fix(server): wake chat lifecycle milestones from committed changes (#17606)

## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for
work.
> - Connected chats show safe notices when a run starts, waits,
finishes, or fails.
> - A recurring scan projected these notices even when no eligible work
existed.
> - Eligibility depends on committed run state, conversation lineage,
and current authority.
> - Existing database rows can reconstruct that work after restart.
> - This PR wakes a scoped worker from those writes and removes
lifecycle polling.
> - Native progress events keep their separate existing owner until the
next migration.

## Linked Issues or Issue Description

**What happened?**

The chat maintenance timer repeatedly scanned run lifecycle state. Empty
and settled instances still queried the database. A run-status event
alone cannot replace the scan: prompt receipts, continuation receipts,
identity changes, and restored authority can make a run eligible later.

**What did you expect?**

Committed changes wake projection. Startup reconstructs eligible work. A
completed pass stops until another relevant change arrives. Failed work
retains recovery without scanning settled history forever.

**Steps to reproduce**

Configure an automatic chat endpoint. Finish its work, or leave it
unused. Observe recurring lifecycle projection queries from the chat
maintenance callback.

Stacked on #17592. Related foundation: #15625. This PR owns lifecycle
milestones only.

## What Changed

- Preserve upstream coalesced Cloud membership writes together with
locked membership restoration and its committed chat notification.

- Signal milestone eligibility from the real Slack account-link
transaction.

- Register the lifecycle worker with the existing delivery coordinator.
Remove lifecycle projection from the periodic chat callback. Keep native
progress in a separately named lane and preserve the explicit combined
API.
- Reconstruct company/issue scopes from the existing selector. Drain
bounded batches with company fairness. Retry failures, retain writes
through drain/resume, and disarm settled work.
- Signal from supported run, presentation, interaction, receipt,
lineage, conversation, recovery, and authority writers. Preserve their
transaction ownership, including nested savepoints and uncertain
settlement. No new table is added.
- Preserve provider authorization, authored-final suppression,
responsible-user continuity, deduplication, the 24-hour selection
window, and raw-output restrictions. Keep provider interpretation in its
owner.
- Preserve PostgreSQL timestamp precision in lifecycle pagination.
Rejected submillisecond candidates must not repeat the same page and
starve later notices.
- Document producer coverage and alternate-writer dispositions in
`doc/plans/2026-10-25-chat-run-milestone-sleep-audit.md`.

## Verification

Published head: `1d056f68c5b1005933b9e12de8745bf1c4cbeeca`, targeting
master after #17592 merged at
`7d75ae0569e41786640cf09647ae8849411d2f22`. A normal merge integrates
the actual landed parent. The entire 77-path milestone patch is
binary-identical to the locally verified preparation across that
ancestry reconciliation; both unrelated master paths are preserved. The
four earlier producer/test integration conflicts retain scoped milestone
and voice notices, current onboarding completion admission, and expanded
identity query/read-scope coverage.

- **330 distinct selected cases pass on the verified unchanged patch:**
305 across 14 complete suites (all five milestone worker suites, run
identity, board claim, Cloud provisioning, auth session routes, Cloud
actor authentication, stale-lock recovery, GitHub credentials, project
Git authorization, and app admission wiring), plus 25 selected real chat
producer cases. The remaining 1,590 chat integration cases were skipped,
not passed.
- The real producer cases cover saved milestone discovery, GitHub and
Slack identity changes, account-link rollback/reconfirmation, ordinary
ingress reactivation, post-close action/delivery receipt settlement, all
ten authority-restoration paths including Cloud synchronization, and
changed native review metadata.
- Worker coverage verifies outer commit, rollback, uncertain-write
recovery, restart, bounded batching/fairness, timestamp precision,
retries, drain/resume, and settled SQL quiet. Authorization and existing
publication deduplication remain with their owning services.
- Server production typechecking, build, and module-boundary checks
pass. The tests above were executed separately. Production typechecking
excludes `src/__tests__` and does not replace those runs. Each database
owner uses its own newly created and app-migrated PostgreSQL fixture.
- [Current-parent acceptance and preserved failure
ledger](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/blob/1d056f68c5b1005933b9e12de8745bf1c4cbeeca/doc/plans/2026-10-25-chat-run-milestone-sleep-audit.md#current-parent-integration-and-acceptance-october-28)
records commands, counts, producer scope, conflict dispositions, and
limits. Earlier combined-stack counts and failures keep their original
revision scope; local acceptance does not erase old CI failures.
- No new migration, queue table, dependency, workflow, or shared
scheduler contract is introduced. Parent migration 0397, bounded consent
recovery, voice cleanup/retention repairs, and runner checkpoint
restoration remain present.
- **Exact-head Greptile is 5/5 and all 55 current checks are clean.** No
Ponytail review is present, which is an explicitly authorized
nonblocker; no failing review is waived. Older reviews and parent checks
are not current passes. Actual failing Ponytail findings must be fixed;
an absent/stopped/paused turn without a verdict is an authorized
nonblocker. Active unfinished Ponytail uses its original request/start
timer, with a 25-minute monitor cutoff respecting the user's 30-minute
maximum.
- No complete local repository matrix, live provider tenant, external
alarm, physical host/database suspension, or fleet savings claim is
made. Native progress remains a separate following slice.

