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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Devin Foley
|
54dd0f4868 |
feat(agents): grant new agents hire permission by default (#12814)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - Agent permissions control which agents can create or hire other agents (`canCreateAgents`) > - Today only CEO-role agents get this permission by default; every other agent starts without it > - Teams that want agents to delegate and build out their own teams must flip the toggle on each hire, and most operators want delegation to work out of the box > - This pull request makes `canCreateAgents` default to enabled for new standard-trust agents, while low-trust agents keep a disabled default > - The benefit is that agent teams can grow without per-agent permission toggling, while low-trust containment and checkout protection stay intact ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Related (not fixed by this PR): #8064 also decouples an authority from `agents:create`. **Subsystem affected** Server agent permissions (`server/src/services/agent-permissions.ts`), authorization (`server/src/services/authorization.ts`), the shared `agentPermissionsSchema` validator, and the UI trust-preset helper. **Problem or motivation** New agents cannot hire other agents unless an operator enables `canCreateAgents` on each one. Only CEO-role agents get the permission by default. This blocks delegation-by-default workflows. Operators must toggle the permission for every hire. **Proposed solution** Default `canCreateAgents` to `true` for newly created agents. Apply and persist the default at creation only. Stored rows without an explicit value stay fail-closed at read and enforcement time. Keep the default at `false` when the agent's permissions record marks it low-trust (the `low_trust_review` preset or a trust boundary). Explicit values always win. Decouple `tasks:manage_active_checkouts` from `canCreateAgents` so the default-on flag does not let a peer agent write over another agent's checked-out issue. **Alternatives considered** Granting the default only at the route layer would leave stored rows and enforcement out of sync. Keeping the checkout authority coupled to `canCreateAgents` would void the active-checkout write protection once the flag is default-on. A per-company setting adds configuration surface without a clear need; explicit per-agent overrides already exist. **Roadmap alignment** Governance and trust-preset work already separates standard-trust from low-trust agents. This change follows that line: capability by default for standard trust, containment by default for low trust. ## What Changed - `normalizeAgentPermissions` now takes a `create`/`stored` context. Creation writes get the new default: enabled unless `permissionsImplyLowTrust()` detects the low-trust review preset or a trust boundary. Stored rows without an explicit value normalize to disabled (fail-closed). The role parameter is gone. - `agentPermissionsSchema` no longer injects `canCreateAgents: false` when the field is omitted. The server-side default applies instead. - `authorization.ts` normalizes raw agent rows for `agents:create`, so enforcement matches what the API reports for legacy rows. - `tasks:manage_active_checkouts` no longer rides on `canCreateAgents`. CEO role, explicit grants, and the manager chain remain the paths. - `agents:create` is denied outright inside any resolved low-trust execution context (agent, project, issue, or run policy). The default-on flag can never reach the legacy creator allow there. - The UI trust-preset helper sets `canCreateAgents: false` when an agent is switched to the low-trust preset, instead of carrying the old value forward. - `doc/CLI.md` describes the new default for `teams install`. - Tests pin the default matrix (standard, low-trust, explicit overrides) on the server and in the UI helper. ## Verification - `cd server && npx vitest run src/__tests__/agent-permissions-service.test.ts src/__tests__/agent-permissions-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/low-trust-red-team-routes.test.ts src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts` — 143 tests pass. - Broader sweep: 18 suites that touch `canCreateAgents` (hire, pending-approval, teams catalog, portability, built-in agents, plugin-managed agents) pass locally. - `cd ui && npx vitest run src/lib/trust-policy-ui.test.ts src/components/TrustPresetSection.test.tsx src/pages/NewAgent.test.tsx src/pages/Agents.test.tsx` — passes. - Typecheck is clean for the changed files in `packages/shared`, `server`, and `ui`. ## Risks - Behavioral shift: agents created after this change persist `canCreateAgents: true` unless low-trust. Pre-existing agents keep their stored value. Legacy or malformed permission records without an explicit value stay fail-closed at read and enforcement time; they never gain the authority retroactively. - Low-trust runs can no longer create agents at all, even when the agent carries an explicit `canCreateAgents: true`. Before this change, that combination could hire. The red-team suite and a new authorization test pin the denial. - Narrowing: a non-CEO agent with `canCreateAgents: true` loses implicit `tasks:manage_active_checkouts`. The manager chain and explicit grants still provide it. This narrowing is deliberate; without it, the default-on flag would let any peer bypass active-checkout write protection. - No migrations. No API shape changes. Low-trust defaults are covered by the red-team regression suite. ## Model Used - Claude Fable 5 (`claude-fable-5`), Anthropic — via Claude Code CLI with extended thinking and tool use (code search, editing, local test execution). ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge |
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|
DottaandPaperclip
|
ed65d08d57 |
[codex] Gate skill mutations with skills:create permission (#8616)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - Agents and board users operate inside a company-scoped control plane where permissions decide which mutating actions they can perform > - Company skills are part of the reusable agent-company setup surface, but skill mutation had been coupled to broader agent-creation authority > - That coupling meant importing or managing skills required a permission that also implies hiring power, which is broader than the operation needs > - Paperclip already has a grant-based permission vocabulary, so skill mutation should be authorized through a dedicated `skills:create` capability while preserving existing default behavior for trusted agents > - This pull request adds the skill creation permission contract, enforces it on company skill mutations, exposes it in agent permission management, and documents the changed CLI/API expectations > - The benefit is a narrower, auditable permission path for skill import/create/update/delete flows without forcing agents to receive broader agent-creation authority ## Linked Issues or Issue Description No public issue is linked. Problem: company skill mutation APIs were effectively tied to broader agent creation authority. This PR splits skill mutation authorization onto the public `skills:create` permission while keeping existing default skill creation behavior for agents unless explicitly disabled. Related public PR found during duplicate search: #5330. That PR uses an older `canManageSkills` shape; this PR implements the `skills:create` grant path instead. ## What Changed - Added `skills:create` to shared permission constants and agent permission types/validators as `canCreateSkills`. - Backfilled default human/member role grants for `skills:create`. - Updated company skill mutation routes to require board/user or agent access to `skills:create`, while preserving legacy/default agent behavior through `canCreateSkills` unless explicitly disabled. - Updated agent permission update handling, UI permission controls, duplicate-agent payloads, plugin SDK fixtures, and agent detail API surfaces for `canCreateSkills`. - Added regression coverage for skill route authorization, permission schema/default behavior, invite grants, omitted permission updates, and duplicate-agent payloads. - Updated CLI and Paperclip skill documentation for the new skill creation permission. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/agent-permissions-service.test.ts server/src/__tests__/agent-permissions-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/company-skills-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/invite-join-grants.test.ts ui/src/lib/duplicate-agent-payload.test.ts` — 5 files, 90 tests passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/shared typecheck && pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck && pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui typecheck` — passed. - `pnpm test:run ...changed files...` was attempted first, but the stable wrapper rejects explicit file arguments; direct Vitest was used for the same targeted files. ## Risks - Moderate authorization risk: this changes the gate for company skill mutations, so the tests cover board grant checks, agent explicit grant checks, legacy default allowance, and explicit denial. - Migration/backfill risk is low: the migration only grants `skills:create` to existing human roles that already need broad management capability. - UI/API compatibility risk is low: `canCreateSkills` remains default-on for full agent permissions, and the update validator preserves omitted values so unrelated permission edits do not re-enable disabled skill creation. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 coding agent with terminal/tool use enabled. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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|
fff3832a01 |
[codex] Add teams catalog extraction (#7550)
