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Author	SHA1	Message	Date
DottaandPaperclip	7f766526a6	feat(sandbox): add task-scoped egress grants (#10155) ... ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - Confinement providers protect agent runs with default-deny network policies > - Kubernetes environments currently apply only provider-level, namespace-wide egress allowances > - Tasks that legitimately need GitHub or package registries therefore cannot request narrow access, while network failures do not explain the governing policy or how to request a grant > - This pull request adds issue-scoped egress grants that become workload-owned, run-label-selected policies and carries the effective grant through lease audit metadata > - The benefit is that internet-dependent work can run without enabling broad egress for every concurrent task, and denied requests point operators to the exact grant path ## Linked Issues or Issue Description No public issue exists. Related but distinct: Refs #9944, which adds a provider-wide open-internet posture; this PR keeps provider defaults narrow and adds per-task grants. **Problem / motivation** Kubernetes sandbox egress is configured at the provider/tenant level. A task that needs to clone from GitHub or install from PyPI cannot request those destinations without changing the policy for every run in the tenant namespace. DNS/connectivity failures also surface as generic tool errors with no policy name or remediation path. **Proposed solution** Accept `executionWorkspaceSettings.networkEgress.allowFqdns` and `allowCidrs`, forward the setting through heartbeat environment acquisition, and create a workload-owned NetworkPolicy or CiliumNetworkPolicy selected by `paperclip.io/run-id`. Record the effective grant in lease activity/metadata, expose policy context through `PAPERCLIP_NETWORK_EGRESS_*`, and append the grant path to likely policy-related stderr failures. **Alternatives considered** A provider-wide open-internet switch is broader than required and is already covered by #9944. Mutating the existing namespace policy would leak each task's destinations to other concurrent runs. Standard Kubernetes NetworkPolicy cannot enforce FQDNs exactly, so standard mode uses the existing hardened public-IPv4 TCP 80/443 fallback only for the selected run; Cilium mode remains exact. **Roadmap alignment** This extends the existing cloud/sandbox agent roadmap capability with task-level control-plane policy and does not duplicate a planned roadmap item. ## What Changed - Added validated `networkEgress` grants to issue execution workspace settings and forwarded them through environment lease acquisition. - Added workload-owned, run-label-scoped NetworkPolicy/CiliumNetworkPolicy resources for task FQDN/CIDR grants. - Added lease audit metadata, sandbox policy environment variables, and actionable network-denial stderr guidance. - Added focused parser, manifest, policy creation, and denial-message tests plus Kubernetes provider documentation. ## Verification - `pnpm -C packages/shared exec vitest run src/validators/issue.test.ts` — 27 passed. - `pnpm -C packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes test -- --run test/unit/network-policy.test.ts test/unit/cilium-network-policy.test.ts test/unit/scoped-network-egress.test.ts` — 21 passed. - `pnpm -C server exec vitest run src/__tests__/execution-workspace-policy.test.ts` — 15 passed. - `pnpm exec vitest run server/src/__tests__/heartbeat-plugin-environment.test.ts server/src/__tests__/environment-runtime.test.ts` — 26 passed. - `pnpm --dir packages/db build && pnpm --dir packages/shared build && pnpm --dir packages/plugins/sdk build` — passed, including migration safety checks. - `pnpm --dir packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes typecheck && pnpm --dir server typecheck` — passed after refreshing the worktree's frozen offline dependencies. - End-to-end cluster validation of the `build-cython-ext` benchmark remains for CI/maintainer Kubernetes infrastructure; the focused tests assert `github.com` and `pypi.org` produce a policy selected only by the granted run. ## Risks - Standard NetworkPolicy cannot express FQDNs, so an FQDN grant allows hardened public IPv4 TCP 80/443 for that run; use Cilium mode for exact hostname enforcement. - The new field is additive and absent by default, so existing runs keep the current provider-level policy. - Workload owner references garbage-collect scoped policies with the Job/Sandbox; a cluster/controller that ignores owner references could temporarily strand a policy that still selects no future run ID. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, exact model ID `gpt-5.6-sol`, high reasoning mode, tool use and code execution. The runtime did not expose a context-window size. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>	2026-07-24 09:58:58 -05:00
Jannes StubbemannandClaude Opus 4.8	05ab45225a	feat(plugin-kubernetes): self-hostable Kubernetes sandbox provider (stage 1/3: plugin package) (#5790) ... ## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work > - Sandbox providers are the seam that lets agent runs execute in isolated environments; today the only first-party remote provider is Daytona, a hosted third-party service > - Self-hosters running Paperclip on their own infrastructure (often Kubernetes already) have no first-party way to run agent sandboxes on a cluster they control > - That gap matters for teams with data-residency, sovereignty, or cost constraints who cannot or will not send workloads to a hosted sandbox service > - This pull request adds a Kubernetes sandbox-provider plugin as a standalone, workspace-excluded package: it implements every SandboxProvider hook the Daytona provider does, on infrastructure the operator owns > - The benefit is that any Paperclip deployment with a Kubernetes cluster gets multi-tenant, network-isolated, quota-bounded agent sandboxes with zero new external dependencies ## Linked Issues or Issue Description No existing issue. Following the feature template: - **Problem:** Paperclip's remote sandbox execution requires a hosted third-party provider. Self-hosters cannot run agent sandboxes on their own Kubernetes clusters with a first-party provider. - **Proposed solution:** A `@paperclipai/plugin-kubernetes` sandbox-provider plugin with two backends: long-lived sandboxes via the [kubernetes-sigs/agent-sandbox](https://github.com/kubernetes-sigs/agent-sandbox) CRD (multi-command exec, adapter-install pattern) and one-shot `batch/v1` Jobs (stable APIs only, no extra controllers). - **Alternatives considered:** Driving kubectl from a generic shell provider (no lifecycle/lease semantics), or requiring a hosted provider (exactly the constraint this removes). ## What Changed This is **stage 1 of 3** of a staged contribution (direction agreed with maintainers): the plugin package alone. Stage 2 (server integration: lease params, provider registration) and stage 3 (agent runtime images + CI) are companion PRs that will be cross-linked from a comment here. - New package `packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes` (workspace-excluded, like the path already carved out in `pnpm-workspace.yaml`): src, unit + kind integration tests, operator prerequisite manifests, README, smoke-test guide - Implements the full SandboxProvider hook surface the Daytona provider implements: `validateConfig`, `probe`, `acquireLease`, `resumeLease`, `releaseLease`, `destroyLease`, `realizeWorkspace`, `execute` - Two backends: `sandbox-cr` (default; long-lived pod via the agent-sandbox `Sandbox` CR, supports multi-command exec) and `job` (one-shot `batch/v1` Job; nothing beyond k8s 1.27+ required) - Per-run adapter resolution: one environment serves mixed harnesses; the per-run `adapterType` hint is read through a local optional type extension, so the plugin typechecks and builds against the current plugin SDK and simply falls back to the environment's configured default adapter until stage 2 lands - Exec-env wrapping: the Kubernetes exec API carries no environment, so commands are wrapped to receive the run's env - Fast-upload interception for workspace realization, scoped per lease - Per-tenant isolation: derived namespace per company, RBAC, ResourceQuota, restricted-PSS pod security (runAsNonRoot, drop ALL, seccomp RuntimeDefault, no SA token automount) - Network egress policy in two flavors: native `NetworkPolicy` and `CiliumNetworkPolicy` (FQDN allowlists) - Image allowlist with glob matching, registry override, and per-run image override validation - Per-run Kubernetes Secrets carrying agent credentials, ownerRef'd to the Job or Sandbox CR for cascade GC ## Verification - Standalone build, exactly as the README documents: ```bash cd packages/plugins/sandbox-providers/kubernetes pnpm install --ignore-workspace pnpm test # 147 unit tests, 17 files, all green pnpm typecheck # clean against the in-repo plugin SDK on master pnpm build # dist/ emitted, manifest + worker entrypoints present ``` - A kind-cluster end-to-end integration test is included (`RUN_K8S_INTEGRATION_TESTS=1 pnpm test test/integration/end-to-end-run.test.ts`) - Beyond CI: this provider has been verified in a production multi-tenant deployment against five harnesses (opencode, pi, codex, gemini, claude code) with real billed runs ## Risks - **Zero behavior change for any existing deployment.** The package is workspace-excluded; nothing in the server imports or loads it until stage 2's integration lands. No existing code paths are touched. - The default `sandbox-cr` backend depends on an alpha CRD (`agents.x-k8s.io/v1alpha1`); the README flags this and the `job` backend uses only stable APIs as a fallback. - Risk surface is confined to deployments that explicitly install and configure the plugin. - The default runtime images (`ghcr.io/paperclipai/agent-runtime-*`) are published by the stage 3 companion PR (#7934); until that lands, deployments must point `runtimeImage` at their own images. ## Model Used Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context), extended thinking, with tool use (Claude Code). ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [ ] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots (no UI changes) - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [ ] All Paperclip CI gates are green (pending this push) - [ ] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-06-10 21:07:00 -07:00