## Risks

- A future eligibility writer must notify the existing projection
boundary. Independent SQL writers or another active server process are
outside this process-local signal contract.
- Authority and lineage remain sensitive. The worker uses the existing
selectors and publication policy; it does not grant execution or
disclosure authority.
- Native progress and other publication maintenance still have recurring
work. This PR removes one reason, not the entire chat maintenance timer.
- Worker quiet does not prove database suspension, host sleep, or
external alarm coverage. Cloud sleep blockers remain unchanged.
- Merge eligibility requires passing current-head CI and Greptile 5/5
after this actual-master reconciliation. Subsequent stack slices retain
their own gates.

## Model Used

OpenAI Codex, GPT-6 family. The exact serving model ID and
context-window size are not exposed. Used repository inspection,
reasoning, shell execution, PostgreSQL tests, browser E2Es and GitHub
tools.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details available in this session)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked
them above
- [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes
#` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant
issue template
- [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or
links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip`
URLs)
- [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`)
and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details
- [x] I have run the documented focused tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green
- [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
This commit is contained in:
DottaandPaperclip authored and GitHub committed 2026-10-28 11:07:54 -05:00
1 parent 143d20e466
commit 5f0da562db
77 files changed
+5002 -501

No files matched your search

+29 -13
View File
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ import { captureRunIdentity } from "../services/run-identity.js";
import { boardAuthService } from "../services/board-auth.js";
import { retryIdempotentDatabaseOperation } from "../database-retry.js";
import { beginIdleTrackedWork } from "../services/task-admission.js";
import { notifyChatRunMilestones } from "../services/chat-run-milestone-notifications.js";
export {
isTransientDbConnectionError,
@@ -652,19 +653,34 @@ async function resolveCloudTenantActorOnce(
// exact legacy-marker guards and the operator's own edits.
await repairCloudTenantCompanyProvisionDefaults(db, { companyId, stackId, now });
effectiveMembership = await db
.insert(companyMemberships)
.values({ companyId, principalType: "user", principalId: userId, status: "active", membershipRole, updatedAt: now })
.onConflictDoUpdate({
target: [companyMemberships.companyId, companyMemberships.principalType, companyMemberships.principalId],
set: { status: "active", membershipRole, updatedAt: now },
setWhere: sql`${companyMemberships.status} is distinct from 'active'
or ${companyMemberships.membershipRole} is distinct from ${membershipRole}`,
})
.returning({ companyId: companyMemberships.companyId, membershipRole: companyMemberships.membershipRole, status: companyMemberships.status })
// PostgreSQL returns no row for an unchanged ON CONFLICT ... WHERE.
// That condition itself proves the existing role/status match the input.
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? { companyId, membershipRole, status: "active" });
effectiveMembership = await db.transaction(async tx => {
const [existing] = await tx.select({
status: companyMemberships.status,
membershipRole: companyMemberships.membershipRole,
}).from(companyMemberships).where(and(
eq(companyMemberships.companyId, companyId),
eq(companyMemberships.principalType, "user"),
eq(companyMemberships.principalId, userId),
)).for("update");
// Serialize authority restoration and its notice while retaining the
// guarded upsert that leaves unchanged memberships untouched.
if (!existing || existing.status !== "active" || existing.membershipRole === "viewer") {
await notifyChatRunMilestones(tx, { companyId });
}
return tx
.insert(companyMemberships)
.values({ companyId, principalType: "user", principalId: userId, status: "active", membershipRole, updatedAt: now })
.onConflictDoUpdate({
target: [companyMemberships.companyId, companyMemberships.principalType, companyMemberships.principalId],
set: { status: "active", membershipRole, updatedAt: now },
setWhere: sql`${companyMemberships.status} is distinct from 'active'
or ${companyMemberships.membershipRole} is distinct from ${membershipRole}`,
})
.returning({ companyId: companyMemberships.companyId, membershipRole: companyMemberships.membershipRole, status: companyMemberships.status })
// PostgreSQL returns no row for an unchanged ON CONFLICT ... WHERE.
// That condition itself proves the existing role/status match the input.
.then((rows) => rows[0] ?? { companyId, membershipRole, status: "active" });
});
// An unchanged membership can still lack default grants after a partial
// sync or an older deployment; keep this repair inside every actual sync.
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ function createFakeDb(options: {
: options.settingsRow;
const insertedTables: unknown[] = [];
const deletedTables: unknown[] = [];
const selectWheres: Array<{ table: unknown; condition: unknown }> = [];
const selectWheres: Array<{ table: unknown; condition: unknown; locked?: boolean }> = [];
function writeChain(table: unknown) {
let values: unknown;
const chain: Record<string, unknown> = {};
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ function createFakeDb(options: {
return chain;
}
const db = {
transaction: async (work: (tx: Db) => Promise<unknown>) => work(db),
insert: (table: unknown) => {
insertedTables.push(table);
return writeChain(table);
@@ -75,21 +76,32 @@ function createFakeDb(options: {
return {
from: (table: unknown) => ({
where: (condition: unknown) => {
// Role-default grant seeding reads existing grants first; keep that
// read working so selectThrows exercises only the degradable reads.
if (options.selectThrows && table !== principalPermissionGrants) {
// Only settings lookup is degradable. Membership locking and
// permission seeding must still work in the fail-closed flag test.
if (options.selectThrows && table === instanceSettings) {
throw new Error("select unavailable");
}
selectWheres.push({ table, condition });
const selected: (typeof selectWheres)[number] = { table, condition };
selectWheres.push(selected);
const rows =
table === instanceSettings && settingsRow
? [settingsRow]
: table === companyMemberships
? (options.membershipQueryRows ?? [])
: [];
return {
then: (resolve: (v: unknown) => unknown) => Promise.resolve(rows).then(resolve),
let locked = false;
const result = {
for: () => { locked = true; selected.locked = true; return result; },
then: (resolve: (v: unknown) => unknown, reject?: (error: unknown) => unknown) => {
// The optional cross-company read can fail independently of
// the primary membership transaction, which must succeed.
const query = options.selectThrows && table === companyMemberships && !locked
? Promise.reject(new Error("select unavailable"))
: Promise.resolve(rows);
return query.then(resolve, reject);
},
};
return result;
},
}),
};
@@ -258,7 +270,8 @@ describe("resolveCloudTenantActor (shared-pool hardening)", () => {
expect(insertedTables.filter(table => table === companyMemberships)).toHaveLength(1);
expect(deletedTables.filter(table => table === instanceUserRoles)).toHaveLength(20);
expect(selectWheres.filter(entry => entry.table === instanceSettings)).toHaveLength(20);
expect(selectWheres.filter(entry => entry.table === companyMemberships)).toHaveLength(20);
expect(selectWheres.filter(entry => entry.table === companyMemberships && !entry.locked)).toHaveLength(20);
expect(selectWheres.filter(entry => entry.table === companyMemberships && entry.locked)).toHaveLength(1);
expect(actors.every(actor => actor?.memberships?.[0]?.membershipRole === "owner")).toBe(true);
});
@@ -461,11 +474,13 @@ describe("resolveCloudTenantActor (shared-pool hardening)", () => {
const { db, selectWheres } = createFakeDb();
await resolveCloudTenantActor(db, fakeReq(VALID_HEADERS));
const membershipSelects = selectWheres.filter((entry) => entry.table === companyMemberships);
expect(membershipSelects).toHaveLength(1);
expect(membershipSelects).toHaveLength(2);
// The first read locks the primary membership before its upsert; the
// second loads the user's active memberships for request authorization.
// Rows for other users and rows in any non-active status are excluded
// by the query itself: the filter binds exactly this user id and the
// "active" status — the same condition the session path applies.
expect(membershipSelects[0]!.condition).toEqual(
expect(membershipSelects[1]!.condition).toEqual(
and(
eq(companyMemberships.principalType, "user"),
eq(companyMemberships.principalId, "user-123"),