Fixes #7551 ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the control plane for AI-agent companies, and reusable company/team setup is part of making those companies faster to launch. > - The teams catalog work introduces app-shipped team templates that can be browsed, previewed, and installed into a company. > - Catalog installation crosses several contracts: bundled package contents, shared API types, server import/install behavior, CLI workflows, and the board UI. > - Agents also need a safe path through catalog installs: scoped company selection, explicit source policy, approval fallback for agent creation, and preserved catalog provenance. > - This pull request extracts the completed teams catalog branch into one reviewable PR on top of `public-gh/master`. > - The benefit is a reusable teams catalog foundation with server, CLI, package, docs, and hidden UI surfaces kept in sync. ## What Changed - Added the `@paperclipai/teams-catalog` package with bundled/optional team definitions, generated manifest, validators, catalog builder tests, and migration notes. - Added shared teams catalog types/validators plus server routes and services for listing, previewing, and installing catalog teams. - Integrated catalog install with company portability, skill/source policy checks, provenance metadata, origin hashes, target-manager reparenting, and installed/out-of-date detection. - Added CLI `teams` commands and agent-safe company selection behavior, including `company current` and approval fallback for forbidden agent-run installs. - Added hidden Team Catalog UI/API/query surfaces, Storybook fixtures, and targeted UI tests while keeping the UI route out of primary navigation. - Added docs for CLI/company/teams catalog behavior and removed generated screenshot artifacts from the PR diff. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run cli/src/__tests__/company.test.ts cli/src/__tests__/teams.test.ts packages/teams-catalog/src/catalog-builder.test.ts packages/teams-catalog/src/shipped-catalog.test.ts server/src/__tests__/agent-permissions-service.test.ts server/src/__tests__/company-portability.test.ts server/src/__tests__/company-skills-service.test.ts server/src/__tests__/teams-catalog-routes.test.ts server/src/__tests__/teams-catalog-service.test.ts server/src/__tests__/teams-catalog-install-no-overrides.test.ts ui/src/lib/company-routes.test.ts ui/src/pages/TeamCard.test.tsx ui/src/pages/TeamCatalog.test.tsx ui/src/pages/useInstallTeamCatalogEntry.test.tsx` - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/shared typecheck && pnpm --filter @paperclipai/teams-catalog typecheck && pnpm --filter paperclipai typecheck && pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck && pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui typecheck` - Confirmed branch is rebased onto `public-gh/master` (`78dc3625a`) and `public-gh/master` is an ancestor of `HEAD`. - Confirmed PR diff excludes `pnpm-lock.yaml`, `.github/workflows/*`, generated screenshot images, and screenshot helper scripts. ## Risks - Medium review surface: this crosses package generation, shared contracts, server install behavior, CLI, docs, and hidden UI code. - Catalog install behavior creates agents/projects/tasks/skills and must keep company scoping, permissions, source policy, and provenance checks strict. - `pnpm-lock.yaml` is intentionally excluded per repo policy; CI/default-branch automation owns lockfile refresh. - The Team Catalog UI is included but hidden from primary navigation, so future enablement should re-check visual QA before exposure. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. > > ROADMAP checked: this aligns with reusable companies/templates and plugin-adjacent onboarding work. This PR packages work already developed on the Paperclip task branch for review. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 series coding agent in this Paperclip session; exact runtime context window was not exposed. Used shell, git, `gh`, and local test/typecheck tooling. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots, or documented why screenshots are intentionally omitted - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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DottaandPaperclip
|
38c185fb8b |
[codex] Add agent permissions and controls plan (#6386)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies by keeping task ownership, approvals, and operator control inside one control plane. > - Agent permissions and plugin-hosted company settings sit on the boundary between autonomy and governance. > - V1 needs scoped task assignment rules, plugin extension points, and clearer company access surfaces without weakening company boundaries. > - The branch builds the core authorization service, plugin SDK/host APIs, and UI simplifications needed to support those controls. > - Paperclip EE plugin surfaces were intentionally moved out of this core PR per review direction, so this PR now carries only the public core/plugin infrastructure work. > - The latest updates preserve the PAP-9937 branch changes that belong in this PR, remove the `design/` artifacts, and exclude the experimental `plugin-briefs` package. > - Greptile feedback was applied through the authorization/audit paths and the final cleanup commit was re-reviewed at 5/5 with no unresolved Greptile threads. > - The benefit is safer assignment control with extension hooks for richer permission products while preserving simple defaults for normal operators. ## What Changed - Added scoped task-assignment authorization decisions and routed issue/agent assignment mutations through the authorization service. - Added plugin SDK and host APIs for company settings slots, authorization policy/grant management, assignment previews, and bridge invocation scope propagation. - Simplified core company access UI and moved advanced controls behind plugin-provided settings surfaces. - Added retry-now affordances for blocked issue next-step notices. - Added protected-assignment enforcement for persisted agent/project/issue policies, including explicit-grant fallback behavior. - Added incremental principal-access compatibility backfill for active agent memberships and role-default human permission grants. - Added the Markdown code block wrap action fix from the latest branch changes. - Removed `design/` artifacts from the PR and removed `packages/plugins/plugin-briefs` from the final diff. - Addressed Greptile feedback for plugin actor sanitization, legacy membership handling, audit pagination, unknown grant-scope metadata, and startup test mocks. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/access-service.test.ts server/src/__tests__/company-portability.test.ts` -> 2 files passed, 54 tests passed. - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/server-startup-feedback-export.test.ts server/src/__tests__/access-service.test.ts server/src/__tests__/company-portability.test.ts` -> 3 files passed, 62 tests passed. - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/authorization-service.test.ts server/src/__tests__/plugin-access-authorization-host-services.test.ts server/src/__tests__/server-startup-feedback-export.test.ts` -> 3 files passed, 28 tests passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` -> passed. - `git diff --check` -> passed. - `node ./scripts/check-docker-deps-stage.mjs` -> passed. - `CI=true pnpm install --frozen-lockfile --ignore-scripts` -> passed with no lockfile update. - `pnpm exec vitest run ui/src/components/MarkdownBody.interaction.test.tsx` -> 1 test passed. - `git ls-files design packages/plugins/plugin-briefs | wc -l` -> 0. - GitHub CI on `40cd83b53` -> all checks passed, merge state `CLEAN`. - Greptile on `40cd83b53` -> 5/5, 102 files reviewed, 0 comments/annotations added, 0 unresolved review threads. - Confirmed the PR diff contains no `design/`, `packages/plugins/plugin-briefs`, `pnpm-lock.yaml`, or `.github/workflows` changes. ## Risks - Medium: task assignment authorization paths are behaviorally stricter for protected/private policy data, so existing plugin-authored policies may block assignment until explicit grants or approval flows are configured. - Medium: plugin-host authorization APIs expand the surface area available to trusted plugins and need careful review for company scoping. - Low: startup now performs a principal-access compatibility backfill, but the migration and runtime backfill use conflict-tolerant inserts. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 coding agent, tool-enabled workflow with shell, git, and GitHub CLI access. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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ForgottenandClaude Opus 4.6
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c09037ffad |
Implement agent hiring, approval workflows, config revisions, LLM reflection, and sidebar badges
Agent management: hire endpoint with permission gates and pending_approval status, config revision tracking with rollback, agent duplicate route, permission CRUD. Block pending_approval agents from auth, heartbeat, and assignments. Approvals: revision request/resubmit flow, approval comments CRUD, issue-approval linking, auto-wake agents on approval decisions with context snapshot. Costs: per-agent breakdown, period filtering (month/week/day/all), cost by agent list endpoint. Adapters: agentConfigurationDoc on all adapters, /llms/agent-configuration.txt reflection routes. Inject PAPERCLIP_APPROVAL_ID, PAPERCLIP_APPROVAL_STATUS, PAPERCLIP_LINKED_ISSUE_IDS into adapter environments. Sidebar badges endpoint for pending approval/inbox counts. Dashboard and company settings extensions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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ForgottenandClaude Opus 4.6
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e0a878f4eb |
Scaffold agent permissions, approval comments, and hiring governance types
Add pending_approval agent status, permissions jsonb column, and AgentPermissions type with canCreateAgents flag. Add approval_comments table and ApprovalComment type. Extend approval statuses with revision_requested. Add validators for permission updates, approval revision requests, resubmission, and approval comments. Add requireBoardApprovalForNewAgents to company update schema. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |