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Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Dotta	3112e4c955	Verify original Dot OAuth authority for signed Cloud requests (#19819 ) ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip manages AI agents and their work. > - Dot uses a user OAuth grant to act in one company. > - Cloud must use that original grant when it resolves a selected user's identity. > - A Cloud signature alone must not create user or board authority. > - The tenant's OAuth owner must check the token and its current restrictions. > - This pull request adds a signed private HTTP boundary for that check. > - The result contains only the checked identity fields. It grants no task or board access. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Subsystem affected Server external-agent identity, public MCP OAuth, Cloud control verification, and HTTP logging. Problem or motivation Cloud needs a private way to resolve the original Dot token for the selected user, client, company and resource. The existing generic Cloud control route creates an operator actor. That route is not the right owner for this identity check. Proposed solution Add `POST /mcp/runner/oauth/cloud-principal`. Require the existing Cloud signature and replay verifier. Bind the whole request to a new, closed `mcp-dot:principal` action with a maximum 60-second lifetime. Authenticate the original token once through the normal Dot OAuth owner. Check current namespace authority before and after that call. Alternatives considered A Cloud-created grant or a board actor would change the authority owner. Neither is used. The private route reuses the existing OAuth and Cloud identity owners. Roadmap alignment This is a narrow boundary for the existing MCP and Cloud areas in `ROADMAP.md`. It adds no work queue, public hosted profile, or provider enablement. Related public work: Refs #14846, #19427, #19750 and #19776. Searches for the exact private path and action found no duplicate PR. The matching private Cloud caller has merged. The current App head passed its required checks and review. ## What Changed - Add an original-token principal reader. Keep the original client, selected user, company, resource, purpose, scope, membership and feature restrictions. - Add a 16 KiB raw JSON private route. Reject compressed, invalid UTF-8, malformed and unknown-field bodies. Bind an ordered whole-body digest to the signature and existing nonce fence. - Compare the current stack, claim, instance, origin and connector identity before and after OAuth. An absent owner or namespace fails closed. - Mount the route in normal `createApp` after hostname, runtime-claim and standby checks, before session/actor work. Do not add it to generic board-control routing. - Keep private request and response logs content-free, including raw buffers, headers, query data and reflected errors. - Add controlled HTTP/privacy tests and a real normal-App OAuth/Cloud-signer integration case. Document the machine-only contract and correct the existing `assistant-connections/client-use` access entry. No new capability ID or agent API entry is added. No schema, lockfile, workflow, Runner, Muse or useful-task fixture changes belong to this PR. ## Verification - Current `70c03593`: normal module-boundary policy and all seven App compiler programs passed. The public module factory has an explicit portable Express return contract. Whole HTTP/log controls passed again: 30/30. The existing real paired OAuth/Cloud-signer/private HTTP case then passed again on a fresh PostgreSQL fixture: 1/1, zero skipped. All known child processes and five database connections closed; the final independent SQL audit was empty. - The original remote policy failure rejected an App import of a module-internal path; dependent E2E/verify gates stopped on that failure. The fix delegates through the public module API. A first local declaration run reported TS2883 for its inferred return type; the explicit public type fixed it. Original logs remain preserved. No checker, compiler option, test body or authority check was weakened. - The normal full App graph passed on the integrated source. The later fixture-only repairs each passed the complete affected owning program:405 entries, including 403 source roots. The remaining programs and own dependency outputs carried only where their source was exact. - Whole private HTTP/log files passed:30 tests, zero failures or skips. The HTTP controls use a controlled OAuth owner with real signatures. The log controls use the actual HTTP logger. - The paired Cloud source passed its normal strict build and whole 26 signer/client/namespace and credential-error controls. These are controlled caller tests, not provider tests. - One normal-App paired case passed with a dedicated PostgreSQL database. It used real DCR 201, PKCE, consent, token exchange and a persisted unpaired grant; actual signed metadata publication and a committed Cloud receipt; the real Cloud signer/client and actual App HTTP; exactly-once authentication; refresh; current namespace restrictions; and revocation. The Cloud registry/provider were the existing controlled in-memory/Fake fixtures. Recorded inbound Hosts matched, with zero metadata overflow. No grant, readiness or mirror ACK was fabricated. - The original principal helper's 21 controlled tests and two real-OAuth tests passed before the HTTP slice. Those three files remained unchanged through integration. They are separate source-scoped evidence, not an extra combined run. - Preserved failures: a helper import and test typing error were corrected before the passed checks. An earlier suite failure did not serialize its hook error and remains unexplained. Later runs captured a missing normal managed-config initialization and HTTP 404 from the loopback mapper. The fixture now calls the normal initialization owners and uses the existing Host-preserving canonical HTTP adapter. All original authority assertions and deadlines remain. - Reproduce the local files with `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/modules/external-agents/cloud-principal-http.test.ts src/modules/external-agents/cloud-principal-log.test.ts --maxWorkers=1 --no-file-parallelism`. The real integration file is `server/src/__tests__/cloud-principal-normal-app.postgres.test.ts`; it requires its explicit dedicated test DB and an own compiled matching Cloud checkout. - The normal `node scripts/check-maps.mjs` check passed for 35 areas and 192 