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feat(oauth): restack OAuth backbone
Restack the OAuth backend from PR #5584 onto current master for PAP-9233, preserving the provider registry, OAuth routes, refresh worker, resolver integration, tests, and docs. Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
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# OAuth Backbone Design (Sub-project A of 3)
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**Date:** 2026-05-09
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**Status:** Design — pending implementation plan
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**Authors:** Jannes Stubbemann + Claude
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**Scope:** Sub-project A of a three-piece decomposition.
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**Out of scope:** Sub-project B (Inbound MCP integration) and Sub-project C (SDK aggregator plugin) — separate spec cycles.
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---
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## 0. Context & Goals
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### 0.1 Problem
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Today, Paperclip agents that need to act in third-party services (GitHub, Notion, Slack, Linear, …) rely on operators creating personal access tokens by hand and storing them as opaque `company_secrets`. There is no interactive authorization flow, no token refresh, no UI affordance for users to "Connect to GitHub", and no provider-agnostic data model. As we expand the set of supported integrations, this scales linearly in operator toil and is the wrong primitive for cloud SaaS users who expect a "Connect" button.
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### 0.2 Decomposition
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The full request — "let users authorize Paperclip to act on their behalf in third-party services" — naturally splits into three independent sub-projects, each with its own spec cycle:
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| | Sub-project | Summary |
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|---|---|---|
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| **A** | **OAuth backbone (this spec)** | OAuth 2.1 + PKCE flow, per-tenant connection storage, refresh worker, plugin-extensible provider registry. The credential layer that everything else consumes. |
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| B | Inbound MCP integration | Per-connection MCP server attached to agent runtimes — turns an "active connection" into "tools the agent can call". Requires (A). |
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| C | SDK aggregator plugin | Optional Composio/Nango-style fallback plugin that wraps a third-party aggregator's catalog. Requires (A). |
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Doing (A) first means (B) and (C) become small, focused additions rather than entangled rewrites.
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### 0.3 Goals for v1 of (A)
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1. **Cloud + self-hosted parity** — same code path, behavior differs only via env config. Operators of self-hosted instances configure their own OAuth apps; cloud ships defaults.
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2. **5–10 launch providers** — GitHub, Notion, Slack, Linear, Atlassian, Google Workspace, Microsoft Graph (and any subset operators choose to enable).
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3. **Per-company connections, single connection per provider.** Multi-account-per-company is a known v2 ask.
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4. **Plugin SDK extensibility** — third parties can ship their own provider definitions.
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5. **File/directory-based config** — adding a provider should not require a DB migration.
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6. **Compatibility with the existing secrets pipeline** — tokens are "secrets with a refresh policy". The runtime never gets a new token-fetching API.
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### 0.4 Non-goals
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- Inbound MCP integration (sub-project B).
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- SDK aggregator integration (sub-project C).
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- Multi-account-per-company connections.
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- Per-user (vs per-company) connections.
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- DPoP / mTLS / token introspection / device flow / client_credentials.
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- Real-provider integration tests in CI.
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---
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## 1. Architecture
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```
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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
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│ Browser / Agent UI │
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│ • Settings → Connections page │
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│ • Agent env editor binding picker (oauth_token type) │
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└──────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────────┘
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│
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▼
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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
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│ Paperclip server │
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│ │
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│ ┌─────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────────────────┐ │
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│ │ Provider Registry │ │ OAuth Flow Handler │ │
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│ │ (built at startup) │◀──│ /api/oauth/connect/:p │ │
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│ │ • file YAML │ │ /api/oauth/callback/:p │ │
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│ │ • plugin contribs │ │ /api/oauth/connections[/:id] │ │
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│ │ • shape modules │ │ /api/oauth/providers │ │
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│ └─────────┬───────────┘ └──────┬───────────────────────────┘ │
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│ │ │ │
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│ ▼ ▼ │
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│ ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐ │
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│ │ oauth_connections (per-company) │ │
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│ │ oauth_authorization_states (PKCE) │ │
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│ └──────┬───────────────────────────────┘ │
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│ │ secret_id refs │
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│ ▼ │
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│ ┌──────────────────────────────────────┐ │
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│ │ company_secrets / _versions │ │
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│ │ ↑ encrypted via SecretProvider │ │
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│ │ (local_encrypted / aws / gcp / │ │
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│ │ vault) │ │
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│ └──────────────────────────────────────┘ │
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│ │
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│ ┌──────────────────────┐ │
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│ │ Refresh Worker │ — every 60s, leader-elected │
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│ │ • proactive scan │ │
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│ │ • per-row backoff │ │
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│ └──────────────────────┘ │
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└──────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────────┘
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│ secret_ref / oauth_token bindings
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▼
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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
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│ Agent dispatch (existing) │
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│ resolveAdapterConfigForRuntime → ctx.config.env (plaintext) │
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│ → per-Job env Secret → adapter runtime in pod │
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└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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```
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### 1.1 Sub-pieces
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1. **Provider registry** — startup loader scanning files + plugin contributions.
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2. **OAuth flow handler** — start flow, validate callback, exchange code, persist tokens.
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3. **`oauth_connections` table** — per-company structured metadata.
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4. **Refresh worker** — proactive expiry-driven token refresh with backoff.
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5. **Lazy refresh** — fallback path inside the resolver for tokens that slipped past the worker.
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6. **Connect UI** — Settings → Connections page + binding picker integration in agent env editor.
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7. **Plugin SDK extension** — `oauthProviders` block in plugin manifest.
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### 1.2 Resolution path
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When an agent dispatch evaluates an `oauth_token` binding inside `resolveAdapterConfigForRuntime`:
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1. Look up the connection by `connectionId`. Fail fast if missing/`revoked`/`error`.
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2. If `access_token_expires_at < now() + 60s` and refresh exists → lazy-refresh inline (Section 5.3).
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3. Read latest `company_secrets` version for `access_token_secret_id`, decrypt via `SecretProvider`.
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4. Return plaintext for `ctx.config.env` — same path as `secret_ref`.
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---
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## 2. Data Model
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Three concerns: provider definition, per-tenant connection state, and in-flight authorization state. Token cipher reuses the existing `company_secrets` infrastructure so we don't reinvent encryption/rotation.
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### 2.1 Provider definitions — file/plugin only, no DB table
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Providers are declared in `oauth-providers/<id>.yaml` (cloud defaults shipped in repo) plus plugin manifests. Client `id`/`secret` resolve from env at startup (`<PROVIDER_ID>_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID`, `<PROVIDER_ID>_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET`); provider is registered iff both env vars are set.
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We deliberately do **not** add a `cluster_oauth_providers` table in v1. Cloud operators manage credentials via IaC; if/when SaaS UX needs in-app credential editing, a future migration adds the table without changing the resolution interface.
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### 2.2 New table: `oauth_connections`
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```sql
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CREATE TABLE oauth_connections (
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id uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
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company_id uuid NOT NULL REFERENCES companies(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
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provider_id text NOT NULL,
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status text NOT NULL CHECK (status IN ('active','expired','revoked','error')),
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account_id text, -- provider-stable id
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account_label text, -- display label (email, workspace name)
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scopes text[] NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}',
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access_token_secret_id uuid NOT NULL REFERENCES company_secrets(id),
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refresh_token_secret_id uuid REFERENCES company_secrets(id),
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access_token_expires_at timestamptz,
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last_refreshed_at timestamptz,
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last_error text,
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last_error_at timestamptz,
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refresh_attempt_count int NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
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created_at timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
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updated_at timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
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UNIQUE (company_id, provider_id)
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);
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CREATE INDEX oauth_connections_refresh_idx
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ON oauth_connections (access_token_expires_at)
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WHERE status = 'active' AND refresh_token_secret_id IS NOT NULL;
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```
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- Token ciphertext lives in `company_secret_versions`; refresh writes a *new version* of the same `company_secret` rather than rotating IDs.
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- `account_id` lets us detect re-authorization with a different account and fail loudly instead of silently swapping.
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- The partial index supports the refresh worker's "expiring soon" scan cheaply.
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- **Insertion order** in the callback handler: create `company_secrets` rows for access + (optional) refresh first; then insert the `oauth_connections` row referencing them. The whole sequence runs in a single transaction so a failed token write rolls back the connection row.
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### 2.3 New table: `oauth_authorization_states`
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```sql
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CREATE TABLE oauth_authorization_states (
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id uuid PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
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company_id uuid NOT NULL REFERENCES companies(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
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provider_id text NOT NULL,
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code_verifier text NOT NULL,
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redirect_uri text NOT NULL,
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scopes_requested text[] NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}',
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initiated_by_user_id uuid REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE SET NULL,
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return_url text,
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created_at timestamptz NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
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expires_at timestamptz NOT NULL, -- default created_at + 10 min
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consumed_at timestamptz -- single-use enforcement
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);
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CREATE INDEX oauth_authorization_states_expiry_idx
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ON oauth_authorization_states (expires_at) WHERE consumed_at IS NULL;
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```
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The row's `id` doubles as the OAuth `state` parameter — no separate token to keep in sync.
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### 2.4 Migration
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Single migration `0086_oauth_connections.sql` adding both tables. Lands cleanly on top of M3b's `0085`.
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### 2.5 Out of v1
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- Audit log table for OAuth events (logs + `last_error*` are sufficient).
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- `oauth_provider_overrides` per company (multi-account per provider).
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- Webhook/notification dispatch on token expiry.
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---
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## 3. API Surface
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All endpoints mount under `/api/oauth`. Auth uses the existing better-auth session middleware (company-scoped) except for the public callback, which validates via the `state` parameter.
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### 3.1 Provider discovery
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```
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GET /api/oauth/providers → 200 { providers: ProviderSummary[] }
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GET /api/oauth/providers/:providerId → 200 ProviderSummary | 404
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```
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`ProviderSummary` exposes only public fields: id, display name, icon URL, scopes-on-offer, doc URL. Never returns client_id/client_secret.
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### 3.2 Flow initiation
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```
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POST /api/oauth/connect/:providerId
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Body: { scopes?: string[], returnUrl?: string }
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→ 200 { authorizeUrl: string, state: string }
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```
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Server generates PKCE `code_verifier`, derives `code_challenge` (S256), inserts an `oauth_authorization_states` row with `state = id`, builds the provider's authorize URL. The UI navigates `window.location = authorizeUrl`. `returnUrl` validated against an allowlist (Section 9.3). `scopes` defaults to provider's declared default scopes.
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### 3.3 Callback (public, state-authenticated)
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```
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GET /api/oauth/callback/:providerId?code=...&state=...&error=...
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→ 302 to returnUrl on success (with ?oauth_connected=<provider>)
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→ 302 to returnUrl with ?oauth_error=... on failure
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```
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Handler steps (all-or-nothing per row):
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1. Look up `oauth_authorization_states` by `state`. 404/410 if missing or `consumed_at` set.
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2. Verify `expires_at > now()`.
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3. Verify `provider_id` from URL matches the row.
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4. If `error` query param present → mark `consumed_at`, redirect with `oauth_error`.
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5. Exchange `code` + `code_verifier` at provider's token endpoint.
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6. Fetch account identity (provider-specific call).
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7. **Upsert** `oauth_connections` keyed by `(company_id, provider_id)`:
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- if existing row's `account_id` differs → reject `account_mismatch`
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- else write new secret version for access (and refresh if rotated), update metadata
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8. Mark `consumed_at`.
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9. Redirect to `returnUrl`.
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### 3.4 Connection management (company-scoped)
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```
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GET /api/oauth/connections → 200 { connections: ConnectionSummary[] }
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GET /api/oauth/connections/:id → 200 ConnectionDetail
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POST /api/oauth/connections/:id/refresh → 200 ConnectionDetail (429 if backoff active)
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DELETE /api/oauth/connections/:id → 204 (revokes upstream + deletes row + secrets)
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# Internal — run-JWT-authed, called by the agent shim only
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POST /api/oauth/connections/:id/mark-revoked → 204
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```
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Response shapes never expose token material — only metadata, status, scopes, account label, expiry, last error.
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The `mark-revoked` endpoint is the runtime-401 substitute for provider webhooks (Section 5.5). Authorization: the run JWT must include the connection id in its `oauth.connectionIds` claim, populated at dispatch time from the `oauth_token` bindings the resolver consumed. A run can only revoke connections it was actually granted access to.
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### 3.5 Internal: secret-ref binding integration
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No new endpoint. The existing agent env editor binding picker gains a third type:
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```ts
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type EnvBinding =
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| { type: "literal"; value: string }
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| { type: "secret_ref"; secretId: string; version?: SecretVersionSelector }
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| { type: "oauth_token"; connectionId: string; field: "access" }; // NEW
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```
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The runtime never sees a new token-fetching API. OAuth tokens flow through the existing per-Job env Secret pipeline.
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### 3.6 Rate limits (reuse M3b limiter)
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| Endpoint | Limit | Key |
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|---|---|---|
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| `POST /connect/:providerId` | 20/min | session userId |
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| `GET /callback/:providerId` | 60/min | client IP |
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| `POST /:id/refresh` | 5/min | connection id |
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### 3.7 Out of v1
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- Bulk operations (refresh-all).
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- Per-user connections.
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- Provider-side webhook receivers (lazy 401-driven revocation substitutes).
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---
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## 4. Provider Config DSL
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Common case is a single declarative YAML file; provider quirks handled by an optional TypeScript "shape module" loaded by id.
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### 4.1 File layout
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```
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oauth-providers/
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github.yaml linear.yaml
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notion.yaml atlassian.yaml
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slack.yaml google-workspace.yaml
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microsoft-graph.yaml
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shapes/
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slack.ts microsoft.ts
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```
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Loaded once at server startup. Self-hosted operators get the same files baked into the Docker image. `PAPERCLIP_OAUTH_PROVIDERS_DIR` (extra dir) merges on top. Plugin contributions feed the same registry.
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### 4.2 YAML schema (example: GitHub)
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```yaml
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id: github
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displayName: GitHub
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iconUrl: https://github.githubassets.com/images/icons/oauth.svg
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docUrl: https://docs.paperclip.ai/integrations/github
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clientCredentials:
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clientIdEnv: GITHUB_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID
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clientSecretEnv: GITHUB_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET
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endpoints:
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authorize: https://github.com/login/oauth/authorize
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token: https://github.com/login/oauth/access_token
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revoke: https://api.github.com/applications/{client_id}/grant
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accountInfo: https://api.github.com/user
|
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scopes:
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default: [repo, read:user, user:email]
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offered: [repo, read:user, user:email, workflow, write:packages]
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pkce: required # required | optional | unsupported
|
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authMethod: post # post | basic
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responseFormat: json # json | form
|
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accountIdField: id # dot-path into accountInfo response
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accountLabelField: login
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refresh:
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supported: false # GitHub user-token refresh requires app-level toggle
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# When supported: true:
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# rotatesRefreshToken: true
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# expirySeconds: 28800
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shape: ~ # optional shape module name
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```
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### 4.3 TypeScript type
|
||||
|
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```ts
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export interface OAuthProviderConfig {
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id: string;
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displayName: string;
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iconUrl?: string;
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docUrl?: string;
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|
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clientCredentials: {
|
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clientIdEnv: string;
|
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clientSecretEnv: string;
|
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};
|
||||
|
||||
endpoints: {
|
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authorize: string;
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||||
token: string;
|
||||
revoke?: string; // {client_id} substitution supported
|
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accountInfo: string;
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};
|
||||
|
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scopes: {
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default: string[];
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offered: string[];
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};
|
||||
|
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pkce: "required" | "optional" | "unsupported";
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authMethod: "post" | "basic";
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responseFormat: "json" | "form";
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accountIdField: string;
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accountLabelField: string;
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||||
|
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refresh:
|
||||
| { supported: false }
|
||||
| { supported: true; rotatesRefreshToken: boolean; expirySeconds?: number };
|
||||
|
||||
shape?: string;
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Source of truth is a Zod schema; the TS type is derived from it.
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.4 Shape modules (escape hatch)
|
||||
|
||||
For providers whose response shape can't be expressed by dot-path fields:
|
||||
|
||||
```ts
|
||||
export const slack: ProviderShape = {
|
||||
parseTokenResponse(raw) {
|
||||
if (raw.authed_user?.access_token) {
|
||||
return {
|
||||
accessToken: raw.authed_user.access_token,
|
||||
refreshToken: raw.authed_user.refresh_token,
|
||||
expiresInSeconds: raw.authed_user.expires_in,
|
||||
scope: raw.authed_user.scope?.split(",") ?? [],
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
return {
|
||||
accessToken: raw.access_token,
|
||||
refreshToken: raw.refresh_token,
|
||||
expiresInSeconds: raw.expires_in,
|
||||
scope: raw.scope?.split(",") ?? [],
|
||||
};
|
||||
},
|
||||
parseAccountInfo(raw) {
|
||||
return { accountId: raw.team?.id, accountLabel: raw.team?.name };
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`ProviderShape` is fully optional; default impl handles RFC-6749-shaped responses with the YAML's dot-paths.
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.5 Validation at startup
|
||||
|
||||
1. Read every `*.yaml`.
|
||||
2. Validate against the Zod schema.
|
||||
3. Resolve `clientCredentials` env vars — provider registered iff both are set, otherwise skipped with WARN.
|
||||
4. Load referenced shape modules; missing module is fatal.
|
||||
5. Build immutable in-memory `Map<providerId, RegisteredProvider>`.
|
||||
|
||||
No hot reload in v1.
|
||||
|
||||
### 4.6 Out of v1
|
||||
|
||||
- Per-tenant provider overrides (different client_id per company).
|
||||
- JSON Schema export for editor tooling.
|
||||
- Custom OAuth grants (device flow, client_credentials, JWT-bearer).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Refresh Strategy
|
||||
|
||||
Two cooperating paths: a proactive worker, and a lazy refresh inside the resolver.
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.1 Proactive worker
|
||||
|
||||
**Schedule:** every 60s, single-instance via the existing `pg_try_advisory_lock` leader-election pattern.
|
||||
|
||||
**Selection** runs in two passes — a cheap unfiltered scan to get candidates, then per-row backoff filtering in TS. The two-pass approach avoids defining a SQL stored proc for `backoffWindow` (whose definition lives in TS, Section 5.2):
|
||||
|
||||
```sql
|
||||
SELECT id, refresh_attempt_count, last_error_at
|
||||
FROM oauth_connections
|
||||
WHERE status = 'active'
|
||||
AND refresh_token_secret_id IS NOT NULL
|
||||
AND access_token_expires_at IS NOT NULL
|
||||
AND access_token_expires_at < now() + interval '5 minutes'
|
||||
ORDER BY access_token_expires_at ASC
|
||||
LIMIT 100
|
||||
FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED;
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Worker then drops rows where `last_error_at != null AND last_error_at + backoffWindow(refresh_attempt_count) > now()`. The cap of 100 candidates means the per-row filter cost is negligible.
|
||||
|
||||
Per-row sequential refresh:
|
||||
1. Decrypt latest refresh token.
|
||||
2. POST to provider's token endpoint per Section 4.
|
||||
3. On 2xx: write new `company_secret_versions` for access (and refresh if rotated), update row, clear `last_error*`, reset `refresh_attempt_count`.
|
||||
4. On 4xx with `invalid_grant`/`invalid_token`: status → `revoked`. No retry.
|
||||
5. On 5xx/network: increment `refresh_attempt_count`, write `last_error*`. Status stays `active` until `access_token_expires_at` passes; then flips to `expired`.
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.2 Backoff
|
||||
|
||||
```ts
|
||||
function backoffWindow(attempts: number): Interval {
|
||||
const seconds = Math.min(2 ** attempts * 30, 3600); // 30s … 1h cap
|
||||
return Interval.fromSeconds(seconds);
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Five consecutive failures → row stops being scheduled. Manual `POST /:id/refresh` or successful lazy refresh re-arms it.
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.3 Lazy refresh inside the resolver
|
||||
|
||||
Triggered when `access_token_expires_at < now() + 60s`:
|
||||
|
||||
1. `SELECT … FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED` the row. If we lose the lock, poll `last_refreshed_at` for up to 2s.
|
||||
2. Otherwise run the same refresh body as the worker.
|
||||
3. On success, return freshly written plaintext.
|
||||
4. On failure with a still-valid token, return the old token; otherwise dispatch fails with `oauth_refresh_failed`.
|
||||
|
||||
The 60s window must exceed worst-case clock skew between replica and provider.
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.4 Concurrency invariants
|
||||
|
||||
- **Single in-flight refresh per row** — `FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED`.
|
||||
- **Refresh-token rotation safety** — new refresh token is persisted in the same transaction as the new access token. Transaction rollback after rotation = `refresh_token_lost_after_rotation`, surfaces as `revoked` next tick.
|
||||
- **Scope drift** — provider may return a different scope set than requested. Accept and store actual scopes; log WARN. Some providers (Google, Microsoft) silently drop user-declined scopes; failing closed would block valid logins.
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.5 Revocation handling
|
||||
|
||||
| Source | Trigger |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| Refresh | Provider returns `invalid_grant`/`invalid_token` |
|
||||
| Runtime 401 | Agent-shim observes 401 from a known integration → calls `POST /api/oauth/connections/:id/mark-revoked` (run-JWT-authed, scoped to the connection ids the dispatch resolved) |
|
||||
| Manual | `DELETE /api/oauth/connections/:id` |
|
||||
|
||||
The runtime-401 path is the cheap substitute for provider webhooks (deferred from v1).
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.6 Cleanup & metrics
|
||||
|
||||
- **State sweeper** in the same worker: deletes `oauth_authorization_states` where `expires_at < now() - 1d`.
|
||||
- **Metrics** (Prometheus, existing pattern): `oauth_refresh_total{provider,result}`, `oauth_refresh_duration_seconds{provider}`, `oauth_connections_by_status{provider,status}`.
|
||||
|
||||
### 5.7 Out of v1
|
||||
|
||||
- Background pre-warming of newly created connections.
|
||||
- Per-provider concurrency caps.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Plugin SDK Extension
|
||||
|
||||
Plugins are first-class providers via the `OAuthProviderConfig` shape.
|
||||
|
||||
### 6.1 Manifest extension
|
||||
|
||||
```ts
|
||||
export interface PluginManifest {
|
||||
// existing fields…
|
||||
kind: "sandbox_provider" | "oauth_provider" | "composite";
|
||||
oauthProviders?: OAuthProviderContribution[];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export interface OAuthProviderContribution {
|
||||
config: OAuthProviderConfig;
|
||||
shape?: ProviderShape;
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
`kind: "oauth_provider"` for pure-OAuth plugins; `kind: "composite"` for plugins that ship a sandbox provider *and* an OAuth provider.
|
||||
|
||||
### 6.2 SDK helper
|
||||
|
||||
```ts
|
||||
export function defineOAuthProvider(
|
||||
contribution: OAuthProviderContribution,
|
||||
): OAuthProviderContribution {
|
||||
return contribution; // identity helper for type inference
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Plugin entry point pattern:
|
||||
|
||||
```ts
|
||||
import { definePlugin, defineOAuthProvider } from "@paperclipai/plugin-sdk";
|
||||
import { hubspotShape } from "./shape.js";
|
||||
|
||||
export default definePlugin({
|
||||
kind: "oauth_provider",
|
||||
name: "@example/paperclip-plugin-hubspot",
|
||||
oauthProviders: [
|
||||
defineOAuthProvider({
|
||||
config: { /* OAuthProviderConfig */ },
|
||||
shape: hubspotShape,
|
||||
}),
|
||||
],
|
||||
});
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 6.3 Loading & precedence
|
||||
|
||||
Registry build at startup:
|
||||
1. YAML files from `oauth-providers/` (in-repo defaults).
|
||||
2. YAML files from `PAPERCLIP_OAUTH_PROVIDERS_DIR`.
|
||||
3. Plugin contributions.
|
||||
4. Merge into the map. **Conflict policy:** lower-numbered source wins. WARN on conflicts.
|
||||
|
||||
### 6.4 Manifest validation
|
||||
|
||||
Existing manifest validator gets a discriminated union on `kind`. `oauth_provider`/`composite` require `oauthProviders` non-empty. `sandbox_provider` plugins remain valid unchanged.
|
||||
|
||||
### 6.5 Plugin lifecycle
|
||||
|
||||
- **Install** — registry rebuilt at next server start (existing plugin install requires worker restart).
|
||||
- **Disable** — provider removed; existing connections move to `error/provider_disabled`. Tokens stay encrypted in `company_secrets`. Re-enabling restores connections.
|
||||
- **Uninstall** — same as disable, plus a deferred cleanup job that hard-deletes `oauth_connections` rows older than 30 days whose provider is still missing.
|
||||
|
||||
### 6.6 Plugin trust boundary
|
||||
|
||||
- Plugin-contributed providers can declare arbitrary URLs as `endpoints.token`. Plugin install requires admin role; we rely on the existing plugin-trust model. No new validation in v1.
|
||||
- Shape modules execute in the server process, same as sandbox-provider modules.
|
||||
- Documented as a known plugin-installation risk.
|
||||
|
||||
### 6.7 Out of v1
|
||||
|
||||
- Hot reload of plugin-contributed providers.
|
||||
- Plugin-private OAuth credentials (plugin maintainer ships their own client_id/secret).
|
||||
- Dedicated `paperclip plugin oauth list` CLI subcommand.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. UI
|
||||
|
||||
Two surfaces touched, plus minor wiring.
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.1 Settings → Connections page
|
||||
|
||||
Route: `/settings/connections` (next to `/settings/secrets`).
|
||||
|
||||
Tile-based layout, driven by `GET /api/oauth/providers` × `GET /api/oauth/connections`. Tiles ordered: connected first (most-recently-refreshed), then unconnected alphabetical.
|
||||
|
||||
| State | Visual | Action |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Available, not connected | Outline + provider name | `Connect →` |
|
||||
| Connected, healthy | Filled + account label + "refreshed Xm ago" | `Manage` (drawer) |
|
||||
| Connected, refresh stalled | Amber border + "Last refresh failed" | `Manage` shows error + retry |
|
||||
| Connected, revoked | Red border + "Revoked — reconnect to use" | `Reconnect` |
|
||||
|
||||
**"Manage" detail drawer** (right-side slide-over, reused from Settings → Secrets):
|
||||
- Account label, account id, scopes granted
|
||||
- Last refresh timestamp + status
|
||||
- "Refresh now" button
|
||||
- "Disconnect" button (with confirmation warning about agents currently using the connection)
|
||||
|
||||
**Connect flow UX:** full-page redirect, not popup.
|
||||
1. Click `Connect →`.
|
||||
2. Frontend `POST /api/oauth/connect/:providerId` with `returnUrl: "/settings/connections"`.
|
||||
3. Server returns `authorizeUrl`; UI sets `window.location = authorizeUrl`.
|
||||
4. User authorizes upstream.
|
||||
5. Provider redirects to `/api/oauth/callback/:providerId?code=…&state=…`.
|
||||
6. Server processes, redirects to `returnUrl` with `?oauth_connected=<provider>` or `?oauth_error=…`.
|
||||
7. UI reads the query param, shows toast, strips the param.
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.2 Empty / unconfigured states
|
||||
|
||||
- **No providers registered**: explanatory empty state, link to docs. Same page; never 404.
|
||||
- **Some registered, none connected**: tiles render normally; tiles are themselves the CTA.
|
||||
- **A provider went missing post-startup**: tiles disappear; existing connections move to `error/provider_unavailable` and surface "Provider no longer configured — contact your administrator".
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.3 Permission model
|
||||
|
||||
| Role | View tiles + status | Connect/Disconnect | Pick `oauth_token` bindings |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Member | ✓ | ✗ | ✓ |
|
||||
| Admin | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
|
||||
|
||||
For members, `Connect →` renders disabled with tooltip "Ask an admin to connect GitHub".
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.4 Agent env editor — binding picker
|
||||
|
||||
Existing `<BindingInput>` gets a third option: "Connection token".
|
||||
- Dropdown of `status = 'active'` connections, labeled `<provider> · <account_label>`.
|
||||
- Disabled-with-tooltip for non-active connections (with reason inline).
|
||||
- Secondary `Field: [Access token ▼]` dropdown — single option in v1, structurally ready for `Refresh token`/`Account id` in v2 without UI rewrite.
|
||||
|
||||
Saved binding: `{ "type": "oauth_token", "connectionId": "uuid", "field": "access" }`.
|
||||
|
||||
If dispatch later finds the connection missing/revoked, it fails fast and surfaces a banner on the agent's run page: "Binding `GITHUB_TOKEN` requires a connected GitHub account — reconnect at Settings → Connections."
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.5 Visual & interaction reuse
|
||||
|
||||
- Tiles, drawer, dropdowns reused from Settings → Secrets / Settings → Adapters.
|
||||
- No new design tokens.
|
||||
- Loading: skeleton tiles.
|
||||
- i18n strings added to existing `ui/src/locales/en.json`.
|
||||
|
||||
### 7.6 Out of v1
|
||||
|
||||
- Per-agent override of which connection backs a binding.
|
||||
- In-app OAuth app credential editing for cloud operators.
|
||||
- Audit timeline UI.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. Error Handling
|
||||
|
||||
### 8.1 Flow initiation
|
||||
|
||||
| Failure | Code | Surface | Recovery |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Provider not registered | `provider_not_found` | "GitHub isn't configured" | Operator sets env vars + restarts |
|
||||
| Invalid scope | `invalid_scope` | UI inline form error | User narrows scopes |
|
||||
| Existing connection, **same** account | (none) | Idempotent re-auth | — |
|
||||
| Existing connection, **different** account | `account_mismatch_pre_flow` | Modal: "GitHub already connected as user@a.com — disconnect first?" | Disconnect, retry |
|
||||
|
||||
### 8.2 Callback
|
||||
|
||||
Always 302 back to a validated `returnUrl` (or hardcoded safe default `/settings/connections`).
|
||||
|
||||
| Failure | Query param |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `state` missing/expired | `?oauth_error=invalid_state` |
|
||||
| `state` already consumed | `?oauth_error=replay` |
|
||||
| `state` provider mismatch | `?oauth_error=provider_mismatch` |
|
||||
| Provider returned `error=access_denied` | `?oauth_error=user_cancelled` (silent toast) |
|
||||
| Token exchange non-2xx | `?oauth_error=token_exchange_failed&detail=...` |
|
||||
| Account info call failed | `?oauth_error=account_info_failed` (tokens not persisted) |
|
||||
| `account_id` differs from existing row | `?oauth_error=account_mismatch` |
|
||||
|
||||
### 8.3 Refresh
|
||||
|
||||
(Specified in Section 5; user surfacing summary.)
|
||||
|
||||
- **Transient (5xx, network):** invisible while still pre-expiry. After expiry, status flips to `expired`; tile shows amber.
|
||||
- **Permanent (`invalid_grant`):** status flips to `revoked` immediately; tile shows red + `Reconnect`.
|
||||
- **Stuck (5 consecutive failures):** worker stops scheduling; tile shows "Stuck — auto-refresh paused".
|
||||
|
||||
### 8.4 Dispatch-time resolution
|
||||
|
||||
| Failure | Behavior |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| Connection deleted | `oauth_connection_missing` — banner: "Binding references a deleted connection" |
|
||||
| Connection `revoked` | `oauth_connection_revoked` — banner: "Reconnect at Settings → Connections" |
|
||||
| Connection `expired` and lazy refresh fails | `oauth_refresh_failed` — banner with `last_error` + retry button |
|
||||
| Connection `error/provider_unavailable` | `oauth_provider_unavailable` — banner: "Provider is no longer configured" |
|
||||
| `active` and refresh succeeds | Token returned to runtime; dispatch proceeds |
|
||||
|
||||
**Critical invariant:** dispatch never silently substitutes a stale or different token. Fail fast.
|
||||
|
||||
### 8.5 Provider downtime
|
||||
|
||||
- 30s timeout per provider HTTP call.
|
||||
- 0 retries on 4xx.
|
||||
- 2 retries with 200ms / 600ms backoff on 5xx + network errors.
|
||||
- Refresh worker has its own per-row backoff (Section 5.2).
|
||||
|
||||
### 8.6 Startup errors
|
||||
|
||||
| Failure | Behavior |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| YAML schema invalid | Fatal — server fails to start |
|
||||
| Shape module missing | Fatal |
|
||||
| Provider env vars unset | WARN; provider skipped |
|
||||
| Plugin/file id collision | WARN; plugin skipped (file wins) |
|
||||
| Two plugins same id | WARN; second skipped (deterministic by install order) |
|
||||
|
||||
### 8.7 Cleanup-on-failure invariants
|
||||
|
||||
- Token exchange success but DB write failure → revoke upstream (best-effort).
|
||||
- Disconnect: revoke upstream first (best-effort), then transactional delete of row + secret versions. Failed upstream revoke logs WARN, does not block local cleanup.
|
||||
- Plugin disable while connections active: connections move to `error/provider_unavailable`, secrets retained.
|
||||
|
||||
### 8.8 Logging conventions
|
||||
|
||||
Every OAuth code path emits a structured pino log line with: `oauth.provider`, `oauth.connectionId` (when available), `oauth.flowStage` (`initiate`/`callback`/`refresh`/`resolve`/`disconnect`), `oauth.outcome` (`success`/`failure`/`skipped`), `oauth.errorCode`. Token material is never logged — explicit redaction filter on the OAuth logger child (Section 9.7).
|
||||
|
||||
### 8.9 Out of v1
|
||||
|
||||
- Automatic re-auth links via email.
|
||||
- Per-error metric counters with provider-specific labels (cardinality discipline).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 9. Security
|
||||
|
||||
### 9.1 PKCE — required, S256 only
|
||||
|
||||
- `code_verifier` is 64 random bytes, base64url-encoded; `code_challenge_method = S256` always.
|
||||
- We never fall back to `plain` even if a provider's metadata advertises it; `pkce: optional` in YAML governs whether we send PKCE to providers that don't require it (we still always send it).
|
||||
- `pkce: unsupported` requires explicit operator override + WARN log. No v1 launch provider needs it.
|
||||
- `code_verifier` lives only in `oauth_authorization_states.code_verifier` and is swept after `consumed_at + 1d`.
|
||||
|
||||
### 9.2 State parameter — CSRF + single-use
|
||||
|
||||
- `state = oauth_authorization_states.id` (UUIDv4, 122 bits entropy). Same value as the row id — no drift between row and state.
|
||||
- Single-use enforced by `consumed_at`.
|
||||
- 10-minute TTL.
|
||||
- Provider id from URL must match the row's `provider_id`.
|
||||
- Initiating user recorded in `initiated_by_user_id` for audit; *not* enforced same-user-must-finish (mobile-then-desktop flows).
|
||||
|
||||
### 9.3 Redirect URI allowlists
|
||||
|
||||
**1. Provider redirect URI** (registered with each provider): single canonical value per deployment, `${PAPERCLIP_PUBLIC_URL}/api/oauth/callback/:providerId`. Not varied per-flow.
|
||||
|
||||
**2. `returnUrl`** (post-callback browser redirect): allowlist of relative paths under the deployment's own origin. Implementation: `new URL(returnUrl, PAPERCLIP_PUBLIC_URL)`, require `origin` matches and `pathname` starts with one of `["/settings/", "/agents/", "/runs/"]`. Anything else falls through to `/settings/connections`. `data:`/`javascript:` schemes caught by the URL parse.
|
||||
|
||||
### 9.4 Token storage at rest
|
||||
|
||||
- Stored as `company_secret_versions` rows, encrypted via the deployment's `SecretProvider`.
|
||||
- **Discrimination via FK, not via a `kind` column.** The `oauth_connections.access_token_secret_id` and `.refresh_token_secret_id` foreign keys are the source of truth for which `company_secrets` rows hold OAuth tokens. (The earlier plan to extend a `company_secrets.kind` column was dropped during implementation: that column does not exist in this codebase, and FK-based discrimination is sufficient. Audit queries like "all OAuth access tokens last rotated > 30 days ago" join through `oauth_connections`.)
|
||||
- Refresh writes a *new version* (atomic rollback on failure; preserves short history).
|
||||
|
||||
### 9.5 Token in transit
|
||||
|
||||
- All YAML-declared provider endpoints must be `https://`. Loader rejects non-https at startup.
|
||||
- Cert pinning out of scope for v1 (matches existing webhook posture).
|
||||
- Tokens never leave the server toward the frontend. Only consumer of plaintext is the agent runtime via `resolveAdapterConfigForRuntime`.
|
||||
|
||||
### 9.6 Client secret protection
|
||||
|
||||
- Resolved from env at startup; never written to disk; never persisted in DB.
|
||||
- Logged once at startup as `client_secret: [REDACTED]` alongside the configured client_id.
|
||||
- Future `cluster_oauth_providers` table will store via `SecretProvider`-encrypted columns.
|
||||
|
||||
### 9.7 Logging redaction
|
||||
|
||||
`oauthLogger` pino child with explicit redact paths covering every shape we route through it:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
['*.access_token','*.refresh_token','*.id_token',
|
||||
'*.code','*.code_verifier','*.client_secret',
|
||||
'data.access_token','data.refresh_token','data.id_token']
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Plus a custom serializer masking any string field whose key matches `/token|secret|credential/i`.
|
||||
|
||||
### 9.8 Tenant isolation
|
||||
|
||||
Every query against `oauth_connections` and `oauth_authorization_states` filters by `company_id` from the authenticated session. Resolver asserts `connection.companyId === ctx.companyId` before reading the secret — assertion failure logs ERROR and fails dispatch with 500.
|
||||
|
||||
### 9.9 Refresh-token rotation behavior
|
||||
|
||||
Per-provider, declared in YAML (`refresh.rotatesRefreshToken`):
|
||||
|
||||
- **`true`**: new refresh_token returned on every refresh; old invalidated. We persist new refresh in the same transaction as new access. Transaction rollback after rotation = unrefreshable; flagged `refresh_token_lost_after_rotation`.
|
||||
- **`false`**: refresh keeps the same refresh_token; only access rotates.
|
||||
|
||||
No auto-detect — operators set this field per provider docs. Misconfigured rotation surfaces as repeated `invalid_grant` after the first refresh.
|
||||
|
||||
### 9.10 Scope minimization
|
||||
|
||||
- `scopes.default` = minimum for basic agent integration; `scopes.offered` = maximum the UI lets users opt into.
|
||||
- `POST /connect/:providerId` accepts `scopes`; values must be a subset of `scopes.offered`. Excess scopes 400-rejected before redirect.
|
||||
|
||||
### 9.11 Provider response validation
|
||||
|
||||
The shape module (Section 4.4) and the default RFC-6749 parser are the only places we trust provider JSON. Both reject:
|
||||
- Missing/non-string `access_token`.
|
||||
- `expires_in` negative or > 1 year.
|
||||
- `scope` containing non-printable characters.
|
||||
- Non-string `account_id`/`account_label` after dot-path resolution.
|
||||
|
||||
Violations surface as `token_exchange_failed` with `detail: response_shape_violation`; raw response logged at server-side ERROR with token fields redacted.
|
||||
|
||||
### 9.12 Rate-limiting (defense-in-depth)
|
||||
|
||||
In addition to Section 3.6's per-route limits:
|
||||
- **State row creation**: 50 rows / 5 min / company.
|
||||
- **Failed callback attempts**: 30 / 5 min / IP.
|
||||
- **Refresh failures**: per-row backoff (Section 5.2).
|
||||
|
||||
### 9.13 Plugin trust boundary
|
||||
|
||||
(Repeated from Section 6.6 for completeness.) Plugin-contributed providers can declare arbitrary token endpoints. Plugins are admin-installed and trusted; no per-provider URL allowlists for plugins in v1. Documented as known plugin-installation risk.
|
||||
|
||||
### 9.14 Out of v1
|
||||
|
||||
- DPoP / mTLS / sender-constrained tokens.
|
||||
- Token introspection (RFC 7662).
|
||||
- Per-tenant cipher keys.
|
||||
- Webhook signature verification for provider revocation.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 10. Testing Strategy
|
||||
|
||||
| Layer | Scope | Speed | Where |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Unit | Validators, shape modules, dot-path, backoff math | <1s | `*.test.ts` next to source |
|
||||
| Mock-provider integration | Full OAuth flow against in-process fixture server | seconds | `test/integration/oauth/` |
|
||||
| Playwright E2E | Connect flow from tile click to toast | tens of seconds | `test/e2e/oauth.spec.ts` |
|
||||
|
||||
No real-provider tests in CI in v1.
|
||||
|
||||
### 10.1 Unit tests
|
||||
|
||||
| Module | Cases |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `provider-config.ts` (Zod loader) | Valid YAML round-trips; missing required field rejected; non-https endpoint rejected; unknown PKCE mode rejected; conflicting `refresh.supported`/`rotatesRefreshToken` rejected |
|
||||
| `dot-path.ts` | Top-level `id`; nested `team.id`; missing path → `null`; null-prototype object handling |
|
||||
| `state-token.ts` | Generated state is base64url; `code_challenge` from known `code_verifier` matches RFC 7636 vector |
|
||||
| `backoff.ts` | First call → 30s; 5th → 8m; 10th → 1h cap; never negative |
|
||||
| `redirect-uri-allowlist.ts` | Allowed paths; cross-origin rejected; `javascript:`/`data:` rejected; missing `returnUrl` falls back to default |
|
||||
| `refresh-token-rotation.ts` | `rotates: true` + new token → write new version; `rotates: true` + missing token → reject; `rotates: false` + new token → log WARN, store defensively |
|
||||
| Each shape module | Paired test reading recorded fixture, asserting parsed shape |
|
||||
|
||||
### 10.2 Mock-provider integration tests
|
||||
|
||||
In-process Express fixture bound to an ephemeral port, configured per-test. Paperclip server under test starts with `mock-oauth.yaml` pointing at the fixture URL. No network egress.
|
||||
|
||||
`test/integration/oauth/mock-provider.test.ts`:
|
||||
|
||||
| # | Scenario | Assertion |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| 1 | Happy path | `status = 'active'`; `account_id` set; access secret retrievable |
|
||||
| 2 | State replay | Second callback returns `?oauth_error=replay`; row not double-written |
|
||||
| 3 | State expired (advance fake clock 11 min) | `?oauth_error=invalid_state` |
|
||||
| 4 | Provider mismatch | `?oauth_error=provider_mismatch` |
|
||||
| 5 | Account mismatch (re-auth different `account_id`) | `?oauth_error=account_mismatch`; existing row untouched |
|
||||
| 6 | Token exchange returns 500 | `?oauth_error=token_exchange_failed`; row not written |
|
||||
| 7 | Refresh worker rotates near-expiry token | New version written; old superseded |
|
||||
| 8 | Refresh returns `invalid_grant` | `status = 'revoked'`; `last_error` set |
|
||||
| 9 | Lazy refresh during dispatch (token < 60s to expiry) | Resolver returns refreshed token; advisory-lock test confirms no double-refresh |
|
||||
| 10 | 5 consecutive refresh failures | `refresh_attempt_count = 5`; row no longer scheduled |
|
||||
| 11 | Disconnect with revoke success | Row + secrets deleted; provider revoke called |
|
||||
| 12 | Disconnect with revoke 500 | Row + secrets still deleted; WARN logged |
|
||||
| 13 | Plugin contributes a provider; YAML with same id present | Plugin contribution skipped; WARN logged |
|
||||
| 14 | Provider env vars unset at startup | Provider not registered; existing connections move to `error/provider_unavailable` |
|
||||
|
||||
Every numbered "Critical invariant"/"must" in Sections 3, 5, 8, 9 maps to one of these tests.
|
||||
|
||||
### 10.3 Playwright E2E
|
||||
|
||||
`test/e2e/oauth.spec.ts`:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Connect happy path** — admin logs in, navigates to `/settings/connections`, clicks `Connect →` on mock tile, full HTTP redirect dance, lands back, asserts `oauth_connected=mock` toast + connected tile.
|
||||
2. **User cancels at provider** — mock returns `error=access_denied`, asserts no toast + tile stays unconnected.
|
||||
3. **Binding picker** — member opens agent env editor, picks "Connection token" binding to `mock` connection, runs agent (mock adapter that echoes env), asserts agent receives the resolved access token.
|
||||
|
||||
Scenario 3 proves end-to-end plumbing.
|
||||
|
||||
### 10.4 Security-flavored tests
|
||||
|
||||
- **Open-redirect regression**: parametrized test of `redirect-uri-allowlist.ts` with OWASP cheat-sheet vectors (`//evil`, `\\evil`, `https:%2F%2Fevil.example`, schema-relative URLs, double-encoded slashes).
|
||||
- **Token redaction**: pino logger test asserts `oauthLogger.info({ access_token: 'abc', refresh_token: 'def' })` produces output containing neither `'abc'` nor `'def'`.
|
||||
- **Cross-tenant isolation**: integration test seeds two companies with mock connections, asserts company A cannot read/refresh/disconnect company B's connection (404, not 403).
|
||||
- **Scope escalation rejected**: `POST /connect/:provider` with `scopes` outside `offered` returns 400.
|
||||
- **State row flooding**: 51 rapid `POST /connect/mock` from one company → 51st returns 429.
|
||||
|
||||
### 10.5 Out of v1
|
||||
|
||||
- Real provider integration in CI.
|
||||
- Plugin install/uninstall lifecycle through OAuth path (existing plugin-host tests cover lifecycle).
|
||||
- Browser-level CSRF tests beyond state-mismatch coverage.
|
||||
|
||||
### 10.6 CI integration
|
||||
|
||||
- Unit + mock-provider integration tests run in the existing `server` test job (~+15s).
|
||||
- Playwright spec joins existing `ui-e2e` job (~+60s).
|
||||
- No new CI workflow.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 11. Migration Plan
|
||||
|
||||
Single migration `0086_oauth_connections.sql` adds two tables (Section 2.2, 2.3). No backfill: existing manually-managed PATs continue to live in `company_secrets` and remain bindable via `secret_ref` indefinitely.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 12. Rollout
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Server-only deploy** with provider env vars unset → no behavioral change; route mounts but `GET /api/oauth/providers` returns `[]`. Migration runs.
|
||||
2. **Operator sets first provider's env vars + restarts.** Tile appears in UI; admins can connect.
|
||||
3. **Per-provider rollout** as operator OAuth-app paperwork completes.
|
||||
|
||||
No coordinated cross-component release; the OAuth backbone is purely additive.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 13. Future Work (sub-projects B and C)
|
||||
|
||||
These are referenced for context only — separate spec cycles will own them.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Sub-project B (Inbound MCP integration):** turn an active `oauth_connections` row into an MCP server attached to the agent's runtime. Will likely add a per-provider MCP server config (alongside the current outbound-only `@paperclipai/mcp-server`) and a binding type `oauth_mcp` that resolves to `{mcp_server_url, oauth_token}` instead of just a token.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Sub-project C (SDK aggregator plugin):** ship a Composio/Nango-style plugin that wraps a third-party aggregator's catalog. Will live as a regular OAuth provider plugin (Section 6) plus an MCP server plugin.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Other v2 candidates:** multi-account-per-company, per-user connections, `cluster_oauth_providers` table for in-app credential editing, webhook-signed revocation, real-provider smoke harness, audit timeline, email re-auth notifications.
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user