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fix: preserve public identifiers in feedback redaction (#16168)
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip is the open source app people use to manage AI agents for work. > - People rate agent comments and documents to capture feedback. > - Feedback bundles remove credentials and personal information before export. > - The feedback scanner treats ordinary dotted text as JWTs and authentication terms as bearer tokens. > - This pull request checks encoded JWT headers and preserves known authentication terms. > - The benefit is readable feedback context with credential masking kept in place. ## Linked Issues or Issue Description Refs #12309 for the related dotted-identifier false-positive report. This PR fixes the separate feedback scanner. It does not close every case in that report. Related PR: #14318 adds fine-grained GitHub token coverage. It addresses a separate credential form and is not duplicated here. **What happened?** Feedback exports replace `api.openai.com`, dotted filenames, and public schema IDs with a JWT placeholder. They also replace the words after `bearer` in phrases such as “bearer tokens.” Five-part encrypted JWTs are only partly masked. **Expected behavior** Keep public identifiers and authentication terms readable. Mask complete credential tokens. Count only text replacements in the redaction summary. **Steps to reproduce** 1. Pass `api.openai.com` or `Use bearer tokens.` to `sanitizeFeedbackText`. 2. Check that the original text is returned and the redaction counts stay empty. 3. Pass a signed JWT or an encrypted JWT to the same function. 4. Check that the full token is replaced and one JWT replacement is counted. **Paperclip version or commit** Reproduced in the feedback scanner on master at `5e8e992df2b3d71f82091b7bbf29fd482854d9f5`. **Deployment mode** Built from source. The defect is in the shared feedback export service and does not depend on deployment mode. ## What Changed - Use the existing JWT header predicate in the feedback scanner. - Match complete three-part and five-part tokens, including direct-encryption tokens with an empty key segment. Accept short token segments in the predicate. - Preserve the closed set of authentication terms already used by the general scanner, including terms inside closing prose delimiters. - Count only replacements that change the text. - Add tests for readable context, credential masking, nested values, and redaction counts. - Document feedback text redaction. ## Verification - Focused redaction and feedback service tests: 89 tests pass across five suites. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/adapter-utils typecheck` passes. Full local typecheck, tests, and build were attempted. The kernel killed compiler and test processes at the sandbox memory limit of 4 GB. Serial retries and a capped Node heap still could not complete the server compiler. CI runs the full repository checks. - `git diff --check` passes. - Latest commit `0eb8d3fb4257bb79e67fab615a8299ef69230ad8`: **55 checks passed**, including full typecheck, tests, build, and E2E; two optional Storybook checks were skipped. [CI evidence](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/actions/runs/38407932875). Both Greptile findings have regression tests and fixes. [Greptile gives this commit 5/5](https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/pull/16168#issuecomment-6146917423), with both review threads resolved. ## Risks - This changes the feedback export matching rules. Public dotted text no longer triggers credential masking by shape alone. - Explicit credential assignments, provider keys, structured secret fields, email addresses, and phone numbers remain masked. Tests cover these cases. - Existing feedback snapshots are not rewritten. No schema change or migration is needed. - The encoded-header check remains a heuristic. It is not a full JWT validator. ## Model Used OpenAI Codex, GPT-6, with reasoning, tool use, and code execution. The runtime identifies the model as GPT-6. It does not expose the exact provider deployment ID or context window size. The earlier patch and this PR preparation were AI-assisted. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [x] I have searched GitHub for duplicate or related PRs and linked them above - [x] I have either (a) linked existing issues with `Fixes: #` / `Closes #` / `Refs #` OR (b) described the issue in-PR following the relevant issue template - [x] I have not referenced internal/instance-local Paperclip issues or links (only public GitHub `#NNN` / `github.com/paperclipai/paperclip` URLs) - [x] My branch name describes the change (e.g. `docs/...`, `fix/...`) and contains no internal Paperclip ticket id or instance-derived details - [x] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] All Paperclip CI gates are green - [x] Greptile is 5/5 with no open P2s, recommendations, or follow-ups - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
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@@ -11,10 +11,41 @@ describe("explicit diagnostic credential forms", () => {
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});
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import {
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REDACTED_COMMAND_TEXT_VALUE,
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looksLikeCredentialJwt,
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redactDiagnosticText,
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redactCommandText,
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} from "./command-redaction.js";
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describe("looksLikeCredentialJwt", () => {
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it("recognizes encoded headers even with short payloads and signatures", () => {
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const header = Buffer.from('{"alg":"HS256"}').toString("base64url");
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expect(looksLikeCredentialJwt(`${header}.e30.c2ln`)).toBe(true);
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});
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it("recognizes direct-encryption JWTs with an empty encrypted-key segment", () => {
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const header = Buffer.from('{"alg":"dir","enc":"A256GCM"}').toString("base64url");
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expect(looksLikeCredentialJwt(`${header}..abcdefghijk.abcdefghijkl.abcdefghijk`)).toBe(true);
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});
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it.each([
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"eyJ..signature",
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"eyJ.key..ciphertext.tag",
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"eyJ.key.iv..tag",
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"eyJ.key.iv.ciphertext.",
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])("rejects empty segments outside the JWE encrypted key: %s", (input) => {
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expect(looksLikeCredentialJwt(input)).toBe(false);
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});
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it.each([
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"api.openai.com",
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"agents.staging.example.com",
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"deployment.credentials.example.md",
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"paperclip.native-model-envelope.v3",
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])("rejects public dotted identifiers: %s", (input) => {
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expect(looksLikeCredentialJwt(input)).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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describe("redactDiagnosticText", () => {
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it("preserves credential metadata and dotted identifiers", () => {
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for (const text of [
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@@ -36,7 +36,12 @@ const COMMAND_JWT_RE =
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/** Recognize encoded JSON headers, without treating dotted identifiers as tokens. */
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export function looksLikeCredentialJwt(value: string): boolean {
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const segments = value.split(".");
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if (![3, 5].includes(segments.length) || segments.some((part) => !/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}$/.test(part))) return false;
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if (![3, 5].includes(segments.length)) return false;
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if (segments.some((part, index) => {
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// Compact JWE direct encryption has no encrypted-key value.
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if (segments.length === 5 && index === 1 && part === "") return false;
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return !/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/.test(part);
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})) return false;
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if (segments[0].startsWith("eyJ")) return true;
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try {
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const header = JSON.parse(atob(segments[0].replace(/-/g, "+").replace(/_/g, "/")));
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