …) and the managed markers stay visible. This also fixes the environments UI for managed sandboxes, which previously lost the provider/image entirely in the restricted view. The floor also covers writes: `PATCH /environments/:id` and `DELETE /environments/:id` on a platform-provisioned row are rejected (403, `environment_platform_managed`) for every actor including instance admins, and the guard binds to the persisted row's markers so a patch cannot strip the managed marker to lift the floor. The one recovery path is a metadata-only PATCH that solely clears the marker keys (null/false), for rows stamped through the old unrestricted API before the markers became reserved — and it never applies to a row whose slot markers are live platform state: the single local row (`environments_local_driver_idx`), which `ensureLocalEnvironment` adopts and stamps on cloud-managed instances from every caller (company creation, the heartbeat, run orchestration), and the single marked sandbox row (`environments_managed_sandbox_idx`) while a managed-sandbox bootstrap path is configured (managed-config `environments` section or `PAPERCLIP_EXECUTION_MODE=kubernetes`) and the provisioner therefore adopts and refreshes it on every boot. Clearing a live slot row's markers would let the next write reclassify it as tenant-managed and bypass the floor; conversely, when no sandbox provisioning path is configured the platform holds no claim on any sandbox row, so a platform marker there is stale by definition and the recovery patch applies. Every marker outside a live slot is clearable, so no legacy row is ever locked permanently. Custom-image setup and probes on the platform sandbox stay available to instance admins — those are the owner-facing flows this elevation exists for. The marker keys themselves are reserved: client create/update payloads that set `managedByPaperclip` or `managedKubernetesSandbox` are rejected (422, `environment_platform_marker_reserved`) on cloud-managed instances, so a tenant row can never be stamped platform-provisioned through the API and self-locked behind the write floor (the provisioner writes markers at the service layer, not through these routes). Tenant-created environments are otherwise unaffected. - **Floor F2 — executionMode** (`server/src/routes/instance-settings.ts`): on cloud-managed instances, `PATCH /instance/settings/general` rejects writes that would change `executionMode` (403, `execution_mode_platform_managed`). Same-value echoes pass so settings forms that submit the full general-settings object keep working. The boot-time execution-policy bootstrap path is untouched (it calls the service directly). - **Floor F3 — manual database backups** (`server/src/routes/instance-database-backups.ts`): floored off on cloud-managed instances (403, `database_backups_platform_managed`); backups are platform-owned there, and the result would also echo a server-side filesystem path. - **Floor F4 — adapter code install** (`server/src/routes/adapters.ts`): `POST /adapters/install` and `POST /adapters/:type/reinstall` are floored off on cloud-managed instances (403, `adapter_install_platform_managed`). Adapter packages execute in the server process, so a runtime install would let an instance admin read the platform trust anchors out of the process environment. This mirrors the existing bundled-only plugin install floor; adapter code on managed instances comes bundled with the platform image. ## Instance-admin surface audit Before widening who can hold `isInstanceAdmin`, every instance-admin-gated surface in `server/src` was enumerated and reviewed for whether its response or side effects could echo process environment values or platform credentials (tenant trust token, JWT signing keys, database connection strings, provider API keys): 29 distinct gate definitions covering ~90+ call sites, in four groups — sole instance-admin gates (12), instance-admin-or-company-permission gates (10), response-shaping/scope-widening sites (6), and the central `allow_instance_admin` short-circuit in the authorization service (58 `decide()` call sites). Findings and dispositions: - **Environment read/write responses** exposed platform sandbox `envVars`/credential-shaped config to instance admins → closed by floor F1. - **Manual backup trigger** echoed a server filesystem path and triggers a platform-owned operation → closed by floor F3. - **Adapter install/reinstall** loads externally fetched code into the server process (indirect, complete env exposure) → closed by floor F4. The sibling plugin-install path already had a bundled-only floor on managed instances and needed no change. - **Token-minting surfaces** (gateway tokens, custom-image terminal/connection tokens) mint credentials scoped to the instance's own resources, not platform trust anchors → acceptable for an owner-admin of a dedicated instance; unchanged. - All remaining gated surfaces return ordinary instance-scoped business data; none echo `process.env` or platform secrets directly. OAuth client secrets are referenced by env-var *name* only; SSH private keys are stored as secret refs before persistence and are not echoed. Operational note for managed platforms: this model assumes the process environment of a managed instance holds only that instance's own credentials. Platform operators should keep provider credentials per-instance (never fleet-shared) since an instance admin ultimately controls in-process code on their own instance. ## Verification - `pnpm vitest run server/src/middleware/cloud-tenant-actor.test.ts` — resolver matrix: owner × flag on/off, flag via managed overlay (on-over-DB-off and off-over-DB-on), member/admin/support × flag on, no-token self-hosted, fail-closed settings read, purge still runs and no role row is ever inserted (14 tests). - `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts` — computed flag elevates a `cloud_tenant` actor; a stale `instance_user_roles` row still never does; `session` actors unchanged (full suite, embedded Postgres). - `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/environment-routes.test.ts` — F1: no secret echo to admins on get/list, structural config visible to restricted readers, platform-row PATCH/DELETE rejected for admins (including a marker-stripping patch), marker-clear recovery allowed for stale legacy rows and for a marked sandbox row when no provisioning path is configured, but refused on the managed local row and on the sandbox slot row under a managed-config `environments` entry or the forced kubernetes execution mode, client marker-stamping creates/patches rejected, tenant rows still readable and writable, self-hosted read+write regression (60 tests). - `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/environment-service.test.ts` — `ensureLocalEnvironment` adopts a pre-existing local row on cloud-managed instances (marker stamped, other metadata preserved, idempotent — no rewrite on re-ensure) and leaves self-hosted rows untouched (22 tests, embedded Postgres). - `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/instance-settings-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/instance-database-backups-routes.test.ts` — F2 change-vs-echo matrix incl. self-hosted regression; F3 floor for both admin shapes (32 tests). - `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/adapter-routes-authz.test.ts` — F4 floor; self-hosted install/reinstall behavior unchanged (existing cases). - `pnpm vitest run server/src/__tests__/first-admin-claim.test.ts server/src/__tests__/bootstrap-claim-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/managed-config.test.ts server/src/__tests__/health.test.ts server/src/__tests__/instance-settings-managed-overlay.test.ts server/src/services/managed-environments.test.ts server/src/services/execution-policy-bootstrap.test.ts` — first-admin bootstrap gate and managed-config behavior unchanged (91 tests). - `pnpm vitest run packages/shared/src/feature-catalog.test.ts` — catalog/schema sync tests cover the new key (selfHostedDefault must equal the schema default). - `pnpm run typecheck` — all 31 workspace projects clean. ## Risks - Self-hosted behavior is unchanged: every floor binds to `isCloudManagedInstance()` (tenant trust token present), the new flag defaults off with no elevation path, and regression tests pin the self-hosted branches. - The elevation is fail-closed and stateless: turning the flag off (managed overlay or DB) de-elevates on the next request; there is no role row to clean up and restores cannot resurrect elevation. - On a cloud-managed instance a pre-existing unmarked local row is adopted (stamped `managedByPaperclip`) by the next ensure and becomes platform-owned — the intended managed-product semantic: the platform owns the single local slot. Self-hosted instances are untouched. - F1 widens restricted readers' view of platform-provisioned rows from fully blanked `config`/`metadata` to structural-only `config` plus markers. Platform-delivered config is guaranteed secret-free by the managed-config contract (secret-shaped keys fail startup), and the floor re-drops secret-shaped keys defensively. - One extra instance-settings read per trusted-header request for owner-role actors (the resolver already performs several queries per request). ## Model Used Claude Fable 5 (Anthropic) — model id `claude-fable-5`, extended thinking enabled, agentic tool use via Claude Code; read-only explore subagents on the same model were used for the surface audit sweep. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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DottaandPaperclip
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9a8d219949 |
[codex] Stabilize tests and local maintenance assets (#4423)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies > - A fast-moving control plane needs stable local tests and repeatable local maintenance tools so contributors can safely split and review work > - Several route suites needed stronger isolation, Codex manual model selection needed a faster-mode option, and local browser cleanup missed Playwright's headless shell binary > - Storybook static output also needed to be preserved as a generated review artifact from the working branch > - This pull request groups the test/local-dev maintenance pieces so they can be reviewed separately from product runtime changes > - The benefit is more predictable contributor verification and cleaner local maintenance without mixing these changes into feature PRs ## What Changed - Added stable Vitest runner support and serialized route/authz test isolation. - Fixed workspace runtime authz route mocks and stabilized Claude/company-import related assertions. - Allowed Codex fast mode for manually selected models. - Broadened the agent browser cleanup script to detect `chrome-headless-shell` as well as Chrome for Testing. - Preserved generated Storybook static output from the source branch. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run src/__tests__/workspace-runtime-routes-authz.test.ts src/__tests__/claude-local-execute.test.ts --config vitest.config.ts` from `server/` passed: 2 files, 19 tests. - `pnpm exec vitest run src/server/codex-args.test.ts --config vitest.config.ts` from `packages/adapters/codex-local/` passed: 1 file, 3 tests. - `bash -n scripts/kill-agent-browsers.sh && scripts/kill-agent-browsers.sh --dry` passed; dry-run detected `chrome-headless-shell` processes without killing them. - `test -f ui/storybook-static/index.html && test -f ui/storybook-static/assets/forms-editors.stories-Dry7qwx2.js` passed. - `git diff --check public-gh/master..pap-2228-test-local-maintenance -- . ':(exclude)ui/storybook-static'` passed. - `pnpm exec vitest run cli/src/__tests__/company-import-export-e2e.test.ts --config cli/vitest.config.ts` did not complete in the isolated split worktree because `paperclipai run` exited during build prep with `TS2688: Cannot find type definition file for 'react'`; this appears to be caused by the worktree dependency symlink setup, not the code under test. - Confirmed this PR does not include `pnpm-lock.yaml`. ## Risks - Medium risk: the stable Vitest runner changes how route/authz tests are scheduled. - Generated `ui/storybook-static` files are large and contain minified third-party output; `git diff --check` reports whitespace inside those generated assets, so reviewers may choose to drop or regenerate that artifact before merge. - No database migrations. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex coding agent based on GPT-5, with shell, git, Paperclip API, and GitHub CLI tool use in the local Paperclip workspace. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge Note: screenshot checklist item is not applicable to source UI behavior; the included Storybook static output is generated artifact preservation from the source branch. --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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DottaandPaperclip
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a957394420 |
[codex] Add structured issue-thread interactions (#4244)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies. > - Operators supervise that work through issues, comments, approvals, and the board UI. > - Some agent proposals need structured board/user decisions, not hidden markdown conventions or heavyweight governed approvals. > - Issue-thread interactions already provide a natural thread-native surface for proposed tasks and questions. > - This pull request extends that surface with request confirmations, richer interaction cards, and agent/plugin/MCP helpers. > - The benefit is that plan approvals and yes/no decisions become explicit, auditable, and resumable without losing the single-issue workflow. ## What Changed - Added persisted issue-thread interactions for suggested tasks, structured questions, and request confirmations. - Added board UI cards for interaction review, selection, question answers, and accept/reject confirmation flows. - Added MCP and plugin SDK helpers for creating interaction cards from agents/plugins. - Updated agent wake instructions, onboarding assets, Paperclip skill docs, and public docs to prefer structured confirmations for issue-scoped decisions. - Rebased the branch onto `public-gh/master` and renumbered branch migrations to `0063` and `0064`; the idempotency migration uses `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS` for old branch users. ## Verification - `git diff --check public-gh/master..HEAD` - `pnpm exec vitest run packages/adapter-utils/src/server-utils.test.ts packages/mcp-server/src/tools.test.ts packages/shared/src/issue-thread-interactions.test.ts ui/src/lib/issue-thread-interactions.test.ts ui/src/lib/issue-chat-messages.test.ts ui/src/components/IssueThreadInteractionCard.test.tsx ui/src/components/IssueChatThread.test.tsx server/src/__tests__/issue-thread-interaction-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/issue-thread-interactions-service.test.ts server/src/services/issue-thread-interactions.test.ts` -> 9 files / 79 tests passed - `pnpm -r typecheck` -> passed, including `packages/db` migration numbering check ## Risks - Medium: this adds a new issue-thread interaction model across db/shared/server/ui/plugin surfaces. - Migration risk is reduced by placing this branch after current master migrations (`0063`, `0064`) and making the idempotency column add idempotent for users who applied the old branch numbering. - UI interaction behavior is covered by component tests, but this PR does not include browser screenshots. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex, GPT-5-class coding agent runtime. Exact model ID and context window are not exposed in this Paperclip run; tool use and local shell/code execution were enabled. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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DottaandPaperclip
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7a329fb8bb |
Harden API route authorization boundaries (#4122)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies. > - The REST API is the control-plane boundary for companies, agents, plugins, adapters, costs, invites, and issue mutations. > - Several routes still relied on broad board or company access checks without consistently enforcing the narrower actor, company, and active-checkout boundaries those operations require. > - That can allow agents or non-admin users to mutate sensitive resources outside the intended governance path. > - This pull request hardens the route authorization layer and adds regression coverage for the audited API surfaces. > - The benefit is tighter multi-company isolation, safer plugin and adapter administration, and stronger enforcement of active issue ownership. ## What Changed - Added route-level authorization checks for budgets, plugin administration/scoped routes, adapter management, company import/export, direct agent creation, invite test resolution, and issue mutation/write surfaces. - Enforced active checkout ownership for agent-authenticated issue mutations, while preserving explicit management overrides for permitted managers. - Restricted sensitive adapter and plugin management operations to instance-admin or properly scoped actors. - Tightened company portability and invite probing routes so agents cannot cross company boundaries. - Updated access constants and the Company Access UI copy for the new active-checkout management grant. - Added focused regression tests covering cross-company denial, agent self-mutation denial, admin-only operations, and active checkout ownership. - Rebased the branch onto `public-gh/master` and fixed validation fallout from the rebase: heartbeat-context route ordering and a company import/export e2e fixture that now opts out of direct-hire approval before using direct agent creation. - Updated onboarding and signoff e2e setup to create seed agents through `/agent-hires` plus board approval, so they remain compatible with the approval-gated new-agent default. - Addressed Greptile feedback by removing a duplicate company export API alias, avoiding N+1 reporting-chain lookups in active-checkout override checks, allowing agent mutations on unassigned `in_progress` issues, and blocking NAT64 invite-probe targets. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/issues-goal-context-routes.test.ts cli/src/__tests__/company-import-export-e2e.test.ts` - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/plugin-routes-authz.test.ts server/src/__tests__/adapter-routes-authz.test.ts server/src/__tests__/agent-permissions-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/company-portability-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/costs-service.test.ts server/src/__tests__/invite-test-resolution-route.test.ts server/src/__tests__/issue-agent-mutation-ownership-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/agent-adapter-validation-routes.test.ts` - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/issue-agent-mutation-ownership-routes.test.ts` - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/invite-test-resolution-route.test.ts` - `pnpm -r typecheck` - `pnpm --filter server typecheck` - `pnpm --filter ui typecheck` - `pnpm build` - `pnpm test:e2e -- tests/e2e/onboarding.spec.ts tests/e2e/signoff-policy.spec.ts` - `pnpm test:e2e -- tests/e2e/signoff-policy.spec.ts` - `pnpm test:run` was also run. It failed under default full-suite parallelism with two order-dependent failures in `plugin-routes-authz.test.ts` and `routines-e2e.test.ts`; both files passed when rerun directly together with `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/plugin-routes-authz.test.ts server/src/__tests__/routines-e2e.test.ts`. ## Risks - Medium risk: this changes authorization behavior across multiple sensitive API surfaces, so callers that depended on broad board/company access may now receive `403` or `409` until they use the correct governance path. - Direct agent creation now respects the company-level board-approval requirement; integrations that need pending hires should use `/api/companies/:companyId/agent-hires`. - Active in-progress issue mutations now require checkout ownership or an explicit management override, which may reveal workflow assumptions in older automation. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 coding agent, tool-using workflow with local shell, Git, GitHub CLI, and repository tests. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [ ] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |