mirror of
https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip.git
synced 2026-10-08 21:03:51 +02:00
codex/plugin-task-execution
4
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Devin Foley
|
8cbd21b3e7 |
feat(apps): add Superagent connection (#15394)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Agents reach external services through the Apps catalog. Each catalog entry is a reviewed `AppDefinition` that connects a provider's hosted MCP server to Paperclip's shared vault, grants, policies, gateway, and audit trail. > - Superagent (`superagent.sh`) is a security platform. Its hosted MCP server lets agents read and triage security findings, start red-team reports, run Contributor Trust and dependency update jobs, and score web pages, email, files, skills, MCP repositories, and packages before an agent trusts them. > - Superagent is not in the catalog. Operators must use the generic "Connect your own MCP server" flow. That flow has no branding, no key guidance, and no warning about billable or destructive tools. > - The connector playbook supports this provider with existing definition fields. The server accepts an organization API key as a bearer header. It publishes no OAuth authorization-server metadata, so browser sign-in is not possible. > - This pull request adds the Superagent definition, its artwork, the research and permission-review ledger rows, documentation, deterministic tests, and one reviewed risk-classification rule. > - The benefit is a branded, governed Superagent connection with clear key guidance and a warning about tools that cost credits or delete data. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **Problem or motivation** Teams that use Superagent for PR security, red teaming, and agent guardrails want their Paperclip agents to read findings, return structured reports, and score content before they use it. Superagent is not in the Apps catalog. Operators must paste the MCP URL and an `Authorization` header into the generic remote-MCP flow. That flow gives no branding and no provider guidance. It also does not tell the operator that the key reaches the whole organization, or that some tools consume credits or permanently delete findings. **Proposed solution** Add a catalog-only Superagent connection that follows the connector playbook. It has one method: a customer organization API key (`sk_live_...`), sent as an `Authorization: Bearer` header to `https://www.superagent.sh/mcp`. The field helper text explains that Superagent keys are not scoped. The method warning tells operators to set billable and destructive actions to Ask first before agents run unattended. All discovered tools stay governed by the normal per-action policies. **Alternatives considered** A browser sign-in method was not added. The server's protected-resource metadata names `https://superagent.sh` as its authorization server, but that origin publishes no `oauth-authorization-server` or `openid-configuration` document, so Paperclip cannot discover OAuth endpoints. A plugin was not needed because the connection needs no custom UI, tables, workers, or webhooks. Relying on the generic risk classifier was not enough. Several Superagent mutations (`triage_finding`, `scan_*`, `restore_agent_builtin_rule`) use names that it reads as reads, so a narrow reviewed Superagent rule was added instead. **Roadmap alignment** This extends the existing self-serve remote-MCP connection catalog. It does not overlap planned core work. ## What Changed - Added the `superagent` row to `packages/shared/src/self-serve-mcp-research.json` (API-key auth, risk tier S4). - Added the `superagent` provider to `scripts/ingest-app-definitions.mjs` (category, key placement and placeholder, console links, guidance, description). Regenerated `packages/shared/src/app-definitions/superagent.json` and the generated registry. - Added the `superagent/mcp-api-key` permission review to `doc/connections/tool-method-permission-reviews.json`, with key-permission text and evidence links. - Added Superagent's official mark (`ui/public/brands/apps/superagent.png`, the 460×460 avatar of the official `superagent-ai` GitHub organization) and the brand manifest entry. - Added gallery copy for the Superagent card. - Added a reviewed Superagent rule to `classifyRisk` in `server/src/services/tool-access.ts`. Only `list_*` and `get_*` tools, and tools that Superagent marks read-only, are reads. `delete_*` and `revoke_agent_client` are destructive. All other tools are writes, so billable and rule-changing tools can be set to Ask first. - Put the Ask-first advice in the API-key helper text, because the key form shows helper text and not method warnings. - Added `doc/connections/SUPERAGENT.md` (transport and auth, why there is no OAuth, administrator setup, capabilities and policy, manifest, brand provenance, validation hook). Linked it from the connections README and the permission audit. - Tests: definition shape, store visibility and artwork, URL recognition, the bearer header on discovery with the key kept out of connection config, read/write/destructive classification of fixture tools, the Superagent risk rule (including `triage_finding` and `restore_agent_builtin_rule`), the visible Ask-first advice and API-key gating of the connect form, and the pinned catalog counts. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run packages/shared/src/app-definitions.test.ts packages/shared/src/app-definitions-url.test.ts ui/src/pages/apps/AppsConnect.test.tsx ui/src/pages/apps/Browse.test.tsx ui/src/lib/app-brand-assets.test.ts ui/src/pages/apps/AppLogo.brand-assets.test.tsx`: 317 passed. - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/tool-access-service.test.ts`: 385 passed. - `node scripts/check-app-brand-assets.mjs` and `node --test scripts/app-brand-validation.test.mjs`: passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/shared typecheck`, `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck`, and `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui typecheck`: clean. - Manual: in a local instance, open Apps → Browse and confirm the Superagent card and icon. Open `/apps/connect?source=superagent`. Confirm the single API-key method, and confirm that Connect enables only after a key is entered. - Live metadata probe on 2026-10-06: an unauthenticated `initialize` on `https://www.superagent.sh/mcp` returns 401 with `resource_metadata="https://www.superagent.sh/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource"`. That document returns 200. No authorization-server metadata exists at the named issuer. ## Risks - Low risk to existing providers. The change is additive catalog data plus tests. The generated registry only gains one import. The new risk rule runs only for Superagent connections. - A Superagent key reaches its whole organization. Some tools consume credits (`create_*_report`, `triage_finding`) or delete data permanently (`delete_finding`). Every action starts Allowed under the current product default. The key helper text tells operators to set these actions to Ask first. - The permission-review ledger records live proof as not run. No Superagent account was used. The lifecycle checklist in `doc/connections/SUPERAGENT.md` needs a documented pass before the entry is fully qualified. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - Claude Opus 5.5 (`claude-opus-5-5`, 1M context) in Claude Code, with extended thinking and tool use (shell, file editing, web fetch, browser checks). ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge |
||
|
|
88ff98b83d |
feat(apps): add read-only Enterpret MCP with OAuth and org tokens (#13906)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip agents need governed access to Enterpret's hosted MCP tools for customer feedback. > - The official Enterpret MCP is read-only. Enterpret Agent’s beta write MCP is a separate service and is outside this PR. > - This PR supports both organization auth tokens and personal browser OAuth for the official MCP. > - Enterpret committed to fixing OAuth scope behavior and reducing its token-revocation cache window. The provider fixes will follow after connector deployment and do not gate this release. Paperclip functional validation remains required. New tools stay quarantined on refresh. > - This PR combines the original connector and Vivek's token-path work on current master, with live self-hosted QA recorded in the validation guide. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description No public issue covers this connector. This PR incorporates the work from #14737. The independent OAuth scope-provenance fix is #14059; it is not required for the organization-token path. #13890 is a merged connector precedent. #13692 provides the connector-authoring skill. **Problem or motivation** The generic MCP setup can reach Enterpret, but it has no reviewed Enterpret entry, method-specific setup, artwork, or policy defaults. The original connector branch had also fallen behind master. **Proposed solution** Publish the Enterpret catalog entry with an organization auth token as the selectable method. Support browser OAuth through instance-local DCR on the same read-only endpoint. Default `run_graph_query` to Ask first and quarantine tools newly found on refresh. ## What Changed - Added the Enterpret app definition, generated registry, official icon, Browse card, setup copy, tests, and Storybook states. - Combined #14737 and resolved the current-master conflicts, including the connector permission audit. - Preserved catalog quarantine on token reconnect and updated expiry guidance to follow the token's dashboard expiry. The QA token displayed three months, contradicting the former six-month copy. - Enabled personal OAuth for the official read-only MCP. Removed the write-capability inference and OAuth draft-only setup restriction. The beta Agent endpoint is excluded. - Preserved tool quarantine during token reconnect, with a regression test for existing quarantined and newly discovered tools. - Added OAuth scope and revocation-cache disclosures and an interactive Storybook retry check. - Merged master `d9f600043` into the existing PR branch without rewriting history. Resolved four conflicts, regenerated the combined registry, and retained the model-provider assertions with a catalog count of 66. - Recorded live QA and its limits in [doc/connections/ENTERPRET.md](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/blob/950bacc52/doc/connections/ENTERPRET.md). ## Verification Current head: `6c73d3084202ccbb25080e7a4e9c3467bc1341dd`. All 513 focused connector, discovery, OAuth, policy, shared-definition, and UI-handoff tests passed across 11 suites. Full repository typecheck, build, Storybook build, token gates, module boundaries, Node policy, no-git-push policy, and typecheck-build-gaps passed. Release-registry tests passed 129/129 with modern Bash. The four failures with macOS Bash 3.2 also reproduced on untouched master. The full test suite passed in CI on this exact head, including every general-test and serialized-server shard and all eight E2E shards. The duplicate local `pnpm test:run` was stopped after these remote test lanes passed; it did not complete locally. The combined registry was regenerated. Regeneration also reproduces existing Linear and AgentMail definition drift on untouched master; those unrelated changes were excluded. On an isolated self-hosted Paperclip instance, an organization token connected and discovered eight actions. `get_organization_details` returned the intended organization before and after reconnect. Catalog refresh, invalid-token failure and valid-token recovery, activity logging, local disable, and local removal were exercised. No feedback quotes or graph query were requested. Paperclip revoked both QA connection secrets and archived the QA connections. The token-path agent access preview correctly showed an action Off, but the board Test endpoint still invoked it as the board user. This shared Test-path mismatch is documented; it is not evidence that a real agent can bypass policy. An actual token-path agent-session denial, a real agent process, expiry recovery, server/VPS, and Cloud remain unverified. Enterpret's dashboard confirmed the QA token was revoked, but the same token immediately reconnected and completed a safe read. Vivek explained this as a 24-hour validity cache and committed to reducing the window. The new maximum delay and deployment remain unverified. The earlier OAuth check reported `mcp:write` and `email` for an `mcp:read` request. This is a scope mismatch; it did not prove access to write tools. On 2026-10-01 the account holder relayed Vivek’s clarification that the official MCP is read-only and the beta Agent write MCP is separate. ## Risks The organization token can read the organization's customer feedback, and provider-side revocation did not immediately stop access. Operators should check each token's displayed expiry and remove Paperclip's local connection when retiring access. The account holder confirmed the provider fixes are fast follows after deployment. Release can proceed with the current scope reporting and up-to-24-hour revocation delay documented, once fresh OAuth authorization/refresh, real-agent allow/deny, CI, and review pass. Retest the reduced revocation window after Enterpret deploys it. Scope labels alone must not be used to claim write access. Greptile is 5/5 on head `6c73d3084` with no actionable findings. All current-head CI checks pass, including the canary dry run. Live agent-session denial and fresh OAuth refresh remain explicit deployment QA items. The board Test panel does not prove agent authorization. Provider scope-reporting and revocation-cache fixes are accepted fast follows after deployment. ## Model Used Original connector and validation record: Claude Opus 5 through Claude Code. Integration, current-master reconciliation, and token-path QA: OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 family (exact host variant not exposed), using repository tools and an isolated runtime. Contributor commits retain their authors. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either linked existing issues or described the issue in-PR - [x] I have not referenced internal or instance-local Paperclip issues or links - [x] My branch name describes the change and contains no internal issue ID - [x] I have run relevant local tests and checks - [x] I have updated relevant documentation - [x] I have considered and documented the risks above - [x] All current-head CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no actionable follow-ups If squash-merging, preserve contributor credit in the squash message: Co-Authored-By: Vivek Kaushal <kaushalvivek@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Vivek Kaushal <vivek@enterpret.com> |
||
|
Devin FoleyandPaperclip
|
5b8b2b38ca |
feat(apps): add Neon connection (#14980)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Agents reach external services through the Apps catalog. Each catalog entry is a reviewed `AppDefinition` that wires a provider's hosted MCP server into Paperclip's shared vault, grants, policies, gateway, and audit trail. > - Neon is a widely used serverless Postgres provider with an official hosted MCP server, but it is not in the catalog. Teams that run their databases on Neon must use the generic "connect your own MCP server" path, which has no branding, no guidance, and no project or read-only controls. > - The connector playbook requires a catalog entry for a provider like this: the hosted server supports dynamic client registration and bearer API keys, and the common definition fields can express every option Paperclip can serialize. > - This pull request adds the Neon definition, its official artwork, the research and permission-review ledger rows, documentation, and deterministic tests, without any provider-specific runtime code. > - The benefit is a one-click, governed Neon connection with optional project pinning and read-only mode, and a documented path to live qualification. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description **Problem or motivation** Neon is a common Postgres host for the applications agents work on, but Paperclip's Apps catalog has no Neon entry. Operators who want agents to inspect schemas, run SQL, or manage branches must paste the MCP URL into the generic remote-MCP flow, which gives no branding, no provider guidance, no project boundary, and no read-only switch. **Proposed solution** Add a catalog-only Neon connection built from the connector playbook: browser sign-in through Neon's dynamic client registration with the reviewed `read` and `write` scopes, or a customer API key sent as an Authorization bearer header. Both methods expose Neon's documented `projectId` pin and `readonly` switch as optional Advanced fields. Every discovered tool stays governed by the normal per-action policies. **Alternatives considered** A plugin was not needed because no custom UI, tables, workers, or webhooks are involved. A separate read-only method was not added because the playbook treats read-only switches as advanced fields rather than methods. Neon's repeatable `category` query filter was left out because tenant fields serialize lists as one comma-joined value, so it cannot be sent correctly without new runtime code; per-action policies cover catalog narrowing instead. **Roadmap alignment** This extends the existing self-serve remote-MCP connection catalog and does not overlap planned core work. ## What Changed - Added the `neon` provider to `scripts/ingest-app-definitions.mjs` (category, API-key placement, methods, tenant fields, guidance, warnings) and regenerated `packages/shared/src/app-definitions/neon.json` plus the generated registry. - Added the Neon row to the self-serve MCP research ledger with `dcr_or_api_key` auth and risk tier S4. - Added permission reviews for `neon/mcp-oauth` (explicit scopes `read`, `write`, taken from Neon's live authorization-server metadata) and `neon/mcp-api-key` (provider key), with evidence links. - Added Neon's official tile icon (`ui/public/brands/apps/neon.png`, copied byte-for-byte from the icon linked by neon.com) and the brand manifest entry. - Added prosumer gallery copy for the Neon card. - Added `doc/connections/NEON.md` (service involvement, endpoints, administrator setup, capabilities and policy, manifest, brand provenance, validation hook) and linked it from the connections README and the permission audit. - Tests: Neon definition shape, store visibility and artwork, URL recognition, reviewed scopes with scope-widening rejection, URL projection of the project pin and read-only flag, invalid project ID rejection, the connect form's API-key gating, and the pinned catalog counts. ## Verification - `pnpm exec vitest run packages/shared/src/app-definitions.test.ts packages/shared/src/app-definitions-url.test.ts` — 34 passed. - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/tool-access-service.test.ts` — 367 passed. - `pnpm exec vitest run ui/src/pages/apps/AppsConnect.test.tsx ui/src/pages/apps/Browse.test.tsx ui/src/lib/app-brand-assets.test.ts ui/src/pages/apps/AppLogo.brand-assets.test.tsx` — all passed. - `node scripts/check-app-brand-assets.mjs` and `node --test scripts/app-brand-validation.test.mjs` — passed. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/shared typecheck`, `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck`, `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/ui typecheck`, `pnpm check:token-gates` — clean. - Manual: in a local instance, open Apps → Browse, confirm the Neon card and icon, open `/apps/connect?source=neon`, confirm both methods, the Advanced project pin and read-only toggle, and that Connect enables after an API key is entered. The operator completed a live connection against a Neon account on this build. - Live metadata probed on 2026-10-02: both `.well-known` documents at `mcp.neon.tech` return the recorded endpoints and scopes; an unauthenticated `initialize` returns 401 with `resource_metadata`. ## Risks - Low risk to existing providers: the change is additive catalog data plus tests. The generated registry only gains one import. - Neon's hosted server grants broad project and database management. The definition carries two warnings, recommends a development project, and keeps every write under the normal action policies; the read-only switch is enforced by Neon's server, not locally. - The permission-review ledger records live proof for both methods as not run; the full lifecycle checklist in `doc/connections/NEON.md` still needs a documented pass before the entry is considered fully qualified. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - Claude Fable 5.1 (`claude-fable-5-1`) in Claude Code, with extended thinking and tool use (shell, file editing, browser verification). ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |
||
|
DottaandPaperclip
|
ad55d0a281 |
fix(connections): repair personal credentials and request write access (#14739)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - Agents use Apps through a gateway that checks identity, company access, and action policies. > - Personal pasted credentials can point to company secrets. Setup can show success while the gateway rejects every call. > - Several OAuth methods also omit the scopes needed for their supported write actions. > - This pull request gives setup, health checks, and invocation the same credential rules. Owners repair existing connections by reconnecting. > - New connections request reviewed permissions for their supported actions. Read-only choices remain available under Advanced. > - Agents can use the connections people give them, while existing consent, identity boundaries, and action restrictions remain enforced. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs #14009 and #14008. This addresses the personal-credential defect. The separate GitHub organization-identity selection defect is outside this change. Related work: #13942 fixed part of new personal-key setup. #14200 independently fixes legacy personal reconnect and protects managed-agent profile credentials during removal. This PR covers that ownership invariant across key and secret-URL setup, reconnect, health, discovery, and invocation, and keeps owner reconnect as the repair path. #14059 tracks requested versus provider-asserted OAuth scopes; it remains separate work. I searched open PRs and issues for Zapier, Airtable scopes, connector writes, and personal credential failures. **What happened?** A Zapier secret URL saved through personal setup can become a company secret referenced by a user grant. Health checks bypass the gateway's ownership check, so the connection appears healthy but calls fail with `grant_credential_invalid`. Custom-header paths can also receive a duplicate `credentials.` prefix. Omitted OAuth scopes make write access depend on provider defaults. **Expected behavior** Personal invocation credentials belong to the selected user. Setup, health, and actual calls enforce the same rule. New connections request documented permissions for supported read and write actions. Existing tokens gain no permissions without provider consent. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Connect Zapier or a generic secret URL with the personal identity. 2. Allow an agent to use the connection and complete setup. 3. Invoke a tool through a run-scoped gateway. The legacy layout fails ownership validation despite successful setup. **Paperclip version or commit** The implementation started from `44736c9c7c67b7b646ead9d51721db10f5b83835` and was rebased onto master at `94e8dec56`. **Deployment mode** Built from source. Regression tests use isolated PostgreSQL fixtures and controlled MCP transports. ## What Changed - Share credential writing, ownership validation, and canonical paths across initial setup, resume, reconnect, rotation, health, discovery, and gateway calls. Keep OAuth client-registration secrets separate from invocation credentials. - Existing personal connections with company-scoped credentials require owner reconnect with a fresh key or secret URL. Reconnect creates a correctly owned value and updates the existing grant and declarations. There is no automatic ownership backfill or new startup hook. - Preserve PostgreSQL timestamp precision when reconnect checks whether a grant changed. Previously, converting the timestamp to a JavaScript Date could reject reconnect with a false concurrent-change error. - Protect credentials used by other grants, connections, bindings, managed-agent profiles, routine triggers, or secret proposals from connection removal. - Review all 117 tool methods, including 84 OAuth methods. Record explicit scopes or documented provider-default exceptions with official evidence. Add Airtable's seven scopes, Hugging Face repository/job scopes, and other documented MCP permissions. - Prefer available write-capable methods. Put explicit read-only choices under Advanced. Explain pasted-key permissions and offer reconnect for missing OAuth consent. Preserve existing grants, policies, Google availability gates, and curated scope allowlists. - Reconnect generic secret URLs and custom headers using their stored credential fields. Refresh the catalog after setup, correct reconnect feedback and error guidance, and let Cancel exit invalid setup while Save & exit retains draft-saving behavior. - Apply ownership checks to the new GitHub repository/skill connection picker. Align the permission audit with the Google scope reductions merged on master. - Add run-scoped gateway, ownership, owner-reconnect, OAuth URL, insufficient-scope, UI, and catalog-wide regression coverage. Update the connector playbook and permission audit. ## Verification Latest commit `97bc0b86e0eae0ec892e4ac44beff1a66164b20e` passes all CI/status gates (55 completed check runs, no failures or pending checks) and has a completed Greptile review at **5/5 with no outstanding findings**. GitHub reports the PR as mergeable/CLEAN. - **Embedded browser:** used the actual server and built UI from this worktree, a fresh isolated database, and local HTTP MCP fixtures. Completed personal bearer-key, secret-URL, and custom-header setup; reproduced the legacy ownership failure; reconnected through the owner’s form; and completed writes afterward. Read-back was verified for bearer-key and secret-URL connections. Public organization-wide setup appeared immediately in Browse without reload. Zapier URL validation/Cancel and Google’s enrollment gate were also exercised. - **Persistence and invocation:** verified user ownership, canonical `credentials.authorization` / `remote.url` / `headers.X-Api-Key` declarations, and unchanged connection/grant identity. The old company secrets retain their ownership. Separate HTTP calls through an actual run-scoped gateway session completed a write and read-back. - **Backend coverage:** the final gateway suite passes all 82 cases, including catalog Zapier and generic inline reconnect. It checks company/user isolation, canonical declarations, same-endpoint URL validation, fresh credentials, retained restrictions, and real gateway read/write execution using fixture transport. A timestamp with PostgreSQL microseconds covers the former false reconnect conflict. - **Local checks:** 368 catalog, gateway, repository, and UI tests passed before the final extra Zapier case; 49 GitHub skill access tests also passed. All three Apps browser regressions pass, including reconnect through the actual form and catalog visibility without reload. Full `pnpm -r typecheck`, `pnpm build`, server typecheck after the final patch, and token gates passed. Full tool-access service runs hit varying 15-second Google fixture timeouts; both affected cases and the updated reconnect assertion pass in isolation (3 tests). The complete test matrix passes in CI on this head. - **Verification limits:** no live provider account was available for Zapier/Airtable/OAuth consent or account-bound write proof. Public metadata and local fixtures do not establish provider consent. The original development database clone failed on a pre-existing missing `tool_connections_transport_check` constraint; browser acceptance used a fresh isolated database created by the normal CLI onboarding flow. ## Risks - Existing broken personal connections stay unusable until their owner reconnects. Health, discovery, and invocation return an actionable ownership error; startup does not rewrite credential ownership. - Scope changes affect new authorization requests. Providers may still require resource selection, account roles, paid plans, or app verification. Existing consent and action restrictions remain unchanged. - Shared credentials are retained rather than reassigned or revoked. Provider-default exceptions and unavailable live checks are documented in `doc/connections/CONNECTOR-PERMISSION-AUDIT.md`. - No new endpoint, database table, lockfile change, or CI workflow change is included. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, based on GPT-6, with reasoning, code editing, shell execution, web research, and browser tools. The exact deployment model ID and context window were not exposed in this session. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> |