capability IDs. This validates map structure, not business acceptance. The later edits are documentation/map only; all executed business source and own outputs from the paired case remained exact. - Current-head remote CI passes: 59 successful checks and three intentional skips. Greptile reviewed this exact head at 5/5 with no findings or review threads. The prior Ponytail review was Ship 5/5 at the earlier head; no current-head Ponytail turn is present, which is nonblocking under the authorized review policy. The three full-repository commands were not repeated locally; the focused normal App graph and affected tests above passed, and required remote CI supplies the broad gates. No deployed, provider-capacity, cold-wake or full hosted lifecycle result is claimed. ## Risks - This is a security boundary. Signature, current namespace and original OAuth restrictions must continue to fail closed. The response gives identity only; callers still need normal operation authority. - The request carries the original token. The reserved route uses a closed log projection on both accepted and refused requests. Privacy regressions remain a material risk. - Both repositories must agree on the action and digest contract. Older code rejects the unsupported action; no fallback creates authority. - This is a prerequisite private boundary. The remaining hosted discovery, wake, capability, operation, event, retry/reactivation and revocation lifecycle work, plus Muse, remains open. No profile or capability is enabled here. - No migration is needed. Rollback removes the private boundary and paired caller; normal OAuth and Personal MCP remain with their existing owners. - The engineering documentation describes this private machine boundary and its access restriction. No operator-facing feature is enabled. Documentation for full hosted enablement remains with that later work. ## Model Used OpenAI `gpt-6.1-sol` (Sol6.1), through Codex, produced the source and tests with tool use and local compiler/test execution. A GPT-6-based Codex coordinator reviewed the work. Its exact model ID is unavailable. Context window sizes are unavailable. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge	2026-11-07 08:02:42 -06:00
DottaandPaperclip	3bbc2104b6	docs: map missing product and operator capabilities (#16990 ) ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - The feature map records product entry points and verification recipes. > - The paired agent access map records APIs and permission boundaries for the same capability IDs. > - The new index in #16987 made several missing capabilities easier to find. > - Those gaps hid existing assistant, privacy, cost, and operator workflows. > - This pull request adds 15 capabilities with source references, test scope, and manual checks. > - Readers can find these workflows without treating documentation or structural checks as live proof. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs: #16987. Related map work: #16025 and #16214. A search of related pull requests found no duplicate of these additions. Issue type Missing documentation. Where is the issue? `maps/feature-map/` and `maps/agent-access-map/`. What's wrong? The maps omit public assistant MCP connections, private task and project sharing, subscription fees, cost-recording recovery, agent API keys, keyboard entry points, and several operator CLI workflows. Suggested fix Add product recipes and matching access records. Show the full capability IDs in the README index and each page. Keep the existing ID format and all 175 existing IDs. Exclude AI account pools. ## What Changed - Add the `assistant-connections` family with setup, consent, device login, client use, and revocation. - Add `tasks/privacy`, `projects/privacy`, `budgets-costs/subscriptions`, and `budgets-costs/accounting-recovery`. - Add `agents/api-keys`, `agents/managed-agent-setup`, and `navigation-preferences/command-palette`. - Add `cli-operations/feedback-export`, `chat-channels/outbound-email`, and `instance-operations/runtime-setup`. - Pair all 15 additions with access rules, source evidence, manual checks, and explicit coverage gaps. Update the visible index to 35 families and 190 capability IDs. - Add cross-links from existing access, connection setup, search, and CLI recipes. Do not change the schema or add AI account pools. - Clarify that the task Share sheet displays direct and inherited access. Manage inherited access at its ancestor or project source. ## Verification - `node scripts/check-maps.mjs` passes: 35 areas and 190 paired capability IDs, with valid references and contract fields. - `node --test scripts/check-maps.test.mjs scripts/storybook-feature-index.test.mjs` passes: 17 tests. - `node scripts/storybook-feature-index.mjs` and `git diff --check` pass. - A comparison with the base confirms all 175 existing IDs remain and exactly the intended 15 IDs were added. The README index matches the discovered feature metadata. - `node scripts/storybook-catalog.mjs` cannot run because this checkout lacks `storybook/internal/csf-tools` and installed workspace dependencies. - `pnpm -r typecheck`, `pnpm test:run`, and `pnpm build` were attempted. All stopped before their task ran: the pnpm 9.15.4 bootstrap could not fetch and verify its registry packages in this environment. - Source review covers the documented UI, CLI, routes, services, and existing tests. No live browser, provider, or authorization journey was run. New access records remain `baseline`, `source-only`, and `not-run`. - Greptile and the Paperclip reviewer both rate current commit `bb8eb797b0a1dc26256faf2f0e57cbe7abc9adcf` 5/5. The inherited-access review thread is resolved. - [GitHub CI](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/39466772379) passes for that commit, including typecheck, build, unit tests, Runner checks, and browser tests. Browser shard 7 passed after one retry for a runner shutdown. All PR checks are successful, neutral, or skipped. ## Risks - Low runtime risk: this change only edits maps. No application behavior, API, dependency, or schema changes. - Source-reviewed recipes can drift or miss deployment-specific behavior. The records state their limits and require live checks before a capability is marked verified. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex, model ID `gpt-6.1-sol`, 475,000-token context window, xhigh reasoning effort, with tool use and code execution. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>	2026-10-20 12:47:41 -05:00

Author

SHA1

Message

Date

Dotta

3112e4c955

Verify original Dot OAuth authority for signed Cloud requests (#19819 )

## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip manages AI agents and their work.
> - Dot uses a user OAuth grant to act in one company.
> - Cloud must use that original grant when it resolves a selected
user's identity.
> - A Cloud signature alone must not create user or board authority.
> - The tenant's OAuth owner must check the token and its current
restrictions.
> - This pull request adds a signed private HTTP boundary for that
check.
> - The result contains only the checked identity fields. It grants no
task or board access.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**Subsystem affected**

Server external-agent identity, public MCP OAuth, Cloud control
verification, and HTTP logging.

**Problem or motivation**

Cloud needs a private way to resolve the original Dot token for the
selected user, client, company and resource. The existing generic Cloud
control route creates an operator actor. That route is not the right
owner for this identity check.

**Proposed solution**

Add `POST /mcp/runner/oauth/cloud-principal`. Require the existing Cloud
signature and replay verifier. Bind the whole request to a new, closed
`mcp-dot:principal` action with a maximum 60-second lifetime.
Authenticate the original token once through the normal Dot OAuth owner.
Check current namespace authority before and after that call.

**Alternatives considered**

A Cloud-created grant or a board actor would change the authority owner.
Neither is used. The private route reuses the existing OAuth and Cloud
identity owners.

**Roadmap alignment**

This is a narrow boundary for the existing MCP and Cloud areas in
`ROADMAP.md`. It adds no work queue, public hosted profile, or provider
enablement.

Related public work: Refs #14846, #19427, #19750 and #19776. Searches
for the exact private path and action found no duplicate PR. The
matching private Cloud caller has merged. The current App head passed
its required checks and review.

## What Changed

- Add an original-token principal reader. Keep the original client,
selected user, company, resource, purpose, scope, membership and feature
restrictions.
- Add a 16 KiB raw JSON private route. Reject compressed, invalid UTF-8,
malformed and unknown-field bodies. Bind an ordered whole-body digest to
the signature and existing nonce fence.
- Compare the current stack, claim, instance, origin and connector
identity before and after OAuth. An absent owner or namespace fails
closed.
- Mount the route in normal `createApp` after hostname, runtime-claim
and standby checks, before session/actor work. Do not add it to generic
board-control routing.
- Keep private request and response logs content-free, including raw
buffers, headers, query data and reflected errors.
- Add controlled HTTP/privacy tests and a real normal-App
OAuth/Cloud-signer integration case. Document the machine-only contract
and correct the existing `assistant-connections/client-use` access
entry. No new capability ID or agent API entry is added. No schema,
lockfile, workflow, Runner, Muse or useful-task fixture changes belong
to this PR.

## Verification

- Current `70c03593`: normal module-boundary policy and all seven App
compiler programs passed. The public module factory has an explicit
portable Express return contract. Whole HTTP/log controls passed again:
30/30. The existing real paired OAuth/Cloud-signer/private HTTP case
then passed again on a fresh PostgreSQL fixture: 1/1, zero skipped. All
known child processes and five database connections closed; the final
independent SQL audit was empty.
- The original remote policy failure rejected an App import of a
module-internal path; dependent E2E/verify gates stopped on that
failure. The fix delegates through the public module API. A first local
declaration run reported TS2883 for its inferred return type; the
explicit public type fixed it. Original logs remain preserved. No
checker, compiler option, test body or authority check was weakened.

- The normal full App graph passed on the integrated source. The later
fixture-only repairs each passed the complete affected owning
program:405 entries, including 403 source roots. The remaining programs
and own dependency outputs carried only where their source was exact.
- Whole private HTTP/log files passed:30 tests, zero failures or skips.
The HTTP controls use a controlled OAuth owner with real signatures. The
log controls use the actual HTTP logger.
- The paired Cloud source passed its normal strict build and whole 26
signer/client/namespace and credential-error controls. These are
controlled caller tests, not provider tests.
- One normal-App paired case passed with a dedicated PostgreSQL
database. It used real DCR 201, PKCE, consent, token exchange and a
persisted unpaired grant; actual signed metadata publication and a
committed Cloud receipt; the real Cloud signer/client and actual App
HTTP; exactly-once authentication; refresh; current namespace
restrictions; and revocation. The Cloud registry/provider were the
existing controlled in-memory/Fake fixtures. Recorded inbound Hosts
matched, with zero metadata overflow. No grant, readiness or mirror ACK
was fabricated.
- The original principal helper's 21 controlled tests and two real-OAuth
tests passed before the HTTP slice. Those three files remained unchanged
through integration. They are separate source-scoped evidence, not an
extra combined run.
- Preserved failures: a helper import and test typing error were
corrected before the passed checks. An earlier suite failure did not
serialize its hook error and remains unexplained. Later runs captured a
missing normal managed-config initialization and HTTP 404 from the
loopback mapper. The fixture now calls the normal initialization owners
and uses the existing Host-preserving canonical HTTP adapter. All
original authority assertions and deadlines remain.
- Reproduce the local files with `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec
vitest run src/modules/external-agents/cloud-principal-http.test.ts
src/modules/external-agents/cloud-principal-log.test.ts --maxWorkers=1
--no-file-parallelism`. The real integration file is
`server/src/__tests__/cloud-principal-normal-app.postgres.test.ts`; it
requires its explicit dedicated test DB and an own compiled matching
Cloud checkout.
- The normal `node scripts/check-maps.mjs` check passed for 35 areas and
192 capability IDs. This validates map structure, not business
acceptance. The later edits are documentation/map only; all executed
business source and own outputs from the paired case remained exact.
- Current-head remote CI passes: 59 successful checks and three
intentional skips. Greptile reviewed this exact head at 5/5 with no
findings or review threads. The prior Ponytail review was Ship 5/5 at
the earlier head; no current-head Ponytail turn is present, which is
nonblocking under the authorized review policy. The three
full-repository commands were not repeated locally; the focused normal
App graph and affected tests above passed, and required remote CI
supplies the broad gates. No deployed, provider-capacity, cold-wake or
full hosted lifecycle result is claimed.

## Risks

- This is a security boundary. Signature, current namespace and original
OAuth restrictions must continue to fail closed. The response gives
identity only; callers still need normal operation authority.
- The request carries the original token. The reserved route uses a
closed log projection on both accepted and refused requests. Privacy
regressions remain a material risk.
- Both repositories must agree on the action and digest contract. Older
code rejects the unsupported action; no fallback creates authority.
- This is a prerequisite private boundary. The remaining hosted
discovery, wake, capability, operation, event, retry/reactivation and
revocation lifecycle work, plus Muse, remains open. No profile or
capability is enabled here.
- No migration is needed. Rollback removes the private boundary and
paired caller; normal OAuth and Personal MCP remain with their existing
owners.
- The engineering documentation describes this private machine boundary
and its access restriction. No operator-facing feature is enabled.
Documentation for full hosted enablement remains with that later work.

## Model Used

OpenAI `gpt-6.1-sol` (Sol6.1), through Codex, produced the source and
tests with tool use and local compiler/test execution. A GPT-6-based
Codex coordinator reviewed the work. Its exact model ID is unavailable.
Context window sizes are unavailable.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

2026-11-07 08:02:42 -06:00

DottaandPaperclip

3bbc2104b6

docs: map missing product and operator capabilities (#16990 )

## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - The feature map records product entry points and verification
recipes.
> - The paired agent access map records APIs and permission boundaries
for the same capability IDs.
> - The new index in #16987 made several missing capabilities easier to
find.
> - Those gaps hid existing assistant, privacy, cost, and operator
workflows.
> - This pull request adds 15 capabilities with source references, test
scope, and manual checks.
> - Readers can find these workflows without treating documentation or
structural checks as live proof.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

Refs: #16987. Related map work: #16025 and #16214. A search of related
pull requests found no duplicate of these additions.

**Issue type**

Missing documentation.

**Where is the issue?**

`maps/feature-map/` and `maps/agent-access-map/`.

**What's wrong?**

The maps omit public assistant MCP connections, private task and project
sharing, subscription fees, cost-recording recovery, agent API keys,
keyboard entry points, and several operator CLI workflows.

**Suggested fix**

Add product recipes and matching access records. Show the full
capability IDs in the README index and each page. Keep the existing ID
format and all 175 existing IDs. Exclude AI account pools.

## What Changed

- Add the `assistant-connections` family with setup, consent, device
login, client use, and revocation.
- Add `tasks/privacy`, `projects/privacy`,
`budgets-costs/subscriptions`, and `budgets-costs/accounting-recovery`.
- Add `agents/api-keys`, `agents/managed-agent-setup`, and
`navigation-preferences/command-palette`.
- Add `cli-operations/feedback-export`, `chat-channels/outbound-email`,
and `instance-operations/runtime-setup`.
- Pair all 15 additions with access rules, source evidence, manual
checks, and explicit coverage gaps. Update the visible index to 35
families and 190 capability IDs.
- Add cross-links from existing access, connection setup, search, and
CLI recipes. Do not change the schema or add AI account pools.
- Clarify that the task Share sheet displays direct and inherited
access. Manage inherited access at its ancestor or project source.

## Verification

- `node scripts/check-maps.mjs` passes: 35 areas and 190 paired
capability IDs, with valid references and contract fields.
- `node --test scripts/check-maps.test.mjs
scripts/storybook-feature-index.test.mjs` passes: 17 tests.
- `node scripts/storybook-feature-index.mjs` and `git diff --check`
pass.
- A comparison with the base confirms all 175 existing IDs remain and
exactly the intended 15 IDs were added. The README index matches the
discovered feature metadata.
- `node scripts/storybook-catalog.mjs` cannot run because this checkout
lacks `storybook/internal/csf-tools` and installed workspace
dependencies.
- `pnpm -r typecheck`, `pnpm test:run`, and `pnpm build` were attempted.
All stopped before their task ran: the pnpm 9.15.4 bootstrap could not
fetch and verify its registry packages in this environment.
- Source review covers the documented UI, CLI, routes, services, and
existing tests. No live browser, provider, or authorization journey was
run. New access records remain `baseline`, `source-only`, and `not-run`.
- Greptile and the Paperclip reviewer both rate current commit
`bb8eb797b0a1dc26256faf2f0e57cbe7abc9adcf` 5/5. The inherited-access
review thread is resolved.
- [GitHub
CI](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/39466772379)
passes for that commit, including typecheck, build, unit tests, Runner
checks, and browser tests. Browser shard 7 passed after one retry for a
runner shutdown. All PR checks are successful, neutral, or skipped.

## Risks

- Low runtime risk: this change only edits maps. No application
behavior, API, dependency, or schema changes.
- Source-reviewed recipes can drift or miss deployment-specific
behavior. The records state their limits and require live checks before
a capability is marked verified.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

- OpenAI Codex, model ID `gpt-6.1-sol`, 475,000-token context window,
xhigh reasoning effort, with tool use and code execution.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>

2026-10-20 12:47:41 -05:00