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codex/runner-active-stop-ordering-eval
3
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 DottaandPaperclip
|
82f662656a |
fix(runner): restore legacy Git access and independent networking (#13094)
## Thinking Path
> - Paperclip runs agents for people with different GitHub accounts.
> - Managed operations must use the intended person's eligible
connection.
> - A failed duplicate connection must not hide a healthy grant for the
same account.
> - Legacy hosts also need their existing Git configuration when managed
access is not configured.
> - Runner networking and local Git operations must not depend on GitHub
broker availability.
> - This pull request separates those policies and improves failure
diagnostics.
## Linked Issues or Issue Description
**What happened?** New runs always cleared host Git credentials and
installed managed launchers. Network permission depended on GitHub
environment variables. A launcher failure could stop even local `git
status`. A newer unhealthy duplicate could take precedence over a
healthy connection, and generic health errors were shown as reconnect
requirements.
**Expected behavior:** Use a healthy eligible managed connection for the
intended account. Preserve host authentication only for unconfigured
standard-trust local or SSH execution. Permit local Git during broker
failures and keep network permission independent of GitHub credentials.
**Steps to reproduce:** Configure healthy and unhealthy grants for one
GitHub account, dispatch an agent, and execute Git commands. Separately
run an unconfigured legacy host with existing GitHub CLI authentication.
Stop the broker and run local `git status`.
**Paperclip version or commit:** Master at
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DottaandPaperclip
|
1cc45086d3 |
feat: use the responsible person's GitHub for shared agent operations (#13005)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Several people can send instructions to the same agent and task. > - A fixed GitHub token in the provider process can keep the first person's access after another person's message is accepted. > - Task ownership cannot select credentials for each accepted instruction or preserve the identity of an operation already in progress. > - This pull request records ordered execution identity contexts and resolves credentials when managed Git, gh, or GitHub tools start. > - The benefit is automatic personal GitHub access for shared agents, with durable continuation rules and no teammate credential fallback. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **Subsystem affected** Cross-cutting: orchestration, connection grants, database, runtime adapters, native runners, and run details. **Problem or motivation** A shared agent must use the person whose instructions it has accepted. A queued message must retain its author. A retry or approval without new instructions must retain the originating identity. GitHub must remain optional for ordinary work. **Proposed solution** Persist execution identity separately from task ownership. Give new processes a run-scoped broker capability and token-free managed launchers. Capture identity at operation start. Keep an explicit dedicated-agent grant as an override. Show redacted diagnostics in run details. **Alternatives considered** Per-task ownership, fixed provider tokens, and mutable repository author configuration do not handle accepted steering or concurrent operations. A manual account-selection action would add unnecessary setup to each turn. **Roadmap alignment** This completes the existing Multiple Human Users, MCP Tool Gateway & Apps, Secrets Manager, and Self-healing Runs capabilities. The implementation follows the maintainer-approved plan. Related work: Refs #12843, Refs #12907. Existing proposals #4618 and #8945 cover per-agent or per-worktree author configuration. This change instead follows the accepted human instruction across runtime types. Refs #11831 for governed personal connection delegation; this change preserves connection audience checks and does not use standing delegation as a personal credential fallback. ## What Changed - Add durable, ordered identity contexts and active run references. Preserve message authors through consolidation, steering, retries, delegation, approvals, routines, and restart. - Add an authenticated operation-time GitHub credential broker and local/remote managed git and gh launchers. Keep personal tokens out of the long-lived provider process. - Resolve GitHub gateway and server-side Git operations through the same responsible-person or dedicated-grant selection rules. - Make absent and unavailable GitHub credentials non-blocking at generic startup. Clear host and prior-person credentials. Keep anonymous Git access where supported. - Add run-detail identity history and the dedicated-account warning. Keep task ownership and queue-versus-steer decisions unchanged. - Preserve personal OAuth declarations through connection edits. Retain exact selected grants in the gateway. - Fix continuation races found during real acceptance: verify a warm owner before credential rotation, and wait for bounded durable runner suspension before the next run starts. - Make migrations replay-safe. Retain identity through agent/run deletion, remove it with its company, and clean terminal launcher directories before releasing execution environments. Document coordinated release and rollback. ## Verification - Full workspace typecheck, build, and token gates passed. The complete local suite passed in its normal test groups: 17,120 passing tests, including all 143 serialized server suites. After integrating the newly merged runner API work, full local typecheck and build passed again, along with 890 focused integration tests. All 31 checks on the integrated revision passed, including build, browser E2E, release registry, canary dry run, typecheck, security and all test suites. Greptile is 5/5 with all review threads resolved. - Current focused checks passed: 142 native executor tests, 67 runtime lifecycle tests, 9 durable identity tests, 75 credential/routine tests, 19 low-trust/resumption tests, and the executable migration replay test. - Authenticated browser acceptance with two Paperclip users and two GitHub accounts on one shared native agent passed. Real commits and pushes followed A → B accepted steering → queued A continuation in the same saved conversation. GitHub commit author and committer identities matched all three operations. Both runs succeeded and task ownership stayed unchanged. - Real GitHub MCP calls switched from A to B after accepted steering. A delegated subtask retained its originating identity across a server restart. - Disabling B's GitHub connection left ordinary work successful. Managed gh was unauthenticated and the provider had no inherited GH_TOKEN or GITHUB_TOKEN. - The browser displayed run-detail diagnostics and the exact dedicated-account warning. A final controller-restart check followed by another-person continuation retained the conversation, selected the correct GitHub login and Git author, and removed each terminal launcher directory. - Company-lifetime migration and all five previously failing CI suites passed locally (167 tests). Same-token gateway A → B → A and six broker/launcher boundary tests passed. - Remote callback, launcher, sandbox, and runtime contract tests passed. Both native and legacy Codex completed actual Daytona executions on the integrated revision ([campaign results](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/34155056509)). The remote package-manager shim staging regression also passed locally. ## Risks - Deploy the migrations, server broker, launchers, and runner artifacts together. Existing processes finish with their original contract. New managed processes need the broker endpoint for GitHub operations. - Finish or stop new managed executions before rolling application code back. Keep the additive schema and identity history during rollback. - Scripts that require a persistent raw GH_TOKEN must use managed git, gh, or GitHub gateway tools. Run capabilities authorize code executing within that run to acquire its current identity; this is not hostile-code isolation within one execution principal. Managed commands prevent automatic credential carryover; arbitrary code deliberately copying a credential is outside that boundary. - Uncertain steering acknowledgement deliberately holds new credential acquisition until reconciliation. Already-started operations retain their captured identity. - GitHub private access and provider outages can still fail the specific operation that needs them. Dedicated grant failure does not fall back to personal access. ## Model Used OpenAI GPT-6 through Codex assisted implementation, review, shell execution, and browser acceptance. The exact model variant and context-window size are not exposed in this session. Tool use included TypeScript and Rust tests, database integration tests, GitHub CLI, and authenticated browser control. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
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DottaandPaperclip
|
3796c6f259 |
fix(connections): project GitHub identity into sandbox runners (#12907)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Managed GitHub connections resolve a responsible user's or dedicated agent's identity into an audited, run-scoped credential projection. > - An enrolled instance could retain a hidden managed setup method after Cloud stopped advertising it, producing a blank, disabled setup step. > - Native runner processes also dropped the resolved GitHub projection before the provider shell, so `gh` and Git could not use the selected identity in Daytona. > - Daytona already provides the outer isolation boundary. Applying Codex's inner Linux sandbox there both duplicated containment and failed because nested user namespaces are unavailable. > - This change repairs setup fallback, carries only the bounded GitHub projection across each runner boundary, and allows only a controller-selected managed sandbox transport to act as the outer sandbox. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **What happened?** An enrolled self-hosted instance could show a blank GitHub setup step when its managed profile was unavailable. Separately, a native Codex run in Daytona could resolve a managed GitHub connection on the Paperclip host but lose it before the provider shell. Once projected, Codex's nested sandbox failed before commands could run because Daytona does not expose the user-namespace operation used by the inner sandbox. **Expected behavior** Setup must select an advertised customer method when the managed method is unavailable. A Daytona run must receive the exact managed GitHub identity selected for that run, support `gh` and HTTPS Git, and rely on Daytona as its outer sandbox without weakening local or SSH execution. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Enroll a self-hosted instance while Cloud does not advertise the managed GitHub profile and open GitHub setup. 2. Observe the blank second step and disabled action. 3. Configure a native Codex agent with a Daytona environment and a responsible-user GitHub grant. 4. Run `gh api user` or HTTPS Git from the agent shell. 5. Observe missing GitHub environment projection or nested-sandbox startup failure. **Paperclip version or commit** The setup bug reproduces on `1dceee9a4`; the runner proof was developed from the same branch and verified at the latest head below. **Deployment mode** Self-hosted Paperclip enrolled with Paperclip Cloud, using the Daytona sandbox-provider plugin and native Paperclip runner. ## What Changed - Wait for connector enrollment hydration, retain a hidden managed method only while enrollment is needed, and otherwise select an advertised customer fallback. - Add a single bounded GitHub credential-environment projection for `GH_TOKEN`, `GITHUB_TOKEN`, the process-only Git helper token, GitHub commit identity, and at most 32 controller-generated Git config entries. - Forward that projection through the durable controller, Codex app-server transport, and Rust provider child without placing token values in arguments or config. - Allow Codex shell inheritance only for the exact projected GitHub keys and enable provider network access only when the managed credential exists. - Derive outer-sandbox authority exclusively from a managed `sandbox` transport; strip the same flag from configured, host, local, and SSH environments. - Define a named external-sandbox permission profile that Codex resolves to `dangerFullAccess` for default-mode Daytona turns while plan mode remains read-only. - Add regression tests for setup fallback, credential projection, local/SSH/sandbox authority separation, provider forwarding, and permission-profile selection. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run ui/src/pages/apps/AppsConnect.test.tsx` — 96 passed. - `pnpm exec vitest run src/drivers/codex/codex-security-config.test.ts src/drivers/codex/app-server-transport.test.ts src/control-plane/durable-prp-control-plane.test.ts` from `packages/paperclip-runner` — 31 passed. - Focused native-session executor tests — 3 passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/paperclip-runner typecheck` — passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` — passed. - `cargo test --manifest-path packages/paperclip-runner/runner/Cargo.toml --locked -p paperclip-runner-core --lib` — 194 passed. - Real Codex app-server configuration probe accepted `paperclip-runner-external-sandbox` and reported `sandbox.type=\"dangerFullAccess\"` while using the named profile. - [Signed Daytona image workflow](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/33995270328) built commit `86571f7997e7100e47bd131aac1f1e773112a0ce`; the isolated environment was pinned to `sha256:ecef21105f8de382d75787e59439d936be239b77ae74a31c8ed3a17cde39b023`. - Live isolated Daytona proof passed: the three projected token variables were non-empty and equal; the host-scoped Git credential helper returned the same token without printing it; `gh api user` resolved `cryppadotta`; authenticated `git ls-remote https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip.git HEAD` returned `1dceee9a4e75b13456760bb54c752deb2dba1d79`; no repository mutation occurred. - The persisted 28,476-byte run log contains no GitHub token shape, bearer header, credential-bearing URL, or private-key marker. - Latest-head pull-request CI and reviews provide the remaining full-suite gate. ## Risks - This deliberately gives shell Git and `gh` access to the run's resolved GitHub identity. It is the audited class-3 behavior required by the GitHub connection design and is outside per-tool Ask-first controls. - The credential source is the trusted broker projection, which overwrites configured environment values. The helper is scoped to HTTPS `github.com`, revalidates protocol and host, and never places its token in command arguments, URLs, or files. - Managed Daytona sandboxes become the containment boundary for default-mode provider commands. Local and SSH targets retain the inner Codex workspace sandbox, and plan mode remains read-only everywhere. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex, GPT-5, with reasoning, browser control, shell access, and code execution. The product did not expose the context-window size. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |